tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-47772102550401953872024-03-19T08:47:14.387+00:00LOL GREECEManoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.comBlogger351125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-20613252577525531362020-01-13T02:25:00.005+00:002023-11-11T14:28:20.721+00:00Πόσες εκτρώσεις γίνονται τελικά στην Ελλάδα; Απάντηση στην προκήρυξη της τ.ο. Μπουμπούκο Χαράμ.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Μου είναι πολύ δυσάρεστο που γράφω αυτή την ανάρτηση. Αυτό τον καιρό προτιμώ η παρουσία μου στα μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης να είναι ελαφριά, και όσο για το ιστολόγιο όπως βλέπει ο καθένας το έχω σχεδόν εγκαταλείψει. Εντούτοις κάθε τόσο εμφανίζεται και μια τρανταχτή περίπτωση όπου φαίνεται ότι συνολικά η χώρα, με τα 11εκ παρά κάτι κατοίκους και τα δεκάδες χιλιάδες χρόνια <a href="http://funel.blogspot.com/2006/01/b.html">διαγαλαξιακής κοσμοκρατορίας</a> της, δεν μπορεί να βάλει κάτω πέντε αράδες στοιχεία για χάρη ενός υγιούς δημοσίου διαλόγου.<br />
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Ο λόγος για την πρόσφατη ανάρτηση του Αδώνιδος '<a href="https://www.protagon.gr/apopseis/editorial/i-syggnwmi-stous-evraious-44341334792">ας μιλήσουμε</a>' Γεωργιάδη, η οποία εκθειάζει πρωτοσέλιδο της Sportime (wot) με θέμα την Ημέρα του Αγέννητου Παιδιού, το οποίο με τη σειρά του φιλοξενεί πλήθος εξωτικών ισχυρισμών για το πλήθος και τις επιπτώσεις των αμβλώσεων. Δεν θα δώσω παραπάνω δημοσιότητα από ό,τι χρειάζεται ούτε στο ένα ούτε στο άλλο. Η πολυετής προσπάθεια του <a href="https://www.ellinikahoaxes.gr/2017/11/15/georgiadis-gileko/">γιλεκοκατακτητή </a>Γεωργιάδη να γίνει χαλίφης στη θέση του χαλίφη εξάλλου θα μας παράσχει πολλά τέτοια περιστατικά από δω και στο εξής.<br />
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Αξίζει εντούτοις να σταθούμε στο θέμα των αμβλώσεων γιατί ξεπερνά τον Άδωνι - εξάλλου <a href="https://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/870547/mitsotakis-to-dimografiko-uponomeuei-to-mellon-tis-patridas-auto-einai-to-shedio-tis-nd/">και το αφεντικό του</a> αναφέρεται σε 150.000 αμβλώσεις, έναν αριθμό που δεν στηρίζεται πουθενά. Είναι τρομακτικό πόσο φτωχή είναι η τεκμηρίωση σχετικά με το θέμα και πόσο κακό έχει κάνει αυτή η έλλειψη στοιχείων στο δημόσιο διάλογο. Το θέμα μας είναι δυσάρεστο και οι μελέτη των στοιχείων είναι κάπως στεγνή, αλλά θα προσπαθήσω να βγάλω την ύλη όσο το δυνατόν καλύτερα.<br />
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<b>Η ανάρτηση περιληπτικά:</b><br />
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Τα περισσότερα στοιχεία που θα δείτε στο διαδίκτυο για το θέμα είναι από παλιά ως απαράδεκτα παλιά, πολύ επισφαλή, και κακώς ανακυκλώνονται στον τύπο από πολλούς απρόσεκτους και μερικούς κακόβουλους σαν να ήταν ακριβή και πρόσφατα. Δεν φταίει μετά ο ιδιώτης για την στρεβλη εντύπωση που έχει αποκομίσει, ότι δηλαδή οι εκτρώσεις γίνονται αλόγιστα και επιπόλαια, αλλά η στρεβλή εντύπωση μπορεί να κάνει πραγματική ζημιά.<br />
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Δεν υπάρχουν επίσημα στοιχεία ούτε πρόσφατες καλές εκτιμήσεις από ιδιώτες. Αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι δεν ξέρουμε τίποτε. Ξέρουμε αρκετά για να μιλήσουμε με κάποια σιγουριά για την τάξη μεγέθους και τις τάσεις. Ξέρουμε ότι οι έρευνες που παραθέτουν τη μεθοδολογία τους, ή οι έρευνες που βασίζονται σε διοικητικά στοιχεία και δειγματοληψία, δίνουν πολύ μικρότερα νούμερα από αυτές που βασίζονται σε υποθέσεις και αναγωγές. Ξέρουμε επίσης ότι οι νεότερες μελέτες δίνουν μικρότερα νούμερα από τις παλαιότερες. Αν μου βάλετε το μαχαίρι στο λαιμό θα σας πω ότι δύσκολα γίνεται να έχουμε πάνω από 70 χιλιάδες αμβλώσεις το χρόνο στην Ελλάδα, και η κρίση μάλλον μείωσε προσωρινά κι άλλο τον αριθμό.<br />
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Η Ελλάδα είχε ένα σύντομο μεταπολεμικό baby boom αλλά στις δεκαετίες του 60 και 70 πέρασε στο άλλο άκρο, με τις αμβλώσεις να αποτελούν σημαντική μορφή αντισύλληψης (ελλείψει άλλων). Αυτά συνέβησαν παρά το γεγονός ότι η χώρα τότε ήταν πολύ πιο θρησκευόμενη, οι εκτεταμένες οικογένειες ήταν πιο δεμένες, η παραδοσιακή οικογένεια ήταν αδιαμφισβήτητος θεσμός, και οι αμβλώσεις ήταν παράνομες.<br />
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Αυτή η ομολογουμένως κακή εξέλιξη έφτασε στο τέλος της τη δεκαετία του '80, ίσως και λόγω της αποποινικοποίησης των αμβλώσεων. Λέω κακή εξέλιξη γιατί τα φάρμακα δεν είναι καραμέλες, και οι αμβλώσεις δεν είναι πλακίτσα - έχουν επιπτώσεις παντός είδους στη σωματική και ψυχική υγεία και στη μετέπειτα γονιμότητα. Όσο και αν θέλω να έχουν οι γυναίκες πρόσβαση σε αυτή την επιλογή, το ότι γινόντουσαν τόσες πολλές αμβλώσεις για χρόνια λόγω της έλλειψης παιδείας και της ελλιπούς πρόσβασης στην αντισύλληψη είναι τραγικό. Στη νεότερη Ελλάδα όμως, αυτή που μας αφορά, οι αμβλώσεις μειώνονται σταθερά και, στο βαθμό που μπορώ να κρίνω, γρηγορότερα από ό,τι οι γεννήσεις - όπως και μειώνεται το ποσοστό των αμβλώσεων που γίνονται στην Ελλάδα από αλλοδαπές γυναίκες, και οι οποίες στο παρελθόν ήταν μεγάλο μέρος του συνόλου των 'επίσημων' αμβλώσεων.<br />
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Όι Ελληνίδες σχεδόν βέβαια δεν έκαναν ποτέ 300.000 αμβλώσεις το χρόνο. Οι Ελληνίδες επίσης σχεδόν βέβαια δεν κάνουν 100.000 αμβλώσεις το χρόνο στις μέρες μας, και αυτές που κάνουν είναι σε όλο και μεγαλύτερο ποσοστό (ίσως κι οι μισές) πολύ νεαρές κοπέλες, γιατί οι μεγαλύτερες Ελληνίδες πλέον ξέρουν να προφυλάσσονται από ανεπιθύμητες εγκυμοσύνες. Και ο αριθμός των αμβλώσεων σχεδόν βέβαια δεν αυξήθηκε κατά 50% επί κρίσης, όπως λέγεται. Είναι αριθμητικά σχεδόν αδύνατον να αυξήθηκε πάνω από 30% και τα στοιχεία συνηγορούν στο ότι, αντιθέτως, μάλλον μειώθηκε κατά τουλάχιστο το ίδιο ποσοστό.<br />
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<b>"Μαμά, από πού έρχονται οι στατιστικές;"</b><br />
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Τρεις τρόποι υπάρχουν για να κάνει κανείς εκτιμήσεις, όχι μόνο για τον αριθμό των εκτρώσεων αλλά και για οποιαδήποτε άλλη ανθρώπινη συμπεριφορά που αξίζει να μετρηθεί αλλά δεν μπορεί να απογραφεί πλήρως.<br />
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<li>Μπορεί να κάνει <b>διοικητικές απογραφές</b> (πχ να ζητήσει από όλα τα νοσοκομεία και τις κλινικές να ελέγξουν τα κιτάπια τους και να πούν πόσες αμβλώσεις έχουν πραγματοποιήσει ή υποβοηθήσει). Όσοι σταστικάριοι διαβάζετε το άρθρο, συγχωρήστε μου την κατάχρηση του ορου 'απογραφή' - όπως θα δείτε παρακάτω συχνά δεν καλύπτεται όλος ο σχετικός πληθυσμός.<br /> </li>
<li>Μπορεί να κάνει <b>δειγματοληπτικές έρευνες</b> (πχ να ρωτήσει ένα αντιπροσωπευτικό δείγμα από 1.000 γυναίκες αν έχουν κάνει άμβλωση και αν ναι πόσες φορές και πότε) ή</li>
<li>Μπορεί αν δεν έχει τίποτε από τα παραπάνω στη διάθεσή του να κάνει <b>αναγωγές </b>με βάση τρίτα μεγέθη και υποθέσεις, πχ. μπορεί να ρωτήσει δειγματοληπτικά 1.000 γυναίκες πόσες ανεπιθύμητες εγκυμοσύνες είχαν και να κάνει υποθέσεις για το πόσες από αυτές κατέληξαν σε άμβλωση, ή να φτιάξει ένα στατιστικό μοντέλο για τους παράγοντες που επηρεάζουν τις γεννήσεις και συγκρίνοντας τις προβλέψεις του με τις πραγματικές γέννες να δει πόση είναι η ανεξήγητη υστέρηση των γεννήσεων σε κάποια χρονική περίοδο.</li>
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Από τις παραπάνω μεθόδους όλες έχουν χρησιμοποιηθεί και όλες έχουν τα τρωτά τους. Ας τις δούμε από κοντά.<br />
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<b>Διοικητικές απογραφές</b><br />
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Οι διοικητικές απογραφές δεν καλύπτουν αυτοσχέδιες αμβλώσεις που γίνονται με φαρμακευτικά ή άλλα μέσα και μπορεί να παραλείψουν ορισμένες ιδιωτικές κλινικές. Η πιο πρόσφατη διοικητική απογραφή που μπόρεσα να βρω δημοσιευμένη σε επιστημονικό περιοδικό αφορά στο έτος 2004, από την Ελληνική Μαιευτική και Γυναικολογική Εταιρία. Υπολόγισε περίπου 70.000 αμβλώσεις (πλήρες κείμενο <a href="https://t.co/83FHknvh61">εδώ</a>, Η/Τ <a href="https://twitter.com/destroxiii/status/1211496282143035392">@destroxiii</a>). Η μελέτη έχει ελαττώματα: λείπουν ορισμένα νοσοκομεία που δεν απήντησαν. Δεν παρατίθενται καθόλου λεπτομέρειες για το δείγμα ιδιωτικών κλινικών που χρησιμοποιήθηκε (που ίσως, ομολογώ να έχουν δημοσιευτεί αλλού). Είναι μια αρχή.<br />
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Διοικητικές απογραφές φαίνεται να έχουν γίνει παλαιότερα και από το Αρεταίειο, τις οποίες δημοσίευε παλαιότερα περιληπτικά η Γενική Γραμματεία Ισότητας. Στη γνωστότερη από αυτές, τα στοιχεία αφορούν στο έτος 2000 (ξέρω, φαίνεται πρόσφατο, αλλά πάνε 20 χρόνια!), και υπολογίζουν 100.000 ως 120.000 αμβλώσεις σε νοσοκομεία και κλινικές (όπως αναφέρεται <a href="http://docstore.ohchr.org/SelfServices/FilesHandler.ashx?enc=6QkG1d%2FPPRiCAqhKb7yhsldCrOlUTvLRFDjh6%2Fx1pWA2nNkJfb4XsVoV7C4X7VKKqdxFSLzgJ92mTpRa5ay0DXAPd7C7OkscWDloAu4a6JXLB28F67V5i%2BBnysSGVIRI">εδώ</a>). Τα στοιχεία της έρευνας ωστόσο δεν βρίσκονται πλέον πουθενά και δεν μπορώ να σχολιάσω ούτε την ποιότητα ούτε την κάλυψη του πληθυσμού. Αν με ανάγκαζαν θα έλεγα ότι κάποια τουλάχιστον από τα νούμερα του Αρεταίειου βασίζονται στα δικά τους μόνο στοιχεία (ή τα στοιχεία δύο-τριών μεγάλων νοσοκομείων) και σε μια αναγωγή στον πληθυσμό (υποθέτοντας πχ ότι έχει μείνει σταθερό το μερίδιο της 'αγοράς'). Το λέω αυτό γιατί το Αρεταίειο έχει κατά καιρούς ανακοινώσει στοιχεία από τα δικά του αρχεία μόνο, τα οποία φαίνεται να δείχνουν πχ ότι το ποσοστό των αμβλώσεων που πραγματοποιούσε σε έφηβες είχε ανέβει από το 29% στο 35% από το 75 ως το 96 (αναφορά <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1016/s0968-8080(04)24001-0">εδώ</a>).<br />
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Το Αρεταίειο φαίνεται να έκανε τουλάχιστο δύο απογραφές, καθώς η Γενική Γραμματεία Ισότητας σχολιάζει ότι τα στοιχεία του 2000 δείχνουν σημαντική μείωση (κατά 30%) των αμβλώσεων σε σχέση με το 1994 πράγμα που αποδίδεται στην έκθεση εν μέρει στη νομιμοποίησή τους. Αλλού <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1016/s0968-8080(04)24001-0">και αυτό το εύρημα</a> αμφισβητείται σε θεωρητικό επίπεδο, αλλά βλέπω δύο μελέτες να στοιχειοθετούν (περίπου) μείωση και πουθενά στοιχεία για το αντίθετο που να μην ανακυκλώνουν απλά παλιές μελέτες. Γενικότερα στο Αρεταίειο αποδίδονται πολλές τέτοιες απογραφές έκτοτε αλλά ποτέ δεν έχω βρει σχετική ακαδημαϊκή δημοσίευση ούτε ενημερωμένα στοιχεία πχ <a href="https://www.refworld.org/country,,CEDAW,,GRC,,,,0.html">εδώ</a> - για ένα τόσο σοβαρό θέμα με τέτοια βαριά έλλειψη τεκμηρίωσης, θα περίμενε κανείς οι γιατροί να κάνουν κρα για να δημοσιεύσουν, αλλά το μόνο που βλέπει κανείς είναι δελτία τύπου και σχόλια σε συνεδριακά πανελ με βάση τα εσωτερικά στοιχεία ενός φορέα. Αυτό βέβαια σημαίνει ότι τα στοιχεία δεν έχουν περάσει από κανένα επιστημονικό κόσκινο και δεν έχουμε ιδέα πώς συνελέγησαν ούτε αν μπορούν να αναχθούν στον πληθυσμό.<br />
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Στοιχεία τέλoς έχουμε και από τον <a href="https://t.co/hQOlyVCMV9?amp=1">παγκόσμιο οργανισμό υγείας</a>, τα οποία όμως αφορούν καθώς φαίνεται μόνο σε αμβλώσεις που χρηματοδοτούνται από το δημόσιο ή τα ταμεία. Ο ΠΟΥ εννοείται τα στοιχεία του τα παίρνει έτοιμα από Ελληνικές πηγές και δεν διεξάγει δική του πρωτογενή μελέτη. Ούτως ή άλλως δίνει μια εκτίμηση της τάξης των 20.000, με μικρή διακύμανση από χρονιά σε χρονιά. Είναι αδύνατον να είναι αυτή η εκτίμηση σωστή (συγκρίνετε τα στοιχεία της με τα αντίστοιχα της ΕΜΓΕ για την ίδια χρονιά), ούτε είναι και συγκρίσιμη με αντίστοιχες άλλων χωρών.<br />
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Δεν μπορώ να βρω καμμία άλλη απογραφή στη βιβλιογραφία κι αυτό ας μη σας ξαφνιάζει. Διοικητικές απογραφές δεν υπήρχε τρόπος να γίνουν στην Ελλάδα ως το 1986, γιατί ως τότε οι αμβλώσεις ήταν <u>παράνομες</u>. Ακόμη και τώρα που μπορούν να γίνουν, το κόστος και η αδυναμία κάλυψης όλων των σχετικών φορέων είναι σοβαρά αντικίνητρα για τους ερευνητές.<br />
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Θα δείτε στο διαδίκτυο άρθρα που ισχυρίζονται ότι έχει κατά καιρούς δώσει εκτιμήσεις η Ελστατ ή η Eurostat (πχ αυτόν τον εξωφρενικό ισχυρισμό <a href="https://www.epostersonline.com/gyn2015/node/362">εδώ</a>). Προφανώς και δεν έχει κάνει κάτι τέτοιο η Ελστατ - δεν υπάρχουν πουθενά στον ιστότοπό της στοιχεία. Μέχρι το 2013 η Ελστατ αναγνώριζε την απουσία στοιχείων για τις αμβλώσεις ως βασική έλλειψη την οποία επεσήμαναν οι χρήστες των δεδομένων της, και την οποία υποσχόταν να καλύψει στο δυνατό βαθμό (<a href="https://www.statistics.gr/documents/20181/1218169/presentation_18122012.pdf">εδώ</a>). Έκτοτε δεν έχει δημοσιεύσει τίποτε σχετικά. Η Eurostat εννοείται ότι δεν έχει στοιχεία για την Ελλάδα (<a href="https://t.co/lcQ0AsnXrc?amp=1">δείτε</a>), και αν είχε θα τα είχε πάρει από την Ελστατ. Η πάλαι ποτέ ΕΣΥΕ, προκάτοχος της Ελστατ, όταν υπήρχε έκανε ορισμένες πρώτες μελέτες προ εικοσαετίας - εντούτοις μπορούσε να συλλέξει στοιχεία μόνο από δημόσια νοσοκομεία και ως εκ τούτου τα στοιχεία της ήταν πολύ ελλιπή.<br />
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Συμπέρασμα: αν βασιστούμε μόνο στις δοικητικές απογραφές, τότε οι αμβλώσεις είναι σίγουρα πολύ λιγότερες από 100.000 ετησίως, και ο αριθμός τους πέφτει εδώ και δεκαετίες.<br />
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<b>Δειγματοληπτικές έρευνες</b><br />
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Οι δειγματοληπτικές έρευνες έχουν σφάλματα, και στο βαθμό που η άμβλωση είναι θέμα ταμπού μπορεί να υποτιμούν την πραγματικότητα. Καλύπτουν όμως κάθε είδος άμβλωσης, ανεξαρτήτως πώς και από ποιόν έγινε, οπότε είναι χρήσιμες για να πάρουμε μια ιδέα του πού βρίσκεται το κατώτατο ορίο ή ποιά είναι η αναλογία των αμβλώσεων με ιατρική βοήθεια προς τις υπόλοιπες.<br />
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Η πρώτη τέτοια έρευνα με δείγμα 6,500 γυναικών έγινε το 1962-3 και βρήκε αναλογία αμβλώσεων προς γεννήσεις 1:1 (<a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00324728.1965.10405453">εδώ</a>). Σημειωτέον ότι οι γεννήσεις ήταν ακόμη και τότε περίπου 150.000 το χρόνο (επίσημα στοιχεία <a href="https://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/-/publication/SPO03/-">εδώ</a>). Οι συγγραφείς (Βαλαώρας και άλλοι) θεωρούν με βάση τον αριθμό και το τζίρο των ιδιωτικών μαιευτικών κλινικών στη χώρα ότι ο πραγματικός λόγος εκτρώσεων προς γεννήσεις πρέπει να είναι πολύ μεγαλύτερος, ωστόσο δεν έκαναν καμμία εικασία για τα πραγματικά μεγέθη. Η έρευνά τους επιπλέον έδειξε ότι ένα 15% των μεγαλύτερων ζευγαριών ομολογούσαν ότι είχαν κάποτε κάνει έκτρωση, πράγμα που δεν αποκλείεται πάλι να αποτελεί υποεκτίμηση.<br />
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Γιατί σας παραθέτω μια έρευνα ηλικίας 68 ετών, προ νομιμοποίησης, βασικά μια φωτογραφία από έναν άλλο κόσμο; Γιατί αυτή τη μελέτη ακόμη και τώρα <a href="https://twitter.com/FokkerPlanck/status/1212842731661332482">μου ζητούν</a> να την λάβω υπόψιν, και γιατί ο λόγος 1:1 έχει κολλήσει στο μυαλό όλων, συμπεριλαμβανομένου και του Άδωνι. Και γιατί ήταν η μόνη από τις παλιές έρευνες που μπορεί κανείς να δει αναλυτικά μεθοδολογικά στοιχεία της στο διαδίκτυο (εντάξει, μέσω sci-hub), ακριβώς επειδή διεξήχθη σωστά και δημοσιεύτηκε υπεύθυνα. <br />
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To 1985, σε μία ακόμη μελέτη της οποίας οι λεπτομέρειες δεν μπορούν να εντοπιστούν πουθενά, το κέντρο οικογενεικού προγραμματισμού στη Θεσσαλονίκη <a href="https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12284544">υπολόγισε </a>1.8 αμβλώσεις ανά γυναίκα σε αναπαραγωγική ηλικία, έναντι 1.3 γεννήσεων (που μου φαίνονται κάπως <a href="https://tradingeconomics.com/greece/fertility-rate-total-births-per-woman-wb-data.html">λίγες</a>).<br />
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Το εθνικό κέντρο κοινωνικών ερευνών ξεκίνησε μια μεγάλη και ενδιαφέρουσα μελέτη κοόρτης το 1983 (δείγμα n=1,924, αναφορά <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1016/s0968-8080(04)24001-0">εδώ</a>), όπου και βρήκε ότι το 36% των γυναικών είχαν κάνει τουλάχιστον μία έκτρωση. Η έρευνα επαναλήφθηκε στοχεύοντας στο ίδιο ακριβώς δείγμα (τις ίδιες ακριβώς γυναίκες δηλαδή) το 1997. Στο μεταξύ όμως το μεγαλύτερο μέρος του αρχικού δείγματος είχε εξαφανιστεί και είχαν απομείνει μόνο 507 από τις αρχικές γυναίκες. Από αυτές το 46% είχαν κάνει έκτρωση, αλλά δυσκολεύομαι να δω το εναπομείναν δείγμα ως αντιπροσωπευτικό: οι γυναίκες που χάθηκαν από το δείγμα δεν είναι ίδιες δημογραφικά με αυτές που απέμειναν.<br />
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Έκτοτε το ποσοστό μειώνεται καθώς οι γυναίκες που μεγάλωσαν τη δεκαετία του 60 φεύγουν από τον γόνιμο πληθυσμό. Η metron analysis και το ινστιτούτο κοινωνικής και προληπτικής ιατρικής υπολόγισαν το 2001 ότι μία στις τέσσερις γυναίκες σε γόνιμη ηλικία είχε κάνει έκτρωση (δείγμα n=744, αναφορά <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1016/s0968-8080(04)24001-0">εδώ</a>). Αυτό, αν ισχύει βέβαια, μας δίνει περίπου 500.000 Ελληνίδες που είχαν κάνει έκτρωση <i>σε όλη τους τη ζωή</i>.<br />
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Μολονότι αυτός ο αριθμός είναι πολύ μεγάλος, σκεφτείτε τί υποθέσεις πρέπει να κάνουμε για να περάσουμε από το '500.000 γυναίκες σε όλη τους τη ζωή' στο '300.000 ή έστω 100.000 γυναίκες <b>το χρόνο</b>', και πόσο πραγματικά απίθανο θα ήταν να κάνουν 300.000 αμβλώσεις <b>το χρόνο </b>οι 2 εκατομμύρια δυνάμει γόνιμες Ελληνίδες. Κατ' αναλογία σκεφτείτε ότι 6 στις 10 Ελληνίδες είναι μανάδες (<a href="http://www.oecd.org/social/family/47701118.pdf">πηγή</a>), αλλά αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι το 60% των γυναικών κάνει κι από ένα παιδί κάθε χρόνο.<br />
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Η πιο πρόσφατη μεγάλη δειγματοληπτική έρευνα για αμβλώσεις στην εφηβεία έγινε το 2018 (δείγμα 3.500 γυναικών), και βρήκε ότι μία στις δέκα Ελληνίδες μανάδες με ζωντανά παιδιά είχε κάνει άμβλωση σε εφηβική ηλικία - 11.4 αμβλώσεις στην εφηβεία για κάθε 100 γυναίκες αν μετρήσουμε και τις πολλαπλές περιπτώσεις (κείμενο <a href="https://t.co/iw9kNhiaog?amp=1">εδώ</a>). Το ποσοστό φαίνεται να πέφτει από γενιά σε γενιά (ειδικά από τη νομιμοποίηση και μετά) και στις νεότερες γενεές φαίνεται να έχει πέσει κάτω από το 8%. Με βάση αυτό το ποσοστό, τη συχνότητα των πολλαπλών αμβλώσεων, και το μέγεθος του σχετικού πληθυσμού (<a href="https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-087286_QID_-2482CC5_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;AGE,L,Z,1;UNIT,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-087286SEX,F;DS-087286INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-087286UNIT,NR;DS-087286AGE,Y15-19;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=AGE_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">εδώ</a>) θα περίμενε κανείς να έχουμε 20-25.000 αμβλώσεις στην εφηβεία ετησίως.<br />
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Μπόνους: η ίδια μελέτη δείχνει ότι οι μανάδες που δήλωσαν ότι είχαν κάνει άμβλωση στην εφηβεία ήταν πιο πιθανό στατιστικά να αποκτήσουν τελικά παραπάνω από ένα παιδί. Ας μας βάλει λίγο σε σκέψεις.<br />
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Δεν ξέρουμε πόσο σημαντικός περιορισμός είναι το ότι ερωτήθηκαν μόνο μανάδες - είναι πολύ λογικό οι άτεκνες να έχουν μεγαλύτερα ποσοστά αμβλώσεων. Ξέρουμε όμως ότι το μέσο ποσοστό ένα προς δέκα είναι ίδιο με αυτό που υπολόγισε για τις συγκεκριμένες ηλικίες η δειγματοληπτική έρευνα της metron analysis του 2001. Από την άλλη, έχουμε έρευνα της metron analysis του 2009 που δεν μπορώ να βρώ τα στοιχεία της και η οποία <a href="https://www.in.gr/2009/09/28/life/kid/to-33-twn-ellinidwn-katw-twn-18-etwn-den-apofeygei-tin-ektrwsi/">μοιάζει να ισχυρίζεται</a> ότι 33% των εφήβων έχει κάνει έκτρωση μολόνοτι η μέση ηλικία πρώτης επαφής με βάση την ίδια έρευνα είναι τα 19. Το βρήκα απίθανο όταν το πρωτοδιάβασα. Όταν όμως ξαναδιάβασα το δελτίο τύπου κατέστη σαφές ότι ερωτήθηκαν κάτι διαφορετικό οι γυναίκες που πήραν μέρος: αν οι ίδιες <u>ή κάποια γνωστή τους</u> είχε αυτή την εμπειρία. Το ποσοστό που αναζητούμε πρέπει λοιπόν να είναι πολύ μικρότερο από το 33%.<br />
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Συμπέρασμα - είναι δύσκολο να βγάλει κανείς άκρη με τις δειγματοληπτικές έρευνες αλλά φαίνεται ότι στις δεκαετίες του 60 και 70 η άμβλωση έγινε πάγια μέθοδος αντισύλληψης, και ο αριθμός των γυναικών με ιστορικό άμβλωσης κορυφώθηκε μάλλον τη δεκαετία του 90, πιάνοντας ποσοστά σίγουρα άνω του 30% - έκτοτε όμως πέφτει. Όποια νούμερα και να πάρει κανείς είναι πολύ, πολύ δύσκολο να στηρίξουν υπολογισμούς του τύπου 100.000 το χρόνο.<br />
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<b>Αναγωγές και εκτιμήσεις.</b><br />
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Οι αναγωγές σε τρίτα μεγέθη μπορούν να είναι από πολύ χρήσιμες ως εντελώς άχρηστες ανάλογα με το πόσο ισχυρές (=περιοριστικές) υποθέσεις χρησιμοποιούν και πόσο καλά πρωτογενή στοιχεία έχουν. Αναγωγές γίνονταν συχνά όσο ακόμη οι αμβλώσεις ήταν παράνομες, για αυτονόητους λόγους.<br />
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Σε μια τέτοια αναγωγή αναφέρεται η Ιωαννίδου-Καπόγλου (2004, H/T <a href="https://twitter.com/GeorgiosGs/status/1211669017720770560">@GeorgiosGs</a>) όταν αναφέρει ότι η Ελληνική Εταιρία Οικογενειακού Προγραμματισμού υπολόγιζε, το 2000, 100.000 αμβλώσεις το χρόνο επίσημα και ίσως 300.000 ανεπίσημα (πηγή <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1016/S0968-8080(04)24001-0">εδώ</a>). Όπως εξηγείται <a href="https://t.co/fo1GEHGZ7d?amp=1">εδώ </a>όμως (σ. 279, Η/Τ <a href="https://twitter.com/destroxiii/status/1211496282143035392">@destroxiii</a>) αυτός ο υπολογισμός προέρχεται από τη δεκαετία του 70 και βασίζεται στην υπόθεση ότι η χρήση αντισύλληψης είναι τόσο χαμηλή που δεν αφήνει εναλλακτικές λύσεις από τις αμβλώσεις. Δεν ξέρω πόσο δόκιμο είναι να συνεχίζουμε να κάνουμε αυτή την υπόθεση 50 χρόνια μετά. </div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br /></div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">Ακούγεται συχνά ότι η χρήση μοντέρνων μεθόδων αντισύλληψης στην Ελλάδα είναι πολύ σπάνια, αλλά εν μέρει γι αυτή την εντύπωση ευθύνεται η καγκουριά των αρμοδίων του ΟΗΕ, οι οποίοι εδώ και 20 χρόνια στις δημοσιεύσεις τους χρησιμοποιούν για την Ελλάδα την ίδια (μία) παρατήρηση του 2001 χωρίς να το σημειώνουν ρητά - το αποτέλεσμα είναι κάθε χρονιά να δημοσιεύονται τα ίδια ακριβώς στοιχεία για την Ελλάδα και να πέφτουμε όλο και πιο χαμηλά στην κατάταξη (δείτε τη χρονοσειρά <a href="https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/publications/dataset/contraception/wcu2019/UNPD_WCU2019_Country_Data_Survey-Based.xlsx">εδώ</a>). Αντιθέτως έχουμε στοιχεία από <a href="https://www.epipsi.gr/images/Documents/hmera-kata-aids/HBSC2018_04_Sex.pdf">αλλεπάλληλες και σχετικά μεγάλες έρευνες</a> μεταξύ εφήβων που δείχνουν ότι πάνω κάτω ένα 80% χρησιμοποιεί προφυλακτικά. Μπορεί εννοείται να μας λένε μούφες αλλά αυτό προϋποθέτει ότι έχουν εμπεδώσει ότι η κοινωνία προσδοκεί να χρησιμοποιείς προφυλακτικό.<br />
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H Χαλκιά (2004, <a href="https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=inZG6htMHXgC&lpg=PA91&ots=7u5y4uHodA&dq=empty%20cradle%20of%20democracy%20%22200000%22%20abortions&pg=PA91#v=onepage&q=empty%20cradle%20of%20democracy%20%22200000%22%20abortions&f=false">εδώ</a>) βασίζεται σε εκτιμήσεις περίπου 30 μαιευτήρων οι οποίοι συλλογικά θεωρούσαν ότι τη δεκαετία του 90 πρέπει να γινόντουσαν πάνω από 300.000 αμβλώσεις ετησίως. Το νούμερο αυτό δεν προκύπτει από πρωτογενή διοικητικά στοιχεία, δεν άνοιξαν τα κιτάπια τους όλοι αυτοί οι μαιευτήρες. Απλά μεταδίδουν τις αναμνήσεις και τις εντυπώσεις τους. Η σωστή ερμηνεία του αριθμού είναι ότι πριν περίπου τριάντα χρόνια οι μαιευτήρες έλεγαν μεταξύ τους ότι τόσες ήταν οι αμβλώσεις, πράγμα λογικό αν κρίνει κανείς από τις δημοσιευμένες εκτιμήσεις που παρουσιάσαμε παραπάνω. Το πρόβλημα, σε αυτή την περίπτωση, είναι ότι αυτές οι εκτιμήσεις δεν περιέχουν νέα πληροφορία: όταν τις λαμβάνουμε υπόψιν απλά διπλομετράμε προηγούμενες δημοσιεύσεις. <br />
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Αλλού ο Κομνηνός (<a href="https://t.co/fFjxsKkxNl?amp=1">εδώ</a>, H/T <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/th_alys">@th_alys</a> ) κάνει λόγο για 200.000 με 250.000 αμβλώσεις. Προς επίρρωση του ισχυρισμού δίνει τρεις παραπομπές στον εαυτό του, ήτοι μία τρισελιδη αναφορά σε πρακτικά συνεδρίου το 1966, μία ομιλία σε εγκαίνια αμφιθεάτρου και ένα σεμινάριο που έδωσε στο υπουργείο πρόνοιας. Δίνει επίσης και τη μελέτη των Βαλαώρα και άλλων (ναι με στοιχεία του 1962) που είδαμε πιο πάνω. Δεν μας λέει άν έχει συλλέξει νέα πρωτογενή στοιχεία, ούτε πώς. Επειδή αυτά δημοσιεύθηκαν όμως σε ένα διεθνή τόμο του 1988 με μεγάλη απήχηση, αρκετοί τα προσεγγίζουν ως στοιχεία της δεκαετίας του 80, πράγμα που δεν είναι, επ ουδενί.<br />
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[ΕΝΗΜΕΡΩΣΗ 14/01 υπάρχει και αυτό το έπος (H/T <a href="https://twitter.com/manchurian/status/1216826551830007809/photo/1">@Manchurian</a>):]<br />
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<img alt="Image" height="94" src="https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EOMJSGwX4AIGkOc?format=png&name=medium" width="400" /><br />
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Μπαίνω στον πειρασμό να εικάσω ότι η (επική, εξαιρετική) μελέτη του Βαλαώρα και λοιπών ευθύνεται για τις περισσότερες εκτιμήσεις άνω των 200.000. Ανακυκλώθηκε από πάρα πολλούς ερευνητές οι οποίοι έχτισαν πάνω της κάνοντας λίγο διαφορετικές υποθέσεις για το πόσες αμβλώσεις δεν δηλώθηκαν στους ερευνητές σε εκείνη την πρώτη έρευνα. Επαναλαμβάνω: οι Βαλαωρας και λοιποί τεκμηρίωσαν πρωτογενώς πολύ λιγότερες εκτρώσεις από όσες υπολογίζουν όσοι μεταγενέστεροι πατούν πάνω στα στοιχεία τους για να κάνουν υποθέσεις. <br />
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Συμπέρασμα: Οι εκτιμήσεις που βασίζονται σε εντυπώσεις και αναγωγές είναι πολύ μεγαλύτερες από αυτές που προκύπτουν από διοικητικές απογραφές ή δειγματοληψία. Είναι επίσης πολύ, μα πάρα πολύ παλιές, και μερικές φορές βασίζονται σε πολύ επισφαλείς υποθέσεις ή δεν υπάρχουν καν στοιχεία για να τις υποστηρίξουν. Κανένας δεν έχει καταφέρει ποτέ να παρουσιάσει πρωτογενή στοιχεία που να είναι συμβατά με 300.000 ή 200.000 αμβλώσεις το χρόνο, ακόμη για και τις εποχές της μεγάλης κατάχρησης.<br />
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Ας μου επιτραπεί μια παρένθεση. Μπορεί από τα παραπάνω να μείνετε με την εντύπωση ότι θεωρώ κακούς επιστήμονες ανθρώπους όπως ο Κομνηνός και ο Βαλαώρας (και συνεργάτες). Όχι. Ειδικά η έρευνα των τελευταίων πρέπει να ήταν μια πραγματικά μνημειώδης προσπάθεια και προσωπικά την αντιμετωπίζω με δέος. Πρέπει όμως να αναγνωρίσουμε ότι α) υπολογισμοί που γίνονται χωρίς να παρατίθεται πρωτογενής έρευνα είναι πολύ λιγότερο αξιόπιστοι και β) υπολογισμοί που βασίζονται σε επιπλέον υποθέσεις πέρα από τα δεδομένα της έρευνας είναι επίσης λιγότερο αξιόπιστοι.<br /><br /><b>Τι άλλαξε επί κρίσης;<br /></b>
<br />Είναι πολύ δύσκολο να υπολογίσουμε πώς επηρεάστηκαν οι αμβλώσεις από την οικονομική κρίση. Δεν είχαμε που δεν είχαμε στοιχεία, θέλουμε και στοιχεία συγκεκριμένα για 2010 με 2018; Σαν πολύ πέφτει. Εντούτοις ξέρουμε στατιστικά πόσο μειώθηκαν οι γέννες και - το σημαντικότερο - τίνος οι γέννες φαίνεται να απουσιάζουν από τα νούμερα επί κρίσης. Οι <a href="https://genus.springeropen.com/articles/10.1186/s41118-019-0066-x">Τραγάκη και Μπάγκαβος (2019)</a> υπολογίζουν ότι χάσαμε περίπου 40.000 γέννες συνολικά από το 2010 ως το 2015. Καμμία από αυτές τις χρονιές δεν χάσαμε πάνω από 11.000 γέννες σε σχέση με την προϋπάρχουσα τάση. </div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br /></div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">Σε πιο πρόσφατη μελέτη, βασισμένη σε στατιστικό μοντέλο που λαμβάνει υπόψη τους παράγοντες που επηρεάζουν τις επιλογές των γυναικών, οι <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/7/3/e007151">Bearac et al (2022)</a> υπολογίζουν περίπου 40,000 εκτρώσεις ετησίως στην περίοδο 2015-19 (όχι <u>επιπλέον </u>εκτρώσεις επί κρίσης, αλλά το σύνολό τους). </div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br /></div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">Θα μου πείτε, ώπα ρε ΛΟΛ σφύρα το, βρήκαμε το νούμερο που ψάχναμε! Κι όμως όχι. Δυσκολεύομαι πολύ να βρω τα πρωτογενή στοιχεία που χρησιμοποίησαν για την Ελλάδα οι Bearac et al και είναι σαφές από το <a href="https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/7/3/e007151/DC2/embed/inline-supplementary-material-2.pdf?download=true" target="_blank">συμπληρωματικό υλικό</a> που δημοσίευσαν ότι βασίζουν τον υπολογισμό τους σε παλινδρομίσεις στοιχείων από πολλές χώρες, των οποίων τις παραμέτρους έπειτα εφαρμόζουν στα περιορισμένα στοιχεία που έχουν για την Ελλάδα. Μεθοδολογικά η μελέτη μού φαίνεται μια χαρά, αλλά τέτοιες επαγωγες έχουν πολλές ευαισθησίες που δεν μπορώ να τις κρίνω εύκολα. Όπως μπορείτε να δείτε παρακάτω, τα "περιορισμένα στοιχεία" τους σταματούν πριν από σχεδόν δύο δεκαετίες. </div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br /></div><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg7aXQ-CJSccLeRWCmKQexvO4torpcYqNHEYjOvl7MYqGOXe47It2yEVaCvmJixWMv76kECXsKohONc7BJBQhHfQXCncaGF-GJuRDPao2M2JzJc-cHdYoz9_RuRQl-8Rg8GDK3I4DtMw2hqR99GvYAmGz7ntFkuTd3jwj2oasnRU-tlzzYbvWecA8a2zR90/s576/IMG_20231111_152655.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" data-original-height="567" data-original-width="576" height="315" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg7aXQ-CJSccLeRWCmKQexvO4torpcYqNHEYjOvl7MYqGOXe47It2yEVaCvmJixWMv76kECXsKohONc7BJBQhHfQXCncaGF-GJuRDPao2M2JzJc-cHdYoz9_RuRQl-8Rg8GDK3I4DtMw2hqR99GvYAmGz7ntFkuTd3jwj2oasnRU-tlzzYbvWecA8a2zR90/s320/IMG_20231111_152655.jpg" width="320" /></a></div><br /><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br /> </div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
Μπορείτε όμως να κάνετε κι εσείς μια εύκολη αναγωγή στο τεφτέρι σας: οι γέννες στην Ελλάδα έχουν μειωθεί κατά 32 χιλιάδες το χρόνο από το 2008 ως το 2018 (επίσημα στοιχεία <a href="https://www.statistics.gr/el/statistics/-/publication/SPO03/-">εδώ</a>). Για να ισχυριστεί κανείς ότι οι αμβλώσεις αυξήθηκαν κατά αριθμό μεγαλύτερο από τις 32 χιλιάδες επί κρίσης πρέπει να κάνει την γενναία υπόθεση ότι κατά την ίδια περίοδο οι εγκυμοσύνες (ανεξαρτήτως κατάληξης) αυξήθηκαν, ή ότι μειώθηκαν κατά πολύ μεγάλο ποσοστό οι αποβολές και οι (ευτυχώς ήδη ελάχιστες) γεννήσεις νεκρών μωρών. Καμμία από αυτές τις δύο υποθέσεις δεν είναι εύλογη ούτε συνάδει με τα δεδομένα στην Ελλάδα - ο πληθυσμός μας γερνάει εξάλλου, και έχουμε λίγοτερα νέα νοικοκυριά. Όταν λοιπόν ακούτε κάποιον να λέει ότι αυξήθηκαν από τις 200.000 στις 300.000 οι αμβλώσεις επί κρίσεως (όπως κάνει <a href="https://www.kathimerini.gr/836139/article/epikairothta/ellada/ay3anontai-anhsyxhtika-oi-diakopes-kyhshs-sthn-ellada">εδώ </a>η Καθημερινή), πρέπει να κάπως να σας εξηγήσουν πώς προέκυψε αύξηση στις εγκυμοσύνες και/ή μείωση των αποβολών κατά <i>τουλάχιστον </i>70.000 το χρόνο, μέσα στην καταραμένη την κρίση, ώστε να βγαίνουν τα νούμερα (τους χαρίζω 8 χιλιάρικα γιατί μιλούν για δήθεν στοιχεία του 2013, όταν οι γεννήσεις είχαν μειωθεί κατά 24.000 μόνο). Αν πάρετε τα στοιχεία των Τραγάκη και Μπάγκαβου, που είναι πιο σωστά, οι εγκυμοσύνες πρέπει να αυξήθηκαν κατά 90.000 το χρόνο για να βγαίνουν τα νούμερα της Καθημερινής. Δεν γίνεται.<br /><br />Θα πρέπει να υποθέσει καποιος ότι όχι μόνο οι Έλληνες προκάλεσαν πολύ περισσότερες εγκυμοσύνες αλλά και ότι γι αυτές ευθύνται, μεσούσης της κρίσης, δυσανάλογα αυτά τα ζευγάρια που δεν ήθελαν παιδιά. <br />
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Δύσκολο πράγμα.</div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br /></div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">Να σημειώσω ένα τελευταίο για τα στοιχεία των Τραγάκη και Μπάγκαβου. Βάσει των υπολογισμών τους, μεταξύ 2010 και 2015 χάσαμε κυρίως τα παιδιά που θα έκαναν γυναίκες που είχαν ήδη παιδιά και τα παιδιά που θα έκαναν οι εικοσάρες άνεργες/άεργες. Οι πίνακες με τις γεννήσεις που 'λείπουν' από τα νούμερα βρίσκονται παρακάτω. Ας μας βάλει και πάλι αυτό σε σκέψεις. Έστω ότι όλες αυτές οι μη-γεννήσεις είναι εκτρώσεις. Δεν είναι, αλλά έστω ας πούμε ότι είναι. Δεν τις έκαναν κοπέλες που γουστάρουν να γκομενίζουν ή φοβούνται μην υποφέρει η καριέρα τους. Τις έκαναν νέες, ήδη μανάδες, με ελλιπή εισοδήματα. </div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><br /></div><div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiciuK_yiZGcyzQh1oyJuHW6FcBNjcuRiu-0qm4hH6SfQp3ymhcdi4J8vjbwokcOv6KiMQi_7PyCewcgFwT5JitUp-bIc8RXNhAdc5q6N5RZ5lxSk2YZpWHiRvowUDJDt92S1eF7d3Ro8RJ/" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img data-original-height="734" data-original-width="1859" height="253" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiciuK_yiZGcyzQh1oyJuHW6FcBNjcuRiu-0qm4hH6SfQp3ymhcdi4J8vjbwokcOv6KiMQi_7PyCewcgFwT5JitUp-bIc8RXNhAdc5q6N5RZ5lxSk2YZpWHiRvowUDJDt92S1eF7d3Ro8RJ/w640-h253/image.png" width="640" /></a></div><br /><div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ8O1NgJosUyKx82Ta1HHba9gO5nxosQr3YgDHPoQoqM2gT9pUGrdu6RKsC9wxWQ6nmJ4I73qJggBNP0dT2iEuo_mWysrIT4UPIUmHmMchiWWULqnJWqSD-ns629vfIRN4obtB4K_N28RN/" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img data-original-height="707" data-original-width="1861" height="244" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ8O1NgJosUyKx82Ta1HHba9gO5nxosQr3YgDHPoQoqM2gT9pUGrdu6RKsC9wxWQ6nmJ4I73qJggBNP0dT2iEuo_mWysrIT4UPIUmHmMchiWWULqnJWqSD-ns629vfIRN4obtB4K_N28RN/w640-h244/image.png" width="640" /></a></div></div><br />
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<b>Εσείς τι θα κάνατε με 100.000 περισσότερα* Ελληνόπουλα;</b><br />
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Το χειρότερο κομμάτι όλης αυτής της ιστορίας είναι κατά τη γνώμη μου η σύνδεση των αμβλώσεων με το ευρύτερο δημογραφικό. Ο πρωθυπουργός <a href="https://www.protothema.gr/politics/article/870547/mitsotakis-to-dimografiko-uponomeuei-to-mellon-tis-patridas-auto-einai-to-shedio-tis-nd/">λέει</a> ότι 'αν είχαμε 10% λιγότερες εκτρώσεις θα είχαμε 10% περισσότερες γεννήσεις'. Όχι βέβαια. Θα είχαμε 10% περισσότερες εγκυμοσύνες που προελήφθησαν με αντισυλληπτικά χάπια ή με άλλο τρόπο. Αμβλώσεις δεν κάνει ο κόσμος από τεμπελιά αλλά από απελπίσία. Η σωστή εξίσωση είναι 'αν είχαμε 10% λιγότερες ανεπιθύμητες εγκυμοσύνες θα είχαμε Χ% λιγότερες αμβλώσεις.'<br />
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Το ζητούμενο είναι να μετατρέπεις τις ανεπιθύμητες σε επιθυμητές, και αυτό γίνεται όταν ο κόσμος είναι αισιόδοξος και νοιώθει ασφαλής. Αν δεν υπάρχει αυτό, κάθε επιχείρημα του τύπου 'μα ποιός θα πολεμήσει τους Τούρκους' ή 'μα ποιός θα πληρώσει τη σύνταξή μου;' είναι τερατώδες. Το ίδιο τερατώδες, σημειωτέον, είναι να χρησιμοποιείς το δημογραφικό ως επιχείρημα υπέρ της μετανάστευσης (η οποία κατά τη γνώμη μου, σημειωτέον, πρέπει να είναι απόλυτα ελεύθερη). Το να εισάγεις ανθρώπους για να πληρώνουν, φτωχοί όντες, τις μη βιώσιμες συντάξεις σου σε κάνει απλά δουλέμπορο.<br />
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<span style="font-size: x-small;">* πρόταση σερβιρίσματος. Μπορεί να μην υπάρξουν 100.000 επιπλέον Ελληνόπουλα. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><b style="font-size: medium;">Καλά γιατί απαντάς;</b></span><br />
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Η τελευταία ένσταση που ακούω από φιλελέ γωνιές του διαδικτύου είναι ότι αυτού του είδους οι κουβέντες πρέπει να κλείνουν γρήγορα για να μην μπάζει από το Overton window, και ότι ο πραγματικός αριθμός των αμβλώσεων είναι δευτερεύον θέμα - το πρωτεύον είναι ότι ο νόμος παρέχει το δικαίωμα στις γυναίκες, και εκεί λέει τελειώνει το θέμα.<br />
<br />
Βλακείες.<br />
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Θα με συγχωρήσουν τα παιδιά αλλά έχω πρόσφατη ακόμη την εμπειρία του Βρετανικού δημοψηφίσματος. Θυμάμαι στη Βρετανική τουητερόσφαιρα (και φαντάζομαι και στις παμπ) ατάκες του τύπου 'μπαίνουν ρε συ ένα εκατομμύριο Βούλγαροι, Ρουμάνοι, Πολωνοί το χρόνο ανενόχλητοι και δεν τους ζητάει κανείς τα χαρτιά τους, δεν μπορείς να τους διώξεις, παίρνουν και με το καλημέρα επιδόματα, ε πόσους να αντέξει η ρημάδα η χώρα.' Προφανώς μπορούσες να τους απαντήσεις 'φίλε δικαίωμά τους, είμαστε χώρα της ΕΕ και έχουν ελεύθερη μετακίνηση.' Αλλά η απάντηση του θαμώνα της παμπ δεν είναι 'ΟΚ φίλε έχεις δίκιο δεν το είχα σκεφτεί, πάω στη γωνιά μου'. Η απάντησή του είναι, 'ωραία ας βρούμε τρόπο να μην έχουν πια το δικαίωμα. Εξάλλου δεν με ρώτησε κανείς, μού το επέβαλαν κάτι ανώμαλοι στις Βρυξέλλες.'<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><b style="font-size: medium;"><br /></b></span>
Αυτή είναι περίπου και η απάντηση σε όσους προτάσσουν τη νομιμότητα των αβλώσεων. Η νομιμότητα δεν είναι φυσική νομοτέλεια. Και για όσους έχουν ειλικρινείς ηθικές αναστολές πάνω στο θέμα και δεν νοιάζονται μόνο να τους κάνετε παιδιά για να πάρουν την Πόλη και να πληρώσουν συντάξεις, το να τους λές 'χέστηκα αν είναι σωστό ή λάθος είναι δικαίωμά μου!' δεν τους πείθει - τους θυμώνει και τους απωθεί.<br />
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Αυτό που αξίζει να γίνει είναι να καταλάβει ο κόσμος ότι οι αμβλώσεις, με σπάνιες εξαιρέσεις, δεν είναι πια επιπόλαιες, αν ήταν ποτέ κάτι τέτοιο. Είναι πράξεις απελπισίας. Ούτε μπορείς να λύσεις το δημογραφικό καταπιέζοντάς τις. Ούτε μπορεις να μειώσεις τις εκτρώσεις κάνοντάς τες πιο δύσκολες ή παράνομες. Ούτε μπορείς να υποκρίνεσαι τον καλόπιστο αν δεν αναγνωρίζεις έμπρακτα ότι αυτό που κατά βάση μειώνει τις αμβλώσεις είναι η πρόσβαση σε αντισύλληψη.<br />
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-92108323822426932022017-08-26T21:59:00.001+01:002017-08-27T06:59:06.412+01:00Η πειθώ στα χρόνια των Μνημονίων: Ή, γιατί στηρίζω το ΚεΦιΜ.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<div dir="ltr" style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;">
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><b>Αντί εισαγωγής</b></span><br />
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Η πρώτη μου δουλειά ήταν η καλύτερη. Το σχολείο μου είχε (και έχει ακόμη) έναν επιτυχημένο ρητορικό όμιλο* και στη συμμετοχή μου σε αυτόν χρωστάω πολλές από τις σημαντικότερες φιλίες και εμπειρίες της ζωής μου. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><br /></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Όταν ήρθε η σειρά μου να προπονήσω τον όμιλο, </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">προέτρεπα τους μαθητές να μην αναλώνονται στη συλλογή στατιστικών στοιχείων και ο ίδιος τα χρησιμοποιούσα πολύ σπάνια. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Υπήρχαν πρακτικοί λόγοι γι' αυτό (δύσκολα διασταυρώνονται στοιχεία στη μέση της συζήτησης), ύπήρχε όμως και η εκπαιδευτική διάσταση. Το ζητούμενο ήταν να καταλάβει κανείς πώς δομείται ένα επιχείρημα, από που αντλεί την ισχύ του, και πώς μπορούν να εντοπιστούν οι αδυναμίες του - όχι να μάθει απέξω νούμερα και παραπομπές. Oι μαθητές αναλάμβαναν στην τύχη την πλευρά του θέματος την οποία θα υπερασπίζονταν. Όχι για να μάθουν τάχα ότι δεν υπάρχει αλήθεια, αλλά για να μάθουν ότι ο συνάνθρωπός μας πολλές φορές πρώτα διαμορφώνει 'θέσει' </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">την άποψή του </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">κι εκ των υστέρων μαθαίνει να την υπερασπίζεται. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Ο δημόσιος διάλογος δε, ακολουθεί τον </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Structure_of_Scientific_Revolutions" style="font-size: 12.8px;">κανόνα του Kuhn</a><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">: ένα υπόδειγμα νικιέται από ένα άλλο υπόδειγμα, από ένα πιο ελκυστικό αφήγημα. Δεν νικιέται από τα δεδομένα που δεν εξηγεί. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Δεν έχω αλλάξει γνώμη, παρά τα φαινόμενα. </span></div>
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<div style="color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 12.8px;">
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Το ιστολόγιο αυτό δεν ξεκίνησε για να κάνω fact-checks και να γράφω σεντόνια. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Η κρίση όμως, και ειδικά οι επικοινωνιακοί εμφύλιοι του 2010—12 και του 2015, τα έφεραν όλα αυτά στο προσκήνιο από ανάγκη. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Ο </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">κόσμος έμαθε να πιστεύει κυριολεκτικά τέρατα. </span>Βασικά στοιχεία, προσβάσιμα κατ' αρχήν, έλειπαν από την επιχειρηματολογία και την αντίληψη κάθε πλευράς. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Τα ηλεκτρονικά μέσα, ακόμη κι εκείνα με ονόματα βαριά σαν πιεστήριο, σπάνια παρέθεταν πρωτογενείς πηγές. Η κοντόφθαλμη λογική τους ακόμη και τώρα είναι ότι ένας επισκέπτης που ξεροσταλιάζει παθητικά στις σελίδες τους είναι πολυτιμότερος από κάποιον που αλλάζει σελίδα για να εξετάσει τις πηγές τους. </span><br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><b style="font-size: 12.8px;">Τι μένει να πούμε;</b></span><br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Κι όμως σιγά σιγά η σκόνη καταλαγιάζει. Οι Έλληνες έχουν μάθει την ορολογία της κρίσης και ποιά νούμερα πρέπει να προσέχουν σαν ηλικιωμένοι που κάνουν συχνά εξετάσεις. Οι πάλαι ποτέ αντιμνημονιακοί υπογράφουν μνημόνια και τα υπερασπίζονται ψελλίζοντας λόγια που τους μάθαμε εμείς, οι γερμανοτσολιάδες - προδότες - νεφελίμ - ανάλγητοι φιλελέρες. Το κακό ΔΝΤ έγινε καλό ΔΝΤ, και σιγά σιγά απλά ΔΝΤ. Μετά από επτάμιση χρόνια, οι Έλληνες όσες πληροφορίες </span><i style="font-size: 12.8px;">ήθελαν </i><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">να μάθουν πάνω-κάτω τις έχουν μάθει. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Στο μεταξύ οι Έλληνες φιλελεύθεροι χάσαμε τη μάχη για τη νοηματοδοσία της Κρίσης. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Σε μια Βουλή με Λεβέντη, Νικνικ, Πόρτα-Πόρτα και Χρυσαυγίτες έχουμε ελάχιστους βουλευτές και κανένα γνήσια δικό μας κόμμα. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Ο Έλληνας δέχτηκε, με τα πολλά, ότι το κράτος ξόδευε περισσότερα από όσα εισέπραττε κι ότι δεν παίζει να μας χαρίσει λεφτά ο Πούτιν ή να πλουτίσουμε από τα πετρέλαια του Αιγαίου.Αλλά μετά από επτά χρόνια κρίσης δεν τον νοιάζει ποιός έφταιξε ούτε τι έπρεπε να είχε γίνει διαφορετικά. </span><br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Επειδή όμως όραμα για την επόμενη μέρα δεν υπάρχει, έχουμε ακόμη μια ευκαιρία να κάνουμε κάτι χρήσιμο για τη χώρα. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Η κουβέντα που κάναμε ως τώρα πρέπει να τελειώνει και να δώσει τη θέση της σε έναν εντελώς διαφορετικό διάλογο. </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><b>Ο Κιμ δεν θα πατήσει το κουμπί</b></span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Για να δούμε τι είδους διάλογος πρέπει να ξεκινήσει, ας σκεφτούμε τι θα συμβεί αν κάποτε τελικά 'νικήσουμε' ιδεολογικά. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Θα πεθάνουν από τη ντροπή τους οι επιτήδειοι κρατιστές και οι συμπολίτες μας που τους έφεραν στην εξουσία; Θα αυτοεξοριστούν όλοι μαζί στη Βενεζουέλα, την Ουγγαρία ή έστω τη Σουηδία (ανάλογα τον καημό του ο καθένας); Θα αποσυρθούν σε μοναστήρια διαβάζοντας προφητείες; Θα δεχτούν την τεχνοκρατική μας ανωτερότητα και θα μας παρακαλέσουν να τους κυβερνήσουμε; Ή μήπως θα πατήσει το κουμπί ο Κίμ, αδειάζοντας την Ελλάδα για να εποικιστεί από πιο άξιους φιλελεύθερους πολίτες εισαγωγής; </span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Μα τ</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">ίποτε απ' όλα αυτά δεν θα γίνει, κι ευτυχώς. Η χώρα μ' αυτά και μ' αυτά θα συνεχίσει να υπάρχει - πιο γερασμένη, πιο φτωχή- και οι ιδεολογικοί μας αντίπαλοι μαζί της. Δεν μας περιμένει ούτε φιλελεύθερη, ούτε εθνικιστική, ούτε σοσιαλιστική, ούτε αναρχική επανάσταση στο τελος του δρόμου. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Αφού έχουν έτσι τα πράγματα, τριών ειδών τακτικές μας απομένουν: συνεργασία, δολιοφθορά και προσηλυτισμός. </span><br />
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<b>Είμαστε λίγοι</b><br />
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><br /></span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Συνεργασία και δολιοφθορά είναι δύο εκδοχές της ίδιας τακτικής - οι φιλελεύθεροι αναρριχώνται στην εξουσία καβάλα σε ένα μεγαλύτερο κόμμα - είτε ως εταίροι του σε έναν κυβερνητικό συνασπισμό, είτε καταλαμβάνοντας εκ των έσω την ηγετική του ομάδα.</span><br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Δεν θέλω να αδικήσω όσους σκέφτονται έτσι. Το ελληνικό πολίτευμα είναι τόσο άνισα στημένο κατά των μικρών πολιτικών δυνάμεων που δεν αφήνει περιθώρια για ελπίδα. Ξεχνούν όμως πόσο λίγοι είμαστε </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">(δείτε σχετικά <a href="https://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2016/02/counting-greeces-libertarians.html">εδώ</a>).</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;"> Περίπου ένα 6%-7% του εκλογικού σώματος είχαν φιλελεύθερες αξίες το 2008 και στα κοινωνικά και στα οικονομικά ζητήματα . Ίσως φτάσαμε στο 9%-10% <a href="http://www.dianeosis.org/research/greek_values/">το 2015</a> και εκεί βρισκόμαστε ακόμη <a href="http://www.dianeosis.org/2017/03/tpe_2017/">το 2017</a>. Οι περισσότεροι φιλελεύθεροι (που όντως ψηφίζουν) υποστηρίζουν τη ΝΔ, όμως μειοψηφούν σημαντικά μεταξύ των ψηφοφόρων της (ήταν λιγότερο από το 20% του συνόλου το 2008, λίγο παραπάνω το 2015, λιγο λιγότεροι το 2017). </span><br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Για να μην σας κουράζω: κανένα κόμμα εξουσίας δεν πρόκειται να αλλάξει δραστικά πορεία για το χατίρι μας. Καλή τύχη στον Κυριάκο, αλλά μην έχετε αυταπάτες. Η δουλειά των κομμάτων εξουσίας δεν είναι να κάνουν ιδεολογικές επαναστάσεις, αλλά να χτίζουν, με μπαλώματα και με εκπτώσεις, συμμαχίες μεταξύ διαφορετικών κοινωνικών ομάδων που για λίγο βρίσκουν κοινό τόπο σε πέντε δέκα αιτήματα. Αυτό δεν είναι ελάττωμα της δημοκρατίας - το αντίθετο.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Η λύση του προσηλυτισμού, όσο δύσκολη κι αν φαντάζει, έχει περισσότερες προοπτικές και είναι απόλυτα συμβατή με τις άλλες δύο. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Για να το πω αλλιώς: δεν χρειάζεται οι φιλελεύθεροι να συμφωνήσουμε σε πρόσωπα ή κόμματα αν καταφέρουμε να φτιάξουμε σιγά σιγά ένα πραγματικό, ζωντανό κίνημα που θα φέρει κι άλλους συμπολίτες μας σε επαφή με τις ιδέες μας. Ένας ισχυρός πόλος ψηφοφόρων που είναι συνεπείς σε πέντε απλά αιτήματα και μπορούν να συνεννοηθούν σε βασικό επίπεδο με τους συμπολίτες τους θα αναγκάζει πάντα σε συμβιβασμούς τα κόμματα εξουσίας κι ας μην τα ψηφίσει ποτέ.</span></div>
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<b style="font-size: 12.8px;">"Έχετε δύο λεπτά να σας μιλήσω για τον Κύριο και Σωτήρα μας, την ελεύθερη αγορά;" </b><br />
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Αν διαλέξουμε την επιλογή της της πειθούς, ο δρόμος μας είναι ανηφορικός. Επτά χρόνια τώρα δεν καταφέραμε να πείσουμε πολλούς συνανθρώπους μας. Οι <span style="font-size: 12.8px;">επικλήσεις της 'κοινής λογικής', η οχύρωση πίσω από στατιστικές, ακόμη και οι εξαγριωμένες επιθέσεις σε 'σανοφάγους' και 'γίδια', όλα </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">αυτή την αδυναμία μας δείχνουν - να πείσουμε, να διδάξουμε ανθρώπους έξω από τον κύκλο μας. Δεν σας κάνω τον έξυπνο - εγώ τα έκανα πρώτος αυτά τα λάθη. Πρέπει όμως να τα αφήσουμε πίσω μας. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><br /></span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Η "κοινή λογική" είναι η χειρότερη από τις αυταπάτες μας. Ο άνθρωπος δεν είναι αυτό που νομίζουμε. Η</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;"> ελευθερία κι ο αυταρχισμός του έρχονται εξίσου αυθόρμητα και αβίαστα. Δ</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">εν έχει ούτε φυσικό αισθητήριο της αλήθειας ούτε φυσική ροπή προς αυτήν. Τ</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">ο μόνο που ενστικτωδώς αφουγκραζόμαστε στο λόγο του άλλου είναι η βιολογική, κοινωνική, ή ιδεολογική μας συγγένεια - ενστικτωδώς ξεχωρίζουμε τους 'δικούς μας' από τους 'αλλους'. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Ακριβώς γι αυτό το λόγο, </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">οι άνθρωποι δεν αλλάζουν γνώμη πάνω στην κουβέντα, επειδή τους έπεισες με τη ρητορική μαεστρία σου, την τετράγωνη λογική σου ή τα τεκμήριά σου. Μπορούν όμως να πειστούν για την καλή σου προαίρεση, ή τη βαθειά σου γνώση, και να αρχίσουν να σε ακούν πιο προσεκτικά.</span></div>
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Ο πραγματικά πειστικός λόγος δεν είναι λοιπόν ο λόγος που αλλάζει γνώμη στον άλλο, αλλά αυτός που τον μπολιάζει με αμφιβολία ή περιέργεια, <span style="font-size: 12.8px;">ή τον κάνει να σκεφτεί με τρόπο που δεν έχει ξανασκεφτεί ποτέ</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">. Που ταράζει τον απαθή. Η πειθώ δημιουργεί μια διαφορά δυναμικού, ας το πούμε έτσι, ανάμεσα στις πεποιθήσεις που έχει, ή ανάμεσα στις πεποιθήσεις και τις πράξεις του. Το τι θα κάνει με αυτή την ενέργεια δεν μπορείς να το καθορίσεις με την πειθώ. Μπορεί (σπάνια) να αλλάξει στάση. Μπορεί (συχνότερα) να αναζητήσει επιπλέον επιβεβαίωση για τις απόψεις του. Μπορεί να σε αποφεύγει ή να σε περιθωριοποιήσει. </span><br />
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Η αυταπάτη της κοινής λογικης όμως μας περιορίζει και με πιο σημαντικούς τρόπους. Αφενός δεν έχουμε πάντα δίκιο. Αφετέρου ο δημόσιο διάλογος δεν χτίζεται στη βάση της λογικής.<br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><b>Πώς δουλεύει ο δημόσιος διάλογος</b></span><br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Σκεφτείτε λίγο τι γνωρίζουμε για τη δυναμική του δημόσιου διαλόγου στις μέρες μας. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Ο </span><a href="http://arxiv.org/pdf/1004.5009v1.pdf" style="font-size: 12.8px;">Galam </a><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">(2013) πχ μας λέει ότι όταν ο δημόσιος διάλογος διεξάγεται υπό συνθήκες αβεβαιότητας, αργά ή γρήγορα υπερισχύει η πλευρά με τους περισσότερους παθιασμένους οπαδούς. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Οι </span><a href="http://ifisc.uib-csic.es/~jramasco/text/stubborn_effect.pdf" style="font-size: 12.8px;">Guazzini et al (2015)</a><span style="font-size: 12.8px;"> εξηγούν</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;"> ότι δεν είναι η <i>προσωπικότητα </i>του άλλου που τον κάνει παθιασμένο. Είναι η <i>θέση </i>του στο δίκτυο. Η προσωπικότητα καθορίζει μόνο σε τίνος την επιρροή θα είναι πιο δεκτικός. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Ανακαλύπτουμε λοιπόν αυτό που ξέρουν όλες οι θρησκείες, όλες οι συμμορίες, όλες οι μονάδες ειδικών δυνάμεων, και όλες οι ποδοσφαιρικές ομάδες, είναι ότι κανείς είτε </span><u style="font-size: 12.8px;">ανατρέφεται </u><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">μέσα σε έναν χώρο είτε </span><u style="font-size: 12.8px;">μυείται</u><span style="font-size: 12.8px;"> σε αυτόν με σύμβολα, αφηγήματα και τελετουργίες. Αμφότερες είναι κοινωνικές και όχι λογικέ ή μηχανικές διαδικασίες.</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;"> </span><br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Αυτό ισχύει και για "πεφωτισμένες" τάχα απόψεις όπως οι δικές μας. Η "γενιά της easyjet" γουστάρει Ευρώπη και ανοιχτά σύνορα γιατί μυήθηκε σε αυτήν σε στιγμές καθοριστικές - στις σπουδές, σε περιπετειώδεις νεανικές διακοπές, σε επιχειρηματικά ταξίδια, σε καλοκαιρινούς έρωτες. Όχι επειδή την έπεισαν τα επιχειρήματα υπέρ της Ενιαίας Αγοράς ή επειδή ψάχτηκε καθόλου σε θέματα Κοινής Αγροτικής Πολιτικής.</span><br />
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Θα μου πείτε - οι φανατικοί πρέπει τουλάχιστον να είναι αμόρφωτοι ή χαζούληδες. Όσο περισσότερα γνωρίζει κανείς τόσο πιο πολύ νερό βάζει στο κρασί του. Κι όμως, μας λένε οι Kahan et al (2013), αναλύοντας το φαινόμενο της <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2319992">'στρατευμένης' τεχνικής δεξιότητας</a>. Όσο καλύτερα καταρτισμένος είναι κανείς, τόσο περισσότερο μπορεί να διαστρέψει τα στοιχεία που έχει στη διάθεσή του. Η πόλωση σε καίρια ζητήματα είναι μεγαλύτερη μεταξύ των 'ψαγμένων,' παρά μεταξύ των περαστικών.<br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Πέρα από την ποσοτική πλευρά του φαινομένου υπάρχει και ποιοτική πλευρά. Όταν ο κόσμος ακολουθεί και αναπαράγει υλικό που επιβεβαιώνει τις απόψεις του και προωθεί ομοϊδεάτες, μοιραία δημιουργούνται γκέτο και μονοκαλλιέργειες ιδεών που γίνονται όλο και πιο ακραίες. Όπως κάθε είδους αιμομιξία, κάθε ανταλλαγή απόψεων μέσα σε αυτούς τους θύλακες </span><i style="font-size: 12.8px;">αποδυναμώνει </i><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">τις θέσεις τους - η άμυνα ενάντια στην κριτική γίνεται όλο και περισσότερο όχι μέσω επιχειρημάτων αλλά με κοινωνικούς ελέγχους. Αυτό το βλέπουμε ξεκάθαρα όταν το κάνουν οι 'άλλοι'. Δεν το βλέπουμε ξεκάθαρα όταν το κάνουμε εμείς οι ίδιοι.</span><br />
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<b style="font-size: 12.8px;">Φιλελευθερισμός με φετβάδες δεν γίνεται</b></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Είναι πλέον κοινός τόπος το αφήγημα, ότι τάχα ο φιλελεύθερος κόσμος δεν μπορεί να μιλήσει στον υπόλοιπο επειδή ζει σε μια ελίτ φυσαλλίδα όπου ομοϊδεάτες μιλούν μεταξύ τους. Δεν είμαστε, λέει αυτή η λογική, παρά μια ηχηρή παρέα από επαγγελματίες καλοθελητές ειδικευμένους στο να προσβάλλονται για λογαριασμό τρίτων και να μιλούν υποτιμητικά στους αδαείς. Ή από καλοπληρωμένους και </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">καλοδικτυωμένους</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;"> </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">αερητζίδες που λένε τεμπέλη και παράσιτο τον κάθε βιοπαλαιστή που δεν δέχεται να του καταστραφεί η ζωή για να τέμνονται στο σωστό σημείο οι καμπύλες της προσφοράς και της ζήτησης. Ο δε 'κανονικός' κόσμος αντιδρά στις εμμονές μας, που του επιβάλλονται συχνά έξωθεν και δια του νόμου, με όλο και πιο προκλητικές και ακραίες εκφράσεις των αντιλήψεών του.</span><br />
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Βλακείες. </span><br />
<span style="font-size: 12.8px;"><br /></span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Συμφωνώ οτι χάθηκε κάπου στην πορεία </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">η τέχνη της πειθούς</span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">. </span><span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Είναι λειψός και τελικά επικίνδυνος ένας φιλελευθερισμός
που στηρίζεται σε τετελεσμένα, σε εκβιαστικά διλήμματα, σε φιρμάνια και
σε δικαστήρια. Όχι επειδή οι εξουσίες
δεν οφείλουν να αναγνωρίζουν την πραγματικότητα, και να σέβονται και να
υπερασπίζονται ελευθερίες και δικαιώματα.
Αλλά επειδή τα νομικά και πολιτικά κεκτημένα χτίζονται
πολύ πιο γρήγορα από ό,τι ωριμάζουν στη
συνείδηση της κοινωνίας οι αντίστοιχες
ιδέες. Ο φιλελευθερισμός δε όταν νικά
κατά κράτος στα χαρτιά γίνεται νωθρός
και θρασύς – αρχίζει να απαντά στον
ανελεύθερο λόγο πρώτα με τον καταναγκασμό και μετά, πολύ αργά, με την πειθώ. Και όταν συμβεί δύο και τρεις φορές αυτό, άκομψα και δημόσια, ο πολύς κόσμος
νοιώθει ότι βάλλεται.</span></div>
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Αν λοιπόν κάποια δικαιώματα κα κάποιες ευκαιρίες δεν μπορούν να
περιμένουν να ωριμάσει η κοινωνία, καθήκον μας τότε είναι να κάνουμε πιο γρήγορα το ιδεολογικό μας έργο. Πιστεύω όμως ότι η κοινή γνώμη μπορεί να μεταστραφεί γρήγορα, ακόμη και σε ζητήματα που τον πολύ κόσμο τον ταράζουν βαθιά στην ψυχή του. <span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Δείτε πχ πώς αντέδρασε ο Ελληνικός λαός στο θέμα των προσφύγων - πώς βρεθήκαμε από λαός βασικά φοβικός να είμαστε και πάλι, με τις όποιες παραφωνίες, φιλόξενοι και ανθρώπινοι.</span></div>
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<b style="font-size: 12.8px;">Ποιό είναι λοιπόν το αφήγημά μας;</b></div>
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<span lang="el-GR" style="font-size: 12.8px;">Το φιλελέ </span><span lang="en-GB" style="font-size: 12.8px;">Think Tank Dianeosis </span><span lang="el-GR" style="font-size: 12.8px;">δημοσιεύει από το 2015 μια σειρά από εξαιρετικές δημοσκοπήσεις σχετικά με τις πεποιθήσεις και τη νοοτροπία των Ελλήνων - ‘Τι Πιστεύουν οι Έλληνες’. Ο</span><span lang="el-GR" style="font-size: 12.8px;">ι απαντήσεις των πολιτών είναι , ακούω, αντιφατικές – όλοι είμαστε λίγο καπιτάλες, λίγο σοσιαλιστές, λίγο αναρχικοί και λίγο φασίστες. Γνέφουμε όλοι αναγνωρίζοντας το πρόβλημα, μετράμε απογοητευμένοι τις </span><span lang="el-GR" style="font-size: 12.8px;">λιγοστές</span><span lang="el-GR" style="font-size: 12.8px;"> ‘υγιείς δυνάμεις’ του τόπου και περιμένουμε την επόμενη έκδοση. Δεν είναι αυτή, νομίζω, η σωστή απάντηση.</span></div>
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Η απάντηση είναι ότι οι Έλληνες (και οι υπόλοιποι λαοί επίσης) δεν ‘πιστεύουν’ τίποτε, κι ως εκ τούτου μπορούν να αντιφάσκουν χωρίς πρόβλημα. Για να είμαι πιο σαφής – οι πολίτες μπορεί να έχουν ηθικές ή φιλοσοφικές αρχές που τους κατευθύνουν στις προσωπικές τους επιλογές. Αυτές όμως σπάνια τους είναι χρήσιμες σε μάκρο ζητήματα. Εκεί αντιθέτως οι πολίτες βρίσκουν το δρόμο τους συνδέοντας αφηγήματα – σκεφτείτε τον Ταρζάν να πετά πάνω από τη ζούγκλα πηδώντας από χορτόσχοινο σε χορτόσχοινο.</div>
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<span lang="el-GR">Όσοι έχετε διαβάσει το </span><span lang="en-GB">Dune </span><span lang="el-GR">του Frank </span><span lang="en-GB">Herbert </span><span lang="el-GR">θα θυμάστε τις μεθόδους των </span><span lang="en-GB">Bene Gesserit –</span><span lang="en-US"> </span><span lang="el-GR">οι ιεραπόστολοί τους πετούν από πλανήτη σε πλανήτη σπέρνοντας πιασάρικους και εύπλαστούς μύθους και προφητείες. Αιώνες μετά, οι πράκτορές τους όπου κι αν προσγειωθούν μπορούν να επικαλεστούν αυτά τα γνώριμα αρχέτυπα για να κερδίσουν την εμπιστοσύνη και το θαυμασμό των ντόπιων. Από τέτοια ‘βαθιά αφηγήματα’ αποτελείται η συνείδηση του μέσου πολίτη. Όποιος ξέρει να τα χειρίζεται, κυβερνά τον κόσμο.</span></div>
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<span lang="el-GR">Δεν γνωρίζω να έχουν χαρτογραφηθεί ποτέ σε βάθος τα βαθιά αφηγήματα και οι κοινωνικές ομάδες στις οποίες βρίσκουν απήχηση στην Ελλάδα. Αξίζει όμως. Η χώρα μας έχει φιλελέ αφηγήματα. Για να τα ανακαλύψουμε χρειάζεται να ξαναζωντανέψουμε και μια άλλη, παλιότερη μέθοδο από τις δημοσκοπήσεις και τα focus groups - χρειαζόμαστε φιλελέ λαογράφους.</span></div>
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<span style="font-size: 12.8px;">Χρειάζεται οι φιλελέδες να καταλάβουμε σε βάθος ποια είναι τα βαθιά αφηγήματα που κουβαλάμε σα λαός, ποιά μπορούν να μεταστραφούν σε υγιείς δυνάμεις και ποιά πρέπει να τα πολεμήσουμε. Ιδανικά, αυτή τη δουλειά θα την είχαμε κάνει πριν την κρίση. Τίποτε όμως δεν είναι ιδανικό και πρέπει να πιάσουμε την άκρη του νήματος από κει όπου έχει κατρακυλήσει το τόπι.</span></div>
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<span lang="el-GR">Τις καλές εποχές το αφήγημα της Ευρώπης ήταν ένα τέτοιο βαθύ αφήγημα – η τουρκοκρατία και οι πόλεμοι μας απέκλεισαν από την φυσική μας κληρονομιά – εμείς δώσαμε τα φώτα στην Ευρώπη και από γκαντεμιά τώρα τα απολαμβάνουν άλλοι κι εμείς όχι. Ως Ευρωπαίοι πια και κάτω από τη θαλπωρή μιας διαρκούς ειρήνης, εύκολα θα ανακτήσουμε το χαμένο έδαφος. Δεν αρκούσε αύτο το αφήγημα – μόλις βρεθήκαμε σε (τεχνητή, πιστεύω) σύγκρουση με την Ευρώπη κατέρρευσε.</span></div>
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<span lang="el-GR">Για να ξανα-ανακαλύψουμε την τέχνη της πειθούς πρέπει να σκεφτούμε βαθιά, να ακούμε προσεκτικά, και να ξαναφτιάξουμε όχι το ένα, λειψό, αφήγημα της προόδου, αλλά πολλά και αλληλλεπικαλυπτόμενα αφηγήματα. Θέλω κι εγώ να συνεισφέρω σε αυτό το έργο.</span></div>
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[Συνεχίζεται]</div>
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* στατιστική-μπόνους: το 2009, σύμφωνα με την <a href="http://pisa2009.acer.edu.au/interactive_results.php">PISA</a>, το 7.5% των μαθητών της επικράτειας είχαν πρόσβαση σε ρητορικούς ομίλους. </div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com29tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-34516340275778388682016-10-17T22:50:00.002+01:002016-10-31T07:54:21.839+00:00WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT GREEK TV LICENCING<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<b>[Attention! Work in progress]</b><br />
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<b>Why are we talking about this at all?</b><br />
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This all started in February - when the Greek government, citing a then-<a href="http://fsr.eui.eu/a-preparatory-study-on-dtt-auctions-in-greece/">unpublished study</a> by the European University Institute of Florence, prepared a Bill for MPs to debate that would <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/only-four-greek-tv-channels-get-licences-eight-will-need-to-close/">cap the number of Greek broadcasting licences at four</a>. Despite not having read the Florence Institute Report (as it is now widely known), the coalition's MPs duly voted the measures through. Fast-forward to September, when the Government awarded these four licences in a bizarre auction/show trial process in which would-be oligarchs were forced to camp alongside government officials for <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/211690/article/ekathimerini/news/greeces-tv-license-tender-reaches-conclusion">three days</a> - no doubt to the satisfaction of many Greeks. The shake-down was trumpeted by the Greek government as a resounding success - the Florence study had suggested a reserve price between EUR0.5m and EUR3.5m; the Government set a starting price of EUR5m; the highest bidder ended up <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/211690/article/ekathimerini/news/greeces-tv-license-tender-reaches-conclusion">paying 75.9m</a>. In total, the Greek government raised <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/only-four-greek-tv-channels-get-licences-eight-will-need-to-close/">EUR246m</a>. By the time of the auction, six of the eight outbid broadcasters, facing forced closure, were already on the case, having taken the matter to Greece's constitutional court - the Council of State.<br />
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A tumultuous interval followed, in which the Government and its proxies made what seemed to be efforts to by turns <a href="http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2016/10/19/tv-licenses-private-e-mails-of-cos-top-judge-stir-greeces-political-agenda-lead-to-multiple-investigations/">blackmail </a>and <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2016/10/06/tsipras-meets-top-greek-judges-to-assure-no-pay-cuts-to-judicial-body/">bribe </a>judges. The Council of State's president adjurned one plenary citing <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/212577/article/ekathimerini/news/council-of-state-vice-presidents-resign-from-union">political interference</a>, his decision prompting two of its vice-presidents to resign from the Union of Judges and Prosecutors in protest. Eventually the Council of State found that the licencing law was <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/444421be-960f-11e6-a80e-bcd69f323a8b">unconstitutional</a> - a split (14 to 11) decision to the effect that the licencing of broadcasters is not within the gift of Government but that of the <a href="http://advanced-television.com/2016/10/27/greek-tv-auction-unconstitutional/">National Council for Radio and Television</a>. This cannot have come as a shock to the Greek Government. After all, they took a gamble precisely in order to circumvent the NCRT, whose leadership must be determined by cross-party consensus. Opposition parties could and did effectively <a href="https://www.indexoncensorship.org/2016/03/greece-move-to-regulate-broadcast-market-draws-objection/">block </a>any appointments, and thereby the licencing process itself.<br />
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In any case the CoS's ruling unravelled a key plank of the Greek government's policy - and one of the few it had full control over - but also forced them to return the funds already committed by the winning bidders, which had already been pledged many times over to pet projects. This humiliation was hardly the first in the licencing saga - one of the top bidders had by that time had to <a href="https://www.ft.com/content/830ab280-8400-11e6-8897-2359a58ac7a5">withdraw their bid</a> as their financial means statement turned out to be bogus - but it was the worst. Almost immediately, the Greek government and sympathetic journalists <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/greek-court-rejects-governments-plan-to-revamp-media-sector-1477520945">denounced</a> the Council of State's decision as an attempted coup that would force children to go hungry, and launched into a bizarre discussion of whether the judiciary should have the power to rule a 'just' law unconstitutional at all.<br />
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<b>Was Greek TV really that bad?</b></div>
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In short, yes. It was never actually very good. The Greek media landscape came to life as the <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/35728875/Paschalidis-Entertaining_the_Colonels.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1476744165&Signature=zcIPrOQ5iubw4P0yeLbyafGEBH4%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DEntertaining_the_Colonels_Propaganda_soc.pdf">plaything of dictators</a>, and to this day our <a href="http://www.hri.org/docs/syntagma/artcl25.html#A15">Constitution</a> continues to stipulate, chillingly, that "<span style="background-color: white;">Radio and television shall be under the immediate control of the State." </span>Following a near-decade of Borat-style ignominy for Greek State television, (between 1981-9, ERT had
thirteen chairmen and DGs, and sixteen news-directors with an average
term of about eight months), Greece embarked on <a href="http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/40826782/Broadcasting__politics_and_the_State_in_Socialist_Greece.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1476743147&Signature=KxqzsaLyn%2FSZPd4XigXTkP%2Ff%2BRw%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DBroadcasting_politics_and_the_state_in_S.pdf">an ill-fated deregulation of television broadcasting</a> in 1989, with the government auctioning four regional TV licences. Upon deregulation, and with a few considerable exceptions, the sector <a href="http://eclass.uoa.gr/modules/document/file.php/MEDIA165/%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%89%CF%81%CE%AF%CE%B5%CF%82%20%CE%B1%CE%BA%CF%81%CE%BF%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%81%CE%AF%CE%BF%CF%85-audience%20research-%CF%84%CF%83%CE%B1%CE%BB%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B7/greek%20tv%20drama.pdf">exploded into an orgy of unimaginative programming and re-runs</a>. TV stations proliferated, and even the biggest remained persistently unprofitable, and dependent, as were newspapers and radio stations before them, on a mix of 'either considerable yearly subsidies or soft state-bank loans
or on the wealth of their owners.' In international comparisons, news pieces on Greek TV stations were much less likely than those in other countries to feature <a href="https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Stylianos_Papathanassopoulos/publication/271172288_Reconsidering_'virtuous_circle'_and_'media_malaise'_theories_of_the_media_An_11-nation_study/links/55301d180cf20ea0a06f656d.pdf">third-party expert</a> opinions, and Greek TV channels were much less likely to offer <a href="http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/docs/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCS_derivate_000000004902/1002.full.pdf">science programmes</a>.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQt7G-SzP7hvIXDTvEwG6h8FdT-ywv2xboIbGKVw8grk8Td3zivvCvqojTWnZ4HSlWOT0ZqlEb4XzpPqncIq5iqUgJl_SpU_ZQFw6z9ErVLMKDRudk-ggmAJAJjymLITmruy0lxE8zMEgi/s1600/mistrust.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="198" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgQt7G-SzP7hvIXDTvEwG6h8FdT-ywv2xboIbGKVw8grk8Td3zivvCvqojTWnZ4HSlWOT0ZqlEb4XzpPqncIq5iqUgJl_SpU_ZQFw6z9ErVLMKDRudk-ggmAJAJjymLITmruy0lxE8zMEgi/s320/mistrust.png" width="320" /></a>So Greek TV was poor, and the people knew it. The <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart//themeKy/18/groupKy/87/savFile/201">Eurobarometer surveys</a>, for example, reveal that only one in five Greeks tend to trust TV channels and on last count (Nov 2015), ours was the worst reading in Europe, with France, Spain, Cyprus and Slovenia following at a safe distance. This follows a steady loss of faith in television that started as far back as 2003, and a divergence between trust in television and trust in the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/PublicOpinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/chartType/lineChart//themeKy/18/groupKy/84/savFile/201">press </a>from late 2004 onwards. Interestingly, trust in the press has recovered slightly during the crisis, while trust in television kept drifting. Meanwhile, anyone with an internet connection <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053730_QID_-7EF1B9C9_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_IS,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;IND_TYPE,L,Z,1;GEO,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-053730INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-053730UNIT,PC_IND_IU3;DS-053730IND_TYPE,IND_TOTAL;DS-053730GEO,EL;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=IND-TYPE_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=INDIC-IS_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">flocked</a> to online portals, blogs and social media for not only their news but also the satisfaction of pushing back against the news agenda.</div>
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The Greek media aren't just increasingly mistrusted at the grassroots level, they are also rated increasingly poorly by <strike>a small, incestuous circle of</strike> experts in the field. <a href="https://rsf.org/en/greece">Reporters without Borders</a> ranks Greece 89<sup>th</sup> of 179 in its press freedom index for 2016 (with a score of 31.01, where 0 is the best possible and 100 is the worst possible; this is rated as 'problematic' under their <a href="https://rsf.org/en/detailed-methodology">methodology</a>). Our ranking is up from 94<sup>th </sup>of 179 in 2014 but down dramatically from 18<sup>th</sup> of 160 in 2005, weighed down not just by falling pluralism but also by increased use of actual violence against reporters. The latter has come from vested interests, angry crowds, criminals, but also very often from their own employers and co-workers (see eg <a href="http://ejc.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/05/01/0267323114531505.abstract">here</a>).</div>
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At the other end of the political spectrum, Freedom House <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2016/table-country-scores-fotp-2016">ranks </a>Greece 94<sup>th</sup> of 199 countries with a score of 48 where 0 is the best possible and 100 is the worst possible (methodology <a href="here: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2016-methodology">here</a>). This puts Greece in the 'partly free' category, ranking as one of the worst countries in Europe for press freedom. Interestingly, in Freedom house's ranking it is the weakness of the legal environment that weighs Greece down the most. Here too Greece's ranking has <a href="https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_FTOP_2016Report_Final_04232016.pdf">fallen </a>dramatically since 2011, by 18 places. </div>
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The EU-funded <a href="http://monitor.cmpf.eui.eu/results-2014/greece/">Media Pluralism Monitor</a>* found a medium/high risk to medial pluralism in Greece in 2014 and also highlighted the legal framework as our biggest problem. However Greece did not participate in the Monitor in 2015 and the 2016 assessment is not out yet.<br />
<br />
<b>If the Greek people don't trust TV news anyway, why is it such a big deal?</b><br />
<br />
Apparently the experience of watching news on the TV is a more passive one than, say, that of reading a newspaper or browsing the internet. Old people, the theory goes, are a particularly vulnerable, captive TV audience. My analysis of DiaNEOsis's surveys of 2015 suggests, for example, that right-wing women and older people do indeed trust the media more. And even those who don't trust the actual information, the theory goes, may still be susceptible to scaremongering through the TV as it bypasses their critical faculties. Stay tuned as I discuss this further.<br />
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<b>Were Greek TV stations financially viable?</b><br />
<br />
Depending on their audience the Greek government flits from one faux-technocratic excuse for its approach to TV licencing to another; the viability of TV stations is only one such. That's not to say this isn't important. The Greek government may be arguing in bad faith but its argument is still sound. A chronically unviable large TV channel is likely to be surviving on a cross-subsidy from corruption-tinged public works money and is likely to be leveraged to push more such prizes in its proprietors' way. Alternatively, it might be a zombie relying on endless loan rollovers which, in an economy such as Greece's, is only made possible by capital injections courtesy of the taxpayer. Or it might be both. And banks themselves have a media agenda which indebted press outlets might feel obliged to serve. We know, for instance that research has found a tentantive link between pro-bank newspaper bias and debt <a href="https://promarket.org/are-newspapers-captured-by-banks/">in Italy</a>.<br />
<br />
It's easy to see what happened to broadcasters' finances by looking at Eurostat's <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120957_QID_-20EABB1_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,Y,0;NACE_R2,L,Z,0;GEO,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-120957INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-120957NACE_R2,J602;DS-120957GEO,EL;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NACE-R2_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=INDIC-SB_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">detailed enterprise data</a> for the sector. Pre-crisis, the entire sector made some EUR1.2bn in turnover and employed 9,000 people (a number still used by the sector to lobby government in 2015). By 2014, and despite a tiny recovery from 2013 onwards, it was turning over barely one sixth of its pre-crisis figures and employing just over a quarter of what it once had. You can see the details of all major media restructurings in Greece <a href="https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/observatories/emcc/erm/factsheets?ef_search=&shs_term_node_tid_depth=9514&term_node_tid_depth[0]=74&field_ef_announcement_date_value[min][date]=&field_ef_announcement_date_value[max][date]=&field_ef_type_of_restructuring_tid=All">here</a>. There is still, in theory, some money to be made in the sector - the <a href="https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/only-four-greek-tv-channels-get-licences-eight-will-need-to-close/">EUR246m</a> oligarchs paid for licences provided them with access to just EUR41m worth of operating surplus in the short term. This is down, however, from EUR269 in 2008 and could, in theory, return to higher levels. A set of TV channels starting from scratch could, in theory, make money. But the existing channels were labouring under enormous debts - Mega alone owed <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36401908">EUR116m</a> earlier this year.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhH0J9QrWYJQKxPxbv7RIFinnNNaKrra-rdvtDmX5mKHSr57mdPEpNkEomGhcSSgi0x4X6YVl14A2QK7PREE5D_3_I6mjaoJCegjj9rEWzCg-7MBdxmQmX0U3lOLEqTT1yWU2hTtraudpKI/s1600/finances.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="190" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhH0J9QrWYJQKxPxbv7RIFinnNNaKrra-rdvtDmX5mKHSr57mdPEpNkEomGhcSSgi0x4X6YVl14A2QK7PREE5D_3_I6mjaoJCegjj9rEWzCg-7MBdxmQmX0U3lOLEqTT1yWU2hTtraudpKI/s400/finances.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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Most of the fall in revenues happened between 2010 and 2012 and was driven by food, drinks and tobacco ad budgets being cut. The top ten advertising sectors* and their approximate advertising spend can be seen below (see links below for sources). It takes a long time for this detailed information to be released so the 2012 figures are genuinely the most recent ones.<br />
<br />
<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0" style="border-collapse: collapse; width: 546px;"><colgroup><col style="mso-width-alt: 12946; mso-width-source: userset; width: 266pt;" width="354"></col><col span="3" style="width: 48pt;" width="64"></col></colgroup><tbody>
<tr height="17" style="height: 12.75pt;"><td height="17" style="height: 12.75pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"></td><td style="text-align: right; width: 48pt;" width="64"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">2012</span></td><td style="text-align: right; width: 48pt;" width="64"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">2011</span></td><td style="text-align: right; width: 48pt;" width="64"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">2010</span></td></tr>
<tr height="17" style="height: 12.75pt;"><td class="xl146" height="17" style="height: 12.75pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco </span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">484</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">682</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">837</span></td></tr>
<tr height="17" style="height: 12.75pt;"><td class="xl146" height="17" style="border-top: none; height: 12.75pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">35</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">63</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">67</span></td></tr>
<tr height="30" style="height: 22.5pt;"><td class="xl146" height="30" style="border-top: none; height: 22.5pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">33</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">43</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">60</span></td></tr>
<tr height="17" style="height: 12.75pt;"><td class="xl146" height="17" style="border-top: none; height: 12.75pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Wholesale trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">54</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">81</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">124</span></td></tr>
<tr height="17" style="height: 12.75pt;"><td class="xl146" height="17" style="border-top: none; height: 12.75pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">47</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">54</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">86</span></td></tr>
<tr height="17" style="height: 12.75pt;"><td class="xl146" height="17" style="border-top: none; height: 12.75pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Warehousing and support activities for transportation</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">86</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">100</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">173</span></td></tr>
<tr height="17" style="height: 12.75pt;"><td class="xl146" height="17" style="border-top: none; height: 12.75pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Telecommunications</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">36</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">53</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">71</span></td></tr>
<tr height="17" style="height: 12.75pt;"><td class="xl146" height="17" style="border-top: none; height: 12.75pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Public administration, defence, compulsory social security</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">49</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">52</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">67</span></td></tr>
<tr height="30" style="height: 22.5pt;"><td class="xl146" height="30" style="border-top: none; height: 22.5pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Creative, cultural and entertainment activities</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">90</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">96</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">103</span></td></tr>
<tr height="17" style="height: 12.75pt;"><td class="xl146" height="17" style="border-top: none; height: 12.75pt; text-align: right; width: 266pt;" width="354"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">Activities of membership organisations</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">65</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">79</span></td><td class="xl145" style="border-left: none; border-top: none; text-align: right;"><span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif; font-size: x-small;">75</span></td></tr>
</tbody></table>
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<div class="western" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">
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<div class="western" style="margin-bottom: 0cm;">
* a statistical mystery: for reasons I cannot fathom, both <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-446651_QID_6A02A7A1_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=PROD_NA,L,X,0;INDUSE,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;GEO,L,Z,1;STK_FLOW,L,Z,2;TIME,C,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-446651TIME,2010;DS-446651UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-446651GEO,EL;DS-446651INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-446651STK_FLOW,TOTAL;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=STK-FLOW_1_2_1_0&rankName5=TIME_1_0_1_0&rankName6=PROD-NA_1_2_0_0&rankName7=INDUSE_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">Eurostat's I/O tables for the Greek economy</a> (latest edition 2010) and Elstat's <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics/-/publication/SEL38/2010">tables for 2010 to 2012</a> record zero spending by financial services firms on advertising and market research. I find this <b>very </b>unlikely.<br />
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<b><br /></b></div>
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<b>TO BE CONTINUED</b></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com19tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-40611876163196402302016-09-16T23:12:00.004+01:002016-09-22T22:32:29.334+01:00COUNTING THE FINGERS OF THE INVISIBLE HAND<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<i>'Greece needs EUR100bn to get it out of today's recessionary spiral. We know how to release it.'</i><br />
<br />
I'm wary of Big Numbers. They tend to stick regardless of their source, the methodology involved in calculating them, or any caveats well-meaning originators attach to them. Citing Big Numbers is thinking big, maybe. But it's also asking for trouble. So who came up with this one? Step forward Kyriakos Mitsotakis, the leader of Greece's opposition.<br />
<br />
The figure, to be fair, predates Mitsotakis' ascension to the ND leadership- it was first mulled by the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises in <a href="http://www.skai.gr/news/finance/article/302925/sev-ependuseis-100-dis-eos-to-22-gia-tin-adistathmisi-tis-apoependusis-ton-teleutaion-eton-/">Dec 2015,</a> only to be resurrected by him in <a href="http://www.ypodomes.com/index.php/alles-ypodomes/politiki-epikairotita/item/35187-mitsotakis-xreiazomaste-100-dis-evro-ependyseis-mexri-to-2021">June 2016.</a> And it's not hard to see where the numbers come from; <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-406763_QID_-45E725B1_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;NA_ITEM,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-406763INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-406763UNIT,CP_MEUR;DS-406763NA_ITEM,B1GQ;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here </a>are the figures on Gross Capital Formation in Greece going all the way to 2015, and a breakdown <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-423033_QID_-38A500A1_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NACE_R2,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;ASSET10,L,Z,1;NA_ITEM,L,Z,2;GEO,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-423033NA_ITEM,P51G;DS-423033GEO,EL;DS-423033INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-423033UNIT,CP_MEUR;DS-423033ASSET10,N11G;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=ASSET10_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=NACE-R2_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">by industry and asset is available going f</a>rom 1995 to 2014. You can also look at the figures for business investment by detailed sector in <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120949_QID_-7871D2B2_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,X,1;NACE_R2,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-120949INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-120949GEO,EL;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName4=INDIC-SB_1_2_1_0&rankName5=NACE-R2_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">trade</a>, <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120957_QID_4683013_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,X,1;NACE_R2,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-120957INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-120957GEO,EL;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName4=INDIC-SB_1_2_1_0&rankName5=NACE-R2_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">services </a>and <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120933_QID_-2CFAE297_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,X,1;NACE_R2,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-120933INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-120933GEO,EL;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName4=INDIC-SB_1_2_1_0&rankName5=NACE-R2_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">construction and industry</a>, although again the data only go up to 2014 (2013 if you want all of those yummy 4-digit industries!).<br />
<br />
As far as I can tell, the HFE researchers have used the data above to compare pre- and post-crisis figures for fixed capital formation other than construction of dwellings, then calculated the shortfall between actual investment and some counterfactual extrapolated from pre-crisis numbers. This isn't a bad idea, as long as we know what we're working with. For the avoidance of doubt, this isn't 'economics' and neither is my commentary. It's playing with numbers to assist our thought process.<br />
<br />
Extrapolating from a pre-crisis trend assumes that the level of investment by Greek businesses in the run-up to the crisis was sustainable and growth could have continued much as it had before - avoiding the excesses of 2007-8 but still on the same basic trajectory. That's unlikely. If we assume that the level of investment would remain constant at 2008 level turns out to be harsher than just mean reversion. Assuming a linear trend is more generous. Both estimates converge on a shortfall of some EUR89-EUR109bn between 2009 and 2014 (the last data available to researchers when the estimate was first produced) or EUR137bn to EUR108bn between 2009 and 2015.* That explains where the EUR100bn number came from.<br />
<br />
An alternative might be to assume that 2008 was the peak of a credit bubble and use 'bubble free' figures that allow for a correction. I'm not going to bother with something detailed for the purposes of a thought experiment, so let's just take the 2001-08 (post-Euro) average as the benchmark for what 2008 should have looked like and assume that investment would then grow in a linear fashion based on the pre-crisis trend. This would produce a 2015 gross capital formation figure (ex dwellings) not far from the 2008 average. It would also mean a shortfall that is only about three quarters what the HFE estimated - about EUR73bn between 2009 and 2014 and EUR95bn between 2009 and 2015.<br />
<br />
Here's what the various estimates look like when plotted against historical data:<br />
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Now if you find these counterfactuals a useful place to start, the logical next step is to apply the same kind of thinking on a sector-by-sector basis. Here a few things become glaringly obvious:<br />
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<li>The big difference between my 'bubble-free' estimate and the simpler ones is precisely investment by real estate firms. By my estimate, there is no real net shortfall; the bubble has burst and that's all. By the estimates I think the HFE carried out, there is a huge shortfall. I think I'm right and they are wrong.</li>
<li>A lot of the investment shortfall is in the public sector. By my reckoning, EUR31bn of the lost EUR76bn of investment were in the broad public sector (including public administration, education and health) and about EUR21.5bn in public administration alone.</li>
<li>The other big contributors to the shortfall are shipping, sectors directly linked to domestic consumption - wholesale and retail and agriculture, and sectors linked to the real estate market. I would argue that this investment, totalling a net EUR40bn of the missing EUR76bn, cannot return while trade and the labour market remain subdued, but will likely be attracted to the sectors naturally as the former recover. </li>
<li>This is some interesting arithmetic - the missing EUR100bn is actually EUR76bn and could in fact be mostly due to public investment cuts. I cannot be certain that all of this investment was productive or needs to be restored. It may take a much smaller, and cheaper, boost to trigger investment into much of the private sector- as long as it is allowed to reach the businesses that can put it to good use.</li>
<li>One sector's investment was, nevertheless, boosted tremendously by the crisis - "membership organisations" have been investing in <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-423033_QID_7720E6A1_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;ASSET10,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;NA_ITEM,L,Z,1;GEO,L,Z,2;NACE_R2,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-423033NACE_R2,S94;DS-423033NA_ITEM,P51G;DS-423033INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-423033GEO,EL;DS-423033UNIT,CP_MEUR;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=NACE-R2_1_0_1_1&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=ASSET10_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">commercial property and other non-housing construction</a> in an explosion of spending that started in 2009. Since "membership organisations" or s.94 in the NACE classification <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/index/by_nace_s_.html#s94">include </a>a) the church b) political parties c) professional and business lobbyists d) unions, I can come up with any combination of conspiracy theories. Unfortunately I can't get much more detail than this as Eurostat doesn't publish detailed enterprise statistics for NACE s.94.</li>
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To confirm some of this thinking I looked at the Conference Board's <a href="https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TED_GrowthAccountingTotalFactorProductivity1990-2014.xlsx&type=subsite">Total Economy Database </a> and its estimates of how disinvestment has contributed to the recession. Again, I have not tried to retro-engineer the Conference Board's Growth Accounting but used simple extrapolations instead. What I got what this: essentially disinvestment in capital itself accounted for just under 10 percentage points of lost growth. Most of the damage was done by a loss of multifactor productivity, which means that the Greek economy has, over the years of the crisis, become fundamentally worse at allocating resources. Surely, disinvestment has contributed to this, but it's hard to know by how much.<br />
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* I can create extrapolations up to 2015 for capital formation excluding dwellings because, even though I don't have an asset x sector matrix for 2015 I know that almost all the investment in dwellings during the crisis era has come from the real estate sector. I can therefore make a pretty accurate guess of the 2015 matrix.<br />
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com2tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-67233979995689205442016-08-05T21:57:00.001+01:002016-08-28T20:47:30.740+01:00STATPORN, STATPIMPS, STATWHORES: AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF GREEK STATISTICS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span lang="EN-US">The Greek debt crisis had been decades in the making when it finally came to a head in late 2009, triggered by a sensational revision of government deficits. </span>But the <span lang="EN-US">events that led up to the ‘Greek Statistics’ </span>debacle<span lang="EN-US"> are still poorly understood both within the country and beyond. Half-truths and conspiracy theories have rushed to fill the void where evidence and reflection is lacking; and the fate of the country’s first-ever independent national statistics agency hangs in the balance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-US">“When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure”</span></b><span lang="EN-US"><br /><br />This little-known but highly quotable phrase is Dame Ann M. Strathern’s summary of Goodhart's “Law”, which stipulates that<i> “any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes.”</i></span><span lang="EN-US"> </span><span lang="DE">I</span><span lang="EN-US">f Goodhart’s “Law” applies to anything, it must apply to government deficits: they are some of the most closely and regularly monitored statistics in the world, and the multi-trillion Euro government bond markets literally hang on every release. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">It is no surprise, then, that a wealth of empirical evidence suggests that European countries’ deficit forecasts and actual deficits are, indeed, tampered with – routinely, significantly, and predictably. A range of studies such as </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/fiscal-gimmickry-in-europe_237714513517?crawler=true"><span lang="EN-US">Koen and Van de Noord (2005)</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://pascal.iseg.utl.pt/~depeco/wp/wp232007.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">Pina & Venes (2007)</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">; </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/86676/1/11-080.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">Beetsma et al (2011)</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1342.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">de Castro et al (2011)</span></a>,</span><span lang="EN-US"> </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://personal.lse.ac.uk/wehner/gimmicks.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">Alt et al (2014)</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> or </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.dnb.nl/binaries/Working%20Paper%20451_tcm46-316415.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">Gilbert & de Jong (2014)</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> show that this tampering is the result of political incentives subject to both economic and political cycles, and is made possible by a combination of incomplete fiscal transparency and fiscal centralisation. Worse, </span>the evidence suggests that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its 3% deficit ceiling (in effect since 1998) accentuated the political incentive to flatter the numbers. Post-SGP, forecast and <span lang="EN-US">early-release deficits have indeed fallen, but at the price of increasing stock-flow adjustments, and particularly the disguising of deficits as equity injections into state-controlled enterprises. Importantly, it isn’t Greece that drives these findings - the pattern holds when Greece is completely removed from the data.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-US">So what was special about Greece?<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">This doesn’t mean Greece’s track record in this regard does not warrant further discussion. </span><span lang="EN-US"><span style="font-family: "cambria" , serif;">A full record of </span></span>planned and actual deficits is available through Greece‘s <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/excessive-deficit-procedure/edp-notification-tables/edp-archives">Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) Notifications</a> - and it raises significant questions. <span lang="EN-US">As </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/fiscal-gimmickry-in-europe_237714513517?crawler=true"><span lang="EN-US">Koen and Van den Noord (2005)</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> and </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/86676/1/11-080.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">Beetsma et al (2011)</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> demonstrate, Greece had been an outlier in terms of both accounting gimmickry and revisions to deficit figures since at least 1997, with ex-post revisions typically doubling our original reported figures. The effect of accounting distortions on Greek deficits was typically three times the size of the distortions of the next worst-performing country. </span><br />
<span lang="EN-US"><br />As with other countries, (see </span><a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/fiscal-gimmickry-in-europe_237714513517?crawler=true"><span lang="EN-US">Koen and Van de Noord (2005)</span></a> Tables 4, 5, p. 15) <span class="MsoCommentReference"><span lang="DE" style="font-size: 9pt;">t</span></span><span lang="EN-US">he SGP reduced Greek governments' <i>planned </i>deficits – which indeed never crossed the 3% ceiling, and kept first-release deficits low as well.<span style="font-family: "cambria" , serif;"> </span></span><span lang="EN-US">Only after 2009 did the real story emerge, through the <i>ex-post</i> reviews of our deficits during Eurostat methodological visits. These revealed a persistent, downward trajectory for the public finances. Compliance with the SGP may not have instilled budget discipline, but it did give Greek finance ministers more power over their colleagues. As Prof. K. Featherstone, a long-time Greece-watcher, </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kevin_Featherstone/publication/4991651_Greece_and_EMU_Between_External_Empowerment_and_Domestic_Vulnerability/links/542557560cf238c6ea7401e7.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">recalls</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, when calls for relaxing the fiscal discipline of the SGP were loudest in 2002, <i>“</i>[t]<i>he Simitis government </i>[of Greece]<i> did not call for a lessening of this external discipline: </i>[T]<i>he corset </i>[…] <i>was a means of strengthening its domestic position when pressing for difficult reform.”</i></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">You </span>might<span lang="EN-US"> think Greece's performance with regard to fiscal targets has always been poor, but you'd be wrong. Historically, Greece is no stranger to such controls. The Greek state was dependent on foreign loans (and therefore on fiscal reporting to third parties) </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://historicalreview.org/index.php/historicalReview/article/view/305/193"><span lang="EN-US">from day minus one</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">; subsequently, we spent decades under fiscal monitoring and monetary straitjackets of some sort or other, of which the Euro accession criteria and the SGP were only the latest.<span style="font-family: "cambria" , serif;"> If this is of interest, see </span></span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/international_history_politics/users/stefano_ugolini/public/papers/Tuncer.pdf"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12pt;">Tuncer (2009)</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12pt;"> and </span><span lang="DE"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 12pt;"><a href="http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Paper200416.pdf">Lazaretou (2004)</a></span></span><span lang="EN-US"> for a review of this rich history. Ironically, it may be because of this history that the Greek people had, by 2009, ceased to be the intended users of fiscal data at all;</span> from a citizen’s perspective, our country had one of the most centralised and opaque budgeting systems in Europe. Fiscal data were, ultimately, for foreigners.<br />
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" o:spid="_x0000_i1027" style="height: 231pt; visibility: visible; width: 453.75pt;" type="#_x0000_t75"><v:imagedata o:title="" src="file:///C:\Users\sony\AppData\Local\Temp\msohtmlclip1\01\clip_image004.png"><o:lock aspectratio="f" v:ext="edit"></o:lock></v:imagedata></v:shape><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In keeping with this institutional deficit, Greece had never, until 2010, had an independent national statistics agency or Government Audit Office. The now-defunct National Statistics Agency of Greece (ESYE) was a directorate of the Ministry of Finance until it was abolished in favour of the independent ELSTAT. This concession was only <span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/greece-promises-independent-statistics/"><span lang="EN-GB">made in late 2009</span></a></span> by then-PM George Papandreou, in a futile attempt to stave off an imminent investor strike. <span lang="EN-US"><br /></span><span lang="DE"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-yMMQLgLCqtqtJzagHBNvqN_hbX4GMTBbWEuagttVwyBGAe5dNo4t7_t_hT7baWenxgRGQWr2zZV-QUpmEvQClUXO7khv__uxHCV_KJ4aDdTKctLVl4LyJWKCW3XZyQ8RBABomGkG1FAX/s1600/grdefs.png"><span lang="EN-US"><br /></span></a></span><u><span lang="EN-US" style="color: blue;"><o:p></o:p></span></u></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-US">In search of a hard constraint<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">With no real pressure from the SGP or the people to rein in spending, did politicians see <i>anything as a hard constraint</i>? An </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.oecd.org/greece/42007249.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">OECD review of budgeting in Greece</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, prepared two years ahead of the 2009 deficit revision, is very revealing. Budgeting was a line-by-line process, planning for only one year at a time, and leaving almost no role for Parliamentary scrutiny and no provision for ex post review. Accounting became increasingly poor as one moved away from central government. Audit lacked rigor and independence.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Most importantly, the country was run almost entirely on cash accounting: transactions were recorded when funds changed hands or bank balances changed; spending was attributed to the year in which the movement of funds took place. This practice (by no means limited to Greece) clashed strongly with the accruals-based manner in which annual Greek budgets and EDP notifications were compiled. Under accrual accounting transactions are attributed to the year in which the state incurs a liability (eg. by approving a supplier’s invoice), regardless of when the cash changes hands.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">This left Greece with two fiscal accounting systems – a cash-based one that was integrated, up-to-date and closely monitored, and a broadly accruals-based one that was purely for show. Ultimately, the real constraint on Greek government spending was the Government “cash plan,” which cascaded regular cash targets down to agencies on a line-by-line basis. In the post- Euro-accession era of cheap borrowing this could be stretched quite a lot – buyers could always be found for our bonds or T-bills, and suppliers could usually be convinced to wait a little longer for payment</span>. In the most controversial case, hospital suppliers had waited for up to five years for invoices to be paid. They were eventually paid in 2010 – <span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303936704576399273733104288"><span lang="EN-GB">in bonds</span></a></span>.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-US">Un-gaming Europe's deficits</span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><br />Critics of Eurostat’s handling of the Greek statistics crisis of 2009 often note that the Directorate had signed-off on the Greek 2004-8 deficit figures that it came back to eviscerate in 2009-10. If Greece was so far off the mark, and if it was only an extreme case of a much wider problem, it’s fair to ask why Eurostat found itself calling for changes so late, against its own earlier opinion, and in such a piecemeal manner.</span><span lang="EN-US"></span><o:p></o:p></div>
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The answer is tha<span lang="EN-US">t</span> Eurostat's current auditing powers over national statistics agencies and its role as guarantor of the reliability of European statistics are themselves a product of the Greek crisis. <span lang="EN-US">Eurostat's September 2010 visit to Greece was </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.independent.ie/opinion/comment/robin-emmott-new-eurostat-powers-littleknown-side-of-european-integration-3260685.html"><span lang="EN-US">the first time they</span></a></span><u><span lang="EN-US" style="color: blue;"> were used</span></u><span lang="EN-US">. Eurostat only got </span>those powers <span lang="EN-US">in </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32010R0679"><span lang="EN-US">June 2010</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, because, as the Commission explained, 'in 2005 [when </span>such powers were<span lang="EN-US"> originally considered, as a result of major revisions in Greece and Italy] several key member states were opposed.' Euractiv reports those as having been the </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.euractiv.com/euro-finance/brief-eurostat-set-powers-probin-news-213240"><span lang="EN-US">UK, France and Germany</span></a></span>. In the idyllic days of 2005, Eurostat helping itself to national statistical offices’ headcount on a whim and possibly imposing one-size fits all reporting standards sounded like a land grab. By 2010, however, it sounded a bit more reasonable.<br />
<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.grahambishop.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=8908&CAT_ID=9"><span lang="EN-US">Strengthened by the evidence of statistics gone wild in Greece</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, the European Parliament’s renewed proposals for auditing powers managed to get past the Council, though <u><span style="color: blue;">not without concessions.</span></u> Commission proposals that member states punish civil servants for misreporting data were still defeated by finance ministers who saw them as an unacceptable infringement of national sovereignty.<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-US">The Greek debt crisis – an alternative timeline<o:p></o:p></span></b></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The Greek statistics crisis began in earnest with the second </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2026464/GR-2009-10.pdf/e78f6233-4e0a-4f1e-9f1b-f3824c96e00c"><span lang="EN-US">EDP notification</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> </span>submitted by ESYE on 21 October 2009<span lang="EN-US">, revising Greece's 2009 deficit forecast from EUR9.3bn (3.7% of GDP) to EUR30.1bn (12.5% of GDP). Submitting two notifications for the same semester is not normal practice; however, just </span>two days after the first notification of 2 October, George Papandreou’s <span lang="EN-US">PASOK </span><u><span style="color: blue;">won</span></u><span lang="DE"><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_legislative_election,_2009"> </a></span><span lang="EN-US">the 2009 legislative </span>elections, and ordered a review of the public finances, and of our deficit figures.<o:p></o:p></div>
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Whatever PASOK’s motivation for revising the 2 October estimates, the <span lang="EN-US">rushed review was so flawed that it was rejected by Eurostat</span>. Faced with a wide range of missing data and (as they claim) pressure from ministers, ESYE staff improvised badly. A substantial amount in hospital liabilities incurred between 2004-2008 was discovered, but lacking any means of allocating them to individual years, ESYE had chosen to lump them all into the 2008 deficit. Within a year the error had been amended, and roughly EUR800m of previous years’ spending was reattributed to the correct years. This was small fry compared to the EUR11bn by which the 2008 deficit was eventually to be revised up, but it presented a ‘smoking gun’ to conspiracy theorists, who saw evidence of a plot to inflate the Greek deficit. Check out the Oct 2009 blip in the charts below - and tell me whether you think it really makes a difference.<o:p></o:p><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi0v2L8sSno_VQpRnyjf6Y6-emMqEUo8dm2e-7nND12UgjAX8PKE-CqlbZt0rHfm4vKb7iAw1vM4zagcrSM8JtF_pljm-HmDUPcZgzcGwa-O7mAWzAufg_7sHm1rTE6WTEmwjxqBKr2BrTL/s1600/vintage.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="240" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi0v2L8sSno_VQpRnyjf6Y6-emMqEUo8dm2e-7nND12UgjAX8PKE-CqlbZt0rHfm4vKb7iAw1vM4zagcrSM8JtF_pljm-HmDUPcZgzcGwa-O7mAWzAufg_7sHm1rTE6WTEmwjxqBKr2BrTL/s640/vintage.png" width="640" /></a></div>
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A string of credit downgrades followed the October 2009 revisions, with all three major credit agencies downgrading Greece by December. Although their ratings were still investment-grade (and thus optimistic in hindsight),<span lang="EN-US"> the timing was disastrous. Greece had </span>lifted<span lang="EN-US"> its </span>head above the parapet <span lang="EN-US">just as </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/6668281/Dubais-financial-crisis-a-QandA.html"><span lang="EN-US">Dubai's unfolding sovereign debt crisis</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> had investors</span> wondering <span lang="EN-US">who would be the next sovereign to go bust. Foreign banks pretty much ran for the exit.</span><o:p></o:p></div>
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The post-mortem for Greek statistics came in early January, with the Greek government’s <span lang="EN-US">expert </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.eurocapital.gr/files.php?force&file=Siatras_Files/Syn_2_Ekth_Yp_Oik_795943087.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">report</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> and</span><span lang="EN-US"> </span><span lang="EN-US">Eurostat’s </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/COM_2010_report_greek/c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a"><span lang="EN-US">account</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> </span>both noting the intense interference of Greek government officials in ESYE’s work. ESYE was finally abolished on <span lang="EN-US">9 March </span>2010, as our <span lang="EN-US">new </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/StatLaw3832_EN_06082014.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">statistical law</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> </span>came<span lang="EN-US"> into force, and ELSTAT established as </span>our first ever independent statistics agency. This was followed, at the end of March, by yet another <span lang="EN-US">Eurostat methodological </span>visit which helped produce the <span lang="DE"><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2028454/EL-2010-04.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">April 2010 EDP </span></a></span>Notification.<span lang="EN-US"> Greece's 2009 deficit now rose from EUR30.1bn (12.5% of GDP) to EUR32.3bn (13.6% of GDP) </span>and predictably launched another round of downgrades, below investment-grade this time. <span lang="EN-US">What the banks had seen coming in October was now becoming obvious to all.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi50_ulsSYOqjvGoEtY4D3glGl2rtKGHzrJduhRZ0PHk8_2MAsIIPi1iqhB5kT3b8KzMgxIexwc6LpFLDtKqimo-eZ9NKj-iIZxPSG8ZLBKQ_a6SXufPY7DnIQn8cNWn2LiCWiy1J-WPAPw/s1600/exposure.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="180" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi50_ulsSYOqjvGoEtY4D3glGl2rtKGHzrJduhRZ0PHk8_2MAsIIPi1iqhB5kT3b8KzMgxIexwc6LpFLDtKqimo-eZ9NKj-iIZxPSG8ZLBKQ_a6SXufPY7DnIQn8cNWn2LiCWiy1J-WPAPw/s320/exposure.png" width="320" /></a></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">E</span>x-IMF man <span lang="EN-US">A. Georgiou, </span>took<span lang="EN-US"> over as president of </span>ELSTAT on 2 August, and his appointment was almost immediately followed by two of Eurostat's methodological visits. It was only after their conclusion, on <span lang="EN-US">15 November </span>2010, <span lang="EN-US">that </span>Eurostat was able to <span lang="DE"><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/5051930/2-15112010-AP-EN.PDF/6704b50f-d771-4c98-889e-261a5f74396d"><span lang="EN-US">publish</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> Greek fiscal data </span>on<span lang="EN-US"> 2004-2009 without reservations again.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><br /><b>The origins of a revision target<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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What caused such frantic activity by the old ESYE in October 2009, and why were such significant errors made in the process? My guess is that by early <span lang="EN-US">October 2009, the old ESYE leadership knew that producing deficit figures below ca. EUR30bn for 2009 and EUR20bn for 2008 would cost them the new Government’s confidence and possibly the international community's remaining goodwill.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Greek governments had form in using fiscal statistics reviews to discredit their opponents, or as an excuse for reneging on campaign promises. But like previous reviews, this one too was justified, at its core. Foreign analysts could see for themselves how much debt Greece was <i>issuing, </i>and it was way out of line with our deficit projections. For example, by Nov 2009, net issuance (debt issued minus debt repaid) for the year was estimated at </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://danskeanalyse.danskebank.dk/abo/Goviesweek46/$file/Govies_week46.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">EUR35.4bn</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> by Danske Bank. </span>This was not tactical over-borrowing. <span lang="EN-US">Greece was raising funds in the teeth of literally </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f198f422-e917-11de-a756-00144feab49a.html"><span lang="EN-US">the biggest bond sale in human history</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">. Our finance ministers in 2008 and 2009 must have known that, and anticipated rising borrowing costs – but they had no choice.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Either way, the rush and political pressure to produce numbers in line with issuance no doubt contributed to errors. But the October 2009 notification, for all its flaws, did not overestimate the headline figures of the 2008 and 2009 deficits. We now know that it underestimated them, to the tune of 4.7bn and 6.1bn respectively.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<b><span lang="EN-US">Conspiracy theories grow</span></b></div>
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By the end of 2009, a persistent conspiracy theory was starting to grow out of the protests of Greece’s conservative ex-ministers and the car-crash manner of the October 2009 deficit revisions. <span lang="EN-US">Ignoring the net bond issuance figures, conspiracy theorists claimed that the 2009 deficit was in fact closer to </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/o/55372"><span lang="EN-US">7.9% of GDP</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">. However, with the active assistance of Eurostat, it had been inflated in order to <i>cause</i> the country to lose access to the capital markets, then pave the way for an IMF bailout and the loss of national sovereignty; and it was finely calibrated in order to scapegoat the country as the most profligate in Europe, just ahead of Ireland, thus cowing the Greek people into submission. </span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">ELSTAT and Georgiou have spent the last five years fighting these allegations even though neither was even <i>around </i>during the decisive October 2009 EDP. Three different court cases on the matter have been dismissed; two separate Parliamentary Committees have examined the case; even Georgiou’s email has been hacked in a vain effort to obtain incriminating evidence against him (more detail </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://uti.is/2015/07/greek-politics-and-poisonous-statistics-an-on-going-saga/"><span lang="EN-US">here</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">).<b><o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Meanwhile, the world's statisticians have been unanimous that the case against ELSTAT is, to quote the International Statistical Institute, 'fanciful.' More than half of all </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.isi-web.org/8741"><span lang="EN-US">ethics-related interventions</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> by the ISI in recent years have been about Greece and in ELSTAT's favour. An international Good Practices Advisory Committee has given the agency a clean bill of health for </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/report_adv_2013_EN.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">2013</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> and </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/report_adv_2014_EN_0.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">2014</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, while deploring Greek governments’ renewed efforts to tamper with our statistics. More recently, ELSTAT passed a </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/64157/4372828/2015-EL-Report/488eadf4-da69-40db-b48b-884c6ac4937c"><span lang="EN-US">peer review</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> with flying colours, and the European Statistical Governance Advisory Board </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/34693/344453/2015_271_opinion+on+Greek+developments_15+03+24_final/c8cab733-3351-41c1-b990-0171e07cc4c0"><span lang="EN-US">heaped praise</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> on it as an example of Greek reform done right.<br /><br />Increasingly, however, ELSTAT’s independence was beginning to rankle, and conspiracy theorists were getting desperate. ELSTAT's employee Union took issue with a compulsory </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/conf_decl_gr.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">confidentiality attestation</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> that obliged staff to not reveal <i>survey respondents' personal information</i> to anyone, including the courts. Taken out of context, this was dressed up as a gagging clause, meant to protect ELSTAT's P</span><span lang="EN-US">resident from what conspiracy theorists saw as his inevitable future prosecution. Two </span><span lang="DE">Greek MPs even </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/c0d5184d-7550-4265-8e0b-078e1bc7375a/8088978.pdf"><span style="background: white; color: #4d469c;">demanded</span></a></span><span lang="DE" style="background: white; color: #444444;"> an explanation of the Justice and Finance Ministers.</span><span lang="EN-US"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><br /></span><b><span lang="EN-US">Who buys this stuff?</span></b><span lang="EN-US"><br /><b><br /></b></span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://uti.is/2015/07/greek-politics-and-poisonous-statistics-an-on-going-saga/"><span lang="EN-GB">In an excellent post</span></a></span><u><span style="color: blue;"> on the subject</span></u><span lang="EN-US">, <span style="background: white;">Sigrún Davídsdóttir asks how come</span> the Greek body politic has bayed for Georgiou's blood when he very likely presided over the production of the first accurate deficit figures in two decades; yet </span>has<span lang="EN-US"> never called to account the former ESYE heads who reported artificially low deficits. The reason is that much of the Greek public either believes the inflated deficit myth or desperately wants it to be true; and as ELSTAT, for all its independence, is institutionally weak, kicking it is a costless way of earning brownie points with that part of the Greek electorate.<br /><br />Barring PASOK, which had no choice in the matter, every major Greek political party has rushed to exploit the deflated deficit myth. Ex-PM Antonis Samaras repeated it outright in 2010, </span>in the <span lang="EN-US">first of his Zappeion speeches (in Greek </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.newsbeast.gr/files/1/2010/07/07/zappio_2.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">here</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">)<i>, </i>though </span>he <span lang="EN-US">cravenly </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304023504577321781269531156"><span lang="EN-US">dropped</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> this line immediately upon taking power. Syriza's Alexis Tsipras called the 2009 deficit review a '</span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/389435/al-tsipras-promeletimeno-egklima-i-anatheorisi-tou-elleimmatos-2009"><span lang="EN-US">premeditated crime</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">,' </span>and <span lang="EN-US">repeated the accusations </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.syriza.gr/article/id/59735/--Binteo---Omilia-toy-Proedroy-toy-SYRIZA-Aleksh-Tsipra-sto-Cine-Kerameikos.html#.Vccl8ROqqko"><span lang="EN-US">in 2014,</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> while in January 2015, one of his MEPs </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bWQ%2bE-2015-000214%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN"><span lang="EN-US">demanded a written answer</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> from the Commission on 'the ELSTAT scandal'. The populist right Independent Greeks not only accept the myth, but signed </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.theinsider.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25460%3Aoikonomiki-ypeythyni-toy-institoytoy-ton-anel-i-z-georganta&catid=68%3Apeople&Itemid=48"><span lang="EN-US">its chief advocate </span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> up as a party member, gave her a salary as part of the un-google-able 'Independent Greeks Institute,' then fielded her as an </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/?page_id=847"><span lang="EN-US">MEP candidate</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> in 2014. </span>The Greek Parliament's<span lang="EN-US"> </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/Report_web.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">Debt Audit </span></a></span>report <span lang="EN-US">repeats the </span>accusation <span lang="EN-US">unreservedly. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Simply put, it has been impossible<u> </u>to come anywhere close to power in Greece since 2011 without at least paying lip service to the 'inflated deficit' myth, because a highly contested part of the Greek electorate <i>believes</i> in it. So entrenched </span>is deficit denial, <span lang="EN-US">that safeguarding the independence of our statistics agency ended up as one of Greece's prior actions agreed with creditors in the </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/07/pdf/20150712-eurosummit-statement-greece/"><span lang="EN-US">July 2015 agreement</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> – after which A. Georgiou finally </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/200172/article/ekathimerini/business/elstat-chief-steps-down"><span lang="EN-US">resigned</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> his post.<br /><br /><b>The early Greek Crisis Propaganda War</b><br /><br />To understand </span>why deficit denial runs so deep in Greece<span lang="EN-US">, you need to think back to </span>Greece's last pre-bailout days<span lang="EN-US">. There </span>had been<span lang="EN-US">, until 2009, very little public discourse on the sustainability of Greek debt, and Papandreou’s PASOK </span>could not come to terms with what was happening, let alone explain it to voters<span lang="EN-US">. Instead, both </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/mar/09/greek-pm-meet-barack-obama"><span lang="EN-US">pre-bailout</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> and </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2010/06/greek-finmin-dismisses-bear-poop-in.html"><span lang="EN-US">post-bailout</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, they blamed evil speculators, aided by the international financial press and by </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/for-gods-sake-stfu-part-ii.html"><span lang="EN-US">credit rating agencies</span></a></span><u><span lang="EN-US" style="color: blue;">,</span></u><span lang="EN-US"> for damaging Greece’s credibility. Their narrative </span>stuck because, to the majority of Greeks, the crisis had appeared out of nowhere and needed an external cause to explain it<span lang="EN-US">.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">Throughout early 2010 the main villain of the Greek anti-austerity camp was neither Angela Merkel nor Wolfgang Schaeuble, but the IMF. The eventuality of IMF involvement in a Greek bailout had for months been </span><span lang="DE"><a href="https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_paper_no.61web.pdf"><span lang="EN-US">portrayed</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> as a defeat for Europe, both in Greece and abroad. The IMF had form in imposing harsh austerity; its presence was the hallmark of third-world dependency; and as a US-based institution it was distasteful to the left, the populist right and, to some extent, Greek Euro-federalists. So even if the bailout turned to be inevitable, the reasoning went, it was treason to invite the IMF </span>into Europe and into <span lang="EN-US">our homes. So when Georgiou took over as ELSTAT president, many chose to see the presence of an IMF man at the helm of the agency as part of a master plan.<br /><br />As the IMF staff made themselves at home in Athens, part of the Greek blogosphere was going into overdrive. One of the </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2010/10/how-some-of-greece-workz.html"><span lang="EN-US">most viral Greek blogposts of all time</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> denounced Papandreou as the half-Jewish son of a </span>traitor (former PM Andreas Papandreou) <span lang="EN-US">who had been paid $100m by Chase Manhattan to destroy </span>Greece.<span lang="EN-US"> The conspiracy theorist blog, Olympia, soon followed up with an unstoppably viral </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/lies-damn-lies-and-interviews-with.html"><span lang="EN-US">hoax interview</span></a></span><u><span lang="EN-US" style="color: blue;"> </span></u><span lang="DE">falsely attributed to Prof Mark Weisbrot</span><span lang="EN-US">, which called on the people to rise up in graphic violence and drive out both the IMF and the domestic elite. As exotic as they sound, news sources like this wielded enormous influence. One of Olympia's most prolific writers, </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://olympia.gr/2014/04/14/%CE%B5%CF%86%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%83%CE%B5-%CE%B7-%CF%89%CF%81%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%80%CF%8C%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B1-%CF%80%CF%8C%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B1/comment-page-1/"><span lang="EN-US">endorsed wholeheartedly by the blog</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, is Independent Greeks MP D. Kammenos, famous for a torrent of </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-34346590"><span lang="EN-US">antisemitic and homophobic remarks</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US"> which cost him his role as deputy </span><span lang="DE">minister </span><span lang="EN-US">for infrastructure in A. Tsipras’ 2015 cabinet, one day into the job.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US"><br /><b>Courting the populist right</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
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<span lang="EN-US">The deficit-denier fantasy was a balm for the wounded pride of populist right-wing </span>groups <span lang="EN-US">who, in the summer of 2010, </span>coalesced into the nationalist <span lang="EN-US">contingent of the Greek Indignados </span>known as the<span lang="EN-US"> </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Publications/GreeSE/GreeSE-No82.pdf"><span lang="EN-GB">Upper Square</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">. Shamed by suggestions of Greek insolvency, they resented the sneering tone of foreign editorials. They wanted no part of the austerity to come, and none of the </span>blame for it<span lang="EN-US">.</span>The Upper Square's<span lang="EN-US"> traditional allegiances had been with New Democracy - the party on whose watch the deficit had got out of hand - and the National Orthodox Alert - the only right-wing party to have voted for the first </span>memorandum. They were desperate to return to the moral high ground, and to a familiar narrative of heroism, resistance, victimhood and betrayal<span lang="EN-US">. An inside job orchestrated </span>by PASOK on behalf of <span lang="EN-US">the dark forces supposedly in charge of the IMF </span>fit the bill perfectly<span lang="EN-US">.<br /><br />But Greece’s populist right has little by way of actual ideology and are </span>opportunistic voters, which<span lang="EN-US"> makes them attractive to parties across the political spectrum. These are the people Syriza officials were going for when they choose, </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231240686"><span lang="EN-US">back in 2013</span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">, to throw in their lot with the Independent Greeks. These are also the people Syriza officials had in mind whenever they have </span><span lang="DE"><a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/14/golden-dawn-will-be-strengthened-by-worse-austerity-yanis-varoufakis-warns"><span lang="EN-US">warned </span></a></span><span lang="EN-US">that Golden Dawn will sweep to power if their own coalition is weakened. With time, these electoral tactics also dovetailed neatly with Syriza's gentlemen's agreement with conservative ex-PM Karamanlis, who has taken a vow of silence since leaving office but somehow remains a power broker even in today's New Democracy.<br /><br />The Greek statistics drama is a cautionary tale of how difficult it is to build, and how easy it is to damage, institutions in a democracy. Whether it’s the SGP deficit ceiling or the independence of a national statistics agency, institutions need to take root in the body politic and in the people to be of any use; and, in Greece at least, politicians often sacrifice institutions in the pursuit of votes without realising the damage they are causing. Syriza hoped that Georgiou's departure would satisfy deficit deniers while allowing the government to honour its obligations to our creditors. It did not, and ELSTAT’s fate was soon to be shared by other independent agencies, and indeed many of the remaining checks and balances in the system; including many that post-crisis governments had only recently introduced in pursuit of reform.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-85911236511886982032016-02-08T09:57:00.000+00:002016-02-13T23:33:04.592+00:00COUNTING GREECE'S LIBERTARIANS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
Veteran readers will know of my love affair with the <a href="http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/page/survey-2008.html">European Values Study of 2008</a> - the last snapshot of Greek society's beliefs and norms before the crisis. It's heartening <a href="https://twitter.com/evs_values/status/660106936382267393">to know</a> that Greece will also take part in the 2017 iteration of the survey, which will allow us to assess the impact of the crisis on the Greek psyche in more detail than has hitherto been possible.<br />
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Today I was hoping to use the 2008 study for a simple stock-take of Greece's libertarian population. The EVS does not discuss libertarianism as such but does ask a range of questions to help establish people's attitudes towards social mores, institutions and the role of the state. Many of these questions are scored conveniently on a scale of 1 to 10 and look into behaviours that respondents approve or disapprove of and their level of agreement with a range of statements about society and the economy. <br />
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Factor analysis can be applied to these variables to reveal some of the key attitudes underlying people's responses and score individual respondents based on the extent to which they share each of them (scores will follow a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1). <br />
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In the case of Greece, seven core attitudes emerge:</div>
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<li><b>Social Liberalism</b> (tolerance for homosexuality, abortion, divorce, assisted suicide, casual sex, prostitution, adultery, soft drugs, suicide)</li>
<li><b>Dishonest Self-Interest </b>(tolerance for lying in own interest, accepting a bribe, benefits fraud, paying bribes, tax evasion)</li>
<li><b>Preference for State Control of the Economy</b> (tolerance for state intervention, competition seen as harmful, belief in state responsibility for the worse-off, preference for public ownership of enterprises, tolerance for less conditionality in unemployment benefits).</li>
<li><b>Distinction between 'victimless crimes' and behaviours involving obvious detriment</b> (tolerance for joyriding, avoiding fares in public transport, tax evasion)</li>
<li><b>Appetite for controversial science</b> (GM food, experiments involving human embryos)</li>
<li><b>Approval of the Death Penalty</b></li>
<li><b>Aversion to redistribution of incomes </b>(Preference for rewarding effort over equal outcomes, self-identification as right-wing).</li>
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This analysis is based on 999 Greek responses (out of a full sample of 1,500 - each case had to have responses for all of the relevant questions to make it into the factor analysis). <br />
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If you run the exact same analysis on the pan-European version of the EVS2008, (using 38,218 out of 67,786 responses) the same factors emerge, with the exception of the 'victimless crimes' factor. This does not mean this way of thinking is unique to Greece, of course; only that it is not universally present throughout Europe. Note that 'Europe' for the purposes of the EVS includes all of the Nordics, as well as Russia, Turkey and the Caucasus. I'll try to use 'Europe+' where possible to remind you of the fact.</div>
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By design, the factors are orthogonal and standardised - ie they are not correlated. This means one must be careful and imaginative in interpreting them. For example, most people who want a redistribution of income also have at least some tolerance for state control of the economy. However, for the two factors to be orthogonal the concepts need some rewording so that they can be truly independent of each other. So the State Control factor is more about state ownership of the means of production and "to each according to his needs..." - classical Marxism in one sense - while the Redistribution factor deals more specifically with fiscal policy and the willingness to redistribute income through tax and benefits. A person can believe in public ownership and also not be convinced by redistribution of income - after all what's the point of taxation and a benefits system in the full-employment paradise of centrally planned production (and consumption)?</div>
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With this caveat in mind, it's fair to say that factors 1 and 7 are probably enough to identify potential libertarians, who should score high in factor 1 (socially liberal) and factor 7 (averse to redistribution of income), and low on factor 3 (against state control of the economy and redistribution of income). I realise I'm oversimplifying of course. It's possible to be a socially conservative libertarian; you may strongly disapprove of, say, adultery, or abortion, and even lecture people against them privately. However, if you always stop short of demanding that government legislate against such behaviours, or that they be penalised in some other mandatory way, you're a libertarian in my book. Unfortunately we don't have the kind of data that would allow this.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFn2qgXJpe3UituSI0ruoB5EZKHBOoQwry3j6SB5kOB55GrrT4S-hxwMs_K0mVqDj6HNSkeXEw8-gvDhmMnvzAjM_zl8hb7uR9LY1kR6s8Gm_6Y2raBW1rGERc__RicRoGFBc-juG-UClt/s1600/GRlibs.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhFn2qgXJpe3UituSI0ruoB5EZKHBOoQwry3j6SB5kOB55GrrT4S-hxwMs_K0mVqDj6HNSkeXEw8-gvDhmMnvzAjM_zl8hb7uR9LY1kR6s8Gm_6Y2raBW1rGERc__RicRoGFBc-juG-UClt/s320/GRlibs.png" width="215" /></a></div>
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It's possible, using the pan-European version of the dataset, to position 2008 Greece in the spectrum of libertarianism: at .1 standard deviation above the European+ mean we were not doing quite so badly for social liberalism. We were marginally less averse to the redistribution of income than the average European+ country (at .16 of a standard deviation below the mean). But we were also one of the highest-ranked countries (at .32 of a standard deviation above the mean) in terms of wanting the government to have control of the economy. And that was in 2008. Commentators who dub Greece the last Soviet republic in Europe (and are routinely vilified for this) kind of have a point.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqsxQDBBUS-CyvHR5JYlnjbj68hUJg3BHJ51tEpBmiHJYFnlIStMO90v7mxoaRHaTBJdd2Th6Z8Bs63hSkNmEKapZg9-wnNqXonBpclpxNQUnG3z7FMyTRAPuiHH4XPTE4D4Nt_WPCo7gi/s1600/grveurope.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="250" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiqsxQDBBUS-CyvHR5JYlnjbj68hUJg3BHJ51tEpBmiHJYFnlIStMO90v7mxoaRHaTBJdd2Th6Z8Bs63hSkNmEKapZg9-wnNqXonBpclpxNQUnG3z7FMyTRAPuiHH4XPTE4D4Nt_WPCo7gi/s400/grveurope.png" width="400" /></a>Now if we assume that libertarians need to be above the European+ average in terms of social liberalism and below the average in their appetite for state control and redistribution, then the number of Greek libertarians was small in 2008 - a mere 6.4% of the adult population and proportionately less than half the European+ average (13.6%). The leaderboard of countries with big libertarian populations is packed with notorious hell-holes like Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and the Netherlands. Nearly half of all Danes are libertarian by this grouping.<br />
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This is of course only a crude way of grouping people (I'll refer to it as the quadrant method for ease of reference). One could, alternatively, use cluster analysis to arrive at less arbitrary, more cohesive groups within which individuals have more in common. No method I've tried using the variables above creates a libertarian cluster naturally, whether in Greece or EU-wide. More skilled people might be able to produce better results (I'm looking at you @dimmu). The best I could do was a k-means clustering in which I forced SPSS to produce 8 clusters (the 'Octo-grouping'). The Octo-clusters are best interpreted as political tribes - the kind of people likely to take similar sides of a public issue. Often members of the same political tribe have significant ideological differences, but can put these aside for a common cause.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj8zS1-QFvFzebigQ1ZxKRHaSje6Jms_P-6CxKNoFQ2znyXo_9z7uzJpphOlC7mmdDWe38hJPRyfZPPT66a2JiMWN_Y2XkKEMMZWxxcTx_PwUw79VOyptsIXas3JcfVMF6xOVK1fGBRhKHI/s1600/libertarians+oh+no.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; display: inline !important; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="211" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj8zS1-QFvFzebigQ1ZxKRHaSje6Jms_P-6CxKNoFQ2znyXo_9z7uzJpphOlC7mmdDWe38hJPRyfZPPT66a2JiMWN_Y2XkKEMMZWxxcTx_PwUw79VOyptsIXas3JcfVMF6xOVK1fGBRhKHI/s320/libertarians+oh+no.png" width="320" /></a>The results change a fair amount using this more cohesive grouping, and I find the way in which the results change particularly disappointing.<br />
Under the 'Octo-grouping', the number of Greek libertarians rises slightly (to 7.2% against a Europe+ average of 10.9%). But the character or the group changes substantially - becoming less socially liberal and more extreme in their views on state control and income redistribution. In fact, Greek 'libertarians' under the Octo-grouping are not, on average, socially liberal; they straddle the axis instead. Only about 40% of the Greek octo-libertarians score against the Europe+ averages the way I described earlier; the bulk of the rest of the group is made up of individuals that I can only call 'free market paternalists' - people who hate state control and income redistribution but are socially conservative. Meanwhile, many 'quadrant' libertarians have more tribal ties with a very different political tradition - social liberals who believe that a certain level of state ownership can obviate the need for mass income redistribution by taking care of citizens' basic needs (think Singapore's policy on housing for instance).<br />
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<b>From 2008 to 2015: who are we now?</b><br />
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Will the headline figures have changed much since 2008? On the one hand, some of the broad<br />
attitudes described above surely correspond to stable personal values. On the other, it's been eight disastrous years for Greece since the EVS, and 'neoliberalism' has since been established for many Greeks as the source of all our misfortunes. This term (see <a href="http://public.econ.duke.edu/~erw/190/Mirowski%20Defining%20Neoliberalism.pdf">here</a> for one of the tortured, rambling definitions held up as definitive) has been applied indiscriminately to libertarians as well as others. Although not all of us identify with it we certainly know we're likely being talked about when it is used.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjdSyMwvD7y1pqlm7APeSXrDmiE7ixzTn8lAaNU8bicVjgWdKmIlvZJEzFz79A58zGwSWO94kixQk2qgcEzCjsB69dv0bIrDPI2dQKTCD4RkZz1mDSjN6Zde7_G0GdIiXP6npslVJ0uWRJJ/s1600/GRlibs3.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="206" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjdSyMwvD7y1pqlm7APeSXrDmiE7ixzTn8lAaNU8bicVjgWdKmIlvZJEzFz79A58zGwSWO94kixQk2qgcEzCjsB69dv0bIrDPI2dQKTCD4RkZz1mDSjN6Zde7_G0GdIiXP6npslVJ0uWRJJ/s320/GRlibs3.png" width="320" /></a>Well, two <a href="http://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Posotiki_Noemvriou_Spreads.pdf">survey</a>s of 1,000 Greeks each by DiaNEOSis found that around 10% self-identified as 'neoliberals' between April (10.6%) and November 2015 (9.3%). DiaNEOSis' 'neoliberals' are a fairly good proxy, I think, for my EVS (quadrant) libertarians, at least as far as their political affiliation goes. However, the Greek centre-right was twice as likely to be 'neoliberals' in 2015 as they were to be 'libertarians' in 2008, and at first I wondered to what extent that's because the Greek centre-right has largely emptied in the meantime. In reality, its share of the population has remained remarkably stable (18.5% in EVS, 19.3% in April DiaNEOSis and 20% in November DiaNEOSis). One explanation might be that the Greek crisis (or perhaps Syriza/ANEL rule) has shifted much of the Greek centre-right into the libertarian camp by convincing them of the dangers of excessive spending or state intervention. Or perhaps they've been drawn into the fold by the endless flow of divisive rhetoric of the past year. Or maybe, self-identification with the pejorative term 'neoliberal' suggests a confrontational attitude versus parts of the Greek political spectrum but few actual libertarian beliefs.<br />
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<b>This section under contstruction</b><br />
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<i>My original tables for this section were wrong. I am recalculating everything. Bear with me.</i></div>
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I need to provide some context here: EVS fieldwork in Greece took place <a href="https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/file.asp?file=ZA4776_mr_gr.pdf">between 12 September and 26 October 2008</a>. This was before the mass protests of December 2008, and almost a year before the national elections of 2009. It followed the narrow passing of a pension reform bill (modest by today's standards but still strongly opposed) in March 2008, and the polls had already swung (narrowly) in favour of a PASOK win, with margins of anything between 0 and 3%. Syriza, or perhaps <em>Ur-</em>Syriza as it was still a radical, movement-based party at the time, was polling at <a href="http://www.naftemporiki.gr/search?q=%cf%80%cf%81%ce%bf%ce%b2%ce%ac%ce%b4%ce%b9%cf%83%ce%bc%ce%b1+%cf%83%cf%85%cf%81%ce%b9%ce%b6%ce%b1&sort=pubdate&page=2&f_tag_exact=%ce%94%ce%b7%ce%bc%ce%bf%cf%83%ce%ba%ce%bf%cf%80%ce%ae%cf%83%ce%b5%ce%b9%cf%82">anything between 8% and 10%</a>.<br />
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<b>Annex: Code for the factor analysis</b><br />
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The factor analysis is easy to reproduce if you have the raw EVS data, and the code is identical for both the Greek and the full EVS datasets:</div>
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FACTOR</div>
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/VARIABLES v193 v194 v195 v196 v197 v198 v199 v233 v234 v235 v236 v237 v238 v239 v240 v241 v242 </div>
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v243 v244 v245 v246 v247 v248 v249 v250 v251 v252</div>
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/MISSING LISTWISE </div>
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/ANALYSIS v193 v194 v195 v196 v197 v198 v199 v233 v234 v235 v236 v237 v238 v239 v240 v241 v242 </div>
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v243 v244 v245 v246 v247 v248 v249 v250 v251 v252</div>
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/PRINT KMO ROTATION</div>
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/FORMAT SORT BLANK(.40)</div>
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/PLOT EIGEN</div>
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/CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(999)</div>
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/EXTRACTION PC</div>
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/CRITERIA ITERATE(999)</div>
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/ROTATION VARIMAX</div>
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/SAVE REG(ALL)</div>
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/METHOD=CORRELATION.</div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-53450629691252643982016-01-29T15:26:00.000+00:002016-01-29T15:26:04.271+00:00e-Petition: Μετρήστε πόσο από το χρόνο τους αφιερώνουν οι Έλληνες πολίτες στο Κράτος<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Αγαπητοί αναγνώστες:</div>
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Ετοίμασα το παρακάτω ψήφισμα στο Avaaz και θα σας ήμουν ευγνώμων αν διαθέτατε μερικά λεπτά για να το διαβάσετε, και να υπογράψετε εφόσον συμφωνείτε.<div>
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Μπορείτε να υποστηρίξετε την προσπάθεια να μετρήσουμε το αθέατο κόστος του κράτους ψηφίζοντας <a href="https://secure.avaaz.org/el/petition/ELSTAT_Elliniki_Statistiki_Arhi_Metriste_poso_apo_to_hrono_toys_afieronoyn_oi_Ellines_polites_sto_Kratos/">εδώ</a>.</div>
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ΕΛΣΤΑΤ - Ελληνική Στατιστική Αρχή: Μετρήστε πόσο από το χρόνο τους αφιερώνουν οι Έλληνες πολίτες στο Κράτος</h1>
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Γιατί είναι σημαντικό;</h2>
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Κανένας δεν γνωρίζει πόση από την καθημερινή ζωή των Ελλήνων Πολιτών αναλώνεται στο να εξυπηρετούν το ελληνικό Κράτος - να του παράσχουν πληροφορίες, δικαιολογητικά, δηλώσεις, μεταφράσεις, πιστοποιήσεις ή απλά να περιμένουν στην ουρά.<br /><br /><br />Η Έρευνα Χρήσης Χρόνου (ΕΧΧ) της ΕΛΣΤΑΤ που ήδη προγραμματίζεται να διενεργηθεί το 2021 είναι μια καλή ευκαιρία να μετρηθεί χονδρικά αυτός ο χρόνος χωρίς πρόσθετο κόστος για το φορολογούμενο. Η ημερομηνία του 2021 φαντάζει πολύ μακρινή αλλά λογικά ο σχεδιασμός της έρευνας θα αρχίσει αρκετά πιο σύντομα. Χρειαζόμαστε επίσης χρόνο για να ενημερωθούν οι πολίτες και οι πολιτικοί παράγοντες ούτως ώστε να στηρίξουν την έρευνα και να αξιοποιήσουν τα ευρήματά της.<br /><br /><b>Προς τί η μέτρηση;</b><br /><b>Ο χρόνος των πολιτών </b><b>έχει αξία κι ανήκει στον ίδιους, όχι στο Κράτος. </b>Το Κράτος έχει την εξουσία να χρησιμοποιεί ή να δεσμεύει το χρόνο μας, αλλά όχι χωρίς λόγο και όχι χωρίς προϋποθέσεις. Πρέπει είτε να λογοδοτεί (όπως αν πχ μας φορολογούσε) είτε να μας αποζημιώνει (όπως πχ αν είχε απαλλοτριώσει την περιουσία μας) είτε να μας ανταμείβει (όπως πχ αν είχε υπογράψει σύμβαση μαζί μας).<br /><br />Αυτό κατά βάθος το γνωρίζουν και οι απλοί πολίτες και οι πολιτικοί. Κάθε σχεδόν κυβέρνηση (και αντιπολίτευση) υπόσχεται ένα πιο ευέλικτο και φιλικό προς το χρήστη Δημόσιο. Πώς όμως αξιολογούμε το αν ο στόχος τους έχει επιτευχθεί, και αν οι όποιες μεταρρυθμίσεις αρκούν για να αλλάξουν την καθημερινότητα των πολιτών; Για την ώρα, δεν μπορούμε να το κάνουμε παρά μόνο πολύ αποσπασματικά.<br /><br /><b>Πώς μπορεί να γίνει;</b><br /><br />Το βασικό εργαλείο της μέτρησης μπορεί να είναι η Έρευνα Χρήσης Χρόνου, που διεξάγει η ΕΛΣΤΑΤ. Στην πρόσφατη ΕΧΧ του 2013/4 (που ήταν και η πρώτη του είδους της) συμμετείχαν 7.137 άτομα από 3.371 νοικοκυριά. Για τη μέτρηση που ζητούμε αρκούν μερικές μικρές προσαρμογές στα ερωτηματολόγια της ΕΧΧ του 2013/4, τα οποία (μαζί με τα αποτελέσματα της έρευνας) μπορεί κανείς να δει εδώ: http://www.statistics.gr/statistics/-/publication/SFA30/-<br /><br />Στο ερωτηματολόγιο της ΕΧΧ, κάθε δραστηριότητα των ερωτηθέντων αντιστοιχεί σε έναν κωδικό. Οι κωδικοί προέρχονται από την Ευρωπαϊκή ταξινόµηση ACL2008 (Activity Coding List for Harmonized European Time Use Surveys) και ακολουθούν τις κατευθυντήριες οδηγίες του 2008 (HETUS 2008). Οι κωδικοί 362 (εμπορικές και διαχειριστικές υπηρεσίες) και 371 (διαχείριση υποθέσεων του νοικοκυριού) θα μπορούσαν να διασπαστούν ούτως ώστε να διακρίνονται ξεκάθαρα οι συναλλαγές με δημόσιες υπηρεσίες και η προετοιμασία τους κατ' οίκον από τις διαχειριστικές ανάγκες του νοικοκυριού.<br /><br />Κάθε τοποθεσία αντιστοιχεί επίσης σε έναν κωδικό. Ο κωδικός τοποθεσίας 19 (Άλλη συγκεκριμένη τοποθεσία) θα μπορούσε να διασπαστεί ώστε να διακρίνονται ξεκάθαρα οι δραστηριότητες που λαμβάνουν χώρα σε δημόσιες υπηρεσίες.<br /><br />Αν χρειαστεί η ΕΛΣΤΑΤ να καταβάλει εναρμονισμένα στοιχεία με βάση την ACL2008, είναι σχετικά απλό ζήτημα το να αθροίσει τους επιμέρους κωδικούς που προήλθαν πχ από τη διάσπαση των 362 και 371 (ας τους πούμε 362/1 και 362/2 ή 371/1 και 371/2).<br /><br /><b>Και τί θα αλλάξει;</b><br /><br />Τα στοιχεία της ΕΧΧ μπορούν να μας πούν πόσο χρόνο αφιερώνουν οι πολίτες στο κράτος, αν αυτός αυξάνεται ή μειώνεται, και ποιές κατηγορίες πολιτών επιβαρύνονται περισσότερο – ανά ηλικία, φύλο, σύνθεση νοικοκυριού, τοποθεσία, βαθμό αστικότητας και θέση στην εργασία. Γνωρίζοντας αυτές τις λεπτομέρειες είναι πιο εύκολο να σκεφτεί κανείς λύσεις για τη δημόσια διοίκηση αλλά και να παρακολουθήσει, σε βάθος χρόνου, την αποτελεσματικότητά τους. Πιθανώς γι αυτό το λόγο και η πρώτη ΕΧΧ του 2013/4 χρηματοδοτήθηκε από το Επιχειρησιακό Πρόγραμμα «Διοικητική Μεταρρύθμιση 2007-2013.<br /><br />Η ΕΧΧ χρησιμοποιείται ήδη για να παράσχει συμπληρωματικές μετρήσεις στον υπολογισμό του ΑΕΠ (πχ εκτιμήσεις που σπάνια βλέπουν το φώς της δημοσιότητας σχετικά με της αξίας της απλήρωτης εργασίας των νοικοκυριών.) Η μέτρηση του χρόνου που δεσμεύει το Κράτος μπορεί κι αυτή να βελτιώσει, πχ τις εκτιμήσεις για την προστιθέμενη αξία της δημόσιας διοίκησης.<br /><br />Σε βάθος χρόνου, μπορεί να πειστούν και άλλες Ευρωπαϊκές χώρες να διεξάγουν τις ίδιες μετρήσεις – με αποτέλεσμα να προκύψουν συγκρίσιμα στοιχεία.<br /><br />Ανεξαρτήτως όμως από το πώς χρησιμοποιούμε τα στοιχεία, κάθε φορά που γίνεται αναφορά σε αυτά θα είναι και μια υπενθύμιση στους κυβερνώντες και στο πολιτικό προσωπικό της χώρας ότι ο χρόνος μας δεν τους ανήκει.<br /><br /><b>Δεν είμαστε παράλογοι…</b><br /><br />Ο σκοπός αυτών των στοιχείων δεν είναι ο εντυπωσιασμός αλλά η μέτρηση. Δεν θέλουμε να νοθεύσουμε τα νούμερα με συναλλαγές ή εργασίες κατά τις οποίες ο πολίτης δεν παρέχει<br />ουσιαστικά την εργασία ή το χρόνο του στο Κράτος, ούτε με δραστηριότητες για τις οποίες ήδη υπάρχει λογοδοσία. Είναι σχετικά εύκολο να γίνει αυτό.<br /><br />Για παράδειγμα, αν ο ερωτηθείς είναι δημόσιος υπάλληλος, εννοείται ότι η εργασία του θα συνεχίζει να εμπίπτει στους κωδικούς (δραστηριότητας και τοποθεσίας) που σχετίζονται με την κύρια εργασία. Και είναι λογικό – ο συμπολίτης αυτός πληρώνεται για την εργασία του και το Κράτος ήδη δίνει λογαριασμό και για το χρόνο εργασίας του και για την αμοιβή του.<br /><br />Παρομοίως, ο χρόνος κατά τον οποίο ο πολίτης απολαμβάνει υπηρεσίες του Δημοσίου δεν έχει νόημα να μετρηθεί ως χρόνος που του ‘δεσμεύει’ το Κράτος. Για παράδειγμα, δεν<br />είναι προσφορά χρόνου στο Κράτος το να παρακολουθεί κανείς διαλέξεις σε ένα δημόσιο πανεπιστήμιο: αρκεί να μετρηθεί όπως και ως τώρα κάτω από τους κωδικούς 211-212 (Μαθήματα – Εργασία στο σπίτι). Η υποβολή μηχανογραφικού όμως και η συλλογή των δικαιολογητικών για την εγγραφή σε δημόσιο ΑΕΙ μπορεί να είναι διαφορετική υπόθεση.<br /><br />Τέλος, όταν οι συναλλαγές με το δημόσιο συνδυάζονται με άλλες δραστηριότητες (πχ ψώνια), δεν πρέπει να χρεώνεται το δημόσιο όλες τις σχετικές δραστηριότητες και μετακινήσεις. Εφόσον υπάρχουν τα υπόλοιπα σχετικά στοιχεία, είναι σχετικά εύκολο για οποιονδήποτε ερευνητή να κάνει έναν απλό επιμερισμό.<br /><br /><b>Τι λέει η ΕΛΣΤΑΤ για όλα αυτά;</b><br /><br />Το αίτημα απευθύνεται στην ΕΛΣΤΑΤ όχι επειδή έχει δείξει κάποια απροθυμία να ασχοληθεί με το θέμα (δεν ισχύει κάτι τέτοιο) αλλα απλώς επειδή είναι η αρμόδια αρχή. Η ΕΛΣΤΑΤ συλλέγει και αξιολογεί τακτικά προτάσεις από τους χρήστες της - δείτε πχ την πιο πρόσφατη έρευνα ικανοποίησης χρηστών:<br /><br />http://www.statistics.gr/user-satisfaction-survey<br /><br />Ο συντάκτης του ψηφίσματος έχει επικοινωνήσει μέσω email με ένα από τα αρμόδια άτομα και εισέπραξε μια ευγενική απάντηση, την υπόσχεση καταγραφής της πρότασής του και μερικές χρήσιμες πληροφορίες.<br /><br />Όταν έρθει η ώρα να σχεδιαστεί η έρευνα του 2021, όμως, θα είναι παράλογο να αποφασίσει η ΕΛΣΤΑΤ μια σημαντική αλλαγή με βάση τα σχόλια ενός μόνο χρήστη. Ένα μαζικό αίτημα θα τη βοηθήσει να αξιολογήσει καλύτερα πόση ζήτηση υπάρχει γι αυτά τα στοιχεία και αν αξίζει τον κόπο να γίνουν οι εν λόγω αλλαγές.</div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-21209030638705332252016-01-15T14:25:00.004+00:002016-01-22T23:27:35.478+00:00WHAT PRICE SALVATION? <div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<em>To celebrate the blog's 6th birthday (and its 500,000th pageview) I proposed to take suggestions for fact-checks from the audience on Twitter and Facebook. This is the second of the two winning fact-checks and it deals with the cost to Greek citizens of the Greek Orthodox Church. </em><br />
<strong><br /></strong>
<strong>In the beginning there was the press release...</strong><br />
<strong><br /></strong>
Perhaps the most surprising element of this fact-check is the extent to which it has been pre-empted by an <a href="https://www.minedu.gov.gr/publications/docs2015/Press_Release_Taxation_Church_of_Greece_Clergy_payroll.pdf">extremely detailed press release</a> from Greece's far-left Government (as it then was) in March 2015. This explained that, contrary to press reports, the Greek Churches (for there are three - the Church of Greece, the Church of Crete and the Holy Metropolises of the Dodecanese) pay taxes; enjoy no undue tax breaks, and have a solid legal claim to the Greek government's payroll. They also do not directly handle public money. Quoting from the release:<br />
<br />
<i>"The payroll of Christian Orthodox Clergy as well as the funding of Christian Orthodox
Religious Education is an obligation of the State declared in texts of the National
Assemblies of the Peoples’ representatives of the Greek revolutionaries (1822, 1829)
in exchange for transferring the assets of the Church to the State. The transfer was
implemented gradually </i>[by means of the following:]<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><i>establishment of public organizations for exploiting the
assets of the Church and for supporting public Education and improvement of the
Clergy’s situation on October 13, 1834; </i></li>
<li><i>expropriation of monasteries’ property to
indemnify farmers and refugees following the destruction of Ionia on November 19,
1909 and on May 10, 1930; </i></li>
<li><i>Concession for transferring ⅘ of fields and meadows
property of monasteries on September 18, 1952; </i></li>
<li><i>Concession for transferring forest,
fields and meadows property of monasteries on May 11, 1988." </i></li>
</ul>
<i>Moreover, it should be made clear that salaries are paid from the State directly to
Clergy. Public funds are not transferred by the State via the Holy Metropolises nor
are any regular grants included in the annual budget of the State to any of the
entities of the Church of Greece, the Church of Crete and the Holy Metropolises of
the Dodecanese. Therefore, the Holy Metropolises do not manage public money”. </i><br />
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<b>The numbers of the Beast</b><br />
<br />
The Syriza presser, apart from being politically shrewd to defend the Church in an almost entirely Orthodox Christian country, is also right. Technically the payment of priests' salaries is a legal obligation; an off-balance-sheet liability, if you will, recorded as a current transfer by the Central Government to bodies outside General Government. It has also been relatively easy to track down from 2013 onwards. You can find it is as follows:<br />
<ol>
<li>Go to the Greek ministry of finance website and select Menu - Financial Data - Budget Execution Bulletins (Οικονομικά στοιχεία - Δελτία εκτέλεσης προϋπολογισμού).</li>
<li>Pick the latest monthly General government bulletin (Δελτίο εκτέλεσης προϋπολογισμού) and look for the attached Central Government time series .xls file. Sometimes the English files will be missing but the Greek ones will be there.</li>
<li>Navigate to the tab named 'Non State Central Government' (Κεντρική Κυβέρνηση Πλην Κρατικού [Προϋπολογισμού])</li>
<li>Look for two rows called B.516.: Current transfers paid - Current transfers to non-governmental units (Τρέχουσες μεταβιβάσεις καταβληθείσες - Προς μονάδες εκτός της γενικής κυβέρνησης). One records just the <i>monthly </i>payments and the other records the <i>cumulative </i>figure over the year. Use the cumulative version where possible.</li>
<li>Always use the latest version as statistics get revised regularly and retrospectively. </li>
</ol>
You can find the most recent time series (Nov 2015) at the time of writing in Greek <a href="http://www.mnec.gr/sites/default/files/financial_files/xron_seires_kentr_kyb_11_2015.xls">here </a>and in English <a href="http://www.mnec.gr/sites/default/files/financial_files/November%202015%20Time%20Series%20Central%20Government.xls">here</a>. This approach only works because the Church's wage bill is the <u>only</u> current transfer from central government to a non-General-Government body. If this were to change, it would become much harder to isolate it. Before 2013, the pay data was a little harder to find, and information on the actual number of clerics was elusive; in fact, the Greek Church(es) had to <a href="http://www.kathimerini.gr/415915/article/epikairothta/ellada/apografh-ierewn-kai-proslhyeis">refine their own data</a> collection from 2011 onwards in order to feed into the census of state employees.<br />
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Clerics' pensions are, like those of civil servants, unfunded and paid directly out of the Central Government budget. As unlikely as it sounds, this makes the associated payments much more transparent than their salaries - as long as you can read Greek you can look them up in any Budget post-mortem (eg see 'Κεντρικές Υπηρεσίες' <a href="http://www.mnec.gr/?q=el/content/%CE%B1%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%BF%CE%B3%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CF%8C%CF%82-%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BF%CE%BB%CE%BF%CE%B3%CE%B9%CF%83%CE%BC%CF%8C%CF%82-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CE%BB%CE%BF%CE%B9%CF%80%CE%AD%CF%82-%CF%87%CF%81%CE%B7%CE%BC-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%83%CF%84%CE%AC%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82-2014">here</a>). You can also, for now, find recent data on <a href="https://diavgeia.gov.gr/doc/%CE%92%CE%9B%CE%93%CE%A8%CE%97-%CE%A137">Diavgeia</a>, the embattled transparency website on which most spending decisions must be published.<br />
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I summarise how much the Greek government has paid priests over the recent years in the graph below.<br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVFBQYDegHIHNqHiIIKEKoou0ph5wxY9HOc-3YKAEm_tdgh0qeNIF7IimLOvl2tOqowDOf08AOfUvo4Ii6BAQOxx-Y9sfiDaoJ_4mxaIqmYTDHug7eX-vvBWVhJ3PmPrr0QJhNPNrtuCif/s1600/priestpay.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="253" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiVFBQYDegHIHNqHiIIKEKoou0ph5wxY9HOc-3YKAEm_tdgh0qeNIF7IimLOvl2tOqowDOf08AOfUvo4Ii6BAQOxx-Y9sfiDaoJ_4mxaIqmYTDHug7eX-vvBWVhJ3PmPrr0QJhNPNrtuCif/s400/priestpay.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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This expenditure includes the salaries of <a href="http://www.kathimerini.gr/806158/article/epikairothta/ellada/kanonika-h-mis8odosia-twn-ierwmenwn">ca. 10,000 priests</a> and other Church staff, while the pensions bill includes pensions paid to <a href="http://www.mnec.gr/sites/default/files/financial_files/EISHGHTIKH%20EKTHESH%202016.pdf">a projected</a> 5,240 priests and Church employees. It doesn't include spending on the education of priests and subsidies to other church institutions, which, in 2014, came up to <a href="http://www.mnec.gr/sites/default/files/financial_files/APOLOGISMOS%202014%20KENTRIKES%20YPHRESIES%20-%20TOMOS%20A.pdf">roughly EUR2.5m</a> - but that is genuinely negligible in the grand scheme of things. Now, priests have never been a 'exotic' category of civil servants; legally they've always been treated in the same way as the rest, even collecting the same spurious pre-crisis <a href="https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/6b518e04-1655-488c-9345-97d596890588.pdf">productivity bonuses</a> as their colleagues elsewhere.<br />
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It's clear from the graph above that the Church has not been immune to austerity, having taken a <i>nominal </i>cut of ca 35% between 2010 and 2015. But it has, perhaps, been somewhat sheltered, presumably because so much of its spending is direct transfers to individuals. If you rank the Church against <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-471197_QID_-6E7E42E4_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;COFOG99,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;NA_ITEM,L,Z,2;GEO,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-471197UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-471197SECTOR,S13;DS-471197INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-471197NA_ITEM,TE;DS-471197GEO,EL;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=COFOG99_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">other categories</a> of spending where comparable data is available, the church's wage bill was cut at about two-thirds of the pace seen in the core civil service, defence spending, sickness and disability benefits, public transport or hospital budgets; or at the same pace as parliamentary functions and legal spending; and faster than, say, the police, agricultural spending or environmental protection. Moreover, even more so than with other Greeks, in the priestly orders pensioners really have screwed everyone else over. The Church's pensions bill has come out of the crisis almost entirely unscathed even though the number of pensioners hasn't risen tremendously. And it's clear that it's not just press releases the Syriza/Anel government had to offer the Church; it also offered it its first real-terms payrise in five years.<br />
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As much as it's enjoyable to point to the Church's sheltered pensions, it's also important to put the Church's payroll and other spending on it in perspective. At a total EUR224m in 2015, the cost of the Church is approximately <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/7039947/EL-2015-10.pdf">0.13% of GDP</a>; that's somewhere between the country's entire public housing budget and the amount the state spends on waste water management.<br />
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<b>God's Social Workers</b><br />
<br />
It is not surprising that there have been calls for a substantial rethink of the Church's relationship to the public finances throughout the last few decades, and even less surprising that they have grown stronger in the recent depression. In 2012, an ungoogleable report from Greece's Centre for Planning and Economic Research (the Greek Government's economic think-tank) called for a rethink, offering several scenarios for the rebalancing of church and state relations - including levying a tax on the faithful or tapping the Church's own income to pay for some 50% of the Church's payroll. This was swiftly dismissed by <a href="http://1myblog.pblogs.gr/2012/06/o-g-g-thrhskefmatwn-gia-thn-misthodosia-toy-klhroy.html">the Government of the time</a> on the grounds that it would jeopardise the Church's social work, which the Government claimed was worth more than the EUR100m KEPE aimed to save.<br />
<br />
But how much charitable work does the Church actually do? Apparently, <a href="http://www.kathimerini.gr/809810/article/epikairothta/ellada/exw-dei-an8rwpoys-na-tsakwnontai-gia-ena-piato-faghtoy">EUR121m worth</a> in 2014, down marginally from EUR122m<a href="http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/pronaos/pronaos_697.html#n1"> in 2013</a>, but up from 106m <a href="http://www.imchiou.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=949:2013-06-08-09-16-13&catid=71:2012-03-07-18-01-05&Itemid=105">in 2012</a>, EUR100m in 2011; EUR96m in 2010, EUR92m in 2009 and EUR93m <a href="http://www.amen.gr/article/to-filanthrwpiko-ergo-tis-ekklisias">in 2008</a>. In any case, the Church claims to feed half a million Greeks over the year in 280 soup kitchens, and another 76 thousand through 150 food banks; it claims to provide 1,300 scholarships and care-at-home for 3,500 persons. Not to mention some 28 nurseries and 75 charitable cramming schools (<a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/11/we-need-to-talk-about-greek-private.html">remember those?</a>). This activity is partly supported by over 3,000 <a href="http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/commitees/welfare/welfare-0004a.htm">parish welfare funds</a>.<br />
<br />
So let's try the maths again. I'm netting off charitable work against wages only, as a kind of 'operating surplus' of the Church's social work. Clearly, wage restraint has eaten very far into this surplus; the Church's work is countercyclical, while its wage bill has been cut.<br />
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<br />
The source of all estimates of the Church's humanitarian work is the Church's <a href="http://sekpe.org/">Synodical Commission for Social Welfare and Well-Being</a>, supported by a <a href="http://sekpe.org/?page_id=251">Census</a> of Church organisations. However, unlike the Church's finances these figures are unaudited. Scrutiny by ELSTAT, for which the Church is <a href="http://sekpe.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/%CE%95%CE%93%CE%9A%CE%A5%CE%9A%CE%9B%CE%99%CE%9F%CE%9D-%CE%A3%CE%97%CE%9C%CE%95%CE%99%CE%A9%CE%9C%CE%91-%CE%A0%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%99-%CE%91%CE%A0%CE%9F%CE%A3%CE%A4%CE%9F%CE%9B%CE%97%CE%A3-%CE%A3%CE%A4%CE%9F%CE%99%CE%A7%CE%95%CE%99%CE%A9%CE%9D-%CE%A6%CE%99%CE%9B%CE%91%CE%9D%CE%98%CE%A1%CE%A9%CE%A0%CE%99%CE%9A%CE%9F%CE%A5-%CE%95%CE%A1%CE%93%CE%9F%CE%A5-%CE%A4%CE%9F%CE%A5-%CE%95%CE%A4%CE%9F%CE%A5%CE%A3-2015.pdf">apparently preparing</a>, is unlikley to fill that gap. So for now, it's important to exercise some skepticism in both directions; these amounts include operating costs of the Church's foundations, and there may be some double-counting in the figures, but also under-counting of donations in kind and voluntary work. I would not query the order of magnitude. <br />
<br />
So the Church's argument goes that if it had to pick up the tab for priests' salaries and pensions it would be unable to devote the same amount it currently does to humanitarian work. I am not entirely convinced - or rather, I'm sure this is true but I'm sure the relationship between the Church's wage bill and its ability to provide humanitarian assistance is more nuanced - and weaker. It has, after all, proven capable of raising substantial funds in these lean times despite a cut in its wage bill - something it had warned would be impossible back in 2012. One reason, among many I'm sure, is that the Church's humanitarian activity is not driven substantially by the work of priests and others on the State payroll but by volunteers. The European Values Study of 2008 tells me that 2.2% of the Greek adult population (some 180,000 people) worked unpaid for a religious organisation - eighteen times the number of actual priests. Pensioners and the unemployed, especially those with lower levels of education, were most likely to do this work - so the Church's supply of unpaid labour has no doubt grown in the crisis. (Bonus: if it really takes 180,000 people to provide ca 120m worth of assistance, that works out to ca EUR666 per person per year - a hilarious but genuine coincidence. <br />
<br />
<strong>Supernatural monopoly</strong><br />
<br />
These figures point to the core of Greece's Church-state problem. The Church's network and infrastructure are, frankly, extremely convenient for the State; and the Church has a longer history of performing both social and administrative functions than the State. In providing services to Greece's mainstream, indigenous population, the Church can, due to its historical endowment, out-compete any NGO or international organisation, and often the State itself. The Church can raise the EUR120m or so it needs for its operations less invasively and more sensitively than the State - I've never once heard of a protest against it. And the Church can mobilise volunteers. The State would have a protest on its hands in no time.<br />
<br />
Put it differently, if the Greek state were to put the social protection and administrative functions of the Church out to tender, as a formal outsourced business, the Church would win almost all of them right back, with a profit margin. Its mas access to free labour would be almost impossible to replicate. If the State were instead to take them all in-house as state functions, it would probably perform them less effectively and efficiently and would struggle to make the case for tax rises to fund them. It would have to scale down massively because it would never be able to find the people to perform them.<br />
<br />
Either extreme is less preferable than the status quo. In the good times, of course, the Church might have struggled to reach the niche or socially excluded groups that were most in need of some interventions (say, sex workers, migrants, or refugees). But as the crisis reaches ever more of the core of Greek society this argument has become weaker.<br />
<br />
The Church, of course, didn't build this unassailable competitive position on its own; it has relied on seventeen centuries of Government endorsement of its administrative and welfare functions, not to mention a massive subsidy to its indoctrination work through the establishment of a state religion. These advantages persisted even during the centuries of Ottoman rule. Clearly, a hypothetical country designed from scratch wouldn't work like this - but what is the point of such thinking?<br />
<br />
The answer to this supernatural monopoly on welfare services does not, to me, appear to be a defunding of the Church in one fell swoop, but rather a combination of gradually reducing pension spending (say, by fixing it forever in nominal terms) and ending the enormous investment of the State in maintaining the State Religion through education and the law itself. Given how the latter is written into the Greek constitution, I don't expect much change is immediately possible, but it's worthwhile.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<b>Enough land for all the flock to roam</b><br />
<br />
A key question posed to me when I began this fact-check related to the wealth of the Church. The Church, the narrative goes, is rich; and because it is rich it must contribute to the public coffers in our time of need. I am not sure how asset-rich the Church is, or how cash-rich it is either. <br />
<br />
The Church's key source of wealth is supposedly land and real estate. But how much land does the Church <i>own</i>? The Greek blogosphere offers a million answers but there some figures with at least some legitimacy. An Agricultural Bank of Greece study (inaccessible online but cited eg <a href="https://www.nbg.gr/english/the-group/press-office/e-spot/reports/Documents/Land_and_Tourism.pdf">here</a>) dating back to 1987 estimates the Church's rural holdings at 1,300 square kilometers, about 1% of the country's rural land. Of this less than a tenth was arable, and about a quarter was classified as forest by the authorities and largely banned from development. A whole lot of it was pastures. But even that study seems to have been compiled based on 'expert views' - on which I would not necessarily rely on such a difficult issue.<br />
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<br />
<br />
The Church cites the 1987 study widely, not only because it makes its real estate empire look small but also because it deals exclusively with rural land; clearly in terms of actual wealth it is the urban property of the Church that actually matters, of which we anecdotally know there is a good deal. The Church's detractors cite the same study because it names the Church as Greece's no.2 landlord after the State itself; even though it is a very distant second. Either way, the reality is that the Church's <i>rural </i>real estate is likely worth very little, and trying to get to the bottom of <em>how</em> much is a fool's errand. Quite how people presume to put a price on land that hasn't been involved in a transaction or put to regular productive use for hundreds of years is beyond me, but I'm not dumb enough to try.<br />
<br />
Ultimately, the best way to value a piece of Church land is to buy it, or exploit it commercially. There is a catch, though. The Church claims that it would love to make more of its real estate but red tape (eg planning and preservation laws) is getting in the way; in fact, it claims it is probably the only landowner and/or develop with actual respect for planning, zoning and conservation laws, and finds itself stranded in 'forest' plots that haven't seen a green shoot in years, while all around them the state tolerates irregular development. To British readers, this may sound a little like Green Belt lobbying with a twist. Whatever the truth of it, it worked for a while. In April, the Greek government was reportedly <a href="http://www.michanikos.gr/_/%CE%95%CE%B9%CE%B4%CE%AE%CF%83%CE%B5%CE%B9%CF%82/%CE%B5%CF%80%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9%CF%81%CF%8C%CF%84%CE%B7%CF%84%CE%B1/800-%CE%B9%CE%B5%CF%81%CE%AC-%CF%86%CE%B9%CE%BB%CE%AD%CF%84%CE%B1-%CF%80%CF%81%CE%BF%CF%82-%CE%B1%CE%BE%CE%B9%CE%BF%CF%80%CE%BF%CE%AF%CE%B7%CF%83%CE%B7-%CF%86%CE%AD%CF%81%CE%BD%CE%B5%CE%B9-%CE%B7-%CF%83%CF%85%CE%BC%CF%86%CF%89%CE%BD%CE%AF-r2639">close to a deal</a> for a deregulation drive that would enable a 50/50 joint venture between the Church and the Greek State to develop Church lands (H/T <a href="https://twitter.com/_LaScapigliata">@_LaScapigliata</a>). The deal stalled and, as of November, was getting started <a href="http://www.avgi.gr/article/5998512/meikti-epitropi-kratous-ekklisias-gia-tin-axiopoiisi-tis-ekklisiastikis-periousias">all over again</a>, with a joint commission set up. Given that the new commission was meant to discuss a much broader set of issues ahead of a Constitutional review, it seems the Government <a href="http://www.fpress.gr/oikonomia/item/30909-kontra-ieronymoy-tsipra-gia-tin-axiopoiisi-tis-ekklisiastikis-perioysias">had not got </a>what it wanted back in the first half of the year and was aiming for more.<br />
<br />
The development JV, by the way, wasn't Syriza's idea; it has existed <a href="http://www.tovima.gr/politics/article/?aid=524251">since 2013</a> and has mostly sat on its hands since. What is the chance that it has a board that has been paid without fail ever since?<br />
<br />
<b>Cadastral projection</b><br />
<br />
If you are strict about the meaning of the word <i>own</i>, of course, the answer is that we don't and can't know what the Church owns at all, since Greece still has no Land Registry or cadastre; a reform one might have expected to see fast-tracked in the memorandum years but which was in fact <a href="http://openeurope.org.uk/blog/reforming-greece-easier-said-done-never-ending-case-land-registry/">left to wither on the vine</a> with EUR100m of EU funding and a billion of the Greek people's own money committed since 1994 and by turns clawed back by Europe, squandered in Greece, or left on the table by both sides. With three quarters of the work still pending and much of it expected to be completed only after 2020, this is <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eurozone-greece-cadastre-insight-idUKKCN0SC0LA20151018">a crime and a national disgrace</a> for which neither the <strike>troika </strike>institutions nor any Greek Government so far has felt the need to seek justice.<br />
<br />
The result? The Church has, <a href="http://newpost.gr/ellada/26886/ksekina-to-iero-ktimatologio-">since 2011</a>, gone on a cadastral safari, in an effort to ensure its claims are as tidy as possible - which is hard to do when one's claim on land is a patchwork of often centuries old squatter's rights, edicts of fallen imperial thrones, bequests and donations. After several rounds of expropriation in the past (see above and below!), it has good cause to worry. But it could help speed up the process even more by putting its moral and legal weight behind getting the Land Registry off the ground faster. It has not. <br />
<br />
<strong>Pearls before swine</strong><br />
<br />
Regarding the Church's total property, there are estimates of <a href="http://www.catholic.org/news/international/europe/story.php?id=43356">7-15bn</a> which appear to be based on pre-crisis property and share values, and other <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2011/09/20/l-argent-tabou-de-l-eglise-grecque_1574772_3214.html">estimates of ca. 1bn</a> which may be more reasonable now - that would make the Church about as rich in real estate as Greek pension funds. <br />
<br />
But claims that the value of church land in Greece runs into the trillions of Euros also abound on the internet. Like much of the Greek blogosphere, they are nonsense, based on a misreading (mishearing even) of the 1994 case of <a href="http://www.interights.org/commonwealth-and-international-law-document/514/index.html">Holy Monasteries v Greece,</a> in which the ECHR awarded ca 8m Drachmas to monasteries in respect of legal fees and expenses following an irregular expropriation of land by the state. <br />
<br />
Eight monasteries did, in fact, make a claim for pecuniary damages amounting to an outrageous <a href="http://www.refworld.org/docid/402a045b4.html">GDR 7.6 trillion</a> for expropriated land (EUR22.3bn in today's exchange rate, actually more after accounting for inflation between 1994 and 2001). In fact, however, when the monasteries tallied up their property, it came up to <a href="http://kig-bg.org/res/file/137/dimopoulou_lampropoulos.pdf">a lot less</a> than that: GRD3.1bn for 7 out of the 8 monasteries and another GRD43bn for the eighth, inflated by its ownership of the marble quaries of mt Parnis. So the typical monastery ended up with an estimate closer to EUR2.7m in current Greek prices (adjusting for inflation since 1994); a substantial amount no doubt, especially considering we have a good 2,500 monasteries. Leaving the outlier aside, and assuming the rest are representative, gives us ca. EUR6.6bn in today's money for monasteries alone. Yet these monasteries were far from representative; they were some of the richest, as evidenced by the fact that they were targeted for expropriation and could afford a ridiculously lengthy court case like this.<br />
<br />
Remember, these are the monasteries' own estimates of real-estate values, which is to say they are almost certainly inflated. Crucially, the ECHR took no view on the actual value of the property of the monasteries - a point lost on most of the people blogging about the case. Instead it urged the monasteries and the State to come to a settlement; which <a href="http://echr.ketse.com/doc/13092.87-13984.88-en-19970901/view/">they finally did</a>, with the State simply acknowledging the monasteries' ownership over the disputed land.<br />
<br />
Of course, monasteries aren't the whole of the Church in Greece; and it is doubtful that the Church 'owns' their property to such effect that it could order monasteries to sell it, rent it out or put it to any other use. Hence the value of these estimates is points. Yet since the one thing both the Church's detractors and its defenders alike agree on is that it is (a very distant) second only to the State as an individual owner of land and real estate, then its urban property cannot in any way be worth more than <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-494255_QID_6B1CA952_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;ASSET10,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;GEO,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-494255UNIT,CP_MEUR;DS-494255GEO,EL;DS-494255SECTOR,S13;DS-494255INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=ASSET10_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">EUR100bn in current values</a> - since that's what the State's buildings are worth. <br />
<br />
But most important of all is the question of why the value of Church property matters. The State <a href="https://www.minedu.gov.gr/publications/docs2015/Press_Release_Taxation_Church_of_Greece_Clergy_payroll.pdf">reassures</a> us that the Church pays the right amount of property tax. If so, then the discussion of Church property is simply a warm-up act for further expropriation, or an attempt to proxy undeclared income. But as the ECHR confirmed back in the 90s, monasteries and indeed the Church can own property just as well as individuals - and no one can help themselves to it without a competing claim or an over-riding social purpose coupled with compensation. That argument is what did for PASOK's expropriation drive in the early 90s, which incidentially is responsible for many of the enduring myths we are still having to discuss today. <br />
<br />
<strong>TO BE CONTINUED</strong><br />
<br /></div>
Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-85642675552589457222016-01-01T09:00:00.000+00:002016-01-01T11:37:46.873+00:00The contribution of the Greek shipping industry: I agree with Reuters<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<i>To celebrate the blog's 6th birthday I proposed to take suggestions for fact-checks from the audience on Twitter and Facebook. This is the first of the two winning fact-checks (a recommendation from my friend P.S.) and it deals with the contribution of shipping to the Greek economy.</i><br />
<br />
The starting point for this fact-check is a Reuters special report, <i><a href="http://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/eurozone-greece-shipping/">The Greek Shipping Myth,</a> </i>which cast doubt on the employment and GDP contribution figures cited by the Greek shipping industry (and echoed by much of the domestic and foreign press - eg the FT <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f99c3fc0-2b9d-11e5-acfb-cbd2e1c81cca.html">here</a>). The core claim in this report is that the industry's contribution to the Greek economy is inflated because ELSTAT calculates the impact of shipping firms differently than the statistical agencies of other countries do - in particular, it includes in its calculations value added and employment that arise (and possibly stay) in other countries.<br />
<br />
In brief: Reuters' claim is correct in its essence. Shipping contributes less to the Greek economy than the industry lets people believe, if by 'economy' one reads 'gross national income' or 'domestic employment'. It is also likely that it contributes a lot less to GDP than the industry claims, although without further input from ELSTAT on the 'domesticity' of its product this is very hard to assess. The treatment of shipping in Greek national accounts is not as unique as Reuters claims - to some extent, countries such as the UK and Cyprus also appear to record it in similar ways. It does, however, contrast sharply to the way in which German statisticians measure the industry, and which is completely aligned with Reuters' preferred approach.<br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>'We're gonna need a bigger boat'</b><br />
<br />
At the risk of flirting with conspiracy theories, it is worth explaining the context of the Reuters publication and the FT coverage cited above. The last few years have seen <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34455981">sustained pressure</a> applied on Greek governments to raise taxes on the shipping industry. It's not just parts of the Greek left gunning for oligarchs that are behind this, either. The German shipping industry is said (see BBC article above) to be lobbying for a review of the taxation of Greek shipping and the IMF appears to have been mulling proposals for further taxation <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4c506aec-3938-11e4-9526-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz3D810gOU7">for some time</a>. Parallel to this, the European Commission has recently submitted a set of <a href="http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6384_en.htm">proposals</a> to Greece on reforming maritime tax; basically asking us to bring some activities out of scope of our tonnage tax system as niche sectors were looking like they were gaming the system.<br />
<br />
There is a big obstacle to taxing the shipping industry further, as a forty-year old law (<a href="http://www.e-forologia.gr/lawbank/document.aspx?digest=1D761EFF91CF2C00.1D031AEA53&version=2013/04/29">27/1975</a>), given a kind of special status by direct reference in article 107 of the <a href="http://www.hri.org/docs/syntagma/artcl120.html#A106">Greek Constitution of 1975</a>, exempts any company that pays tonnage tax in Greece from paying any other corporation tax or capital gains tax on sales of vessels. The exemption even extends to individual shareholders; see more details on p 173 <a href="http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Shipping_Almanac_2014/$FILE/EY-Shipping_Industry_Almanac_2014.pdf">here</a>. This is pretty heavy stuff; it means it's not just difficult to apply income tax to the shipping industry and its owners - it's virtually unconstitutional. The last Greek government got around this problem in 2013 by establishing a <a href="http://www.hellenicshippingnews.com/hellas-ship-owners-agree-to-420-million-euros-voluntary-tax-levy-for-2014-2017-period/">voluntary agreement</a> with the industry for an additional levy, and then formalising aspects of this into law. This idea had originally been mooted in 2011, during <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/bf83f570-dc8d-11e0-8654-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3v3j4fUij">negotiations</a> on the second Greek bailout, and effectively means that Greek-owned shipping companies (regardless of flag) will have paid an additional EUR420m between 2014 and 2017 (and no less than EUR105m in any given year). It's a steep increase from the amount of tonnage tax receipts which bring in a risible EUR12m per year (in 2012; historical data available <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/2014/ntl_release_2014.xls">here</a> under the 'EL' tab), but clearly this amount still looks relatively modest.<br />
<br />
In short: there's a hell of a lot of money to play for; national statisticians are swimming with sharks and Reuters' claim is that they've long avoided being eaten but cutting a deal.<br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>Shipping in the ocean of data</b><br />
<b><br /></b>
It's not easy to pin down shipping in national statistics. This is because the full suite of relevant sectors are only really identifiable at the 4-digit level of the European Union's revised standard industry classification (<a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nomenclatures/index.cfm?TargetUrl=LST_NOM_DTL&StrNom=NACE_REV2&StrLanguageCode=EN&IntPcKey=&StrLayoutCode=HIERARCHIC">NACE rev. 2</a>). The NACE rev. 2 codes we're potentially looking at are as follows:<br />
<br />
C: MANUFACTURING<br />
<i>30.11: Building of ships and floating structures</i><br />
<i>30.12: Building of pleasure and sporting boats</i><br />
<i>33.15: Repair and maintenance of ships and boats.</i><br />
<br />
H: TRANSPORTATION AND STORAGE<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;">50.10 Sea and coastal passenger water transport</span><br />
<i>50.20 Sea and coastal freight water transport</i><br />
<i>52.10 Warehousing and Storage activities for transportation</i><br />
<i>52:22: Support activities incidental to water transportation</i><br />
<br />
N: ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT SERVICE ACTIVITIES<br />
<i>77.34: Rental and leasing of water transport equipment</i><br />
<br />
Even then, there is room for discretion. I would be careful, for example, about counting anything other than codes 50.20, 52.22 and 77.34 under 'shipping,' though I would count almost all of the rest as part of the 'maritime cluster.' Even then, I would be careful about including code 52.10: it's likely that warehousing support for shipping is only a small part of this activity, and it's impossible to disaggregate it further. The 'maritime cluster' sectors are a unit of sorts because they share skillsets and specialisms, not to mention historical, corporate and family ties. But it's fair to say that the industries of the broader cluster respond to completely different sources of demand - demand for yachts, ferry rides and cruises isn't really driven by the currents of world trade, except perhaps in the very long term. And you wouldn't really expect to tax these sectors by tonnage, would you?<br />
<br />
There is a shortcut that researchers can and do use to get round all of this detail. NACE rev 2 code 50 (water transport) is a 2-digit sector and therefore a lot more statistics are publicly available for it; and intermediate demand for water transport from other industries is a half-decent proxy for shipping output, because it strips out demand for passenger travel and other non-trade related things.<br />
<b><br /></b>
Using Eurostat's supply and use tables <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-446651_QID_58E9CB8E_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=STK_FLOW,L,X,0;TIME,C,X,1;INDUSE,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;PROD_NA,L,Z,1;GEO,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-446651UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-446651GEO,EL;DS-446651PROD_NA,CPA_H50;DS-446651INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=PROD-NA_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName5=STK-FLOW_1_2_0_0&rankName6=TIME_1_0_1_0&rankName7=INDUSE_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a> it's relatively easy to see what the top line is for 'water transport services.' Some EUR15bn per year, as of 2010, almost all of it from exports. These are the latest and only figures on intermediate consumption of shipping that are available to us, but happily they are not the only figures we can rely on.<br />
<br />
<b>A missing middleman?</b><br />
<br />
Contrary to what the Reuters piece might have you think, Greece's ELSTAT does not publish regular releases specifically on the contribution of the shipping industry, the way it might do with say, manufacturing or services as a whole. It does, however, <i>quietly </i>prepare estimates of value added and employment in the industry for the purposes of compiling national accounts - which in turn feed into estimates of Greek GDP and productivity.<br />
<br />
You can see ELSTAT's breakdown of GDP components for 'water transport services' <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-423039_QID_208F21FF_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;NACE_R2,L,Z,1;GEO,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-423039UNIT,CP_MEUR;DS-423039NACE_R2,H50;DS-423039GEO,EL;DS-423039INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NACE-R2_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>. This roughly confirms the topline figure I cited above (15.8bn in 2010 but EUR12.8bn in 2014) and suggests that the industry contributed EUR5.7bn of value added in 2014, down from EUR6.6bn in 2010. ELSTAT provides the same figures on its own website <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/en/statistics?p_p_id=documents_WAR_publicationsportlet_INSTANCE_Mr0GiQJSgPHd&p_p_lifecycle=2&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_cacheability=cacheLevelPage&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_count=4&p_p_col_pos=3&_documents_WAR_publicationsportlet_INSTANCE_Mr0GiQJSgPHd_javax.faces.resource=document&_documents_WAR_publicationsportlet_INSTANCE_Mr0GiQJSgPHd_ln=downloadResources&_documents_WAR_publicationsportlet_INSTANCE_Mr0GiQJSgPHd_documentID=115311&_documents_WAR_publicationsportlet_INSTANCE_Mr0GiQJSgPHd_locale=en">here</a>. Accounting for the sector's own demand for goods and services, in turn, produces <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-446651_QID_-DCACD17_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=STK_FLOW,L,X,0;TIME,C,X,1;PROD_NA,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;GEO,L,Z,1;INDUSE,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-446651INDUSE,CPA_H50;DS-446651UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-446651GEO,EL;DS-446651INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=INDUSE_1_2_1_1&rankName5=STK-FLOW_1_2_0_0&rankName6=TIME_1_0_1_0&rankName7=PROD-NA_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">this table</a>, which suggests value added of EUR6.1bn in 2010.<br />
<br />
That the two sets of figures are not identical is a little odd. They ought to be, yet you'll notice a difference of EUR460m in the industry's value added, as well as the fact that the water transport sector seems to buy almost no services (a puny EUR28m!) from itself. Now what could that be? It's rare, after all, for a broad (2-digit) industry to not use some of its own product as inputs. This to me is a first hint that there might be a missing middle-man in the GDP figures.<br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>The impact studies</b><br />
<br />
Unlike ELSTAT, the shipping industry and its observers in academia and think tanks are far from quiet about these estimates, and so the relevant figures have, in recent years, found their way into three widely-cited and to some extent overlapping assessments:<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>The <a href="http://www.bcg.gr/documents/file146826.pdf">BCG Assessment</a> of 2013 </li>
<li>The <a href="http://iobe.gr/docs/research/en/RES_05_F_07012913REP_ENG.pdf">IOBE assessment </a>of 2013.</li>
<li>The Oxford Economics <a href="http://llsa.lt/images/articles/naudinga_info/2014-04-01%20Oxford%20Economics%20Shipping%20value.pdf">Assessment</a> of 2014. </li>
</ul>
It is these studies that provide the chief lobby fodder of the industry, and they are genuinely loyal to the ELSTAT estimates. In fact, there is not much wrong with them at all. Like many 'impact' studies of course, they tend to bulk up their value added estimates with estimates of 'induced demand' and multiplier effects - ie value added in other industries that would not occur if it weren't for shipping. This tends to inflate the industry's contribution to a normally running economy, but might be a good approximation of what the country would miss out on if the entire industry were to decamp to other shores. This approach to impact assessment is not my main concern, or that of the Reuters investigation. Rather, I am concerned that Reuters may be right and that the core ELSTAT figures are probably wrong.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<b>A Waste of Money at Reuters </b><br />
<b><br /></b></div>
<div>
Reuters comes to this conclusion by looking at a sample of company accounts for the Greek offices of shipping companies - which account for only a fraction of the value added and employment claimed by the industry. This must have been a heroic effort - but also a wasted one, as ELSTAT had already done this work for them, The results can now be found in Eurostat's annual detailed enterprise statistics, and have two advantages: first, they go to enough detail to identify shipping <i>extremely </i>closely; second, they are limited to shipping enterprises registered in each member state.<br />
<div>
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>You can check out the service components of the maritime cluster <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120957_QID_-2760CAF5_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=NACE_R2,L,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;TIME,C,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-120957TIME,2013;DS-120957INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-120957GEO,EL;&rankName1=TIME_1_0_-1_2&rankName2=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NACE-R2_1_2_0_0&rankName5=INDIC-SB_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>, along with their (very detailed) income, employment* and value added figures. </li>
<li>You may also want to add, for completeness, the activities of shipyards and dockyards, available separately <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120933_QID_-20AAC59D_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=NACE_R2,L,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,Y,0;TIME,C,Z,0;GEO,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-120933GEO,EL;DS-120933INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-120933TIME,2013;&rankName1=TIME_1_0_-1_2&rankName2=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NACE-R2_1_2_0_0&rankName5=INDIC-SB_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>. </li>
</ul>
*You need to be cautious and patient when it comes to the employment figures cited here. Unfortunately, quality control of the detailed enterprise statistics is relatively poor - on two occasions I've come across errors obvious to the naked eye, and shipping employment is one of them. Eurostat has a good record of acting on tip-offs about such errors but this is the holidays so it might take them a while to respond to my complaint.<br />
<br />
Whatever the quality of the overall dataset, I believe there is no doubting the value added figures, which tally well with Reuters' estimates. The narrow shipping sector's value added (at factor costs) is barely EUR380m, based on output of EUR 735m. The broad maritime cluster produces a more respectable EUR936m of value added, on turnover of EUR2.2bn. Even this is miles away from the over EUR5bn that ELSTAT counts towards Greece's GDP. It's not just a question of inter-group transfers to companies outside Greece (like the ones, eg, that result in Starbucks' extremely low taxable income). If it were, then the top-line at least would presumably be the same regardless. It really looks like Reuters is right - the value added by shipping businesses registered abroad is being routinely included in the Greek GDP figures.<br />
<br />
Then again, look again at the 2010 figures from enterprise stats - we may have our missing-middleman right there. At just over EUR400m, the sea freight sector's 2010 turnover from detailed enterprise statistics fits quite well into the gap between the two value added estimates for 'water transport' that we saw earlier - suggesting that the Greek-registered businesses (local management offices, in Reuters' article) produce nothing but intermediate inputs into an international industry that is somehow considered to be Greek in our annual accounts. Depending on whether the estimate is run top-down or bottom-up, they disappear into opaque group accounts, instead of being tallied up as intermediate inputs, which produces the two separate value-added estimates we saw earlier.<br />
<br />
<b>Whose billions?</b><br />
<b><br /></b>
But what of the other EUR5bn? Is that Greek domestic value added or is it foreign value-added? And if it is foreign value-added, does it give rise to Greek incomes? Consistent with Reuters' theory, it looks like ELSTAT treats all value added from firms of Greek beneficial ownership as domestic, and adds it to GDP. There may be some basis for this. The question of when a transaction can be said to arise in a country's territory and therefore to be <i>domestic</i> is not one of economics but of statistical convention, for which we turn to the wisdom of the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5925693/KS-02-13-269-EN.PDF/44cd9d01-bc64-40e5-bd40-d17df0c69334">ESA2010 manual</a>:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>Exports of goods occur without the goods crossing the country’s frontier in the following examples: (a) goods produced by resident units operating in international waters are sold directly to nonresidents in foreign countries. Examples of such goods are oil, natural gas, fishery products, maritime’s salvage; (b) transportation equipment or other movable equipment not tied to a fixed location; (c) goods after changing ownership, which are lost or destroyed before they have crossed the frontier of the exporting country; (d) merchanting, i.e. the purchase of a good by a resident from a non-resident and the subsequent resale of the good to another non-resident, without the good entering the merchant’s economy. Analogous cases occur for the imports of goods. </i></blockquote>
Is Greece as unique in this treatment as Reuters alleges? It's easy to test this by comparing the contribution of water transport (remember, this is not quite 'shipping'!) to gross value added under the national accounts with its contribution under enterprise statistics. Here I'm keeping passenger transport in the calculation so that we're comparing 'water transport' with 'water transport' and can therefore isolate the effects of statistical treatment, country of registration and ownership structure.<br />
<div>
<br />
The entire EU water transport sector makes about 26.5bn of value added under the detailed enterprise statistics approach (2013 figures <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120957_QID_-68B30C3E_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=NACE_R2,L,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;INDIC_SB,L,Z,0;TIME,C,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-120957TIME,2013;DS-120957INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-120957INDIC_SB,V12150;&rankName1=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDIC-SB_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=TIME_1_0_1_0&rankName4=NACE-R2_1_2_0_0&rankName5=GEO_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>) but 34bn under the GDP approach (see <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-423039_QID_-6E458A6E_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;NACE_R2,L,Z,1;NA_ITEM,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-423039NA_ITEM,B1G;DS-423039UNIT,CP_MEUR;DS-423039NACE_R2,H50;DS-423039INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NACE-R2_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NA-ITEM_1_0_1_1&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>). Greece, the United Kingdom, Cyprus and Romania have enormous shipping sectors in their national accounts compared to detailed enterprise statistics, while Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Italy provide roughly the same figures under both datasets. Finally, Belgium, Portugal and Estonia seem to have larger shipping sectors in enterprise statistics than in their national accounts.</div>
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj51xYLf6Peobd6eJjTU3hnj10J_LGIrBjQJ6Hh_fdSqKfqDxuRuvFwUWfgOhxnqwFKos3qSMddzgWFhG3OsMfJUJK6SrZuoJBWZHiilKeWO3TH48WbWPZ89r0-mCJVNJbx5LuJH-ynL3sf/s1600/shipping.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="190" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj51xYLf6Peobd6eJjTU3hnj10J_LGIrBjQJ6Hh_fdSqKfqDxuRuvFwUWfgOhxnqwFKos3qSMddzgWFhG3OsMfJUJK6SrZuoJBWZHiilKeWO3TH48WbWPZ89r0-mCJVNJbx5LuJH-ynL3sf/s400/shipping.png" width="400" /></a></div>
</div>
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<br /></div>
<br />
<b>But where does the money end up?</b><br />
<br />
Whether you think their view of domesticity of shipping product is right or wrong, it's worth noting that ELSTAT makes no claim as to whether this domestic <i>product </i>produces <i>national incomes.</i> The industry claims this, on the basis of GDP figures, as it shouldn't. This is a fine distinction that Reuters fails to make but it does point to the true villain.<br />
<br />
I make this introduction because there is <a href="http://www.diffen.com/difference/GDP_vs_GNP">a difference between GDP and Gross National </a><a href="http://www.diffen.com/difference/GDP_vs_GNP">Product</a> (not to mention GDP and Gross National Income), and I wouldn't expect the two to be identical in the case of Greece .[I spoke too soon; in 2013 <a href="http://knoema.com/UNNAMAD2015/national-accounts-main-aggregates-database-1970-2013">they were</a>. But they don't have to be]. If shipping value added arises within Greece's borders, then there's no reason not to count it towards GDP. If it then immediately leaves the country to swell the coffers of foreign firms, then it won't count towards GNI, but that does not make the GDP calculation incorrect. Clearly, industry lobbyists have an interest in conflating GDP contributions with GNP/GNI contributions, but it is the latter that would give their argument against further taxation weight with the Greek authorities. Hence Reuters, despite a light mixup in terminology, is essentially right to question the numbers. The argument, however, cuts both ways. If so little of the sector's value is created in Greece, on what basis would the Greek government tax it?<br />
<br />
Still, the industry claims that the disputed EUR5bn of value added somehow finds its way back to Greece. But in what way? There is no massive net inflow of funds to Greek business in the 'water transport' sector that would account for this difference. You can see this for yourselves <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-212262_QID_-25E002F3_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;CURRENCY,L,Z,0;POST,L,Z,1;STK_FLOW,L,Z,2;NACE_R2,L,Z,3;PARTNER,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-212262CURRENCY,MIO_EUR;DS-212262STK_FLOW,NET;DS-212262PARTNER,WORLD;DS-212262INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-212262NACE_R2,H50;DS-212262POST,330;&rankName1=PARTNER_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=STK-FLOW_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=POST_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=CURRENCY_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=NACE-R2_1_2_-1_2&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a> - a trifling EUR40m at last count, and net outflows in most years. There is, to be sure, a huge flow of remittances and wages earned abroad into Greece - <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-062205_QID_53A120E_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;CURRENCY,L,Z,0;POST,L,Z,1;STK_FLOW,L,Z,2;PARTNER,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-062205INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-062205PARTNER,EUR;DS-062205STK_FLOW,DEB;DS-062205POST,968;DS-062205CURRENCY,MIO_EUR;&rankName1=PARTNER_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=STK-FLOW_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=POST_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=CURRENCY_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">nearly EUR1bn</a> on last count. Unfortunately, it's hard to know how much of this is attributed to the shipping industry, and even if all of it were money from shipping employees abroad it wouldn't account for the full EUR5bn anyway.<br />
<br />
Or does the money return as private flows of savings, consumption and charitable donations? The industry's flow of charitable giving is unrecorded but clearly massive. A single shipping-family foundation, for example, has been responsible for about <a href="http://time.com/3951086/dracopoulos-shipping-magnate/">EUR900m</a> of easily-traceable charitable giving in Greece over the last ten years, of which at least a third has come post-crisis. It is said that much of the Greek ambulance service <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-34455981">runs on donations</a> from the shipping industry, and that many individual charities have benefited.<br />
<br />
Without much more transparency from the notoriously secretive shipping families, it is impossible to answer this question. My guess is that the contribution of shipping to Greek national incomes is overstated by something in the order of EUR3-4bn. It also reflects very poorly on ELSTAT that they are not able to answer a straightforward question on how their value added figures are derived, and that they provide two different estimates of value added in the water transport sector (one in I-O tables and one in the national accounts, never mind the one in enterprise statistics). At the very least a methodological note would be very useful. Like, yesterday.<br />
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-78618531423197417562015-12-20T16:03:00.001+00:002016-01-05T10:19:39.108+00:00THE GREAT UNPAID<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<em>Acknowledgement 5/1/2016: This post, and the mixed income post that triggered it, owe much to the thinking of <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/aristosd">A. Doxiadis</a> and his book, <a href="https://play.google.com/store/books/details/%CE%91%CF%81%CE%AF%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%82_%CE%94%CE%BF%CE%BE%CE%B9%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B7%CF%82_%CE%A4%CE%BF_%CE%B1%CF%8C%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%BF_%CF%81%CE%AE%CE%B3%CE%BC%CE%B1?id=vVxuBgAAQBAJ">Το Αόρατο Ρήγμα</a>, on the structural characteristics of the Greek economy. That's not to say he has endorsed the post of course. All errors etc are my own.</em><br />
<strong></strong><br />
<strong>Are You Into Detailed Sector Statporn?</strong><br />
<br />
Veteran readers know that I am a big fan of the Eurostat website. I have no interest to declare here; I am not an employee or contractor or associate of Eurostat or any of the national statistics agencies it oversees. I do, however, perform regular fact-checks and so I appreciate two things that Eurostat does to make my life easier.<br />
<br />
One is of course their database's bookmark function - the ability to capture a set of tables as I have customised them and share them in the precise same layout to anyone else. I'm amazed at how rare this is (eg the Bank of International Settlements publishes Bankstats with <i>almost</i> the same functionality - the OECD is nowhere near), and how little it is used by commentators.<br />
<br />
The second thing I like about the Eurostat database is the sheer coverage of national-level statistics. Greece's ELSTAT produces a shit-ton of data that the average Greek can never access except through Eurostat. Of these, my firm favourite is the SILC dataset on poverty and living conditions (see eg <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/greeces-humanitarian-crisis-fact-and.html">here</a>) - as grim as it is to read the findings. However, I have recently found a close second to SILC in Eurostat's annual detailed enterprise statistics.<br />
<br />
I urge you to consider this dataset because it really exposes the guts of the economy - both by providing rich data (number of businesses, employment, value added, investment, etc) but also by providing data by 456 <i>detailed </i>sectors (4-digit NACE, not including agriculture, government and social and community services). Want to find out how many call centre workers there are in Greece, and how much they get paid? <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120957_QID_57F1AA96_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;NACE_R2,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-120957GEO,EL;DS-120957INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-120957NACE_R2,N8220;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NACE-R2_1_0_1_1&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=INDIC-SB_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">Done</a>. Want to know what the finances of Greek newspapers look like? <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120957_QID_4698D6D_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;NACE_R2,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-120957INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-120957GEO,EL;DS-120957NACE_R2,N8220;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NACE-R2_1_0_1_1&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=INDIC-SB_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">Done</a>. Maybe how much was invested into Greek winemakers (because allegedly much of this activity was money laundering)? <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120933_QID_-150D31C7_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;NACE_R2,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-120933GEO,EL;DS-120933NACE_R2,C1102;DS-120933INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NACE-R2_1_0_1_1&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=INDIC-SB_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">Done</a>.<br />
<br />
I started looking into these data again the other day a propos of <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/12/under-taxing-greece.html">my post on mixed income and its relationship with tax revenues</a>. The figures on mixed income are very interesting, but where do they come from? Who are all these self-employed people? What do they do? More importantly, does the decrease in mixed income as a share of GDP represent structural reform as I had originally suggested? Or was there something else at play?<br />
<br />
<strong>A Mixed Income Scoreboard</strong></div>
<div>
<br />
So I ran the detailed tables for <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120933_QID_-1D772471_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,X,1;NACE_R2,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-120933GEO,EL;DS-120933INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName4=INDIC-SB_1_2_1_0&rankName5=NACE-R2_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">industry</a>, <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120935_QID_7B4412C9_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,L,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,X,1;NACE_R2,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-120935GEO,EL;DS-120935INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName4=INDIC-SB_1_2_1_0&rankName5=NACE-R2_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">construction</a>, <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120949_QID_-1CB8DF51_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,X,1;NACE_R2,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-120949GEO,EL;DS-120949INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName4=INDIC-SB_1_2_1_0&rankName5=NACE-R2_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">trade </a>and <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-120957_QID_-24FB9660_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_SB,L,X,1;NACE_R2,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-120957GEO,EL;DS-120957INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName4=INDIC-SB_1_2_1_0&rankName5=NACE-R2_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">services </a>- and prepared a comparison between 2009 (the last pre-Memorandum year) and 2013 (the latest available data). I would ideally have picked 2008 but there are substantial gaps in that year's figures. Even with 2009 I have had to extrapolate once or twice (eg taking averages between 2008 and 2010).<br />
<br />
The sectors included here accounted for 2.54m of 4.6m working persons in 2009 (of which 37% were unpaid) and 2.11m of 3.5m working persons in 2013 (of which 36% were unpaid). Two notes: first- these figures do not include the entire private sector, as explained above. Second- the 'unpaid' counted by Eurostat were not employees who hadn't been paid what was owed to them. They were people not drawing a <em>salary</em> from the business - working proprietors and their families, perhaps a few volunteers too. That's not to say they weren't earning an <i>income </i>from the business, however: their income might eg be a share of the profits of the business, as opposed to a salary.<br />
<br />
So I ranked all of the 456 detailed sectors according to the absolute number of unpaid workers in each of them and kept the top 20 in each year. I avoided a ranking based on relative ranking because a) in turbulent times a small, niche sector's workforce can change more dramatically than that of a major sector and b) my intention is to track Greece's reliance on household mixed income - so the larger sectors are a priority.<br />
<br />
As you can imagine, there's a big overlap betweem the 2009 and 2013 rankings; there have only been two movers in each direction; so I've opted for a top 20 + 4 leaderboard. These 24 3-digit sectors (see list below) accounted for 21% of all employment in 2009 (971k). Of this 971k, 499k were unpaid (51%). Not one of the 24 top sectors had more than 64% of its workforce on the payroll in 2009. In 2013, the top 24 sectors accounted for 23% of all employment (798k); of this total, 427k were unpaid (54%). Only one of the top 24 had cleared the previous 64% ceiling for payrolled workers (the sector in question being the Greek equivalent of off-licences or 7-11s, which now had 69% of its workers on payroll).<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgiqvmAfxoTFQHx-l_PUvsiVdL-l_155T9u_6iDfD_TwTyBdnjxrs2xJeQcPqpbq-e6SWjkjl8znhCpb8r8LiEG8wSajYpE8Epo6fWLf01JNMBzJaXqOU4KfVo_z8X3QbVVQRUOyL91jOVh/s1600/unpaid.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="252" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgiqvmAfxoTFQHx-l_PUvsiVdL-l_155T9u_6iDfD_TwTyBdnjxrs2xJeQcPqpbq-e6SWjkjl8znhCpb8r8LiEG8wSajYpE8Epo6fWLf01JNMBzJaXqOU4KfVo_z8X3QbVVQRUOyL91jOVh/s400/unpaid.png" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
<strong>This is Not the Reform Proxy You're Looking For</strong><br />
<strong></strong><br />
The key outcome here is that the industries that are core users of unpaid work (ie producers of mixed income) have not reformed quite so drastically. The improvement in the balance of mixed income to GDP seems, instead, to have come from the reduced <i>income </i>of these sectors. That's not really what I had in mind when wondering whether the fall in mixed income as a share of GDP could be a possible proxy for structural reform.<br />
<br />
This is clear if you look at the supposedly 'reforming' sectors, in which reliance on the unpaid fell: bakeries, homeware stores, architects' practices, off-licences, and legal practices. The relative share of the unpaid fell by more than 38%. Yet only construction companies and law firms improved their labour productivity at the same time. On the other hand, a number of the top 20+4 sectors saw the role of the unpaid expand: look at hotels, specialist retailers, car repairs. All of these saw their reliance on the unpaid grow by 43% or more, as business grew too tight for anyone with a payroll. All of them also saw labour productivity fall.<br />
<br />
Now for the big picture. In 2009, the top 20+4 produced EUR16bn of value-added* (7.5% of all gross value added). clearly underperforming the rest of the economy. In 2013, they underperformed even further, producing EUR9.5bn. (5.9% of all gross value added). Their apparent labour productivity fell by 27%.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgz55MpVoGSSoqqcQ0nTboKJ9J6NCqUlK7jNgQInpY2v841Limj6YMoatjc3YKT5nBRFASoPPNsTcK7mjZ0HQFP4eMxg5001VVNw12hEK0HXNe5-TEhwTrSMmoQiF2JxWL6TpYhRlEBqV7n/s1600/unpaid2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="255" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgz55MpVoGSSoqqcQ0nTboKJ9J6NCqUlK7jNgQInpY2v841Limj6YMoatjc3YKT5nBRFASoPPNsTcK7mjZ0HQFP4eMxg5001VVNw12hEK0HXNe5-TEhwTrSMmoQiF2JxWL6TpYhRlEBqV7n/s400/unpaid2.png" width="400" /></a></div>
<br />
<br />
What does this mean? Far from reforming, Greece's mixed-income generating industries are withering on the vine. It's unlikely that one explanation alone can account for this, but clearly turning failing, near-informal businesses into companies takes substantial amounts of credit, which Greek banks still struggle to provide, and equity, which even well-off households are running out of. Moreover, an antiquated insolvency framework and treacle-slow courts make it harder to dissolve failed businesses. Perhaps, of course, the fall in apparent labour productivity is simply a reflection of subsdued demand, and a recovering economy will reveal structural reform of the kind I was hoping for. We will have to wait and see.<br />
<br />
*I've had to tweak one figure in all of this - the value added number for bakeries, which may or may not have been inflated by <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.gr/2015/03/28/koinonia-fournoi-trafficking_n_6962286.html">money laundering</a>. I'm not sure but the numbers don't stack up. <a href="https://t.co/autns2V6ew">See for yourselves</a>. The difference between my 'extrapolated' figure (average of 2008 and 2010) and the one Eurostat records is about EUR200m.<br />
<br />
TO BE CONTINUED</div>
</div>
Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-7841468623615342362015-12-01T23:01:00.001+00:002016-01-05T11:01:38.524+00:00UNDER-TAXING GREECE<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
<em>Acknowledgement 5/1/2016: This post owes much to the thinking of </em><a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/aristosd"><span style="color: #3778cd;"><em>A. Doxiadis</em></span></a><em> and his book, </em><a href="https://play.google.com/store/books/details/%CE%91%CF%81%CE%AF%CF%83%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%82_%CE%94%CE%BF%CE%BE%CE%B9%CE%AC%CE%B4%CE%B7%CF%82_%CE%A4%CE%BF_%CE%B1%CF%8C%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%84%CE%BF_%CF%81%CE%AE%CE%B3%CE%BC%CE%B1?id=vVxuBgAAQBAJ"><span style="color: #3778cd;"><em>Το Αόρατο Ρήγμα</em></span></a><em>, on the structural characteristics of the Greek economy; as well as to conversations on tax with <a href="https://mobile.twitter.com/gregoryfarmakis?lang=en">Gregory Farmakis</a>. That's not to say either has endorsed the post of course. All errors etc are my own.</em><br />
<br />
One of the stylised facts of the Greek crisis has been that Greece never truly overspent (barring perhaps 2009); if anything, it under-taxed. It's not hard to understand where this argument comes from - just compare revenue and spending as a % of GDP between Greece and the EU or the Eurozone average - the data are available <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-416345_QID_-3B4E9F01_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Y,1;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-416345UNIT,PC_GDP;DS-416345SECTOR,S13;DS-416345INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&rankName6=GEO_1_2_1_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEih2b3xH-ibRkS0dfzsl1ggitk7f5iReM8xYPxHrn3syEmISUJZBBHMffWc044sZl1godzbGVzDwkhv9_IEXV5SOmMqefWQMuAHqj05zyButwdbE3qcRycNPlkB3_t3Pd_wBip14R8Ee2nA/s1600/revespend.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="400" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEih2b3xH-ibRkS0dfzsl1ggitk7f5iReM8xYPxHrn3syEmISUJZBBHMffWc044sZl1godzbGVzDwkhv9_IEXV5SOmMqefWQMuAHqj05zyButwdbE3qcRycNPlkB3_t3Pd_wBip14R8Ee2nA/s400/revespend.png" width="310" /></a>Clearly, in 1995 government spending in Greece was well below the EU average. It caught up quickly, but even so was still very close to the EU average around the 2005-7 period, especially after allowing for higher interest costs. Revenues, on the other hand, lagged the EU average by a persistent 4 percentage points each year since accession. On the face of it, it's more credible to look at Greece as a story of under-funding of the state than one of overspending.</div>
<br />
Advocates of the under-funding hypothesis also point to the (unfortunately, now discontinued) dataset of tax by economic functions. This generally suggests that Greece has been taxing, eg., consumption more than the rest of Europe, while taxes on capital, once above the EU average, have fallen steadily and payroll taxes on employers have been persistently lower than the EU average (data <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-055290_QID_56A613D0_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=GEO,L,X,0;TIME,C,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;INDIC_NA,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-055290UNIT,PC_GDP;DS-055290INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-055290INDIC_NA,TX_CAP_INCO;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDIC-NA_1_2_1_1&rankName4=GEO_1_2_0_0&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a> and <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-055290_QID_-5C9D59B9_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=GEO,L,X,0;TIME,C,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;INDIC_NA,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-055290UNIT,PC_GDP;DS-055290INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-055290INDIC_NA,TX_LAB_EMPR;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDIC-NA_1_2_1_1&rankName4=GEO_1_2_0_0&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>). Greek governments, the narrative goes, gave tax breaks to some industries, turned a blind eye to avoidance and evasion of social security contributions by others, then let taxpayers foot the bill.<br />
<br />
This narrative eventually made its way, via the Trade Union movement, to the Greek Parliament's <a href="http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/Report_web.pdf">debt audit report</a> - the definitive account of that kangaroo court that called itself the 'Debt Truth Committee.' It was one of the better-documented claims made in the report.<br />
And it is wrong.<br />
<br />
<b>1. Greece is not what you think it is</b><br />
<br />
Upset about Greece's low government revenues? Spare a thought for <a href="https://www.quandl.com/data/ODA/TUN_GGR_NGDP-Tunisia-General-Government-Revenue-of-GDP">Tunisia's </a>government, whose revenues are only ca. 24% of GDP- just over half the EU average. Is Tunisia's government under-funded? To be sure, it is less good at extracting tax from its population than the average EU country; but no one would dream of using an EU average as the yardstick for Tunisia.<br />
<br />
Yet, by virtue of being an EU country, Greece is often benchmarked against the continent.The assumption is that Greece is a similar sort of country as its EU peers and the Greek state should rightfully expect similar revenues. If there is a difference in revenue, it is due to lower tax effort: a combination of lower tax rates or a lower level of tax compliance, which the state tolerates. In reality, this comparison is invalid. Greece may not be like Tunisia, but it is also not a mini-Germany, a mini-Spain or a large Portugal for that matter. It is structurally less well placed to yield large tax revenues.<br />
<br />
The reasons are simple. All other things being equal, it's harder to tax the self-employed; of whom we have proportionately <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/on-greek-working-hours-and-structural.html">many more than other European countries</a>. It's harder to tax the poor; <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/greeces-humanitarian-crisis-fact-and.html">of whom we also have more</a>; and harder to tax retirees, <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/06/the-rest-of-truth-about-greek-pensions.html">of whom we also have more</a>; finally, it's hard to tax <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2010/10/tax-administration-epic-fail.html">chronically unprofitable micro-enterprises; of whom we also have more</a>.<br />
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To illustrate how big the effect of these structural characteristics is, I wanted to focus on one example. Let's look at the components of market output that a government can reasonably expect to tax - the operating surpluses of financial corporations; the operating surpluses of non-financial corporations; the operating surpluses of organisations serving households; and the mixed income of households. You can find all of these figures <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-414693_QID_12F98A54_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;DIRECT,L,Z,1;NA_ITEM,L,Z,2;SECTOR,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-414693NA_ITEM,B3G;DS-414693DIRECT,RECV;DS-414693UNIT,CP_MEUR;DS-414693INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-414693SECTOR,S14_S15;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=DIRECT_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>; unfortunately the figures are not expressed as % of GDP, which has to be done manually by comparing with <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-406763_QID_72222B6D_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;NA_ITEM,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-406763INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-406763UNIT,CP_MEUR;DS-406763NA_ITEM,B1GQ;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">these</a> figures.<br />
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Once you run the figures, one set of numbers stands out - <em>household mixed income</em>. As <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5925693/KS-02-13-269-EN.PDF/44cd9d01-bc64-40e5-bd40-d17df0c69334">pg 200 of Eurostat's ESA2010 manual</a> explains, this is the income of self-employed people working in unincorporated businesses (ie not companies); it includes the income of business owners and their families. Hence the term 'mixed': these are part wages and part profits, and the two can only be separated arbitrarily.<br />
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Greece, as you might expect from my introduction, has the second-highest share of mixed income as a share of GDP in Europe, and had the highest bar none pre-crisis. But, whatever lazy journalists tell you, this structural issue is not common to all of the PIIGS countries. Greece stands alone amongst peripheral Euro countries in having its operating surpluses distributed in this way. At 23.7% of GDP in 2008, mixed household income as a share of total output was over three times higher than in Cyprus; more than twice as high as in Spain; nearly twice as high as in Portugal; and over 40% higher than in Italy. Spain was more or less on a par with Germany on this metric. In fact, to find economies similar to Greece's in their dependence on household mixed income, you need to go as far as Poland and Slovakia. <br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhIy_9bYSRkY-P0uOjzJ0IJmeWuCGW9xIMXrapXS0VayLe6IdhUMvyi34LvwB-k2K65q3iia4N3WwA_FWVywEcAwOG3_FmZSd4wIM4RuyTWLTl2VRUeuxiFr0Jvv-6Nv8RHRtDYfP8vNw8L/s1600/mixed+income.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="279" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhIy_9bYSRkY-P0uOjzJ0IJmeWuCGW9xIMXrapXS0VayLe6IdhUMvyi34LvwB-k2K65q3iia4N3WwA_FWVywEcAwOG3_FmZSd4wIM4RuyTWLTl2VRUeuxiFr0Jvv-6Nv8RHRtDYfP8vNw8L/s640/mixed+income.png" width="640" /></a><br />
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But what does this mean for tax? Well, there is a good correlation in Europe between mixed income as a share of GDP and the amount a government can raise from taxes on income and profits (data on this <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-471199_QID_7AE7AE3B_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;NA_ITEM,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-471199UNIT,PC_GDP;DS-471199NA_ITEM,D5;DS-471199INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-471199SECTOR,S13_S212;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>). In fact, all of the high-tax/high spend Nordic economies have tiny mixed income contributions to GDP; while those with high mixed income contributions tend to be recent accession countries. The correlation isn't perfect of course, and I am guilty of cherry-picking; the correlation becomes less neat after 2008. I believe the reason for this is the increased tax effort of some economies over others during and after the crisis; as tax effort rose most amongst those countries with the lowest tax revenue, it makes sense for the correlation to weaken. In fact, in later years the curve tends to flatten as all countries apparently aim to raise at least 5% of GDP in income and corporation tax.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIm1QVN-zoxk3B-AfbcakPCFnt8AYAzxpu-HJQ3QQopdX10-Gyhrd-pX29221m11VuEhYBfiahBVrb-DO6XlgPoQYn-DuDVTKni2FqAsMo_jQwQXpZpoJj9tGHgn5Y2Fv2V4EnIYXFTVlX/s1600/tax.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="261" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgIm1QVN-zoxk3B-AfbcakPCFnt8AYAzxpu-HJQ3QQopdX10-Gyhrd-pX29221m11VuEhYBfiahBVrb-DO6XlgPoQYn-DuDVTKni2FqAsMo_jQwQXpZpoJj9tGHgn5Y2Fv2V4EnIYXFTVlX/s400/tax.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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Now look very closely at the revenue/mixed income graph. First- it suggests that tax effort in Greece may, if anything, have been relatively high pre-crisis. In a slightly different study looking at structural influences on tax revenues, the <a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/6252.pdf?abstractid=2167186&mirid=1">World Bank's researchers</a> have found much the same thing, although for completeness I should note their colleagues at <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13244.pdf">the IMF</a> and<a href="http://www.theigc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Langford-Ohlenburg-2015-Working-paper1.pdf"> IGC</a> have found the opposite.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLpOtAAFrkENUaQAW0-s-_Fo6MTr4xQwXBygl4zkjhAR6YTmlEsuOe3YacmKqVlK7B5M0Dd9XLLxYYaNrhNVK3g62pWqzfUNMof7yqV-uNzq4tv2f26WV7UtOhu0aZvLRns84QDWMD2Yog/s1600/Laffer.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="309" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgLpOtAAFrkENUaQAW0-s-_Fo6MTr4xQwXBygl4zkjhAR6YTmlEsuOe3YacmKqVlK7B5M0Dd9XLLxYYaNrhNVK3g62pWqzfUNMof7yqV-uNzq4tv2f26WV7UtOhu0aZvLRns84QDWMD2Yog/s320/Laffer.png" width="320" /></a></div>
Yet another way of approaching this would be to consider how far along the Greek laffer curve we were in 2010. As veteran readers know, we have an estimate of this from <a href="http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12638.pdf">Trabandt & Uhlig (2012)</a>, who found that 2010 Greece could only increase its tax take by 2.4% of GDP by raising capital taxes before it started falling again. It could increase it by a maximum of 4.8% of 2010 GDP by also maximising labour taxes. True enough, Greece <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-416345_QID_3B2408B7_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;NA_ITEM,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-416345NA_ITEM,D5REC;DS-416345UNIT,PC_GDP;DS-416345SECTOR,S13;DS-416345INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NA-ITEM_1_0_0_1&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=GEO_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">has never since managed</a> to get to that peak, but even without a major recession it seems the best we could ever do would be to catch-up to the EU average.<br />
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Now the tax to mixed income graph we discussed earlier suggests that, if the mixed income contribution in Greece were to fall to where Spain's is (ie by 12 percentage points - which is to say, very substantially), we might expect income and corporation tax revenues to rise by a good 4% of GDP - incidentally the same margin by which our government revenues have chronically lagged those of the rest of Europe.<br />
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Does all of this not sound familiar? This over-reliance on self-employment and very small businesses is precisely the same distortion that is responsible for the bulk of Greece's lead over the rest of Europe in terms of <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/greeces-humanitarian-crisis-fact-and.html">hours worked per person</a>. Isn't it time we reviewed this properly? I know you've heard it said a million times that small businesses are the backbone of the economy, and that entrepreneurs will save Greece/Europe/the world; I have worked in small business advocacy for years and I have some sympathy for this view. But not all self-employment is enterprising and not all small family businesses are small and family-run for the right reasons. A Greek self-employed pharmacist may be an entrepreneur; but some of their colleagues are also effectively civil servants with a profit margin. A Greek freelancer may be a flexible go-getter; or they may be an employee whom the employer doesn't want on their books so they can avoid national insurance contributions.<br />
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Here's a heretical proposal; why not adopt the change in mixed income as % of GDP as a simple indicator of structural change? Whether it is a good thing, I cannot say. But it is worth noting that, by this token, Spain, Croatia and Bulgaria are the star post-crisis reformers; much more so than Greece.<br />
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UPDATE 22/12: I've looked into why the mixed income of Greek households has fallen as a share of GDP <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/12/the-great-unpaid.html">here</a>. In summary, and with the exception of construction and law firms, there is no evidence that this is a sign of 'reform' - Greece's mixed income-generating sectors are withering on the vine rather than formalising. <br />
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<b>An ideological aside</b><br />
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I don't wish for readers to interpret the above as a suggestion that the Greek economy must be reformed into a shape that maximises tax revenue. Paying taxes is nobody's idea of the meaning of life or the purpose of economic activity. But we need to accept that the current setup leads to low revenues, almost inescapably. We can choose to accept a low-revenue, low-spend equilibrium; tax ourselves to the gills to achieve a high-spend, high-ttax equilibrium with very low output, or aim for a low-revenue, high-spend and high output equilibrium and accept the hardship that will surely come whenever the credit line next dries up. There is no other choice.<br />
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<b>2. Tax revenue is not what you think it is</b><br />
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In addition to misunderstanding what kind of country Greece is, the discussion of Greek tax effort also ignores what tax revenues are, and why ours are different than many other EU countries'.<br />
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Tax revenue isn't just money the state <i>takes.</i> Some tax revenue is also money the state <i>makes</i>. It is a return on past public investment. By this I don't mean tax revenues resulting from fiscal multiplier effects, which should be small on a cyclical basis if the public finances are consistently well managed. I am referring to tax revenues resulting from the deepening of physical, social or human capital as a result of public spending.<br />
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Essentially, when a government invests productively, it builds public capital which in turn boosts the productivity of the private sector. Better roads and ports enable trade. A nation-wide electricity grid makes appliances more reliable and homes more valuable. A fibre-optic network brings more people within reach of their peers and of online retailers. More educated, informed, empowered or healthier people are both more productive and more demanding. Simply- and well-regulated industries are more trustworthy and productive. At the extreme, the state can sometimes build entirely new kinds of intellectual capital; it can become a venture capitalist of sorts, creating whole new fledgling industries for the private sector to explore - the premise, after all, of Mariana Mazzucato's <i>Entrepreneurial State</i>.<br />
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The better an investor the state is, and the more it allocates funds to investment rather than consumption, the more its tax revenue will tend to grow as a share of GDP, holding tax effort and state capacity constant. The share of its tax revenue that reflects returns on investment will grow, while the share of revenue that reflects coercion and rents will shrink. If, on the other hand, government spending fails to build valuable capital and improve productivity across the economy, then over time returns on public spending will fall as a share of GDP - forcing the state to increase its tax effort or its capacity just to stay still.<br />
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<b>The right amounts, the wrong places</b><br />
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Is there reason to believe that this has happened to Greece in the run-up to the crisis? Yes. We invested broadly the right amounts, but got very little by way of returns. Government gross fixed capital formation <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-055358_QID_-34E9FAD1_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;COFOG99,L,Z,2;INDIC_NA,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-055358COFOG99,TOTAL;DS-055358UNIT,PC_GDP;DS-055358INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-055358SECTOR,S13;DS-055358INDIC_NA,TE;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=INDIC-NA_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=COFOG99_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">was not low</a> in the pre-crisis era, and with the exception of the year 2005 it was almost unwavering at ca. 3.5% of GDP (Eurostat claims that none of this was defence spending, by the way). That put us ahead of places like Norway or Sweden, but just short of Spain or Ireland and way behind Portugal. <br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOXtN5aIINqPhxtPBRRmzhNhMJ8OuaV6GDwLLQGAUQjzhp4hH7200fy93WoOoBCPg3L9jviC4KLsZtdRX1I9qkQrZSsG3I7nYoLePMpZJ9E45Mr4YwxLtdo71WTebK_2EOMoIiSajvrHoQ/s1600/investment.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="195" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjOXtN5aIINqPhxtPBRRmzhNhMJ8OuaV6GDwLLQGAUQjzhp4hH7200fy93WoOoBCPg3L9jviC4KLsZtdRX1I9qkQrZSsG3I7nYoLePMpZJ9E45Mr4YwxLtdo71WTebK_2EOMoIiSajvrHoQ/s400/investment.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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The problem then was not the allocation of public spending between consumption and investment, but rather the <i>quality </i>of public investment and its complementarity with private investment.<br />
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<li>Both pre- and post-crisis, our welfare state has consistently given us the <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.gr/2015/06/the-rest-of-truth-about-greek-pensions.html">lowest social returns on investment among the OECD countries</a> .</li>
<li>Public investment in Greece was for years allocated <a href="http://www.voxeu.org/article/politics-and-regional-allocation-public-investments">based on regional voting patterns</a> - and because of this decisions have remained <a href="http://www.eib.org/attachments/efs/efr_2007_v02_en.pdf">stubbornly centralised</a>. </li>
<li>A great deal of public spending is misdirected. Our own citizens suspected corruption was rife <a href="https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2008/0/#results">even pre-crisis</a>, more so than in any other PIIGS country.</li>
<li>Our spending on education, on the other hand, seems to have yielded consistently good returns. The <a href="https://www.conference-board.org/retrievefile.cfm?filename=TED---Growth-Accounting-and-Total-Factor-Productivity-1990-2014.xlsx&type=subsite">Conference Board's Growth Accounting Database</a> suggests we've got more growth out of skills since the 90s than any other developed country, bar Singapore. </li>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGz25HBO9J720JEWnYGgaE5uDR35zzAL4VeVEpjs1Iq06vCLdsHiq7wTIcBZRNsUFW-yxI6e8xx0b0me0DnG5Vp2DHVfZe-rdz1OzvPnCxYw0sMBCsvLJ-My6aoKxMKR94Y_9VyZ3xL2fy/s1600/fullreturns.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="244" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjGz25HBO9J720JEWnYGgaE5uDR35zzAL4VeVEpjs1Iq06vCLdsHiq7wTIcBZRNsUFW-yxI6e8xx0b0me0DnG5Vp2DHVfZe-rdz1OzvPnCxYw0sMBCsvLJ-My6aoKxMKR94Y_9VyZ3xL2fy/s320/fullreturns.png" width="320" /></a>There are some very good long-term calculations for Greece, in two studies in particular. <a href="http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/17768/1/kap1224.pdf">Kamps (2004)</a> finds very strong returns on public investment between 1961-2001, more so than in other EU countries; but these are what are known as partial returns - ie they look at the returns on public spending without considering the losses from crowding out of, or by, private investment. Using data from 1960 to 2005, <a href="https://www.repository.utl.pt/bitstream/10400.5/2150/1/ecbwp864.pdf">Alfonso and St Aubin (2008)</a> confirm the finding of strong partial returns on public investment, but find negative total returns due the negative response of public investment to private investment. The actual, total effect of public investment in Greece was negative .<br />
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<b>A second ideological aside </b><br />
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In discussing the money that government <i>makes </i>I do not pretend that all government spending builds capital; that all of it is efficient, or has high or even positive returns; or that the private sector would not, left to its own devices, have used the same funds better. All I am saying is that, undeniably, some tax revenue is a return on public investment.<br />
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com8tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-55337907321474427812015-11-27T23:40:00.000+00:002015-11-28T23:35:59.452+00:00Ο ΛΑΟΣ ΔΕΝ ΞΕΧΝΑ, ΟΚ. ΑΛΛΑ ΤΙ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ (ΚΕΝΤΡΟ)ΔΕΞΙΑ;<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
Ο λαός, λέει το σύνθημα, δεν ξεχνά τι σημαίνει δεξιά. Όπως όλα τα συνθήματα, έτσι κι αυτό είναι αστείο. Ο λαός ξεχνά και ξαναθυμάται κατά το συμφέρον του, και τη μανούβρα αυτή μπορεί να την κάνει και σε μετα-γνωσιακό επίπεδο: ξεχνά πως κάποτε ήξερε, ή θυμάται πως κάποτε ξέχασε, τι σημαίνει Δεξιά. Έτσι κάπως η ΝΔ ανακαλύπτει το αντιμνημόνιο που ξέχασε μετά το 2012 και η πρώτη φορά Αριστερά συγκυβερνά με Ανελ και κάνει (προσωρινά) υφυπουργό τον Πόρτα-Πόρτα.<br />
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Εντούτοις, ενόψει των εσωκομματικών εκλογών στη ΝΔ, με τον Καμμένο άλλη μια φορά κυβερνητικό εταίρο και την ΧΑ σταθερά τρίτο κόμμα (αν και ευτυχώς σε απόλυτους όρους η ψήφος της πέφτει) το σύνθημα είναι τουλάχιστον επίκαιρο αν εκφραστεί λίγο διαφορετικά. Κυρίως δε γίνεται επίκαιρο το τί σημαίνει κεντροδεξιά: ένα ερώτημα-δείγμα παρακμής από μόνο του, όπως και η συζήτηση περί κεντροαριστεράς που προηγήθηκε της τελικής διάλυσης του ΠαΣοΚ.<br />
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Προσωπικά δεν με ενδιαφέρει πώς ορίζουν την (κεντρο)δεξιά οι επίδοξοι ηγέτες της. Τα λόγια είναι τσάμπα εξάλλου, και όλοι έχουν κίνητρο να ανοιχτούν σε ένα πλατύ κοινό. Ούτε με ενδιαφέρει πώς την ορίζουν οι αντίπαλοί της. Με ενδιαφέρει μόνο το πώς καταλήγει κανείς να θεωρεί <i>τον εαυτό του</i> (κεντρο)δεξιό - ποιές αρχές, αξίες, μνήμες, συνθήκες διαβίωσης και παραστάσεις ωθούν κάποιον στο να ταυτιστεί με αυτή τη λέξη. Ευτυχώς υπάρχει τρόπος να το ελέγξουμε.<br />
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Τα στοιχεία μου εν προκειμένω προέρχονται από την <a href="http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/">Ευρωπαϊκή Έρευνα Αξιών του 2008</a> - την πιο πρόσφατη δυστυχώς. Περιμένω πώς και πώς την επόμενη έρευνα του 2017, στην οποία έμαθα με μεγάλη ανακούφιση ότι <a href="http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/page/Aikaterini-Gari.html">θα συμμετάσχει η Ελλάδα</a>. Η σύγκριση των δύο ερευνών θα μας πει πιο πολλά για την κρίση, τα αίτια και τις επιπτώσεις της από δέκα διδακτορικά οικονομολόγων πάνω στο θέμα.<br />
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Το δείγμα της Έρευνας Αξιών είναι σταθμισμένο και αντιπροσωπευτικό: 1.208 Έλληνες άνω των 16 (η έρευνα περιλάμβανε γύρω στους 1.500 αλλά τόσοι απήντησαν στις ερωτήσεις που με απασχολούν - δείτε παρακάτω). Το ερωτηματολόγιο μπορείτε να το δείτε <a href="https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5BfigHcPqekNkEwMzhualpwVjg/view?usp=sharing">εδώ</a>. Η πολιτική τοποθέτηση των ερωτηθέντων μετριέται σε κλίμακα από 1-10, όπου 1 είναι ο πιο αριστερός Έλληνας και 10 ο πιο δεξιός. Σε καμμία φάση της συνέντευξης δεν δίνεται ορισμός σε αυτές τις έννοιες. Πέρα από την ερώτηση περί πολιτικής τοποθέτησης, υπάρχουν και πολλές άλλες που εστιάζουν στις νοοτροπίες, αξίες και ιδανικά του συνεντευξιαζόμενου, αλλά και στην καταγωγή, την οικογενειακή και οικονομική κατάστασή του, και τη θέση του στην κοινωνία γενικότερα.<br />
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Η λογική είναι απλή: αν βρούμε τις νοοτροπίες, τις ιδέες και τα ιδανικά που τείνουν να ενστερνίζονται περισσότερο οι αυτοαποκαλούμενοι 'δεξιοί' από τους υπόλοιπους Έλληνες (και τα οποία τείνουν να ενστερνίζονται σε μεγαλύτερο βαθμό όσο πιο 'δεξιοί' θεωρούν ότι είναι), τότε έχουμε στα χέρια μας έναν εμπειρικό ορισμό και της δεξιάς, και της 'κεντροδεξιάς.' Και επειδή αυτό που στην πραγματικότητα αναζητούμε είναι μια σειρά από στερεότυπα, σκέφτηκα να χρησιμοποιήσω μια απλή μέθοδο - decision trees. Ουσιαστικά, η μέθοδος αυτή επιτρέπει να δοκιμάσουμε πολλές τέτοιες νοοτροπίες, ιδέες και ιδανικά, μία-μία, για να βρούμε ποιές χωρίζουν πιο ξεκάθαρα τον Ελληνικό λαό σε 'δεξιούς' και 'αριστερούς'. Μόλις βρεθεί η καλύτερη διαχωριστική γραμμή, η διαδικασία επαναλαμβάνεται για κάθε ένα ξεχωριστά από τα δύο μέρη στα οποία χωρίστηκε ο πληθυσμός με όλες τις μεταβλητές που δοκιμάσαμε και νωρίτερα - και ούτω καθεξής, μέχρι να καταλήξουμε σε υπο-ομάδες που παραείναι μικρές για να διασπαστούν παραπάνω, επειδή τα επιμέρους μέρη δεν θα μπορούσαν να συγκριθούν μεταξύ τους με στατιστικά σημαντικό τρόπο.<br />
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Εφαρμόζοντας αυτή τη λογική πάνω στο πλήρες δείγμα της έρευνας, βλέπει κανείς ότι μερικές ερωτήσεις χωρίζουν το δείγμα με ξεκάθαρο τρόπο σε περισσότερο και λιγότερο δεξιούς. Σημειώνω με (+) τους παράγοντες που σχετίζονται με πιο 'δεξιά' άτομα, και με (-) αυτούς που σχετίζονται με πιο 'αριστερά' άτομα. Τα 'επίπεδα' που σημειώνω υποδηλώνουν πόσες φορές έχει υποδιαιρεθεί ο πληθυσμός όταν εμφανίζεται για πρώτη φορά ως σημαντική διαχωριστική γραμμή μια μεταβλητή.<br />
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<li>Επίπεδο πρώτο: πόσο εμπιστεύεται κανείς την Εκκλησία ως θεσμό (+); </li>
<li>Επίπεδο δεύτερο: Πόση εμπιστοσύνη έχει στους δημοσίους υπαλλήλους (-) Έχει ποτέ συμματάσχει σε διαδήλωση (-); Πόση εμπιστοσύνη έχει στα εργατικά σωματεία και τους συνδικαλιστές (-); </li>
<li>Επίπεδο τρίτο: Θεωρεί αποδεκτή την έκτρωση για μια ανύπαντρη γυναίκα (-); Θεωρεί αποδεκτή συμπεριφορά το περιστασιακό σεξ με αγνώστους (-); Θεωρεί ανεπιθύμητους ως γείτονες τους Ρομά (+); Θεωρεί επικίνδυνο το να επεμβαίνει ο άνθρωπος στο φυσικό του περιβάλλον (+); θεωρεί σημαντικό η δουλειά του να τον φέρνει σε επαφή με (ενδιαφέροντες) ανθρώπους (-); θεωρεί ότι είναι δουλειά των ιδιωτών ή του κράτους να φροντίζουν τους πιο αδύναμους; (-)</li>
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Δοκίμασα, βέβαια πολλές ακόμη ερωτήσεις που δεν αποδείχθηκαν καλές στο να ξεχωρίζουν τον πληθυσμό σε 'δεξιούς' και 'αριστερούς.' Δεν τις παραθέτω εδώ για λόγους συντομίας, αλλά περιλάμβαναν και πολλές δημογραφικού χαρακτήρα μεταβλητές όπως ηλικία, φύλο, οικογενειακό εισόδημα, καταγωγή και λοιπά. Θα προσέξετε ότι η ανάλυσή μου δεν εξετάζει την επίδραση των διαφόρων μεταβλητών <i>ταυτόχρονα </i>- δεν υπάρχουν controls. Οπότε δεν απαντά στο ερώτημα 'ποιές επιρροές κάνουν έναν Έλληνα δεξιό/αριστερό;' - μόνο στο ερώτημα 'τι σημαίνει στο μυαλό του Έλληνα δεξιά/αριστερά;'<br />
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Μιλήσαμε λοιπόν για το πλήρες δείγμα. Όμως και η αριστερά έχει τη 'δεξιότερη' μεριά της, και η δεξιά επίσης έχει την, αχέμ, 'δεξιότερη' μεριά της. Τι σημαίνει 'δεξιά' σε αυτό το πλαίσιο; Για να το εξηγήσουμε αυτό επαναλαμβάνουμε την ίδια ακριβώς ανάλυση, ξεχωριστά για 'δεξιούς' (6-10 στην κλίμακα αριστερά-δεξιά) και για 'αριστερούς' (1-5).</div>
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Για τους αριστερούς τα πράγματα έχουν ως εξής (τα θετικά πρόσημα υποδεικνύουν παράγοντες που σχετίζονται με την κεντροαριστερά):</div>
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>Επίπεδο πρώτο: πόσο εμπιστεύεται κανείς την Εκκλησία ως θεσμό (+); </li>
<li>Επίπεδο δεύτερο: πόσο σημαντικό μέρος της ζωής του είναι η πολιτική; (+) πόσο θεμιτό θεωρεί το να παίρνει κανείς επιδόματα πρόνοιας τα οποία τυπικά δεν δικαιούται; (-) πόσο σημαντικό θεωρεί ότι είναι για την υγεία ενός γάμου το να έχει το ζευγάρι ένα καλό σπίτι; (+); πόσο σημαντικό θεωρεί για τη ζωή του το να έχει άφθονο ελεύθερο χρόνο; (+); </li>
<li>Επίπεδο τρίτο: Θεωρεί αποδεκτή την έκτρωση για μια ανύπαντρη γυναίκα (-); πόση εμπιστοσύνη έχει στις ένοπλες δυνάμεις (+); θεωρεί σημαντικό για την υγεία ενός γάμου να έχουν οι δύο σύντροφοι ίδιες θρησκευτικές πεποιθήσεις; (+)</li>
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Για τους δεξιούς τα πράγματα έχουν ως εξής. Όπως πάντα τα θετικά πρόσημα υποδεικύουν παράγοντες που σχετίζονται με τη δεξιά, εν προκειμένω με τους αυτοχαρακτηριζόμενους ως πολύ δεξιούς ή και ακροδεξιούς. Άρα τα αρνητικά πρόσημα υποδηλώνουν συσχετισμό με την κεντροδεξιά:<br />
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<li>Επίπεδο πρώτο: πόσο σημαντικό θεωρεί ότι είναι για την υγεία ενός γάμου το να ζει το ζευγάρι ξεχωριστά από τους γονείς των δύο συντρόφων; (-)</li>
<li>Επίπεδο δεύτερο: όταν τον ρωτάς αν η συντήρηση των φτωχότερων είναι καθήκον των ιδιωτών ή του κράτους, και όταν τον ρωτάς αν ο άνθρωπος έχει δικαίωμα να διαχειρίζεται τη φύση όπως νομίζει, απαντά με <i>απόλυτο </i>τρόπο (σίγουρα ναι ή σίγουρα όχι;) (+)</li>
<li>Επίπεδο τρίτο: θεωρεί με <i>απόλυτη </i>βεβαιότητα ότι οι άντρες πρέπει να κάνουν παιδιά για να ολοκληρωθούν σαν άτομα; (+)</li>
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[Το γράφημα μου βγήκε λίγο λάθος - το διορθώνω σύντομα]</div>
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Συμπέρασμα - το 2008, οι Έλληνες θεωρούσαν 'δεξιά' μια θρησκευόμενη, κοινωνικά συντηρητική μερίδα του πληθυσμού που έβλεπε ως απειλές προς τον τρόπο ζωής της μια σειρά από επιστημονικές, κοινωνικές και γεωπολιτικές εξελίξεις και προέβαλλε ως αξία την άμυνα ενάντια σε αυτές. Η 'δεξιά' στο μυαλό του μέσου Έλληνα έβλεπε κάποιους συνανθρώπους ως ανεπιθύμητους, έβλεπε με δυσπιστία το συνδικαλισμό, τον ακτιβισμό , και είχε επιφυλάξεις απέναντι στο κοινωνικό κράτος και την πρόοδο της επιστήμης. Έβλεπε δε τη δουλειά πολύ περισσότερο ως μέσο βιοπορισμού και λιγότερο ως χώρο έκφρασης ή αυτοπραγμάτωσης.<br />
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Με βάση την ίδια λογική, οι δεξιότεροι Έλληνες θεωρούσαν 'Κεντροδεξιά' το κομμάτι της δεξιάς που φοβόταν τους δογματισμούς σε περίπλοκα ζητήματα, και έδειχνε ανοχή σε όσους αμφισβητούσαν τις δομές και αξίες της παραδοσιακής (εκτεταμένης;) οικογένειας.<br />
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Οι αριστερότεροι Έλληνες από την άλλη θεωρούσαν 'κεντροαριστερά' το κομμάτι της αριστεράς που ήταν θρησκευόμενο ή θεωρούσε την εκκλησία σημαντικό θεσμό, δεν εξέφραζε αντιμιλιταριστικές θέσεις, είχε μεσοαστικές αξιώσεις (οικονομική άνεση, πολιτική έκφραση και ελεύθερο χρόνο), και επιπλέον το ενοχλούσε η σπατάλη στις κοινωνικές δαπάνες. <br />
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Πού να είναι άραγε τώρα όλοι αυτοί οι κεντροαριστεροί και κεντροδεξιοί; Η πρώτη μου αντίδραση είναι ότι οι κεντροαριστεροί του 2008, με τις μεσοαστικές και (γιατί όχι;) υλιστικές αξίες τους, πρέπει να τσαλακώθηκαν περισσότερο από όλη την υπόλοιπη χώρα την εποχή της κρίσης και να εκφράζονται πλέον εντελώς διαφορετικά - ο χώρος τους δεν υπάρχει. Οι κεντροδεξιοί του 2008, από την άλλη, έχουν ελαφρύ ιδεολογικό στίγμα και θα μπορούσαν πλέον να ψηφίζουν ό,τιδήποτε.<br />
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Μια τελευταία σημείωση: Το 2008, από τους ερωτηθέντες που δέχτηκαν να πουν πού τοποθετούνται στην κλίμακα δεξιά-αριστερά, το 61% ήταν από κεντροαριστεροί (5) ως <a href="https://twitter.com/conclavios/status/640791896185507840">@conclavios</a> (1). Το 20% προτίμησε να μην απαντήσει. Το 'κέντρο' (5-6) συγκέντρωνε το 40% της ψήφου, ανώ τα άκρα (1-2 και 9-10) το 18%.<br />
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com18tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-89048764462006100542015-11-10T12:23:00.001+00:002015-11-15T22:45:42.811+00:00WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT GREEK PRIVATE EDUCATION<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
In the early years of the Greek crisis, I used to feel a stirring of guilty pleasure when foreign media were forced to take deep dives into Greek politics. I would imagine young journos doing their meticulous research with a smug look on their faces and then suddenly being hit with a depressing realisation: "wow, this story goes so deep and so far back; I don't know who to trust; and every policy decision past or present hurts someone! - is that how it feels to be Greek?"<br />
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I rarely feel this way anymore, but the <i>Economist's </i><a href="http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21677382-left-wing-government-aimed-new-tax-rich-it-hit-poor-instead-greece-reconsiders">recent piece</a> on Greek private education brought it all back for a moment.<br />
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<b>VAT on Private Education: the story so far</b><br />
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As readers may know, in the aftermath of its capitulation in July and as details of the Third Memorandum were being ironed out with the <strike>Troika</strike> <strike>Institutions</strike> Quadriga, the Greek government found itself looking for alternatives to a VAT hike on beef. This idea, nominally popular with creditors, had run into stiff opposition within the ruling party, and speculation persists that pressure was being applied on the government by the French, eager to protect their beef exports (context <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e6a1ec50-3064-11e5-91ac-a5e17d9b4cff.html">here</a> and <a href="http://www.thecattlesite.com/news/48302/greek-exit-spells-danger-for-french-beef/">here</a>).<br />
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The Greek counter-proposal was to raise VAT on private education to an eye-watering 23%, and the story offered to the electorate at the time - that this was a specific demand from Greece's creditors - <a href="http://neurope.eu/article/eu-private-education-vat-hike-a-greek-government-initiative/">turned out to be a lie</a>. On 'discovering' this in September, Syriza (now campaigning for re-election) <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/01/uk-eurozone-greece-education-idUKKCN0R14KQ20150901">pledged</a> to reverse the measure if re-elected. However, on returning to power, they found little to offer the creditors in return and mooted a <a href="http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1500033884">counterproposal</a> for a three-tier VAT regime (0% for primary and pre-primary, 6% for vocational and cramming schools and 13% for private secondary schools). Unfortunately, the three-tier proposal was <u>illegal</u>. The VAT Directive lists services to which a two-or three-tier VAT regime may apply but this does not include education (for the entire context, read Articles 98, 132-133 and Annex III <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32006L0112">here</a>). Effectively, the Greek government has only ever had a choice between applying a full VAT rate or a zero VAT rate to all private education.<br />
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With opposition to the VAT hike growing, and a number of private schools already in significant difficulty as a result, the Greek government will now, perhaps more appropriately, raise equivalent from <a href="http://www.capital.gr/tax/3078157/den-tha-mpei-fpa-stin-ekpaideusi-isodunama-meso-kino">gambling </a>instead. Turns out the owners of newly-privatised OPAP aren't as good at lobbying as private schools, or maybe they did their lobbying <i>too early.</i><br />
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Unfortunately, too little actual evidence was used in debating this issue; which is a shame because the facts on the ground tell us a fascinating (and often tragic) story about Greek society and how it's coping with the crisis.<br />
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<b>An objection in principle</b><br />
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Before I go into the statistics, I need to clarify one thing: I believe that true education should not be taxed, and definitely shouldn't be subject to VAT of all taxes. Education, whether private or public, is not consumption; it is an investment. The time to tax is is when the human capital it creates starts generating income. There is a significant debate about how good the returns on investment in education are and whether any of the mechanisms that we assume produce its returns actually work (see <a href="http://pseudoerasmus.com/2015/06/15/education-econ-growth/">this gem from Pseudoerasmus</a> for example), but there is no doubting the <em>purpose</em> of most such spending; it is an investment in human capital. <br />
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I say <em>most</em> because not all spending with education providers purchases <em>education</em> as such. Parents may eg pay a premium for kids to be looked after a little while longer while they're at work. This extra schooling might build no human capital, but instead simply buy employers and employees additional <em>flexibility</em>. Rich parents might pay for access to a social elite - an investment in <em>social capital</em> but also (in less meritocratic societies) in future economic <em>rents</em> - which many libertarians would happily agree should be taxed. Parents afraid of the stiff competition their kids will face in getting into university or finding a job market may be paying for teaching-to-the-test even though they know it does not build human capital; as a kind of <em>insurance</em> for their children. <br />
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How education spending should be taxed or subsidised, whether it is investment or consumption, and whether it ought to be promoted or suppressed through better co-ordination really depends on these questions. It is perhaps natural for the ideological Left (whatever's left of it in Syriza) to despise private provision of a public good. However it's also worth bearing in mind a historical irony: in Greece's modern history, the expulson and, later, exclusion of teachers with open communist sympathies from public schools <a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-94-6209-237-2_6#">contributed strongly</a> to building the supply of private tuition; this may also help explain its ability to specialise in serving lower-income groups.<br />
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<b>How many Greek households use private education anyway?</b><br />
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The obvious starting point is the actual share of pupils enrolled in private education. 'Private education' is a very wide term, so it helps to speak more precisely by level of education, and to distinguish between provision in private <em>schools</em> and tuition in private institutions such as frontistiria, or by private tutors. Each of these sectors is a whole different kettle of fish, and taxability varies. Private one-on-one tutoring in particular can go underground in the blink of an eye - good luck collecting VAT on that.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkmTP0Pv34C-lpi_Ao_wI7O3LfN4yQVv3HSr49SQw3K8nqBw8A3BYpw-g_QZfrvRE7g4iY9dm4WYb9oLttnPgYpp2PQHbXb9qwxKBZCNvUFvgvZNiDdnbT8sMdYM1QdP6CO5obG7Vq430i/s1600/privatetable.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="200" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgkmTP0Pv34C-lpi_Ao_wI7O3LfN4yQVv3HSr49SQw3K8nqBw8A3BYpw-g_QZfrvRE7g4iY9dm4WYb9oLttnPgYpp2PQHbXb9qwxKBZCNvUFvgvZNiDdnbT8sMdYM1QdP6CO5obG7Vq430i/s200/privatetable.png" width="171" /></a>About 7% of Greek pre-primary and primary school pupils go to private <em>schools</em> (see p 416 <a href="http://www.oecd.org/edu/Education-at-a-Glance-2014.pdf">here</a> or raw data <a href="http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.aspx?datasetcode=RENRL&lang=en">here</a>). The percentage falls as children grow, from 5% in lower secondary (gymnasio) to 4% in upper secondary (lykeio). By most countries' standards this is actually a small share of the population - only three OECD countries have (marginally) less privatised education systems. On last count (2012) there were ca 75,500 pupils in Greek private schools excluding nurseries and pre-schools (on which more details will follow), and an additional 11,500 in the latter.<br />
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Not only is the Greek private <em>school</em> population small in relative terms, it's also not growing; in fact (again, excluding nurseries) it peaked in 2003 and has fallen relatively consistently over the years, both in absolute numbers and as a share of the pupil population. Demand for upper secondary schools is positively falling in the long term. Overall, the private school population was down 12% from its peak even in 2007, and down 18% in 2012. This suggests to me that, all other arguments aside, private school fees make for a rather poor tax base, unless they are somehow a fantastic proxy for undeclared income (which I expect they are not).<br />
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<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQe9_Z9WltYWdTkjdcYcXL1NQo1iZr8Y4wFsDQgju9HAmjpdLohaK7eSZZIhyphenhyphenSLLPMEUm3ZxIelt1s9ACVq8fPp0RUTZ138Jck_r82DeJRlsOsSBzYgua_OSjJ5PQG1k2bt9uMZv3oIKax/s1600/privshare.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="228" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQe9_Z9WltYWdTkjdcYcXL1NQo1iZr8Y4wFsDQgju9HAmjpdLohaK7eSZZIhyphenhyphenSLLPMEUm3ZxIelt1s9ACVq8fPp0RUTZ138Jck_r82DeJRlsOsSBzYgua_OSjJ5PQG1k2bt9uMZv3oIKax/s400/privshare.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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But schools are not the only kind of private education out there. Private foreign language tuition is common. <a href="http://www.esos.gr/arthra/frontistiria/510-575-mauhtes-sta-6-564-kentra-jenvn-glvssvn-13-650-kauhghtes-me-eparkeia-8-187-me-ptyxio-aei">Over half a million</a> Greek children were enrolled in 6,500 language schools as of 2013 - roughly one in three Greek children in education of any kind.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhTEjOpXrQ7PJREuUZyRXVr0Lv3Jw9EsFKAg12tP_IABEWHWWN-oR6Z-Iq_TUp41n53kocCALei3pw0vwbVWo7h-u0NxJNBMiEe_UEL4hq19b_6RKzm4branAvFXGJ-9y84bBEBWeIpPsxk/s1600/Private.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="211" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhTEjOpXrQ7PJREuUZyRXVr0Lv3Jw9EsFKAg12tP_IABEWHWWN-oR6Z-Iq_TUp41n53kocCALei3pw0vwbVWo7h-u0NxJNBMiEe_UEL4hq19b_6RKzm4branAvFXGJ-9y84bBEBWeIpPsxk/s320/Private.png" width="320" /></a>Then there is private tuition across a range of academic subjects, whether remedial or as a top-up for students cramming ahead of their final exams. <a href="http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/interactive_results.php">PISA </a>findings reveal that the majority of Greek secondary school pupils attended private lessons <i>outside </i>school in 2012 - 56% in the case of mathematics, though fewer when it came to other subjects. That might sound like a lot but the equivalent figure was 74% in <a href="https://pisa2009.acer.edu.au/interactive_results.php">2009 </a>and <a href="https://pisa2006.acer.edu.au/interactive.php">2006</a>; clearly parents cut down during the crisis. Possibly because of this, the overlap between different kinds of private lessons isn't as big as one might think. If you can get hold of the raw PISA 2012 data (I did) you can combine these figures to reveal that 72% of Greek high school kids had private lessons <em>of some kind or other</em> in 2012. <br />
<br />
Shockingly, this included 69% of Greek kids in single-parent households. This is shocking because half of all single-parent households in Greece were, by that time, <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/those-2012-greek-poverty-figures-in-full.html">struggling</a> to afford food. Let me repeat this in case it did not penetrate; in 2012 a good percentage of Greek single parents (38%, if you assume single parents have on average as many kids as two-parent households) were to some extent willing to prioritise paying for private lessons over food. <i>One does not do this sort of thing on a whim; </i>these people were no doubt convinced that private lessons were crucial if their children were to have any hope of getting out of poverty.<br />
<strong></strong><br />
<strong>What about primary education?</strong><br />
<br />
There is one type of private education that is in particular demand among Greece's lower middle class: private nurseries, primary schools and pre-schools. As already demonstrated, the percentage of pre-primary school children going to private institutions doubled during the peak of the crisis (2011-12). As early as 2010, spending on primary and pre-primary education was already <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-055574_QID_6A909668_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=QUANTILE,L,X,0;TIME,C,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;COICOP,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-055574GEO,EL;DS-055574INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-055574COICOP,CP101;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=COICOP_1_2_1_1&rankName4=QUANTILE_1_2_0_0&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">shooting up</a> among the top 20% highest-earning households.<br />
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This is due to a combination of push and pull factors. The crisis forced more Greek women to become <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053514_QID_66F7FABF_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;INDIC_EM,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;GEO,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-053514GEO,EL;DS-053514SEX,F;DS-053514INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=GEO_1_0_1_1&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=INDIC-EM_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">economically active</a>, most of them working <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053312_QID_7D25742A_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;INDIC_EM,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-053312INDIC_EM,PT_EMP_RT;DS-053312INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-053312SEX,T;&rankName1=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDIC-EM_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=GEO_1_0_0_1&sortR=ASC_-1_FIRST&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">part time</a> or only occasionally (on which much more detail <a href="https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/66298/1/MPRA_paper_66298.pdf">here</a>). This added, over exactly the years of the pre-primary boom, between 3 and 4 hours of childcare per week <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053878_QID_-242C3CFA_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;AGE,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-053878AGE,Y3-CSA;DS-053878INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName2=GEO_1_2_0_1&rankName3=AGE_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">for the average household</a>. This increase <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053884_QID_31B94A78_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;AGE,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-053884AGE,Y3-CSA;DS-053884INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName2=GEO_1_2_0_1&rankName3=AGE_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">did not come </a>from existing users taking on more hours, but from <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053870_QID_57ABA64D_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;DURATION,L,Y,0;AGE,L,Y,1;GEO,L,Z,0;INDICATORS,C,Z,1;&zSelection=DS-053870GEO,EL;DS-053870INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName3=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName4=DURATION_1_2_0_1&rankName5=AGE_1_2_1_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">more families</a> leaving their kids (especially those under 3) with nurseries. An even more important factor was the pilot operation of 801 all-day schools (see p 40 <a href="http://www.oecd.org/greece/48407731.pdf">here</a>) supported by EU structural funds. The pilot was meant to have a demonstration effect, with the Greek government taking over the cost of the scheme once it was convinced of its practicability and benefits. It did not, and the private primary education boom proved to be short-lived - in fact since 2012 the numbers have been slowly reverting back to normal as fewer and fewer people can afford nurseries, or alternatively fewer women can find part-time work. <br />
<br />
<b>Is it true that private schooling makes up for failings in the educational system?</b><br />
<br />
There are two ways to approach this question. One is a matter of efficiency, as assessed by <a href="http://www.aueb.gr/conferences/Crete2015/Papers/Koutsampelas.pdf">Koutsampelas (2015)</a>. I cite this study with apologies to the authors, who clearly are still working on the paper and don't want it used as is by other researchers until it has been finalised. They find [...]<em> household willingness to pay €2,182 (annually, in 2009 prices) in 2009 and 2,517 (annually, in 2013 prices) in 2013 per school-age child for substituting state for private education. The corresponding figures for government cost per school-age child is €4,33915 and€ 3,70716 or 2009 and 2013 respectively, suggesting that from the consumers’ point of view the public provision of education in Greece might be inefficient.</em><br />
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You can check Koutsampelas' sums <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-471197_QID_24BA79F1_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;COFOG99,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;NA_ITEM,L,Z,2;GEO,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-471197UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-471197SECTOR,S13;DS-471197INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-471197NA_ITEM,TE;DS-471197GEO,EL;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=COFOG99_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>. If you combine Eurostat's data with the OECD's figures on pupil numbers, the result is ca EUR3600 per pupil for primary and pre-primary and EUR4400 per pupil for secondary school as of 2012. Of course these figures are down from a peak of EUR4100 and EUR5600 respectively in 2009 and, assuming no change in pupil numbers in 2013, they would be 3300 and 3900 respectively.<br />
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The second way is to ask whether private school pupils do better than their state-educated peers, and why. The OECD's PISA assessment finds a persistent, statistically significant difference <a href="https://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/interactive.php">across all areas</a>, with private schools performing better. However, the PISA 2009 assessment also <a href="http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/pisainfocus/48482894.pdf">found</a> that, once the effects of pupils' social backgrounds, school independence and competition for pupils are taken into account, private school pupils actually do marginally <u>worse</u>. Adding 'independence' to the mix is not trivial though. Greek schools have probably the least discretion in deciding on their own curricula in the developed world (see <a href="http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/pisa-2012-results-volume-IV.pdf">IV.4.2. here</a>).<br />
<br />
Then there is the question of whether private out-of-school tuition makes up for failings of public schools <em>specifically </em>as opposed to those of the educational system. The answer is likely to be no. Going back to the PISA 2012 data, you can see that pupils in private schools still use private tutoring as much as public school students. When it comes to non-traditional subjects (ie not language, science or mathematics) they arguably use <em>more </em>private tuition.<br />
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UPDATE 15/11: PISA 2012 included three trick questions, in which pupils were invited to rate their familiarity with the made-up concepts of "proper numbers"; "declarative functions"; and "subjunctive scaling." Only ca. 3% of Greek pupils claimed to understand all three concepts well, but about 37% claimed at least <i>some </i>familiarity with <i>all </i>of them. This isn't bad by international standards. However, what is really interesting is the correlation between such 'overclaiming' and out-of-school tuition. Greek pupils that received out-of-school tuition in mathematics in 2012 were significantly more likely to over-claim (ca a quarter of a s.d.), and pupils that received 6 hours of out-of-school tuition per week or more were even more so - a full s.d above average. It could be reflex: when taught to the test, a pupil knows it's best to try some answer and show familiarity than none at all. It could be psychological pressure; a child taught on the insistence of parents may be eager to please. Or it could be confusion: a child desperate to keep track of new concepts may genuinely feel one is vaguely familiar, even if it is not.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVrbatBuMnYY8D3PnaVP3FqjI0p0akBBsSMJkzosogY1abZfXqb6WYG21SOK2u0zQdtIADRRJoDM3OyXKbgBwVv0supIpcYWG8B1czCic0YYICAaKNYZuv_j55hKFiuajnIyttqwlKjYD2/s1600/PISA.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="289" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjVrbatBuMnYY8D3PnaVP3FqjI0p0akBBsSMJkzosogY1abZfXqb6WYG21SOK2u0zQdtIADRRJoDM3OyXKbgBwVv0supIpcYWG8B1czCic0YYICAaKNYZuv_j55hKFiuajnIyttqwlKjYD2/s400/PISA.png" width="400" /></a><br />
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<b></b><br />
<b>Do poorer Greeks use private education?</b><br />
<br />
The latest data we have suggest that, <a href="http://t.co/Q9VIpp5zkl">in 2010,</a> and among Greek two-parent families with children, education made up ca. 5% of consumption spending. Among single parents, this went up to 10%. This generally includes all spending on education; books tend to be free but a wide range of accessories are not. Even so, private schools and tutoring are likely the major driver.<br />
<br />
Eurostat doesn't break these figures up by income bracket and household composition at once, but there is a breakdown by income quintiles across the whole population <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-055574_QID_21B66D2D_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=QUANTILE,L,X,0;COICOP,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;TIME,C,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-055574GEO,EL;DS-055574TIME,2010;DS-055574INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=TIME_1_0_1_0&rankName4=QUANTILE_1_2_0_0&rankName5=COICOP_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>. This suggests that the top 20% of households by income spent 2.3 times as much on education as the bottom 20% in 2010 - but the differences are greatest for pre-primary and primary education, where the top 20% spent 6x as much. So we know that private education spending is skewed towards higher incomes - but is it the top end of the distribution driving this or the bottom end?<br />
<br />
PISA confirms that private <em>schooling</em> in Greece is skewed towards higher incomes - more so than other countries, but suggests that this is mostly due to the exclusion of the very poor, not exclusivity to the privileged (see fig. 2.1 and 4.2 <a href="http://www.oecd.org/pisa/50110750.pdf">here</a>). Private lessons and cram schools are, as we saw, widely used by lower income families and even charitable shadow education is becoming <a href="http://www.education-inquiry.net/index.php/edui/article/view/24058">increasingly common</a>. But again this is a story of the very poor missing out on a near-necessity, not the well-off enjoying a luxury: on PISA's standardised <a href="https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5401">socio-economic status index </a>non-users score a very significant 0.4 of a standard deviation lower than users.* <br />
<br />
It's worth noting that Greek society is changing rapidly during the crisis. The findings of <a href="http://www.aueb.gr/conferences/Crete2015/Papers/Koutsampelas.pdf">Koutsampelas (2015)</a> suggests that Greek state schools are now receiving an influx of children from newly-poor, once middle-class families. This group dominates the flow out of private education to such an extent that the progressiveness of public education spending has actually <em>increased</em> during the crisis even though the class composition of state schools has widened to include better-off people.<br />
The downside of this is that the government has rarely been able to budget for the increased demand for public schooling, leading to widespread <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2015/09/04/greek-schools-may-remain-closed-due-to-staff-shortages/">teacher shortages</a> and putting the Greek education budget under further pressure. <br />
<br />
<strong>Epilogue</strong><br />
<br />
In Greece, attendance of private <em>schools </em>is rare, and falling. In fact, the crisis has pushed previously middle-class families into state education, leading to mass teacher shortages. Use of private <em>daycare</em> is more common and an important, if dysfunctional, contributor to labour market flexibility. But private lessons, cram schools and tutoring are extremely common, even though they too have taken a hit during the crisis. There is no suggestion that private tutoring in Greece is economically efficient; it is a bad, path-dependent solution to a poor education system. Because of this function, it's also a desperate necessity. Private schooling, on the other hand, <em>is efficient</em> up to a point; it does not make up for failings in public<em> schools </em>as such, simply for the lack of school autonomy and choice in the educational system as a whole.<br />
<br />
The cases of private nurseries and of single parents using private tuition make me think of all the times critics have told me to put 'people over numbers' and check my figures against their (sometimes atypical, and almost always second-hand) slice-of-life anecdotes. The numbers are people, guys. The numbers are <em>always</em> people. Telling their story well is the same art as that of putting a tearful first-hand account into context. And if you can't be bothered to do the one, you probably can't do the other correctly either.<br />
<br />
<br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;">* [Bear in mind, PISA's index is a composite, and uses posessions, immigrant status, parents' jobs and parents' education to create a status proxy; this means it is not as variable as family income - if neither parent has become unemployed it is likely that a child's PISA status will not have changed throughout the crisis.]</span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;">
</span></span><br />
<span style="font-size: x-small;"><span style="font-size: small;"><b>PS: What if private schools do not confer an advantage after accounting for socio-economic status?</b><o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">I can't know without running the OECD's regression whether school independence makes more of a difference ot the private/public performance gap than socio-economic status. But what if its impact turns out to be negligible? What would that mean? I have three pet theories.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><b>1. Some of the Greek private school system may not be in the business of producing 'education'.</b> It may be efficient in terms of meeting parents' <i>actual </i>requirements,
which may not match a reasonable person's idea of 'good education.' Parents may
be willing to spend money in order to ensure their kids are supervised while
they work long hours; or are allowed to coast or get away with poor conduct; or
are spared from mixing with 'the wrong sort' or have a chance to make their way
into the elite.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><b>2. Demand for private schooling could be compensating specifically, but
inefficiently, for the lack of independence and competition among state
schools.</b> Parents may be willing to pay for a more tailored curriculum, or
for non-mainstream teaching methods. This tailoring, however, may be
inefficient because of Greece's fragmented geography and relative scarcity of
children - which means that parents can rarely find exactly the 'alternative'
education they need, and the schools may themselves struggle to find the
specialist labour that they need. In other cases, parents with a demand for
tailored schooling may genuinely want a good education but have preferences as
to what this entails that don't prioritise academic achievement (eg they might
want an education that provides religious indoctrination; or an environment
that nurtures creativity).<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;">
</span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"><b>3. Greek private schools may, by virtue of being private, have access to
inferior inputs. </b>If people who train as teachers in Greece value
secure jobs more than marginal differences in pay and are willing to wait and/or relocate to get such jobs, they might prefer
to pass up offers from private schools, especially
if they are highly qualified on paper. Similarly, people moving into teaching (or a specific kind of teaching) after switching
careers out of necessity may also be more likely to go into private schools for
similar reasons. Parental effort is also an input. Parents who opt for private schooling because it helps them
trade off money for working time may have less time to devote to supervising or
encouraging learning.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-size: small;"></span><br />
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com213tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-77990476774582112882015-10-11T23:24:00.000+01:002015-11-21T22:24:48.473+00:00WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT GREEK SURVEYS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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UPDATE 21/11/15: Join me in protesting the Greek government's attempt to discredit and punish staff at the polling unit of the University of Macedonia; the Independent Greeks' conspiracy theories and personal vendettas have hurt to many people already. Sign the petition <a href="https://secure.avaaz.org/el/petition/Panepistimio_Makedonias_Ekklisi_gia_tin_eleytheria_tis_epistimonikis_ereynas/?wpuizdb">here</a>.<br />
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The days leading up to the second Greek election of 2015 saw <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/16/us-eurozone-greece-poll-idUSKCN0RG2EP20150916">a rash of new polls</a> suggesting Syriza and ND were neck-and-neck ahead of the second election of 2015. No less esteemed an organ than the FT was citing Greek polls to inform its readers that ND's Meimarakis (whose mustache alone should have given him away as a throwback to the party's deep past) had refreshed the party's image and was <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f060e500-59f6-11e5-9846-de406ccb37f2.html">proving such 'a formidable opponent'</a> for A. Tsipras that ND was in with a chance again.</div>
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<span style="text-align: left;">It was, we now know, bollocks. So were surveys conducted ahead of this summer's referendum, whose errors were made that much more </span><a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/08/greece-polls-wrong_n_7754874.html" style="text-align: left;">humiliating </a><span style="text-align: left;">for pollsters by the fact the actual result fell outside even the </span><i style="text-align: left;">envelope </i><span style="text-align: left;">of projections published in previous days. No less successful were predictions of the January election result, which again showed a dead heat to the very end, despite a comfortable lead for Syriza in real life. The graph below shows the evolution of polls, with large circles representing the actual election results.</span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgU2aImijuBwG_drUA5N7VjskxFH3XxXi8CKUyxI_OjTG8rrNqRTOsppJYB6aXHj1DcdGPhNNXGRW_lG5GpVei38MOLdLzUGqkYIhg2bI-gRI_IAz7aAWs4fj9DO64tlhG7blaFc9kHvH7Z/s1600/1200px-ElectionMonthlyAverageGraphGreece2015.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="308" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgU2aImijuBwG_drUA5N7VjskxFH3XxXi8CKUyxI_OjTG8rrNqRTOsppJYB6aXHj1DcdGPhNNXGRW_lG5GpVei38MOLdLzUGqkYIhg2bI-gRI_IAz7aAWs4fj9DO64tlhG7blaFc9kHvH7Z/s640/1200px-ElectionMonthlyAverageGraphGreece2015.png" width="640" /></a></div>
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"<a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:ElectionMonthlyAverageGraphGreece2015.png#/media/File:ElectionMonthlyAverageGraphGreece2015.png">ElectionMonthlyAverageGraphGreece2015</a>" by <a class="new" href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=User:Impru20&action=edit&redlink=1" title="User:Impru20 (page does not exist)">Impru20</a> - <span class="int-own-work" lang="en">Own work</span>. Licensed under <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0" title="Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0">CC BY-SA 3.0</a> via <a href="https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/">Commons</a>.</div>
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Now readers know how this blog works. I explore cock-up before conspiracy. And I believe in surveys. I deeply respect those who produce them. They are tools with limitations, but they are good tools nonetheless. When surveys start to malfunction our window into the real world narrows, and we become more dependent on the confirmation bias factories in our heads and in our social circles.</div>
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So what can account for the errors we've seen? The following explanations have been put forward.</div>
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<ul>
<li><b>non-response (non-contact and refusal): </b>an increasing share of the population mistrust pollsters and this attitude is correlated with particular, non-mainstream political views. More importantly, more and more people reject landlines altogether in favour of mobiles and the internet. Finally, social and economic upheaval makes people's contacts less reliable as households fall apart, people emigrate, and domestic life is disrupted. The people affected by these phenomena are systematically different in their politics from those unaffected, and are under-represented in what should be 'representative' samples. There is certainly enough evidence that these influences are important. See for instance <a href="http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/50113/1/__libfile_repository_Content_Steele,%20F_Alternative%20Approaches%20Multilevel%20Modelling_Steele_Alternative_approaches_multilevel_2013.pdf">UK results</a>, and <a href="http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4257477/">US findings</a> on the matter, and some of my own work on <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/03/greeces-shrinking-working-age.html">emigration</a>. To put it simply, rising non-response is a symptom of social deterioration; reduced fertility rates, reduced neighborhood cohesion, precarious employment and social isolation.</li>
<li><b>fluid public opinion/unit non-response:</b> It is possible that individuals are becoming increasingly unwilling to discuss their politics specifically with pollsters, either out of mistrust or out of disillusionment, and that this attitude is correlated with a predisposition to vote for non-mainstream parties. For an empirically founded overview of this argument, in Greek, see <a href="http://vernardakis.gr/article.php?id=559#.Vb31wO2GKeV.twitter">here</a>. To this explanation should be added the fact that the context of recent Greek elections and even more so the Greek referendum was extreme; public opinion may have been genuinely fluid to such an extent that late surges can make a difference. For an argument and data in support, see HuffPo's surprisingly good coverage <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/08/greece-polls-wrong_n_7754874.html">here</a>. Alternatively, pollsters' failure to allocate 'don't know responses' to a likely preference (eg based on their previous voting record, which would usually have favoured Syriza) may have been at fault (an argument to that effect <a href="http://www.alphatv.gr/news/politics/o-thomas-gerakis-gia-tis-proeklogikes-dimoskopiseis-kai-koino-exit-poll">here</a>)</li>
<li><b>abstention: </b>with abstention on the rise, Greek survey results are becoming increasingly sensitive to people's propensity to vote and small variations in nationwide voting intention can be magnified in real elections.</li>
<li><b>herding:</b> pollsters are worried about being the odd-one-out and weed out or suppress survey results that put them at odds with their peers. Nate Silver makes a good case for this <a href="http://fivethirtyeight.com/datalab/the-polls-were-bad-in-greece-the-conventional-wisdom-was-worse/?ex_cid=538twitter#fn-1">here</a>. Ironically, New Democracy staffers caught on to this theory and spent much of the eve of the last elections briefing opinion formers (of whom I am not one) that ND was indeed ahead in surveys but the pollsters were self-censoring out of fear. They got <a href="https://twitter.com/vivian_e/status/645854651938643968">caught</a>.</li>
<li><b>tampering:</b> pollsters are in cahoots with political parties whom they insist on painting in a favourable light. There were multiple accusations of such tampering in the aftermath of the 2015 elections, reviewed in <a href="https://datelineatlantis.wordpress.com/2015/09/21/who-rigged-the-greek-opinion-polls/">this excellent post on Dateline: Atlantis</a>. My feeling is that this may be true of some, but not nearly enough pollsters to explain the outcomes we've seen (see below on the performance of 'non-establishment' polls)</li>
</ul>
How to deal with these problems?<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><b>Stick to cross-tabs. </b>The Press Project ran its own <a href="https://www.indiegogo.com/projects/a-different-kind-of-poll-for-the-greek-elections">crowdfunded survey</a> ahead of the September elections. Despite a stated intention to compare its findings with those of other polls, in the end TPP simply chose to report on cross-tabulations only (full video <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbrYPhNJRW4">here</a> and more commentary <a href="http://www.thepressproject.gr/article/81425/Simera-parousiazetai-i-dimoskopisi-ton-politon">here</a>). Although this was likely motivated by the relatively small sample size achieved, I would hazard a guess that TPP found themselves faced with the same methodological issues as everyone else. </li>
<li><b>Invite scrutiny. </b>Pollsters ProRata (who came closest of all to the actual September election results) have <a href="http://www.prorata.gr/Portals/0/pdf/prosklhsh-summetoxhs-newn-epistimonwn.pdf">opened up</a> their survey datasets to researchers. [Or did they? See Comments section!]</li>
<li><b>Extrapolate from biased samples. </b>Ironically, the innovators here were populist blogs such as Tromaktiko (see a sample <a href="http://tro-ma-ktiko.blogspot.co.uk/2015/09/blog-post_6734.html">here</a>), who quickly realised how unrepresentative their readership is and developed simple rules of thumb in order to work backwards from this to a more 'normal' population. At least one company (the unknown and ungoogle-able Clear Foundations Institute) has tried to combine a telephone survey with a web survey (see <a href="http://t.co/2phWVxRWYJ">here</a>). These approaches so far seem to have failed as badly as the old-fashioned methods, but that's not to say that there aren't valid ways of extrapolating from biased samples (example <a href="http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/published/forecasting-with-nonrepresentative-polls.pdf">here</a>).</li>
<li><b>Build the sampling frame or weights matrix around referendum results.</b> Pollsters have repeatedly claimed that their raw data were of the highest quality, but errors crept in as the data were weighted. In particular, weights based on past electoral preferences became unreliable as the Greek electorate became more fluid and deranged. A solution would be to use the recent referendum as the reference for weighting. The sampling frame approach was, for instance, suggested <a href="http://oladeka.com/2015/09/%CE%AE%CF%81%CE%B8%CE%B5-%CF%84%CE%BF-%CF%84%CE%AD%CE%BB%CE%BF%CF%82-%CF%84%CF%89%CE%BD-exit-polls-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CF%84%CF%89%CE%BD-%CE%B4%CE%B7%CE%BC%CE%BF%CF%83%CE%BA%CE%BF%CF%80%CE%AE%CF%83/">here</a>. ProRata also appear to have used respondents' referendum voting record in weighting responses (as opposed to or in addition to past electoral voting record).</li>
</ul>
<b>An even bigger problem </b><br />
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Ultimately, political polls may not matter much; I've yet to see convincing evidence that undecided or tactical voters are swayed by them, although private party funding may be influenced.<br />
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More to the point, political polls will always be subject to accusations of tampering. At the back of the Greek people's heads, they are part of politics and thus to be taken with a grain of salt. But what if similar problems were impacting the surveys used to produce national statistics?<br />
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National statistics surveys have an advantage over polls in that they are allowed to be much more expensive than political surveys, they have to follow a common methodology, and are, in some cases, compulsory for the poor bastards chosen to provide a response. And while there are potentially incentives to tamper with, say, unemployment rates or poverty rates, tampering with more obscure findings like IT usage statistics is pretty inconceivable. </div>
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It's not difficult to find the non-response rates associated with national statistics surveys. ELSTAT publishes a good deal of this information under each theme's 'methodology' section (see an example for the Labour Force Survey <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/PAGE-themes?p_param=A0101&r_param=SJO01&y_param=MT&mytabs=0">here</a>). Additionally Eurostat summarises the national quality reports for each survey on an annual basis (see an example for EU-SILC <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/income-and-living-conditions/quality/eu-quality-reports">here</a>). In the graph below, I've put figures together for some of my favourite national statistics (on employment, household spending, living conditions and IT use). Plotting them all together makes for grim viewing.</div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgO-KJpfHKBYv0C7Ju4567VbegRlp04PCzGhaZutHLEk2Mof6MW2WzadnDoYTeKNqSoFGUwCY7gCq3mGIvtWNUPU6ZOAEhirHKL-bM4WMYJLHDlW18SyEv8Ar3WwC4uUZAFoAFng89v2-oc/s1600/comparison.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="441" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgO-KJpfHKBYv0C7Ju4567VbegRlp04PCzGhaZutHLEk2Mof6MW2WzadnDoYTeKNqSoFGUwCY7gCq3mGIvtWNUPU6ZOAEhirHKL-bM4WMYJLHDlW18SyEv8Ar3WwC4uUZAFoAFng89v2-oc/s640/comparison.png" width="640" /></a></div>
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First of all, it's plain to see that there is a long-term trend towards rising non-response rates, mirroring the experience of pollsters in Greece and abroad. However, this trend clearly accelerated after 2010, the first memorandum year, which gives credence to a 'social breakdown non-response' theory. Second, the years 2011 and 2012 seem to have been a particularly sharp deviation from this trend - which I believe is due to the fact that this was the period of mass disruption - e.g. Greek's sense of physical safety and food poverty were <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/greeces-humanitarian-crisis-fact-and.html">at their worst</a>. Third, not all surveys have seen non-response develop in the same way. EU-SILC, a survey designed to tease out signs of poverty and its implications, has managed non-response a lot better, and appears to be returning to normal. How is SILC different? I am not sure - bear with me as I try to find out.</div>
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The Labour Force Survey provides even more detail on non-response. It shows, for instance, that it's the 'uncontactables' that account for the rise in non-response. They also show that major urban areas have substantially higher non-response rates. Attica, in particular, has a non-response of around 40%, twice its pre-crisis level. This should get ELSTAT worried.</div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-HUKSQ5CLS7uOzZr-yPfGO3lZnB58KDSsMJfDWZBGYjOSfwUcEvT2M9DvsIZXzFdPnrtEsUSa2Kr2XXV1lSDNkhtnjZ3Rl5OotMEegy0jounii1MpwndvRn2il0PVc0RuqbWJLJeHluvD/s1600/nonresponse2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em; text-align: center;"><img border="0" height="238" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh-HUKSQ5CLS7uOzZr-yPfGO3lZnB58KDSsMJfDWZBGYjOSfwUcEvT2M9DvsIZXzFdPnrtEsUSa2Kr2XXV1lSDNkhtnjZ3Rl5OotMEegy0jounii1MpwndvRn2il0PVc0RuqbWJLJeHluvD/s400/nonresponse2.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEie4yEz2wwXEJFNT7Ajnbrxa7-MG2iRJCcsnBb-vIewhnwO2kCI89s5lcff69J0hWjbClSrkkrK5ULLM7dCkEWzfjdPrZkwoqpkmSNuJa1pEJ34zEwccZAu398tTqtkdxREchUg9hY5_BwL/s1600/nonresponse.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="238" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEie4yEz2wwXEJFNT7Ajnbrxa7-MG2iRJCcsnBb-vIewhnwO2kCI89s5lcff69J0hWjbClSrkkrK5ULLM7dCkEWzfjdPrZkwoqpkmSNuJa1pEJ34zEwccZAu398tTqtkdxREchUg9hY5_BwL/s400/nonresponse.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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One might recoil in horror from such numbers - we get our unemployment figures from a survey that has 25% non-response? WTF?! It's important to remember, however, that statisticians don't just let non-response be; they contact different households fitting the same general description (e.g. local area, age of reference person) until they fill their quota for each box on their grid. When non-response is random, or displays no systematic pattern that is related to the subject of the survey, it does not bias the resulting figures, even if it's really quite large. Greek election polls had ca. 80% non-response even back when they were accurate (data <a href="http://vernardakis.gr/article.php?id=559#.Vb31wO2GKeV.twitter">here</a>).</div>
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Ultimately, I'm not even sure that the Syriza surge was correlated to the rise of the uncontactables. Electoral data are available <a href="http://ekloges-prev.singularlogic.eu/v2015a/v/public/index.html#{"cls":"party","params":{"id":4}}">here</a>, and a regional breakdown of non-response is available, at least for LFS. The interesting thing is that the correlation between transience and Syriza vote growth is quite weak</div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOjMKffoBUqEUwrZy9nZZpp5ZLYgO1DdqQdfn2Cxl_fXip1UmfTwtyWnkz6G8wXzo6lczJbOhZpkhiBO3dieRLGbHbJfKcb2WCZLl3dRU4UPI8x3ps1c2IK4S5avSQl9wfil6ifi4vEmSW/s1600/nonresponse3.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="173" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOjMKffoBUqEUwrZy9nZZpp5ZLYgO1DdqQdfn2Cxl_fXip1UmfTwtyWnkz6G8wXzo6lczJbOhZpkhiBO3dieRLGbHbJfKcb2WCZLl3dRU4UPI8x3ps1c2IK4S5avSQl9wfil6ifi4vEmSW/s400/nonresponse3.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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TO BE CONTINUED</div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com9tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-68752626380497071342015-08-20T09:23:00.002+01:002015-08-20T10:26:14.152+01:00STATPORN, STATPIMPS, STAWHORES PART III: EVOLUTION OF THE 2008-9 DEFICIT<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
This is the third part of my series on the 2008-9 revision of the Greek deficit and the events that led to it; it considers the specific allegations related to the 2008-9 deficit revision. Part 1 of the series is available <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/08/statporn-statpimps-statwhores.html">here</a>, and Part 2 is available <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/08/statporn-statpimps-statwhores-part-ii.html">here</a>. Part 4 is underway.<br />
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<strong>The truth is out there</strong><br />
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It's hard to overstate just how much of what goes on in the world (even the unsavoury bits) is a matter of record, if not entirely in the public domain. Conspiracy theorists' claims are, as a result, always much more testable than they realise. This is true of Greece's 2008-9 deficit revision. <br />
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Here's what you need to make your way through the revisions:<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>Eurostat's rules on Government deficit and debt calculation are in the public domain. The ones in place at the time of the 2010 methodological visits are recorded <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5911493/KS-RA-09-017-EN.PDF/65e3c992-039a-4fee-885f-767d85a58ca7" target="_blank">here</a>, while the revised rules of 2012 are available <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3859598/5922701/KS-RA-12-003-EN.PDF" target="_blank">here</a>. The European System of Accounts (ESA95) which was in force at the time is explained in detail <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Glossary:European_system_of_national_and_regional_accounts_(ESA95)">here. </a>We've since moved on to ESA2010.</li>
<li>Eurostat keeps a <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/methodology/decisions-for-gfs" target="_blank">record </a>of its decisions on how methodological matters should be dealt with, and a record of <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/methodology/guidance-on-accounting-rules" target="_blank">guidance </a>, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/excessive-deficit-procedure/eurostat-edp-visits-to-member-states">visits</a> and <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/methodology/advice-to-member-states" target="_blank">advice </a>to member states. </li>
<li>All notifications under the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) are available <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/government-finance-statistics/excessive-deficit-procedure/edp-notification-tables/edp-archives">here</a><b>. </b>The ones most relevant to the 2008-9 deficit review are <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/4255579/EL-2008-04.pdf">April 2008</a>, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/4255595/EL-2008-10.pdf">October 2008</a>, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2026460/GR-2009-04.pdf/907e3e3a-7d4c-4cb0-a32a-01e91c731cd9">April 2009</a>, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2026464/GR-2009-10.pdf/e78f6233-4e0a-4f1e-9f1b-f3824c96e00c">October 2009</a> (the first one, of 2/10), <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2028454/EL-2010-04.pdf">April 2010</a> and <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2028464/GR-11-2010-0.pdf">October 2010</a>. </li>
<li>It's important to remember that the Oct 2009 Notification was fatally flawed; no one accepts it; not Eurostat, not ELSTAT, not the old ESYE, not the conspiracy theorists. No one.</li>
<li>Eurostat's report on the 2010 revision of Greek deficit statistics is available <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/COM_2010_report_greek/c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a">here </a>with a very helpful annex <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/COM_2010_report_greek_annex_1/4b10d2ba-7a93-4c18-b50f-957f2ad3af8a">here</a>. Their <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/5765001/GREECE-EN.PDF/2da4e4f6-f9f2-4848-b1a9-cb229fcabae3?version=1.0">report</a> on the 2004 revision is available <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/5765001/GREECE-EN.PDF/2da4e4f6-f9f2-4848-b1a9-cb229fcabae3?version=1.0">here</a>. And <a href="http://edz.bib.uni-mannheim.de/www-edz/pdf/sek/2005/sek-2005-0723-en.pdf">here </a> (pp 31 and 32) is the commission's breakdown of the revisions made back in 2004.</li>
<li>Eurostat has also published reports on their methodological visits to Greece in <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/3991366/FF-GR-2006-09-29.pdf/2c201de2-9f26-4b89-8284-931f55c623f0">2006 (Spring)</a>, <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/5773537/C3-WGM-200606-EN.PDF/e8c8c10a-ea64-4212-b57a-328031c6e691?version=1.0">2006 (Autumn) </a> and <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/3991231//Greece-2010-methodological-visits-report.pdf">2010</a>.</li>
<li>The 2010 Greek expert report into the reliability of fiscal statistics is available <a href="http://www.eurocapital.gr/files.php?force&file=Siatras_Files/Syn_2_Ekth_Yp_Oik_795943087.pdf">here</a> (in Greek)</li>
</ul>
Using the EDP notification tables, it is relatively easy to present a history of our 2008 and 2009 deficit forecasts and estimates, by vintage. All timings refer to the EDP notifications in which each estimate was made, but, since EDP notifications don't go back more than four years , I've also added the figures currently cited by Eurostat. For comparability, these are all ESA95 stats.<b></b><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgFP9DgkHNQ3vLap8hdTaZzttOxO0bfiZbmAHUgT-U16LUdwzT0pt3VsSJ8bkcHhysqxmOnuxgFUY2ayg-laFiqpSayd7pSH0RDbH3QzXaGKdFqTjw4myAoJuFp8EWwK1eWySm_pq0JOl3U/s1600/notifications.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="220" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgFP9DgkHNQ3vLap8hdTaZzttOxO0bfiZbmAHUgT-U16LUdwzT0pt3VsSJ8bkcHhysqxmOnuxgFUY2ayg-laFiqpSayd7pSH0RDbH3QzXaGKdFqTjw4myAoJuFp8EWwK1eWySm_pq0JOl3U/s640/notifications.png" width="640" /></a></div>
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As you can see, the flawed Oct 2009 notifications conducted by ESYE, ELSTAT's non-independent predecessor, revised our 2008 and 2009 deficits enormously. Yet, while the Oct 2009 notifications were both severely wrong on many levels, their estimates of the 2008 and 2009 deficits weren't overly <em>high</em> - the figures Eurostat and ELSTAT agree on today, and which I think are methodologically sound, are in both cases significantly <em>worse </em>than what came out of the Oct 2009 notification. This means that, unless one rejects all subsequent revisions, the Oct 2009 notification did not <em>inflate</em> the deficit. Conspiracy theorists can only, perhaps, claim that it drew <em>attention </em>to the deficit at the wrong time. Which is true enough, but not treason.</div>
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To help you assess the timing of notifications, I've put together a simple timeline, with help from <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_government-debt_crisis_timeline">Wikipedia</a>:</div>
<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li><div style="text-align: left;">
2 October 2009: The first <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2026464/GR-2009-10.pdf/e78f6233-4e0a-4f1e-9f1b-f3824c96e00c">October 2009 EDP notification</a> is submitted, revising Greece's 2009 deficit forecast from EUR9.3bn (3.7% of GDP) to EUR30.1bn (12.5% of GDP). </div>
</li>
<li>4 October 2009: PASOK <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_legislative_election,_2009">wins </a>the 2009 legislative elections</li>
<li>21 October 2009: A second October 2009 EDP notification is submitted.</li>
<li>22 October 2009: Fitch <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6Y6T3olWgX0">downgrades</a> Greece from A to A-</li>
<li>8 December 2009: Fitch <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/08/greece-credit-rating-lowest-eurozone">downgrades</a> Greece from A- to BBB+</li>
<li>16 December 2009: S&P <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/12/16/greece-ratings-sandp-idUSN1646403820091216">downgrades</a> Greece from A- to BBB+</li>
<li>22 December 2009: Moody's <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/6864878/Moodys-downgrades-Greece.html">downgrades</a> Greece from A1 to A2</li>
<li>2 January 2010: An expert <a href="http://www.eurocapital.gr/files.php?force&file=Siatras_Files/Syn_2_Ekth_Yp_Oik_795943087.pdf">report</a> into the reliability of Greek fiscal statistics is published</li>
<li>8 January 2010: Eurostat publishes its <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/6404656/COM_2010_report_greek/c8523cfa-d3c1-4954-8ea1-64bb11e59b3a">report</a> on Greek fiscal statistics</li>
<li>9 March 2010: Greece's new <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/StatLaw3832_EN_06082014.pdf">statistical law</a> comes into force, establishing ELSTAT as an independent entity.</li>
<li>29-31 March 2010: Eurostat methodological visit.</li>
<li>1 April 2010: The <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1015035/2028454/EL-2010-04.pdf">April 2010 EDP Notification</a> is submitted, revising Greece's 2009 deficit from EUR30.1bn (12.5% of GDP) to EUR32.3bn (13.6% of GDP).</li>
<li>9 April 2010: Fitch <a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/fitch-downgrades-greek-debt--to-bbbminus-1940587.html">downgrades </a>Greece from BBB+ to BBB-</li>
<li>21 April 2010: Bailout talks <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aA8C8Qaysag8&pos=3">begin</a></li>
<li>22 April 2010: Moody's <a href="http://www.nbcnews.com/id/36712807/ns/business-world_business/t/greek-debt-crisis-deepens-rating-downgraded/">downgrades </a>Greece from A2 to A3.</li>
<li>23 April 2010: Greece <a href="http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1984192,00.html">formally requests</a> a bailout from the IMF, EU and ECB.</li>
<li>27 April 2010: S&P <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/27/greece-ratings-sandp-idUSWNA964520100427">downgrades </a>Greece from A to BB</li>
<li>2 May 2010: The first bailout is <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/02/greece-economy-bailout-euro-eu-imf">signed</a></li>
<li>21-22 June: Eurostat methodological visit</li>
<li>26 July 2010: <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32010R0679">Regulation no 697/2010</a> comes into force, giving Eurostat auditing powers </li>
<li>2 August 2010: A. Georgiou takes over as president of ELSTAT.</li>
<li>27-29 September 2010: Eurostat methodological visit</li>
<li>11 October-9 November 2010: Eurostat methodological visit</li>
<li>15 November 2010: Eurostat <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/5051930/2-15112010-AP-EN.PDF/6704b50f-d771-4c98-889e-261a5f74396d">publishes</a> Greek fiscal data from 2004-2009 without reservations for the first time.</li>
</ul>
<b></b><br />
<b>The origins of a revision target - accounting for issuance</b><br />
<br />
As readers know, I do not deal in 'insider' accounts. I am not privy to what went on within ESYE or ELSTAT except through what accounts there are in the public domain. However, I'm willing to bet that, come October 2009, the old ESYE's leadership knew that producing a deficit figure below ca. EUR30bn for 2009 and EUR20bn for 2008 would lose them the last of the international community's remaining goodwill, and I'm willing to bet they were under orders to reach those levels while still allowing their bosses (first ND, then PASOK ministers) to look reasonably good. The reason was simple, and it was not treachery; foreign analysts could see for themselves how much debt Greece was <i>issuing, </i>and it was way out of line with our deficit projections<i>. </i><br />
<br />
It is not impossible to manipulate deficit statistics in order to exaggerate government deficits; however, it <i>is</i> impossible to manipulate the numbers on bond issuance. Bond issues are, after all, probably the most <a href="http://www.pdma.gr/index.php/en/debt-instruments-greek-government-bonds/issuance-calendar-a-syndication-and-auction-results">public</a> financial transactions in the world. Eurostat <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-548022_QID_34F2D97_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;ST_FL,L,Y,1;SECTOR2,L,Z,0;FINPOS,L,Z,1;SECTOR,L,Z,2;CO_NCO,L,Z,3;UNIT,L,Z,4;GEO,L,Z,5;INDICATORS,C,Z,6;&zSelection=DS-548022GEO,EL;DS-548022INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-548022SECTOR2,S1_S2;DS-548022FINPOS,LIAB;DS-548022UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-548022CO_NCO,NCO;DS-548022SECTOR,S13;&rankName1=FINPOS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=CO-NCO_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=SECTOR2_1_2_-1_2&rankName7=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName8=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName9=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&rankName10=ST-FL_1_2_1_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">estimates </a>net issuance (all securities issued minus all securities repaid) of EUR23bn in 2008 and EUR38bn in 2009. It would be hard to believe that our deficits (in cash terms, at least) were orders of magnitude smaller than this.<br />
<br />
If you're a conspiracy theorist, you may not trust Eurostat on this matter; but bond-watching analysts' estimates at the time might convince you. By Nov 2009, gross issuance for the year was estimated at <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9ea32d02-e8d4-11de-a756-00144feab49a.html#axzz3itWZdKmy">EUR59bn</a> by Barclays Capital and later at <a href="http://danskeanalyse.danskebank.dk/abo/Goviesweek46/$file/Govies_week46.pdf">EUR61.3bn</a> by Danske Bank; and since EUR25.9bn of Greek bonds matured or were repaid over the year, that leads us back to a net issuance of EUR35.4bn for 2009. Similarly, as of Dec 2008, gross issuance for the year was estimated at <a href="http://www.protothema.gr/economy/article/21673/daneia-8211-mysthrio-ypsoys-7-dis-eyro-to-2008/">EUR44bn</a>; suggesting net issuance was way ahead of the projected deficit. <br />
<br />
It is, of course, possible for a country to net issue more bonds than it needs to, if it is tactically overborrowing to take advantage of low interest rates. But Greece was raising funds in the teeth of literally <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f198f422-e917-11de-a756-00144feab49a.html">the biggest bond sale in human history</a>. It was common knowledge that the debt we were raising at the time would cost us dearly. It is also possible, in a conspiracy theorist's mind, for a government to intentionally overborrow in order to bring about a fiscal crisis, but then the bulk of the 2009 issuance was not carried out by the new PASOK government at all. It was carried out by the outgoing ND government which protested the new estimates and <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/08/statporn-statpimps-statwhores.html">started</a> the 2009 deficit myth in the first place!<br />
<br />
In any case, it's worth comparing the EUR35.4bn of net bond issuance for 2009 to the conspiracy theorists' own upper-bound estimate for the 2009 deficit: <a href="http://www.defencenet.gr/defence/o/55372">7.9% of GDP</a> (based on the Oct 2010 notification) <i>before</i> accounting for what they allege was a major GDP underestimate. This produces an utterly impossible net borrowing requirement of EUR18.5bn - these people truly believe the Greek government had issued some EUR17bn worth of bonds just for fun in 2009.<br />
<br />
<b>The timing and impact of revisions</b><br />
<b></b><br />
<div>
Timing is key to the inflated deficit myth: it is, after all, alleged that Greece's 'falsified' deficit figures triggered our debt crisis, hastened the involvement of the IMF in our bailout, or were used to build support for austerity policies domestically. The goalposts keep shifting, so one needs to be careful.</div>
<br />
The first EDP notification to significantly review the 2008-9 deficits was the Oct 2009 notification, which came in two parts - the original notification of 2 October, and a follow-up notification on 21 October. Not only was this not prepared by ELSTAT (which did not exist at the time) - the first shocking set of figures was submitted ahead of PASOK winning the 2009 legislative elections. While the timing doesn't tie in well with conspiracy theories, it does tie in with the narrative of the crsis. As you can see <a href="http://stats.bis.org/bis-stats-tool/org.bis.stats.ui.StatsApplication/StatsApplication.html?query=eJxVT8EOgjAU654mxJtX%2FQ%2B9b2PAFBW3IeHEp%2FiVnj35HdiAMbqkadq3vnWAupSvvcba%2BNg5M1idoq3cyWFDGRPlYL2phzYMuU66qC8deATIHh9%2B3sdxVIpqiezmGUg9hYKUAaspnfrGTZYqsSyCu87iiiy45nN%2FC7EV5FyTNUHWLSQFiHeQSLgIMeScKOjrxDcM52dqDznSiyVkZ5nr6HO%2B466GfGggbZw6zb2x%2BC33LfL3g7nrG2FaNTY%3D">here</a>, our October 2009 notification, combined with <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financialcrisis/6668281/Dubais-financial-crisis-a-QandA.html">Dubai's unfolding sovereign debt crisis</a>, was the signal for foreign banks to up sticks and get out of Greek bonds. Greece had put up its hand to ask for a loo break just as investors were wondering who would be the next sovereign to go bust. This is tactically awful, of course, and had I been a PASOK minister I might have tried to stall as long as possible. But the massive deficit and international scrutiny were both already there; a budget would be drawn up in early 2010 no matter what. Greece could not put this off forever.<br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOH80Ht8RD2VXkjmwCXbUaXMf_bnsilR_ZmA0nTQHJgu3YSqvt3xtEbeo2Fmg-hghmM-WwW8p8C-iUkAEHxpfMngkBDavO2fjJL4Lqy2wLbFWjTaCq14hSJccdUmK0AhzE0WfwzQJiVuQG/s1600/ggb.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; float: left; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="318" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgOH80Ht8RD2VXkjmwCXbUaXMf_bnsilR_ZmA0nTQHJgu3YSqvt3xtEbeo2Fmg-hghmM-WwW8p8C-iUkAEHxpfMngkBDavO2fjJL4Lqy2wLbFWjTaCq14hSJccdUmK0AhzE0WfwzQJiVuQG/s640/ggb.png" width="640" /></a><b></b><br />
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While foreign banks were individually heading for the exits post October 2009, in other ways the market was slow to catch on. Greece CDS premia were only beginning to diverge from the rest of the periphery in Q4 2009, and it took credit rating agencies, on average, until Q1 2010 to take Greece below investment grade (graph taken from <a href="http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1109g.pdf">here</a>). Similarly, <a href="https://www.google.com/trends/explore#q=greek%20deficit%2C%20greece%20deficit&cmpt=q&tz=Etc%2FGMT-1">Google search trends</a> for the Greek deficit only start to really pick up in March 2010. Throughout all of this, the revision of the <em>2008</em> deficit hardly made it into the international financial press at all; it was the dramatic revision of the <em>2009</em> deficit that was cited most.<br />
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<ul style="text-align: left;"><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg9z7qXussKMKJ8mpOGr1xkePgjH2ZMQt4aHwamR_5fFz-OOZDizfgSR7gt3khZG9yvelyPPKasIzVD7c_dvtDcZ-UYhEPzmOAKqWhmcREm27bYcjqH_MROdvsT25C0LWkiUb6g6QiWQyza/s1600/timeline.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; display: inline !important; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="285" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg9z7qXussKMKJ8mpOGr1xkePgjH2ZMQt4aHwamR_5fFz-OOZDizfgSR7gt3khZG9yvelyPPKasIzVD7c_dvtDcZ-UYhEPzmOAKqWhmcREm27bYcjqH_MROdvsT25C0LWkiUb6g6QiWQyza/s400/timeline.png" width="400" /></a>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com1tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-91348706598994020852015-08-13T23:14:00.000+01:002015-08-14T10:51:02.807+01:00STATPORN, STATPIMPS, STATWHORES PART II: THE ROAD TO GREEK STATISTICS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
In this second part to my post, I try to explain the factors behind the decline and corruption of Greek statistics leading up to the 2009 deficit revision, and what it can teach us about Greece, Europe, and the State.<br />
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<b>Goodhart's Law</b><br />
<br />
Let's start with the basics: Goodhart's Law. It's reason number #45608 why centrally planned economies do not tend to work:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>Goodhart’s “law” </i>[...]<i> stipulates that “any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes” </i>[...] (<a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/fiscal-gimmickry-in-europe_237714513517?crawler=true">Koen and Van den Noord 2005</a>)</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"w<i>hen a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure."</i><br />
<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marilyn_Strathern" target="_blank">Dame Ann Marilyn Strathern</a> </blockquote>
Normally, Government deficits are among the most closely monitored government statistics out there, and come with monthly targets; if Goodhart's Law holds, then it makes sense that they should be some of the most prone to manipulation. We don't know how they compare to other statistics but we know they <i>are </i>tampered with, at least in the Eurozone, as a result of political incentives subject to both economic and political cycles, and within the scope allowed by incomplete fiscal transparency. A number of studies demonstrate this conclusively, but I would single out <a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/fiscal-gimmickry-in-europe_237714513517?crawler=true">Koen and Van de Noord (2005)</a>, <a href="http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/86676/1/11-080.pdf">Beetsma et al (2011)</a>, <a href="http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1342.pdf">de Castro et al (2011)</a> or <a href="http://personal.lse.ac.uk/wehner/gimmicks.pdf">Alt et al (2014)</a> as the most useful. Readers may have others to contribute; all are welcome.<br />
<br />
It takes constant vigilance to keep deficit figures relevant and free from interference - in fact, it is a job for institutions of fiscal <a href="https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp1567.pdf">governance </a>and <a href="http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/tools-resources/topics/promoting-open-budgets/fiscal-transparency">transparency</a>, not for the occasional do-gooder. You might think Greece's historical record in this has always been poor, but you'd be wrong. As the IMF <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp13219.pdf">acknowledges</a>, fiscal transparency was written into Greece's first constitution and elements of it were in place even during the Revolution. This is because the Greek state, born as it was out of war and a concerted Western nation-building effort, was dependent on foreign loans <a href="http://historicalreview.org/index.php/historicalReview/article/view/305/193">from day minus one.</a> Subsequently, we spent decades under fiscal monitoring and monetary straitjackets of some sort or other (on which, read <a href="http://graduateinstitute.ch/files/live/sites/iheid/files/sites/international_history_politics/users/stefano_ugolini/public/papers/Tuncer.pdf">Tuncer (2009)</a> and <a href="http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/Paper200416.pdf">Lazaretou (2004)</a>).<br />
<br />
<b>The Stability and Growth Pact</b><br />
<br />
But what happens when institutions are as wrong as the people they're supposed to control? In Greece's case, the key institution was the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its infamous 3% deficit target. Pina and Venes (2007) <a href="https://www.repository.utl.pt/bitstream/10400.5/2592/1/wp232007.pdf">demonstrate</a> that the SGP increased the tendency of governments to flatter their deficit forecasts. Alt at al (2014), moreover, demonstrate that the influence of the SGP reduced headline deficits but increased stock-flow adjustments, and particularly the disguising of deficits as equity injections into state-controlled enterprises. This stock-flow adjustment effect only occurred in countries with low levels of fiscal transparency. Unfortunately for us, Greece's recent record in this regard was poor, whatever our history might have prepared us for.<br />
<br />
<b>Differences of degree and of quality</b><br />
<br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxwN16XG1t1UqBUwXmSw37BFDZl8K2ijDRDs1kazhjK9Zsj6mCegzHJ-q6_Knp7Zk11ApeJC64IwDDNjetniyYuBdg8KCm_6D29D7tZmxej1iHse_roSqVCVDV1UJYwOg7dKlgc5SAHg-r/s1600/gimmiks.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="205" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjxwN16XG1t1UqBUwXmSw37BFDZl8K2ijDRDs1kazhjK9Zsj6mCegzHJ-q6_Knp7Zk11ApeJC64IwDDNjetniyYuBdg8KCm_6D29D7tZmxej1iHse_roSqVCVDV1UJYwOg7dKlgc5SAHg-r/s320/gimmiks.png" width="320" /></a>These were in fact Eurozone-wide problems. All studies mentioned so far find the same problems when Greece is removed from the data. So what was special about Greece? For one, there are differences of degree. Tables 4 and 5 <a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/fiscal-gimmickry-in-europe_237714513517?crawler=true">here</a> and Figure 1 <a href="http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/86676/1/11-080.pdf">here</a> demonstrate that Greece has been an outlier in terms of downward revisions to the deficit figures, ever since 1997, with revisions typically doubling our deficits. The effect of accounting distortions on Greek deficit figures was typically three times the size of the distortions of the next worst-performing country.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg7Z0kwAbWg1R1FexYazbcfxaaZ9OYF4tv5HdKp7yKjdwSJrxJaAw9-xidSNZw66x-cJksL6rtips16zSnMZtL7ongMb80x9X7vOME9JJmYwaqpr7-z4AmS-V47ZYBI4-XqKwP90W2pDK_5/s1600/revision.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="183" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg7Z0kwAbWg1R1FexYazbcfxaaZ9OYF4tv5HdKp7yKjdwSJrxJaAw9-xidSNZw66x-cJksL6rtips16zSnMZtL7ongMb80x9X7vOME9JJmYwaqpr7-z4AmS-V47ZYBI4-XqKwP90W2pDK_5/s320/revision.png" width="320" /></a></div>
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-yMMQLgLCqtqtJzagHBNvqN_hbX4GMTBbWEuagttVwyBGAe5dNo4t7_t_hT7baWenxgRGQWr2zZV-QUpmEvQClUXO7khv__uxHCV_KJ4aDdTKctLVl4LyJWKCW3XZyQ8RBABomGkG1FAX/s1600/grdefs.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="232" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-yMMQLgLCqtqtJzagHBNvqN_hbX4GMTBbWEuagttVwyBGAe5dNo4t7_t_hT7baWenxgRGQWr2zZV-QUpmEvQClUXO7khv__uxHCV_KJ4aDdTKctLVl4LyJWKCW3XZyQ8RBABomGkG1FAX/s400/grdefs.png" width="400" /></a><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi-yMMQLgLCqtqtJzagHBNvqN_hbX4GMTBbWEuagttVwyBGAe5dNo4t7_t_hT7baWenxgRGQWr2zZV-QUpmEvQClUXO7khv__uxHCV_KJ4aDdTKctLVl4LyJWKCW3XZyQ8RBABomGkG1FAX/s1600/grdefs.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><br /></a>As you can see in the graph to the right, the SGP (in effect from 98 onwards) was an effective constraint mostly on Greek governments' <i>planned </i>deficits - these were indeed never above the 3% ceiling. First releases were also subject to SGP; and although these would always revise the planned balances downward (2000 and 2006 were the sole exceptions), the size of the revision was more or less random, or subject to unforeseen circumstances such as the 2004 Olympics running much further over-budget than expected. Such revisions occasionally breached the 3% target. But it was the <i>ex-post</i> reviews, based on methodological visits and Eurostat interventions, that restored Greek deficits to a persistent, downward trajectory. The reason for this is that ex-post deficit figures weren't just about revisions due to random events or<br />
within the bounds of good practice. They were all about gimmicks. Pg 28 <a href="http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/fiscal-gimmickry-in-europe_237714513517?crawler=true">here</a> details the full list of accounting gimmicks used in the years leading up to 2005, and it really takes the whole page to go over them.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiskwdIHkYByF994zXrPKtILdtdJeXVttLoCU7R9mfVQy8Agyjq-l2ENE86a1VCTTMSuddoqL4JNUJnOg2Hkgw0rDNjA2DPFZeTHGxYxSwWRVECBAbgouMO2fTnPHvn14HrzYvwIjQshiR5/s1600/gimmicks3.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiskwdIHkYByF994zXrPKtILdtdJeXVttLoCU7R9mfVQy8Agyjq-l2ENE86a1VCTTMSuddoqL4JNUJnOg2Hkgw0rDNjA2DPFZeTHGxYxSwWRVECBAbgouMO2fTnPHvn14HrzYvwIjQshiR5/s320/gimmicks3.png" width="281" /></a></div>
<b>So what was the <em>hard</em> constraint on our deficits?</b><br />
<br />
If the SGP was not a hard constraint on Greece's true deficits, did politicians see <em>anything as a hard constraint</em>? An <a href="http://www.oecd.org/greece/42007249.pdf">OECD review of budgeting in Greece</a>, prepared on the very eve of the crisis and two years ahead of the 2009 deficit revision, is clear on how things worked. Budgeting was a bottom-up, line-by-line as opposed to programme-by-programme process, planning for only one year at a time, leaving almost no role for Parliamentary control and with no provision for ex post oversight. Accounting became increasingly poor as one moved away from central government. Even the OECD had to concede that accrual accounting was not an immediate priority since the state was bad enough at cash accounting. Audit needed to be strengthened. But perhaps most telling is the way the OECD describes the relationship between the SGP targets and the actual budget (see p 14):<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"for the
medium term (t+2 and t+3), forecasts are done annually for the Stability and Growth
Programme that the Greek government must deliver to the EU in the autumn each year.
The medium-term forecast is not updated as part of the budget preparation process in the
spring. The overall position of the central government finances is updated centrally using
the new forecast. One feature of the forecasting process is the overall fiscal targets that the
Greek government decides to reach in the medium-term Stability and Growth Programme
forecasts. If the fiscal targets (deficit, expenditures, revenues) are not reached according to
an updated medium-term forecast, unspecified or partly specified “reforms” are added
(such as a reduction in tax evasion or government expenditures), without these reforms
being specified in concrete detail.
The macroeconomic forecasts are not used in the line ministries’ budget preparations;
rather, as discussed below, they develop their own forecasts. This practice naturally
hampers the use of the estimates and indeed undermines the integrity of the budget." </i></blockquote>
As K. Featherstone, a long-time Greece-watcher <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Kevin_Featherstone/publication/4991651_Greece_and_EMU_Between_External_Empowerment_and_Domestic_Vulnerability/links/542557560cf238c6ea7401e7.pdf">argues, SGP compliance</a> did make a difference but of a very different kind: it strengthened the hand of Greek finance ministers against their colleagues, at least in their short term:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>The Maastricht convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact set clear policy parameters and created an external discipline for monetary policy in Greece. At home, the government was empowered: the legitimacy of the EU and the precision of the convergence criteria carried a difficult process of adjustment forward. </i>[...] <i>ultimately the strength of the domestic reform initiative would very probably have run aground without the Maastricht constraint. It was telling that, </i>[...]<i> in 2002 </i>[...][t]<i>he Simitis government did not call for a lessening of this external discipline: presumably, it saw advantages in having the corset. It was a means of strengthening its domestic position when pressing for difficult reform. </i></blockquote>
I would argue that, in the post-Maastricht era, the ultimate constraint was not the SGP targets, or the government's deficit forecasts. The true targets were the Government's cash targets; these were constrained by a combination of tax revenue and 'safe' borrowing. Notice, in the OECD's 2008 review of Greek budgeting, how much more regular, robust, integrated and closely monitored the cash targets were than the actual budget and the SGP targets.<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>The process of cash management includes the preparation of the “budget expenditure implementation plan” and of the “cash plan”.
Both plans are backed up by the monthly cash limit decision.
The “budget expenditure implementation plan” shows monthly forecasts of
expenditures. It is prepared for the entire fiscal year, and is updated and rolled over on a
monthly basis. The plan is based on the budget appropriations. The monthly forecasts are
prepared by using the assumptions underlying the budget preparation and monthly
historical data.
The “cash plan” puts the “budget expenditure implementation plan” in the context of
the revenue forecasts. It is on a pure cash basis and shows daily cash inflows and outflows
from the “Single Treasury Account”. [...] The “cash plan” is <b>reviewed and updated every day for the whole month and every
month for the whole year. </b><b>[emphasis mine] </b>The monitoring system includes a continuous flow of data from
the Treasury’s departments, the Central Bank, the Fiscal Audit Offices, and the local Tax
and Payment Offices. The “cash plan” is a tool for ensuring that there will be adequate cash
balances to meet the budget obligations. The forecasts of the cash plan are used for
decisions on borrowing and for investing the cash surpluses.
The forecasts are elaborated and a ministerial decision is issued, defining a monthly
cash limit for every unit involved. Fiscal Audit Offices and Tax and Payment Offices are
required to ask for special approval before payments above a certain amount are made
(EUR 3 million). The limits are checked against the monthly outcome data and crosschecked
against information received on a daily basis by the Central Bank.</i></blockquote>
The cash constraint was much harder than the SGP's 3% target. But it was soft in another, more insidious way. Tax revenues may have looked steady but they were vulnerable to erosion and the political cycle; market financing was based on a colossal, global mispricing of risk.<br />
<br />
We can test some of this insight empirically. A reasonable number of studies have looked into the causal link between tax revenue and government spending in Greece. The question common to all is whether we followed a 'tax and spend' model, whereby government sets its spending target based on what it can raise through taxes, or a 'spend and tax' model, whereby government sets its spending target based on politics and then scrambles to raise the taxes to pay for it. You can see my selection of studies for yourselves below:<br />
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/107953/1/81854709X.pdf">Richter and Paparas (2013)</a>: spend and tax, years 1833-2009 (no typo!)</li>
<li><a href="http://www.researchgate.net/publication/24074576_Tax_and_Spend_or_Spend_and_Tax_Empirical_Evidence_from_Greece_Spain_Portugal_and_Ireland">Kollias and Makrydakis (2000)</a> bi-directional causality, years 1950 - 1990</li>
<li><a href="http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF00159364">Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1996)</a>: spend and tax, years 1957-1993</li>
<li><a href="http://www.jed.or.kr/full-text/29-2/Panagiotis.pdf">Konstantinou (2004)</a>: tax and spend, years 1970 to 1997</li>
<li><a href="http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Emmanouil_Trachanas/publication/240042721_Fiscal_deficits_under_financial_pressure_and_insolvency_Evidence_for_Italy_Greece_and_Spain/links/54a12e620cf256bf8bae37a5.pdf">Trachanas and Katrakilidis (2013)</a>: spend and tax, years 1970 to 2010</li>
<li><a href="http://www.iseg.ulisboa.pt/departamentos/economia/wp/wp392008deuece.pdf">Afonso and Rault (2008)</a> spend and tax, years 1960 to 2006, except for 1986 onwards </li>
<li><a href="https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01111809/document">Mutascu (2015)</a> tax and spend, years 1988 to 2014.</li>
<li><a href="http://trachanas.weebly.com/uploads/2/5/7/6/25769402/government_spending_and_revenues_in_the_greek_economy_evidence_from_nonlinear_cointegration.pdf">Athanasenas et al (2014)</a> fiscal synchronisation with asymmetric fiscal adjustments, years 1999 to 2010</li>
</ul>
This is by no means the last word on the matter, but it seems to me that Greece operated a 'spend and tax' model (i.e. government set a spending target first and then adjusted taxes to fund this) for most of our modern history - but switched to a strange type of cash-and spend policy post-Maastricht, which counted any borrowing we thought we could draw on without inviting undue attention as equivalent to tax revenue. It was the sum of this plus actual tax revenues which led government spending post-Maastricht.<br />
<br />
<b>Un-gaming Europe's deficits</b><br />
<br />
People often wonder why, if Greece was only an extreme case of a much wider problem, Eurostat called for changes to European countries' deficit calculations in such a piecemeal manner, review by review, rather than demand that everything be restored to the appropriate level of accuracy at once. Part of the story has to do with the fact that Eurostat's powers and capabilities changed as a result of the Greek crisis - it did not always <i>know </i>what changes needed to be made, nor could it impose changes.<br />
<br />
You see, back when our original 2009 deficit figures and the first revised 2009 deficit figures were released, Eurostat did not have auditing powers over national statistics agencies. It only got those in <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32010R0679">June 2010</a>, because, and I quote, 'in 2005 [when this was originally proposed] several key member states were opposed to a strengthening of Eurostat's powers.'<br />
<br />
This new demand for auditing powers for Eurostat came, appropriately, from the European <a href="http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:236E:0076:0079:EN:PDF">Parliament</a>, and this time, <a href="http://www.grahambishop.com/ViewArticle.aspx?ID=8908&CAT_ID=9" target="_blank">strengthened by the evidence of statistics gone wild in Greece</a>, it managed to get past the Council. Eurostat's September 2010 visit to Greece, which resulted in the final deficit figures which are currently being questioned, was <a href="http://www.independent.ie/opinion/comment/robin-emmott-new-eurostat-powers-littleknown-side-of-european-integration-3260685.html" target="_blank">the first time ever</a> that the Directorate made use of its new auditing powers. This resulted in an unprecedented ability to zero in on unreported or misclassified spending and liabilities.<br />
<br />
Even in the days leading up to June 2010, the struggle to deny Eurostat its new auditing powers and maintain Governments' 'right' to lie to their citizens was <a href="http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2010/06/eurostat-to-get-extended-auditing-powers-/68172.aspx">fiercely defended</a> by the Council:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
[...]<i> ministers have watered down aspects of the Commission's original proposal. The Commission wanted to require member states to punish their civil servants with “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” sanctions if they deliberately misreported data to Eurostat. Ministers have removed this requirement, because they felt it was an unacceptable infringement of national sovereignty.<br /><br />The Commission also wanted to place a mandatory obligation on member states to provide Eurostat with “experts in national accounting”. These experts would work with Eurostat on a temporary basis, to help it prepare visits. This was also removed by finance ministers.<br /><br />The Commission had protested against the changes, but backed down because it did not want to threaten the chance of the legislation being adopted. </i><i>The Commission also wanted to place a mandatory obligation on member states to provide Eurostat with “experts in national accounting”. These experts would work with Eurostat on a temporary basis, to help it prepare visits. This was also removed by finance ministers. </i><i>The Commission had protested against the changes, but backed down because it did not want to threaten the chance of the legislation being adopted.</i></blockquote>
Who were the 'key' member states so opposed to further scrutiny of their accounts? Why only the <a href="http://www.euractiv.com/euro/brief-eurostat-set-powers-probing-member-states-fiscal-data/article-136257">UK, France and Germany</a>. There is no record of how Greece voted but, by the looks of it, that first bunch of proposals was dead on arrival.<br />
<br />
TO BE CONTINUED</div>
Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com11tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-63469451708743080542015-08-07T23:45:00.001+01:002015-08-18T22:19:06.037+01:00STATPORN, STATPIMPS, STATWHORES PART I: ACCUSATIONS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
This post has been a long time in the making. I started it a full five years ago and never managed to get it to work. Then longtime LOLGreece favourite Frances Coppola <a href="http://coppolacomment.blogspot.co.uk/2015/07/lies-damned-lies-and-greek-statistics.html">hosted </a>an excellent blog by <span style="background-color: white; line-height: 20.79px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Sigrún Davídsdóttir</span></span> about the legal drama following the 2009 Greek deficit revision, and soon afterwards ELSTAT <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/NWS_ELSTAT_PRESIDENT_02082015_EN.pdf">announced </a>the resignation of its President Andreas Georgiou. Rather than weigh down the comments section at Frances' blog, I decided to come back to the drafts section and finish this monster. Part II of this post is now available <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/08/statporn-statpimps-statwhores-part-ii.html">here</a>.<br />
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br />
<b>What's happening at ELSTAT?</b><br />
<br />
ELSTAT and its president have spent the last five years fighting a persistent allegation - that they had tampered with the 2009 deficit figures in order to cause, hasten or intensify, the onset of austerity in Greece. <b>This is, coincidentally, almost the entire time ELSTAT has been in existence. </b><br />
<b><br /></b>
You see, an independent national statistics agency was not on the agenda for Greece prior to October 2009 - Greece's government at the time <a href="http://www.politico.eu/article/greece-promises-independent-statistics/">promised the world</a> such an agency only in the aftermath of the (first) Greek deficit shocker in a vain attempt to rebuild confidence. Much of ELSTAT's eventual form was derived from the <a href="http://www.eurocapital.gr/files.php?force&file=Siatras_Files/Syn_2_Ekth_Yp_Oik_795943087.pdf">recommendations</a> of the Committee for the Reliability of Fiscal Statistics, published in early 2010. The Committee was not billed as fully independent (what ever is, in Greece?); its authors hailed from the BoG, ΚΕΠΕ and ΙΟΒΕ (Greece's most prominent economic think tanks), ΓΣΕΕ (Greece's tertiary trade union), and the Greek banking federation. One, Gikas Hardouvelis, best known for <a href="http://blognet.gr/greece/tsakalotos-syriza-will-not-implement-measures-in-hardouvelis-email/">that email</a>, was eventually to become Minister of Finance for the last half-year of the old Coalition government.<br />
<br />
The world's statisticians have been pretty much unanimous throughout that the case against ELSTAT is, to quote the International Statistical Institute, 'fanciful.' More than half of all <a href="http://www.isi-web.org/8741">ethics-related interventions</a> by the ISI in recent years have been about Greece (see <a href="http://www.isi-web.org/images/news/2012ISIPresidentsLetterToPresidentOfHellenicStatisticalAuthority.pdf">here</a>, <a href="http://www.isi-web.org/images/news/20130304ISIGreece-Statement.pdf">here</a>, and <a href="http://www.isi-web.org/images/newsletters/OpenletterELSTAT.pdf">here</a>) and in ELSTAT's favour; and the ISI has had no qualms in publishing its accusers' letters (anonymised) for all to see.<br />
<br />
In 2011, Eurostat <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/4187653/5781173/INFO-GREECE-2011-SEPT-EN.PDF/f2c89cca-76f8-45c5-9e77-c2c19f821ae1?version=1.0" target="_blank">wrote a public letter</a> in ELSTAT's defence; more tellingly, they haven't questioned our figures for years now. In 2012, the Greek <a href="http://www.tovima.gr/files/1/2012/03/30/PorismaExetastikis.pdf">Parliamentary Inquiry into the 2009 deficit </a>found little fault with ELSTAT, noting that it had followed the new European national accounts standard (ESA95) to the letter. A reasonably-independent Good Practices Advisory Committee has twice reviewed the function of ELSTAT in light of these recommendations and general good practice and given it a clean bill of health for <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/report_adv_2013_EN.pdf">2013</a> and <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/report_adv_2014_EN_0.pdf">2014</a>, in both cases deploring (the <i>previous</i> government's) renewed efforts to tamper with statistics. More recently, between 2014 and 2015, ELSTAT passed a <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/64157/4372828/2015-EL-Report/488eadf4-da69-40db-b48b-884c6ac4937c">peer review</a> pretty much with flying colours. The European Statistical Governance Advisory Board likewise <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/34693/344453/2015_271_opinion+on+Greek+developments_15+03+24_final/c8cab733-3351-41c1-b990-0171e07cc4c0">heaped praise</a> on it earlier this year.<br />
<br />
But the 2009 deficit review is not the only matter in which ELSTAT's procedures have been elevated to scandal by conspiracy theorists - not long ago, ELSTAT's own employee Union took issue with a <a href="http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/General/conf_decl_gr.pdf">confidentiality attestation</a> that obliged staff to not reveal <i>survey respondents' personal information</i> (clearly and uncontroversially defined in the text) to anyone, including the courts. This was taken out of context and dressed up as a wholesale gagging clause, meant to protect ELSTAT's President from future prosecution. The accusation taken up immediately, not by the usual semi-literate bloggers but, perhaps inevitably, by <a href="http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/c0d5184d-7550-4265-8e0b-078e1bc7375a/8088978.pdf">Greek members of Parliament</a> (G. Dimaras of the Panhellenic Citizens' Chariot and G. Avramidis of the Independent Greeks, the kind of person who feels the need to <a href="https://www.facebook.com/AvramidisThessaloniki">assure</a> people on Facebook that he has never been a member of a Masonic Lodge). The original culprits, ELSTAT's Union, even <a href="http://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/sto-ste-gia-ti-%C2%ABdilosi%C2%BB-aporritoy-tis-elstat">took the matter to court</a> , egged on by <a href="http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/?p=976">former Board members</a> involved in championing the deficit tampering myth.</div>
<br />
<b>Who buys this stuff?</b><br />
<b><br /></b>
<span style="background-color: white; line-height: 20.79px;">Sigrún Davídsdóttir asks, in her original post, how come</span> the Greek body politic has bayed for Georgiou's blood when he very likely produced the first accurate deficit figures in decades, yet have never called to account the former ESYE heads who reported artificially low deficits; even though these brought about the <a href="http://blogs.reuters.com/financial-regulatory-forum/2010/01/12/eu-exec-likely-to-sue-greece-over-statistics-mess/">threat of legal sanctions</a> and the reality of national humiliation. The reason is that much of the Greek public either believes the inflated deficit myth or desperately wants it to be true; and as ELSTAT is institutionally weak, kicking it is a costless way of earning fetid brownie points with the worst of the Greek electorate.<br />
<br />
Barring PASOK, which had no choice in the matter, every major Greek political party has at least hinted that the 2009 deficit was inflated, if not claimed it as fact.<br />
<ul style="text-align: left;">
<li>Ex-PM Antonis Samaras made the claim outright in 2010, in the first of his Zappeion speeches (transcript <a href="http://www.newsbeast.gr/files/1/2010/07/07/zappio_2.pdf">here</a>): <i>the 2009 deficit was inflated in order to justify engaging the IMF in the Greek bailout.</i> And while Samaras <a href="http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304023504577321781269531156">dropped</a> this line immediately upon taking power, New Democracy's onetime spokesperson, E. Antonaros, insisted on pushing the inflated deficit myth <a href="http://www.tsantiri.gr/politiki/antonaros-to-elleimma-fouskosan-technita-papakonstantinou-kai-elstat/">as late as 2014</a>. </li>
<li>Syriza's leader, Alexis Tsipras, called the 2009 deficit review a '<a href="http://www.naftemporiki.gr/story/389435/al-tsipras-promeletimeno-egklima-i-anatheorisi-tou-elleimmatos-2009">premeditated crime</a>,' despite his own party <a href="http://www.syriza.gr/article/id/39347/Dhlwsh-Pan.-Lafazanh-Koinob.-Ekproswpoy-SYRIZA--gia-to-dhmosionomiko-elleimma-sto-9mhno-toy-2009.html#.VcU0CFRViko">warning</a> about the ballooning deficit as early as Q1 that year. Nor did Syriza repent as it drew closer to power: Tsipras repeated the accusations <a href="http://www.syriza.gr/article/id/59735/--Binteo---Omilia-toy-Proedroy-toy-SYRIZA-Aleksh-Tsipra-sto-Cine-Kerameikos.html#.Vccl8ROqqko">in 2014 (h/t to reader Y.M.),</a> and as late as January 2015, Syriza MEP Papadimoulis <a href="http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bWQ%2bE-2015-000214%2b0%2bDOC%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN">demanded a written answer</a> from the Commission on what he called 'the ELSTAT scandal', heaping scorn on the findings of the Good Practice Advisory Committee without further explanation. The infamous <a href="http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/Report_web.pdf">Greek Debt Audit report</a>, that sensational executive summary commissioned from a sympathetic body of experts (and otherwise) by Syriza, repeats the myth with no hint of reservation - and with clearly inadequate documentation. </li>
<li>The far(cical) right Independent Greeks, rescued from the political scrapheap to buttress a Syriza government, have not only claimed that the 2009 deficit was inflated, but signed <a href="http://www.theinsider.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=25460%3Aoikonomiki-ypeythyni-toy-institoytoy-ton-anel-i-z-georganta&catid=68%3Apeople&Itemid=48">the chief 2009 deficit conspiracy theorist</a> up as a party member, gave her a salary courtesy of the taxpayer as part of the utterly un-google-able 'Independent Greeks Institute,' then entered her as an <a href="http://zoe-georganta.co.uk/?page_id=847">MEP candidate</a> in 2014.</li>
<li>The Prophet Varouphael, PBUH, has stood out for his <a href="http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2013/01/29/why-is-the-2009-greek-government-deficit-probed-by-the-courts-again/">unwillingness</a> to blame ELSTAT for inflating the deficit. Although he has taken <a href="http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2014/04/24/greek-statistics-are-back-primary-deficit-presented-as-surplus-with-eurostats-seal-of-approval/">a marginally less cheap shot</a> at the Greek surplus that gave him the fighting chance at a negotiation that he magisterially wasted earlier this year. </li>
</ul>
How else shall I put it? It has been <u>impossible </u>to come anywhere close to power in Greece since 2011 without at least paying lip service to the 'inflated 2009 deficit' myth. So entrenched is the war against ELSTAT that safeguarding the independence of our statistics agency was one of Greece's prior actions agreed with creditors in the <a href="http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/07/pdf/20150712-eurosummit-statement-greece/">July agreement</a>. Of all of the humiliations we endured this summer, including my own elderly parents queueing up for hours to withdraw EUR50 of their own money, I hold this to be the most painful - that our Prime Minister had to be headlocked into a commitment to not interfere with national statistics, as though this were his god-given right.<br />
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<b>The early Greek Crisis Propaganda War</b><br />
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This explains the how but not the why of the inflated deficit myth. To understand the why, you need to un-learn the Greek crisis consensus that has emerged since 2012, and try to think back to late 2009 and early 2010.<br />
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The Greek government of the day, George Papandreou's PASOK, spent most of its time handling the crisis in deep denial. Their narrative, both <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/mar/09/greek-pm-meet-barack-obama">pre-bailout</a> and <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2010/06/greek-finmin-dismisses-bear-poop-in.html">post-bailout</a>, was that Greece was under attack from evil speculators making a killing by shorting Greek bonds or CDSs (remember those?), aided by the international financial press and by <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2011/01/for-gods-sake-stfu-part-ii.html">credit rating agencies</a>. Though in every other way G-Pap's government has since been soundly discredited, this narrative stuck. There was, until mid-2010, very little public discourse on the sustainability of Greek debt and even committed defaultniks were staking their claim for debt relief on the much less promising premise of odiousness - this was Syriza's core debt relief narrative too, <a href="http://www.thepressproject.net/article/55007/Syriza-backtracks-on-Greeces-odious-debt-MP-states-that-it-only-amounts-to-5-of-countrys-total-debt">until as late as 2014</a>.<br />
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By April 2010, the main villain of the Greek anti-austerity camp was neither Angela Merkel nor Wolfgang Schaeuble, but the IMF - of which Georgiou was an ex-staffer. The eventuality of IMF involvement in a Greek bailout had for months been <a href="https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/cigi_paper_no.61web.pdf">portrayed</a> as a defeat for Europe, both in Greece and abroad. The IMF had form in imposing harsh austerity; its presence was the hallmark of third-world dependency and loss of sovereignty; and as a US-based institution it was distasteful to the left, the populist right and, to some extent, Greek Euro-federalists. So even if the bailout turned to be inevitable, the reasoning went, it was treason to invite the IMF into our homes.<br />
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The Greek blogosphere went into overdrive. The IMF's involvement in our bailout was part of an ages-old foreign conspiracy to bring proud Greece to heel. The second deficit revision, to over 15%, was calculated in order to make sure Greece had a bigger deficit than Ireland and thus scapegoat the country and shame us into obedience. One of the <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2010/10/how-some-of-greece-workz.html">most viral Greek blogposts of all time</a> denounced then-PM George Papandreou as the half-Jewish son of a traitor who had been paid $100m by Chase Manhattan to destroy Greece (an obviously forged 'contract' was even attached). The conspiracy theorist blog, Olympia, soon followed up with the <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2011/03/lies-damn-lies-and-interviews-with.html">Weisbrot hoax</a>, which went unstoppably viral between 2010 and 2011 and warned of the horrors of IMF occupation, calling on the people to rise up in graphic violence and drive out both the IMF and the domestic elite. This despite Mark Weisbrot, the supposed interviewee in that post, denouncing it as a hoax immediately and persistently. As exotic as they sound, news sources like this wielded enourmous influence. One of Olympia's most prolific writers, <a href="http://olympia.gr/2014/04/14/%CE%B5%CF%86%CF%84%CE%B1%CF%83%CE%B5-%CE%B7-%CF%89%CF%81%CE%B1-%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85-%CF%80%CF%8C%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B1-%CF%80%CF%8C%CF%81%CF%84%CE%B1/comment-page-1/">endorsed wholeheartedly by the blog</a>, is now an Independent Greeks MP famous for his <a href="http://antisemitism.org.il/article/95910/mp-tweets-about-attacks-jews-against-all-us">antisemitic remarks</a>. The blog's admin has even landed a plum public sector job.<br />
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As for Georgiou, the appointment of a former IMF man to ELSTAT ahead of the deficit revision was proof positive that the new statistics agency was a Troikan Trojan horse.<br />
<div>
<br />
<b>Courting the populist right</b><br />
<br /></div>
The deficit-denier fantasy was a perfect fit for the psychological needs of all of these populist right-wing groups, who, in the summer of 2010, formed the bulk what came to be known as the 'upper square' contingent of the Greek Indignados (explanation <a href="http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/CMS%20pdf/Publications/GreeSE/GreeSE-No82.pdf">here</a>). These people were shamed by suggestions of Greek insolvency, and they resented the sneering tone of foreign editorials. But most of all they wanted no part of the austerity to come, and none of the blame.<br />
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These people's traditional allegiances had been with New Democracy - the party on whose watch the deficit had got out of hand - or the National Orthodox Alert - the only right-wing party to have voted for the first memorandum. An inside job orchestrated by the Americans supposedly in charge of the IMF left New Democracy blameless for the ballooning deficit, restored the defensive narrative of Greek nationalism, and maintained the fiction that Greece could go on as it always had - as soon as the political elite had been taken to the gallows.<br />
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But traditional allegiances had counted for little in the years leading up to the crisis. Leaders of the Left noted that many of the populist Right voters had also opportunistically <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2011/02/u-can-haz-tipping-point.html">voted for PASOK</a> in 2008 to steer the country away from the mild austerity promised by Karamanlis. With the exception of nationalism, and possibly religion, these people had no ideology and were contestable political ground. It was this opportunism in the Greek populist right that made them so attractive to parties across the political spectrum. Hit the right, shrill, defensive, patriotic notes, and they would swing. These are the people Syriza officials were going for when they choose, <a href="http://news.in.gr/greece/article/?aid=1231240686">back in 2013</a>, to throw in their lot with the Independent Greeks. These are also the people Syriza officials had in mind when <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jul/14/golden-dawn-will-be-strengthened-by-worse-austerity-yanis-varoufakis-warns">warning </a>that a failed negotiation would bring Golden Dawn to power.<br />
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There is a pattern here: Greek politicians have always thought it acceptable to weaken important institutions in the pursuit of votes. The problem is that the damage cannot be controlled, much less undone when the political hour of need is over. New Democracy's initial protests of an inflated deficit figure, normally part and parcel of a government handover in Greece, mutated into a full-blown conspiracy theory. No party with an eye on the votes of the populist right had the guts to stand against it. Today, Syriza hopes that Georgiou's departure will lay the matter to rest while allowing the government to honour its obligations to our creditors. It will not. These people do not realise what damage they are doing.<br />
<br />
Part 2 of this post is now available <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/08/statporn-statpimps-statwhores-part-ii.html">here</a>.</div>
Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com5tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-1782080236828088522015-07-04T08:28:00.001+01:002015-07-04T08:50:25.062+01:00Μερικοί μύθοι που φράζουν το δρόμο προς το #ναι<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
Σημείωση: το κείμενο είναι μετάφραση <a href="http://www.lolgreece.blogspot.gr/2015/07/getting-to-yes-in-greece-collection-of.html">αυτού εδώ </a>. Ευχαριστώ πολύ τον φίλο Θ.Χ. για τη μετάφραση.<br />
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Αυτή η ανάρτηση δεν χρειάζεται εισαγωγή, παρά μόνο για να πω ότι είναι η πρώτη από μια σειρά πάνω στο θέμα, στην οποία ελπίζω να δείξω πώς πέντε βασικά στοιχεία της ρητορικής του “ΟΧΙ”, τόσο μέσα όσο και έξω από την Ελλάδα, έχουν τεράστια και παραπλανητικά ελαττώματα.<br />
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Μύθος Νο.1: Οι εταίροι αρνούνται στην Ελλάδα ελάφρυνση του χρέους<br />
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Όπως ξέρουμε από το 2012, μας έχει προσφερθεί ελάφρυνση του χρέους και η προσφορά ισχύει ακόμη. Αυτό που δεν είναι μας προσφέρει κανείς είναι η εκ των προτέρων και χωρίς όρους διαγραφή του χρέους. Μια αναδιάρθρωση του χρέους που μειώνει εξόφθαλμα το ονομαστικό ποσό του χρέους μας θα είναι πολιτικά δύσκολη, αλλά υπάρχουν επιλογές για τη μείωση της πραγματικής του αξίας, και για τη βελτίωση της βιωσιμότητας του χρέους μας.<br />
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Το Eurogroup υποσχέθηκε ρητά και ξεκάθαρα να συζητηθεί ξανά η ελάφρυνση του χρέους μόλις ολοκληρωθεί επιτυχώς η τελευταία αξιολόγηση του μνημονίου.<br />
Ο Jens Bastian έγραψε στο Macropolis :<br />
«Ανάμεσα στα συμπεράσματα του Eurogroup για την Ελλάδα το Νοέμβριο του 2012 υπήρξε και η συμφωνία ότι τα κράτη μέλη θα εξετάσουν "μέτρα ... για την επίτευξη μιας περαιτέρω αξιόπιστης και βιώσιμης μείωσης του ελληνικού χρέους σε σχέση με το ΑΕΠ". Δύο όροι τέθηκαν για να ξεκινήσει μια τέτοια διαδικασία από τους πιστωτές:<br />
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I. Επίτευξη ετήσιου πρωτογενούς πλεονάσματος. Η έμφαση εδώ είναι στον όρο "ετήσιο". Αυτό συνεπάγεται επαναλαμβανόμενα πρωτογενή πλεονάσματα, αλλά δεν προσδιορίζει ένα συγκεκριμένο αριθμό που πρέπει να επιτευχθεί σε βάθος χρόνου.<br />
II. Πλήρης εφαρμογή όλων [η υπογράμμιση δική μου] των όρων που περιέχονται στο πρόγραμμα (δηλαδή του δεύτερου προγράμματος μακροοικονομικής προσαρμογής) ανάμεσα στην Ελλάδα και την Τρόικα.<br />
[...]<br />
Η προαναφερθείσα προϋπόθεση "πλήρους" εφαρμογής στηρίζεται στην έκτη αξιολόγηση του εν εξελίξει προγράμματος ανάμεσα στην Ελλάδα και την Τρόικα. Η αξιολόγηση ξεκίνησε το Σεπτέμβριο του 2014 στο Παρίσι και είχε ήδη “σκαλώσει” πριν από την προεκλογική εκστρατεία.»<br />
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Δυστυχώς, η νέα Ελληνική κυβέρνηση έστειλε (έτσι<br />
νόμιζε) την Τρόικα σπίτι της τον Φεβρουάριο, αρνούμενη να διαπραγματευτεί μαζί τους και αρνούμενη να ολοκληρώσει την έκτη αξιολόγηση. Φαίνεται σαν αιώνες πριν, αλλά τότε απέριψε και το ίδιο το Eurogroup ως στερούμενο νομιμότητας – ήθελαν να διαπραγματευτούν με μια Ευρωπαϊκή Διάσκεψη Χρέους αμφίβολης προέλευσης και νομιμότητας. Με αυτή την πράξη κέρδισαν πολλούς πόντους με το Ελληνικό εκλογικό σώμα. Ταυτόχρονα όμως εξαφάνισαν την προοπτική μείωσης του χρέους, εκτός αν κατάφερναν να διαπραγματευτούν ένα νέο μνημόνιο από μηδενική βάση. Αυτό ακριβώς προσπάθησαν να κάνουν τους τελευταίους έξι μήνες.<br />
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Παρεμπιπτόντως, εκείνοι που ισχυρίζονται ότι δεν προσφέρθηκε ελάφρυνση χρέους στην Ελλάδα ξεχνούν ότι είχαμε ήδη δύο αναδιαρθρώσεις, μία από τις οποίες έφερε πολύ σημαντική εξοικονόμηση τόκων, ακόμη και υπολογίζοντας το γεγονός πως η οικονομία βρισκόταν σε ύφεση. Δεν υπάρχει κάποιο δόγμα κατά της ελάφρυνσης του χρέους· υπάρχουν πολλοί πολιτικοί που προσπαθούν να μην τους τσακίσουν οι ψηφοφόροι τους. Αλλά αυτό είναι η δημοκρατία, είτε μας αρέσει είτε όχι. Δεν υπάρχουν δικαιολογίες για να μην υπολογίζουμε την πολιτική άλλων στη δική μας στρατηγική.<br />
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Τελικά, θα υπάρξει ελάφρυνση του χρέους με τον ένα ή τον άλλο τρόπο. Θα πρέπει να γίνει με τέτοιο τρόπο ώστε να είναι εύκολο στα κοινοβούλια άλλων χώρων να το αποδεχθούν. Και θα είναι υπό όρους - μεταρρυθμίσεις. Διαφορετικά, έχουμε μόνο δύο άλλες επιλογές που καταλήγουν σε μείωση του χρέους: 1. χρεοκοπία 2. οι διαπραγματεύσεις παραμένουν στο κενό, αλλά η οικονομία καταρρέει σε σημείο που ακόμη και ο πιο αφοσιωμένος υπέρμαχος του extend and pretend δεν μπορεί πλέον να προσποιηθεί ότι μπορούμε να εξυπηρετήσουμε το χρέος μας.<br />
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Μύθος 2: Η ελάφρυνση του χρέους μπορεί να διαχωριστεί από την ανάγκη για μεταρρυθμίσεις.<br />
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Αλλά γιατί επιμένουν οι πιστωτές στις μεταρρυθμίσεις πριν από την ελάφρυνση του χρέους; Διότι, όπως διαπίστωσαν οι Έλληνες ψηφοφόροι όταν ανακοινώθηκε το ερώτημα του δημοψηφίσματος, η ελάφρυνση του χρέους βασίζεται στην ανάλυση βιωσιμότητας του χρέους, και μια τέτοια ανάλυση βασίζεται σε υποθέσεις σχετικά με την μακροπρόθεσμη ανάπτυξη. Οι πιστωτές υποθέτουν ότι οι δυνατότητες μακροπρόθεσμης ανάπτυξης και αύξησης των εσόδων στην Ελλάδα αυτή τη στιγμή περιορίζονται από την αναποτελεσματική κυβέρνηση και από στρεβλώσεις του ανταγωνισμού. Ακόμα και η δική μας κυβέρνηση συμφωνεί σε αυτό. Οι πιστωτές υποθέτουν, επίσης, ότι ένα μεγάλο μέρος των κοινωνικών δαπανών μας (π.χ. για τις συντάξεις) είναι αναποτελεσματικές, πράγμα που διατηρεί τις δαπάνες μας σε τεχνητά υψηλό επίπεδο, και επομένως και την ικανότητά μας να αποπληρώσουμε το χρέος τεχνητά χαμηλή.<br />
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Αν ακολουθήσουμε αυτή τη λογική, προκύπτει ότι μακροπρόθεσμα περισσότερο χρέος θα είναι βιώσιμο με μεταρρυθμίσεις από ότι χωρίς μεταρρυθμίσεις. Ελάφρυνση του χρέους με μεταρρυθμίσεις είναι καλή τακτική δανεισμού. Ελάφρυνση χρέους χωρίς αποδεδειγμένες μεταρρυθμίσεις είναι απλά χρηματοδότηση του τρόπου ζωής των λίγων Ελλήνων που επωφελούνται από τις στρεβλώσεις της Ελληνικής οικονομίας. Η δική μας κυβέρνηση θα πρέπει να επιμείνει πως δεν πρέπει να υπάρξει ελάφρυνση του χρέους χωρίς ένα αξιόπιστο μακροπρόθεσμο επενδυτικό πρόγραμμα - δεδομένου ότι η ανάπτυξή μας αυτή τη στιγμή περιορίζεται τεχνητά από το γεγονός ότι οι ελληνικές επιχειρήσεις δεν έχουν πρόσβαση σε χρηματοδότηση και, ενδεχομένως, από ανεπαρκείς επενδύσεις στην εκπαίδευση και την υγειονομική περίθαλψη. Χωρίς κάτι τέτοιο, η ελάφρυνση χρέους θα ήταν μια κακή συμφωνία για εμάς και για τους εταίρους.<br />
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Μέσα σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, υπάρχουν και πολλά πράγματα που οι πιστωτές τα έχουν πιάσει στραβά - αν μη τι άλλο σχετικά με τις συντάξεις και τις επενδύσεις. Αλλά αν η κυβέρνησή μας και ο Ελληνικός λαός θα μπορούσαν να συμφωνήσουν επί της αρχής ότι μεταρρυθμίσεις και ελάφρυνση του χρέους είναι συνδεδεμένες, θα μπορούσε να δημιουργηθεί ένα πρόγραμμα το οποίο να προσφέρει ελάφρυνση του χρέους με αντάλλαγμα μεταρρυθμίσεις, αντί για περαιτέρω δανεισμό με αντάλλαγμα οικονομικούς στόχους.<br />
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Και επειδή το χρέος μας πλέον είναι εξαιρετικά μακροπρόθεσμο, οι πιστωτές μας θα πρέπει να είναι πρόθυμοι να ακούσουν επιχειρήματα σχετικά με το πώς μπορούν οι δαπάνες στους τομείς της υγείας και της εκπαίδευσης να ενισχύσουν την ανάπτυξη - που μακροπρόθεσμα μπορούν να κάνουν τεράστια διαφορά.<br />
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Σε αυτό το θέμα η κυβέρνησή μας, με τις δηλώσεις που έχει κάνει, έχει αυτοπαγιδευτεί (και η χώρα μαζί της). Δεν έχει υπάρξει κυριολεκτικά καμία σημαντική μεταρρύθμιση που πραγματοποιήθηκε τα τελευταία 6 χρόνια για την οποία να εξέφρασαν ικανοποίηση - ακόμα και το πρωτογενές πλεόνασμα που τους επέτρεψε να αγωνιστούν για έξι μήνες ήταν ένας στόχος στον οποίο αντιτάχθηκαν έντονα μέχρι και τον Φεβρουάριο. Μερικοί από τους βασικούς ψηφοφόρους τους δεν έχουν συνέλθει ακόμη από αυτήν την αλλαγή πολιτικής.<br />
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Η Ελλάδα έχει κάνει μια εντυπωσιακή φορολογική και νομοθετική προσαρμογή που θα έπρεπε να κερδίσει το σεβασμό κάθε πληροφορημένου παρατηρητή. Μια κυβέρνηση που αποζητά απομείωση του χρέους θα μιλούσε γι αυτή την προσαρμογή με υπερηφάνεια - "ο λαός μας έκανε θυσίες για να μας κάνει τη μόνη Ευρωπαϊκή χώρα που πληρώνει τα έξοδά της"- αλλά όχι αυτή η κυβέρνηση, η οποία πρέπει μονίμως να ικανοποιεί το κοινό της στο εσωτερικό που θα ήθελε η προσαρμογή να μην είχε συμβεί ποτέ, που πιστεύει ότι το προ κρίσης χρέος μας ήταν απεχθές, τα ελλείμματά μας ήταν φουσκωμένα, και πως η Ελλάδα είναι θύμα μιας σατανικής συνωμοσίας.<br />
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Είναι αυτή η συμπεριφορά ανάμεσα στην κυβέρνηση και τους ψηφοφόρους της που καθιστά τόσο δύσκολο να πάρει οποιαδήποτε παραχώρηση εκ των προτέρων. Είναι σαφές σε όλους πως η ελληνική κυβέρνηση θεωρεί πως έχει λαϊκή εντολή να αναιρέσει τις υπάρχουσες μεταρρυθμίσεις. Οτιδήποτε λιγότερο από αυτόν τον στόχο το παραχωρεί απρόθυμα ή ξαφνικά, χωρίς προηγούμενο σχεδιασμό. Το Γενάρη αυτή η άποψη δεν ήταν ακόμη ευρέως αποδεκτή. Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ είχε το πλεονέκτημα ότι ήταν “καθαρός” και χωρίς να χρωστά τίποτα σε διαπλεκόμενα συμφέροντα. Αλλά ενδυναμώθηκε μέσα από τη μονομέρεια και ερασιτεχνισμό. Ακόμα και μικρά πράγματα, όπως η απίστευτα ηλίθια ιδέα να έχουμε εθελοντές φοροελεγκτές, προσθέτουν σε αυτή την εικόνα.<br />
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Μύθος 3: Οι εκκλήσεις στον “ηθικό κίνδυνο” ανέκαθεν ήταν απλά πρόσχημα για ιδεολογική προσκόλληση στη λιτότητα.<br />
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Για να καταλάβουμε πώς λειτουργεί το επιχείρημα ηθικού κινδύνου, θα πρέπει πρώτα να εξετάσουμε το προτιμώμενο σενάριο των υποστηρικτών μιας “εορτής χρέους”: πίσω στο 2010, η Ελλάδα θα είχε χρεοκοπήσει σε σημαντικό βαθμό (ας πούμε 50-70 τοις εκατό) για τους ιδιώτες πιστωτές και θα τησ είχε δοθεί μια πιστωτική γραμμή με λίγες ή καθόλου προϋποθέσεις από την Ευρώπη και το ΔΝΤ, μέχρι να μπορέσει να επιστρέψει στις αγορές. Αγνοήστε προς το παρόν το ερώτημα του πώς οι κυβερνήσεις της Ευρώπης θα κατάφερναν τα κοινοβούλιά τους να στηρίξουν μια τέτοια διάσωση, ενώ θα έπρεπε ταυτόχρονα να διασώσουν το σύνολο του ευρωπαϊκού τραπεζικού συστήματος, ή αν η Ευρώπη θα μπορούσε όντως να επιβιώσει μετά την επακόλουθη “επιδημία χρέους” με αρκετούς πόρους ώστε να χρηματοδοτήσει αναπτυξιακά μέτρα για όλη την ήπειρο.<br />
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Συνεχίζοντας το σενάριο, ο Γιώργος Παπανδρέου θα είχε επιστρέψει από αυτή την υποθετική εορτή χρέους του 2010 με ηρωικό καλωσόρισμα, φέρνοντας φρέσκο, φθηνό χρήμα αλλά και ελάφρυνση του χρέους. Εκλεγμένος με την υπόσχεση ότι “λεφτά υπάρχουν” για να πληρωθούν οι δημόσιες δαπάνες, θα είχε δικαιωθεί. Θα είχε παραμείνει στην εξουσία μέχρι τα τέλη του 2014, και στη συνέχεια θα είχε κερδίσει εύκολα τις επόμενες εκλογές. Το ΠΑΣΟΚ θα ήταν “εδώ, ενωμένο δυνατό”, ενώ ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ θα παρέμενε για πάντα το κόμμα 5-8% που ήταν πριν από την κρίση. Αντιθέτως, σήμερα το ΠΑΣΟΚ είναι νεκρό και η ΝΔ είναι χρεοκοπημένη. Οι βουλευτές τους θεωρούνται τοξικοί για κάθε άλλο κόμμα. Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ είναι μίλια μπροστά από όλους τους άλλους στις δημοσκοπήσεις.<br />
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Οι “χρεοεορταστές” που ισχυρίζονται ότι ολιγάρχες στράγγιξαν τα ελληνικά ταμεία και έχτισαν το στρεβλό κράτος γύρω από τις πελατειακές τους σχέσεις θα είχαν εκπληρωμένη μία από τις επιθυμίες τους (ελάφρυνση του χρέους) σε βάρος της άλλης (την καταπολέμηση της διαφθοράς και της πελατοκρατείας). Αν έχουν δίκιο και τα προβλήματα της Ελλάδας του 2009 δεν σχετίζονται με τις επιλογές των δαπανών μας, εάν τα προβλήματα της Ελλάδας ήταν όντως περισσότερο ζητήματα πολιτικής παρά οικονομίας, αυτό δεν θα μας βοηθούσε καθόλου. Το πλοίο θα συνέχιζε ολοταχώς προς το επόμενο παγόβουνο. Αυτό ακριβώς σημαίνει ο ηθικός κίνδυνος: δίνοντας την εντύπωση πως ανταμείβουν κακές πρακτικές, οι πιστωτές θα εξασφάλιζαν πως το ίδιο σύστημα που δημιούργησε το χρέος θα επιβίωνε. Ο Ελληνικός λαός επωφελείται από την επιμονή στο επιχείρημα του ηθικού κινδύνου όσο και οι πιστωτές μας - και περισσότερο από όλους επωφελείται ο ίδιος ο Τσίπρας.<br />
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Μύθος 4: Πρόκειται για αλλαγή καθεστώτος - Ευρώπη ενάντια στη δημοκρατία<br />
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Το προηγούμενο επιχείρημα μας φέρνει στις κατηγορίες για μια αλλαγή καθεστώτος που ενορχηστρώνεται από τις Βρυξέλλες και τη Φρανκφούρτη. Σημειώστε ότι αυτοί που κάνουν τέτοιες αξιώσεις δεν καταγγέλουν το γεγονός ότι η Ευρώπη δεν μας έδωσε ελάφρυνση του χρέους το 2010 ως αλλαγή καθεστώτος, αν και αυτό το γεγονός προκάλεσε την πολιτική δολοφονία του ΓΑΠ από το ΠΑΣΟΚ. Δεν καταγγέλουν την άρνηση των Ευρωπαίων στα αιτήματα του Σαμαρά για ελάφρυνση χρέους το 2012 ως αλλαγή καθεστώτος, ακόμη και αν αυτό εξασφάλισε πως η ΝΔ θα έχανε τις επόμενες εκλογές και πιθανότατα δεν θα ξαναβρεθεί στην εξουσία για δεκαετίες, ή και ποτέ. Μόνο τώρα, που το ίδιο πράγμα συμβαίνει σε ένα συμπαθές σε αυτούς κόμμα, φωνάζουν για «αλλαγή καθεστώτος». Όμως ακόμη και τώρα, ο μόνος λόγος που οι πιστωτές διακινδυνεύουν να χάσουν το ΣΥΡΙΖΑ ως συνεργάτη είναι πως ο ίδιος ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ δεν μπορεί να αναμετρηθεί με την περιθωριακή εσωκομματική του αντιπολίτευση. Άλλωστε, αν γίνονταν σήμερα εκλογές, ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ θα κέρδιζε μεγαλύτερο προβάδισμα έναντι της ΝΔ από ό, τι πήρε στις τελευταίες εκλογές και θα αποκτούσε αυτοδυναμία, με μια πλειοψηφία που δεν θα εξαρτιόταν από την αηδιαστική συνδρομή των Ανεξάρτητων Ελλήνων.<br />
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Πάντα αγανακτώ με ανθρώπους που θέλουν να παρουσιάσουν την αναμέτρηση σχετικά με το ελληνικό χρέος ως μια μάχη για τη δημοκρατία. Δεν είναι ούτε κατά διάνοια. Για να καταλάβουμε γιατί, πρέπει να καταλάβουμε α) τι ήταν η “λαϊκή εντολή” του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, β) τι θέλουν οι Έλληνες, γ) τι πραγματικά εμποδίζει το ΣΥΡΙΖΑ από το να έρθει σε μια συμφωνία και δ) ότι υπάρχουν και άλλες δημοκρατίες που πρέπει να ληφθούν υπ' όψιν.<br />
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Ας αρχίσουμε με τη λαϊκή εντολή του Τσίπρα. Ο ΣΥΡΙΖΑ ήρθε στην εξουσία υποστηρίζοντας ότι θα μπορούσε να αντιστρέψει τη λιτότητα «με ένα νόμο, ένα διάταγμα», και ότι θα κάνει στη Μέρκελ μια προσφορά που δεν θα έχει «ούτε ένα στο εκατομμύριο» πιθανότητα να απορρίψει. Υποσχέθηκε μια σκληρή επαναδιαπραγμάτευση του χρέους μας, μια σταδιακή αναστροφή των περικοπών σε παροχές και ελάχιστο μισθό (που θα χρηματοδοτούνταν από την ΕΚΤ), πάταξη της φοροδιαφυγής και εξισορρόπηση των φορολογικών εσόδων, έτσι ώστε οι πλούσιοι να πληρώνουν μεγαλύτερο μερίδιο από ό, τι σήμερα. Κανείς δεν πίστευε πως όλα αυτά ήταν πραγματικά δυνατό να συμβούν. Επανειλημμένα, οι υποστηρικτές του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ έλεγαν πως «αν κάνουν το 10% από αυτά που υποσχέθηκαν, θα είναι καλύτεροι από τους προηγούμενους». Το υπονοούμενο λοιπόν της λαϊκής εντολής (που έγινε εμφανές όταν ξεκίνησαν οι διαπραγματεύσεις) ήταν ότι ήθελαν κάποιον να αποκαταστήσει την αξιοπρέπειά τους, να πολεμήσει για αυτούς και να τους μετατρέψει από παθητικούς παρατηρητές της λιτότητας σε κύριους της δικής τους μοίρας.<br />
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Ωστόσο, η πλειοψηφία του ελληνικού λαού διατηρεί επίσης την αμέριστη υποστήριξή της για το ευρώ· όχι γιατί πιστεύουν όλοι ότι ήταν μια καλή ιδέα να ενταχθούμε στο κοινό νόμισμα, αλλά επειδή πιστεύουν ότι η φυγή από το ευρώ θα είναι ένα επίπονο διαζύγιο τώρα και θα προτιμούσαν να μην το κάνουν τη στιγμή που η οικονομία μας παραπαίει από τη χειρότερη ύφεση στην ιστορία της. Μπορεί αν τους δοθεί η δυνατότητα να εγκαταλείψουν το ευρώ με μεθοδικό τρόπο αργότερα, η πλειοψηφία των Ελλήνων να το έκανε. Θα πρέπει να έχουν αυτή την ευκαιρία. Αλλά για τώρα αυτό δεν είναι μια καλή επιλογή (δεν είμαι σίγουρος πώς θα μπορούσε ποτέ να είναι), και οι ψηφοφόροι έχουν υπάρξει σαφείς σε δημοσκοπήσεις από το Μάιο ότι θα προτιμούσαν μια κακή διαπραγμάτευση από τη διακινδύνευση Grexit. Η πλειοψηφία των Ελλήνων επίσης, από τον Ιούνιο, πιστεύει ότι οι διαπραγματεύσεις δεν πάνε καλά.<br />
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Είναι στην πραγματικότητα μόνο ένα μικρό αριστερό τμήμα εντός του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ από το οποίο δεν είναι σε θέση ο Τσίπρας να περάσει μια συμφωνία και ταυτόχρονα είναι ανοιχτό στο ενδεχόμενο του Grexit. Κάτι τέτοιο μπορεί να είναι σημαντικό για τον πυρήνα του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ που υπάρχει από το 2009, αλλά δεν είχε σχεδόν τίποτα να κάνει με την εκλογική του επιτυχία από τότε. Άλλο ένα 30% του εκλογικού σώματος προστέθηκε στους ψηφοφόρους του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, το οποίο έχει ελάχιστα κοινά με την αριστερή πτέρυγα του κόμματος. Δυστυχώς, ως αποτέλεσμα της ιστορίας του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ ως συνασπισμόυ, ο Τσίπρας θα χρειαζόταν τις ψήφους της αριστερής πτέρυγας για να περάσει οποιαδήποτε διαπραγμάτευση από τη βουλή, γιατί αυτή η ομάδα έχει περισσότερους βουλευτές σε σχέση με το μερίδιο της λαϊκής ψήφου που της αντιστοιχεί.<br />
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Είναι ήδη αρκετά κακό ότι μια πτέρυγα που αντιπροσωπεύει περίπου το 4-5% του ελληνικού εκλογικού σώματος μπορεί να κρατήσει σε ομηρία το άλλο 30% που υποστηρίζουν την κυβέρνηση, αλλά θα χρειαζόταν εξαιρετικό κυνισμό ή εξαιρετική αφέλεια ώστε να ισχυριστεί ένας εξωτερικός παρατηρητής ότι στην πραγματικότητα αυτό το 5% αντιπροσωπεύει τη βούληση του λαού.<br />
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Τέλος, η Ελλάδα δεν έχει το μονοπώλιο στις εκλεγμένες κυβερνήσεις. Η δική μας λαϊκή εντολή μας υπαγορεύει με ποιους όρους είμαστε πρόθυμοι να δανειστούμε. Η λαϊκή εντολή των πιστωτών τους υπαγορεύει υπό ποιους όρους είναι πρόθυμοι να δανείσουν. Αν στο διάγραμμα Venn η τομή των δύο είναι κενό σύνολο, όπως πιθανότατα είναι, τότε η ειλικρινής και σωστή τακτική θα ήταν πουν στο λαό “λυπούμαστε, δεν μπορούμε να δανειστούμε από αυτούς τους ανθρώπους”. Και να σταματήσουν να σπαταλάνε χρόνο.<br />
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Μύθος 5: Η Τρόικα έχει επιβάλλει ελέγχους κεφαλαίων<br />
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Πρέπει να κάνω μια ειδική αναφορά εδώ σχετικά με το ρόλο της τρόικα στην επιβολή περιορισμών στην κίνηση κεφαλαίων στην Ελλάδα. Όπως επαναλήφθηκε κατά κόρον τους τελευταίους μήνες, μόνο η δική μας κυβέρνηση έχει τη δύναμη να εισαγάγει ελέγχους κεφαλαίων στην Ελλάδα. Είναι νομικά και πρακτικά αδύνατο να γίνει με οποιοδήποτε άλλο τρόπο. Η ΕΚΤ μπορεί να επηρεάσει αυτή τη διαδικασία, αλλά μόνο επειδή οι Ελληνικές τράπεζες δεν έχουν άλλη πρόσβαση σε ρευστότητα και εξαρτώνται από αυτήν (μέσω του ELA) για χρηματοδότηση.<br />
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Γιατί δεν έχουν οι Ελληνικές τράπεζες ρευστότητα; Γιατί υπήρξε ένα τεράστιο κύμα αναλήψεων, που ξεκίνησε το Δεκέμβριο και κορυφώθηκε τον Ιανουάριο.<br />
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Πώς προέκυψε αυτό το κύμα αναλήψεων; Επειδή α) η ηγεσία του ΣΥΡΙΖΑ είπε επανηλλειμένα κατά τη διάρκεια της προεκλογικής εκστρατείας του ότι προτίθεται να φορολογήσει τις καταθέσεις και β) επειδή η Ελλάδα έμεινε χωρίς πιστωτική γραμμή, όταν διώξαμε την Τρόικα, αυξάνοντας έτσι τους φόβους ότι η Ελλάδα ενδέχεται να χρεοκοπήσει- πράγμα που θα σκότωνε τις τράπεζές μας. Ναι, υπήρξαν δημοσιεύματα για το θέμα αυτό - μετά το Δεκέμβριο - και ναι, οι φόβοι ενός bank run μπορεί να βοηθήσουν να προκληθεί ένα bank run, αλλά η εναλλακτική λύση θα ήταν να φιμώσει η κυβέρνηση τον Τύπο σχετικά με ένα θέμα που ειλικρινά είναι πολύ σημαντικό (και για το οποίο η αρθρογραφία ήταν σε γενικές γραμμές ακριβής).<br />
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Τι έκανε η ΕΚΤ για αυτή την κατάσταση; Αν η ΕΚΤ επεδίωκε «αλλαγή καθεστώτος», θα μπορούσε να κλείσει τον ELA από τον περασμένο Φεβρουάριο και να αναγκάσει την ελληνική κυβέρνηση σε υποταγή, ενώ αυτοί ακόμα προσπαθούσαν να καταλάβουν πώς λειτουργεί μια κυβέρνηση. Αντ 'αυτού, συνέχισε να αυξάνει το ποσό που οι ελληνικές τράπεζες θα μπορούσαν να δανείζονται από αυτήν. Οι τράπεζες δανείζονται χρήματα από τον ELA έναντι εχέγγυων - σε πολλές περιπτώσεις ελληνικά ομόλογα. Με τον ίδιο μας τον υπουργό Οικονομικών να λέει δημοσίως ότι α) είμαστε αναξιόχρεοι και β) θα επιδιώξουμε την ελάφρυνση του χρέους, η ΕΚΤ βρέθηκε να αποδέχεται ομόλογα ως εγγύηση τα οποία γνώριζε ότι ήταν πολύ πιθανό να μην αποπληρωθούν. Θα έπρεπε να σταματήσει να το κάνει τη στιγμή που Βαρουφάκης άνοιξε το στόμα του. Αντ 'αυτού, απλά αναθεώρησε το κούρεμα που εφάρμοζε για τα εν λόγω ομόλογα, καθ' όλη τη διαπραγμάτευση. Σταμάτησε μόνο όταν κατέστη σαφές πως η Ελλάδα πρόκειται να χρεοκοπήσει απέναντι στο ΔΝΤ, μια κατάσταση που ήταν ιδιαίτερα σημαντική σε σχέση με την αξία των ομολόγων μας και η οποία ήταν πάρα πολύ δημοσια για να (προσποιηθεί ότι) αγνοούσε.<br />
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Βέβαια η ΕΚΤ δεν είναι και αθώα περιστερά, αλλά το μεγαλύτερο λάθος της είναι να συνεχίσει να αποδέχεται τη φερεγγυότητα των ελληνικών τραπεζών. Τόσο η ΕΚΤ όσο και η ελληνική κυβέρνηση καθ' όλη τη διάρκεια αυτής της κρίσης κρύβονται πίσω από την αξιολόγηση της ΕΚΤ, η οποία είναι, ειλικρινά, κουραφέξαλα. Η φερεγγυότητα εξαρτάται από τις τιμές των τίτλων και αυτές εξαρτώνται από την πολιτική. Ο αριθμός Ελληνικών μη εξυπηρετούμενων δανείων δεν μειωνόταν τον Ιανουάριο και σίγουρα δεν μειώνεται ούτε τώρα. Ο αριθμός πτωχεύσεων έχει αυξηθεί. Επιπλέον η νέα κυβέρνηση έχει πάρει πολύ αρνητική στάση σχετικά με τις κατασχέσεις, ουσιαστικά καθιστώντας μεγάλο μέρος του χρέους ακάλυπτο, και η αξία των όποιων ομολόγων εξακολουθούν να κατέχουν οι τράπεζες πρέπει να έχει πέσει αρκετά.<br />
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Γιατί λοιπόν χειραγωγείται η αξιολόγηση φερεγγυότητας της ΕΚΤ με αυτόν τον τρόπο; Ένας επικριτής μου στο Twitter με βοήθησε να ξεκαθαρίσω τις σκέψεις μου σχετικά. Είναι επειδή αυτή η χειραγώγηση επιτρέπει στην ΕΚΤ να παράσχει ELA, το οποίο κανονικά μόνο φερέγγυες τράπεζες μπορούν να λάβουν. Χωρίς αυτό το πρόσχημα, η ΕΚΤ θα έπρεπε να τραβήξει την πρίζα – όχι να σταματήσει απλά την αύξηση του ανώτατου ορίου· να σταματήσει εντελώς να παρέχει ELA. Ακόμα μέχρι σήμερα δεν το έχει κάνει. Αυτό είναι λάθος, φυσικά, αλλά μήπως προδίδει μια στρατευμένη κεντρική τράπεζα που προσπαθεί να ρίξει τη νέα κυβέρνηση; Όχι, αντιθέτως προδίδει μία ΕΚΤ που κάνει τα στραβά μάτια προκειμένου να αποφύγει να κάνει το δυσάρεστο μέρος της δουλειάς της – το διακανονισμό της χρεοκοπίας των τραπεζών μας. Δεν θα προσποιηθώ πως το κίνητρο είναι ανθρωπιστικό, αλλά το αποτέλεσμα είναι.</div>
Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-1809793976946976232015-07-02T16:57:00.002+01:002015-07-02T21:32:15.204+01:00GETTING TO YES IN GREECE - A COLLECTION OF MYTHS (IN PROGRESS)<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">This post needs no introduction, other than for me to say that it is the first of a few on the subject, in which I hope to show how five key elements of the NO side's rhetoric, both within and outside Greece, are fatally flawed. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Due to the density of Greece's political time at the moment, I will have to update and provide references as I go along. If any readers are willing to translate, please get in touch via Twitter.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><strong>Myth no.1: Greece is being denied debt relief</strong></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">As we've known since 2012, debt relief is on the table. What is not on the table is up-front, unconditional debt relief. Debt relief that very explicitly reduces the nominal Euro amount of our debt will be politically difficult, but options exist for reducing the actual value of our debt and our interest burden, and for improving the sustainability of our debt.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The Eurogroup explicitly, unambiguously promised in black and white to discuss debt relief once again on the successful conclusion of our latest programme review. Quoting </span><a href="http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.the-agora.2139"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Jens Bastian's post on Macropolis</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">:</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The November 2012 Eurogroup conclusions on Greece agreed that member states would consider “measures … for achieving a further credible and sustainable reduction of Greek debt-to-GDP ratio”. Two conditions were stipulated for such a process to be initiated by Greece’s European creditors:<span style="color: #222222;"> </span></span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I. Achieving an annual primary surplus. The emphasis here is on the term “annual”. The conditionality implies recurring primary surpluses, but it does not specify a certain number or volume to be attained over time.<span style="color: #222222;"> </span></span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">II. Full implementation of <span style="border-image-outset: initial; border-image-repeat: initial; border-image-slice: initial; border-image-source: initial; border-image-width: initial; border: 0px; font-family: FrutigerLTPro-Bold, sans-serif; font-stretch: inherit; font-variant: inherit; line-height: inherit; margin: 0px; padding: 0px; vertical-align: baseline;">all</span> [my emphasis] conditions contained in the programme (i.e. the second macro economic adjustment programme) between Greece and the troika. <span style="color: #222222;"> </span></span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">[...]<span style="color: #222222;"> </span></span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The aforementioned “full” implementation conditionality critically rests on the conclusion of the sixth review of the ongoing programme between Greece and the troika. The review mission started back in September 2014 in Paris and had already stalled before the election campaign.</span></blockquote>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Unfortunately, the new Greek government </span><a href="http://www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2015/01/30/varoufakis-tells-dijsselbloem-greek-govt-will-not-negotiate-with-troika/"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">dismissed the Troika in February</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">, refusing to negotiate with them or indeed conclude the sixth review. It seems like centuries ago, but back then they also dismissed the Eurogroup as lacking legitimacy - they would only deal with a European Debt Conference of dubious provenance and legitimacy. This won them tons of credit with the Greek electorate. It also killed the prospect of debt relief, unless a new memorandum could be negotiated from scratch. Which is what we set about doing for the last six months.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">By the way, those who claim that Greece has not been offered debt relief forget we've had </span><a href="http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.the-agora.672"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">two restructurings already</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">, one of which delivered very substantial day-to-day interest savings even after accounting for a depressed economy (see graph, raw data </span><a href="http://t.co/YZoTWZaofu"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">). There is no dogma against debt relief; there are a lot of politicians trying not to get slammed by their electorates. But that is democracy, whether you like it or not. There are no excuses for not factoring other people's politics into our strategy.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Is Greece paying too much interest on its debt? Here's interest as % of gov revenue. Data: </span><a href="http://t.co/YZoTWZaofu"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">http://t.co/YZoTWZaofu</span></a><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><a href="http://t.co/0YTyTtfa8p"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">pic.twitter.com/0YTyTtfa8p</span></a></div>
<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">— Emmanuel Schizas (@eschizas) </span><a href="https://twitter.com/eschizas/status/594580437382602752"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">May 2, 2015</span></a></blockquote>
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Bottom line - we will get debt relief one way or another. It will have to be packaged nicely for other countries to accept. And it will be conditional. Failing this, only two other options are open to us, both of which end with debt relief: 1. we default 2. negotiations remain stay in limbo but the economy collapses to the point where even the most committed extender-and-pretenders can no longer pretend we're solvent.</span></span><br />
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><strong>Myth 2: The case for debt relief can be divorced from the case for reform.</strong></span></span><br />
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">But why do creditors insist on reforms before debt relief? Because, as Greek voters found when the question of our referendum was announced, debt relief relies on debt sustainability analysis, and DSA relies on assumptions about long term growth. The creditors assume that Greece's long-term growth and revenue raising potential is currently constrained by inefficient government and competitive distortions. Even our own government agrees. The creditors also assume that much of our welfare spending (eg on pensions) is inefficient, which keeps our spending artificially high, and therefore our ability to repay debt articifially low.</span></span></div>
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">If you follow this logic, it follows that more debt is sustainable long-term <em>with</em> reform than <em>without</em> reform. Giving debt relief with reform is good lending. Giving debt without proof of reform is financing the lifestyle choices of the </span><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">few Greeks who benefit from distortion. Our own government should likewise insist on no debt relief without a credible long-term <em>investment</em> plan - since our growth is currently artificially contrained by Greek businesses not having access to finance and possibly by underinvestment in education and healthcare. Without this, <em>we </em>would get a bad deal.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Within this framework, there is a lot the creditors are getting wrong - not least on pensions and investment. But if our government and the Greek people could agree on the principle that reforms and debt relief are linked, a programme could be built that offers debt relief in exchange for reform, as opposed to just credit on policy conditions. </span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">And because our debt is now super-long in maturity, our creditors should be willing to listen to arguments about the growth enhancing powers of health or education spending - which in the long run make a huge difference to growth.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"> </span><br />
<script async="" charset="utf-8" src="//platform.twitter.com/widgets.js"></script><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">This is where our government has talked itself, and the country into a corner. There is literally no major reform carried out in the last 6 years that they actually welcomed - even the primary surplus that has allowed then to fight on for six months is an aim they bitterly opposed right up until February. Some of their core voters are still reeling from this change in policy.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Greece has made a staggering fiscal and regulatory adjustment that would win us the respect of any informed observer. A government out to get debt relief would speak of it with pride - "our people sacrificed to make us the only European country that pays its way." but not this government, which must forever play to a gallery back home that wishes said adjustment had never happened, that believes our pre crisis debt was odious, our deficit figures inflated, and Greece the victim of an evil conspiracy.</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">It is this attitude among the government and its voters that makes it so hard to get any up front concessions. The Greek government, it is clear to all, sees it as its mandate to roll back reform. It offers anything less grudgingly, or with barely a moment's planning. This was not yet the consensus in January. Syriza had the advantage of being clean and owing nothing to established interests. But It was built up through unilateralism and amateurism. Even small things, such as the unbelievably stupid volunteer tax inspector brainwave, add to this image.</span></div>
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><strong>Myth 3: appeals to moral hazard have always been just a front for ideological austerity.</strong> <o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><span style="color: black;">To understand how the moral hazard argument works, you need to imagine the
preferred scenario of the Debt Jubilee Crowd: back in 2010, Greece defaults to a
substantial extent (say 50-70pc) on private creditors and is given a few- or
no-strings credit line from Europe and the IMF until it can return to the
markets. </span><span style="color: black;">Ignore for now the question of how European sovereigns would get their parliaments to back
such a rescue while having to bail out the entire European banking system at
the same time, or whether Europe would indeed survive the ensuing contagion
with resource enough to fund continent wide stimulus. <o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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</span><br />
<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">George Papandreou would return from the hypothetical 2010 debt jubilee to a hero's
welcome, bringing both fresh, cheap money and debt relief. Elected on a promise that 'money can be found' to pay for government spending, he has been vindicated. He'd stay in power until
late 2014, then easily win another term. PASOK would "live and
reign," as we say in Greece, while Syriza would forever remain the 5-8% party
it was pre-crisis. Today, instead, PASOK is dead, ND is bankrupt. Their old deputies
are toxic to any new party. Syriza is miles ahead of everyone else in the polls. <o:p></o:p></span></span><br />
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Jubileans who claim that oligarchs drained the Greek coffers and built the
crooked state around their rent-seeking would have got one wish (debt relief)
at the expense of the other (fighting corruption and cronyism). If they are
right and Greece’s 2009 woes are in no major way related to our spending choices, if indeed Greece's problems were political rather than economic, this would do us no
good. The ship would keep speeding into the next iceberg. That's what moral
hazard means: by appearing to reward wrongdoing, the creditors would ensure the
same system that created the debt would survive. The Greeks benefit from the insistence on moral hazard arguments as much as our creditors - and none more so than Tsipras himself.</span></span><br />
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"><strong>Myth 4: This is regime change - Europe versus democracy </strong></span></span><br />
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<span style="color: black;"><span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">The argument above brings us to accusations of regime change orchestrated by Brussels and Frankfurt. Note that the people who make such claims do not denounce the failure of Europe to give us debt relief in 2010 as regime change, though it caused PASOK to politically assassinate g-pap. They don't denounce the rebuff of Samaras' debt relief demands in 2012 as regime change, even though it ensured ND would lose the next election and not see power again for decades, if ever. Only now, with a favoured party at the receiving end, do they cry 'regime change.' And even now, creditors are only risking losing a partner in Syriza because Syriza cannot square up to its niche internal opposition. An actual election today, after all, would give Syriza a bigger lead over ND than it got in the last election and make them all powerful, with a straight majority that would not depend on the disgusting company of the Independent Greeks. <o:p></o:p></span></span></span><br />
<span style="color: black;"><span style="color: black; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;"></span><br /></span>
<span style="color: black;"><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">I am always exasperated by people who make the Greek debt stand-off out to be a battle for democracy. It is far from. To understand why, you have to understand a) what Syriza's mandate was, b) what the Greek people want, c) what's really keeping Syriza from a deal and d) that there are other democracies at play.</span></span></div>
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">First, Tsipras' mandate. Syriza came to power claiming that it could reverse austerity 'with one law, one edict', and that it would make Merkel an offer she would have 'not one in a million' chances of rejecting. It promised a tough renegotiation of our debt , and a gradual reversal of benefits and minimum wage cuts, to be financed by the ECB, a crackdown on tax avoidance and a rebalancing of tax revenues so that the rich pay a greater share than they currently do. No one believed all of this was truly possible. Repeatedly, Syriza supporters said that 'if they do 10% of what they promised, they'll be better than the previous bunch'. The subtext to the people's mandate (which became evident once the negotiations began) was therefore that they wanted someone to restore their dignity, fight their corner, and turn them from passive observers of austerity back into authors of their own fate.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">Yet the majority of Greek people are also unwavering in their support for the Euro; not because they all think it was a good idea to join the common currency but because they think it will be a messy divorce right now and would rather not do it while our economy is reeling from the worst recession in history. It may be that, given the option to leave the Euro in an orderly fashion somewhere down the line, a majority of Greeks would take it. They should have this chance. But for now this is not a good option (I am unsure how it would ever be), and voters have been clear in surveys since May that they'd rather take a bad deal than risk Grexit. A majority of Greeks have also, since June, believed that negotiations are not going well. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">It is in fact only a small left-wing faction within Syriza that Tsipras is unable to sell a deal to and that is additionally comfortable with Grexit. These may be close to the heart of 2009 Syriza, but they have had almost nothing to do with its electoral success since. A new 30% of the electorate has swelled their ranks which has little in common with the left wing of the party. Unfortunately, as a result of Syriza's history as a coalition, Tsipras would be counting on the votes of its left wing to see any deal through parliament, because this group is over-represented relative to their share of the party's actual popular vote. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;">It's bad enough that a faction representing some 4-5% of the Greek electorate can hold another 30% that support the government to ransom; but it takes a special kind of cynicism or cluelessness for an outside observer to claim that it actually represents the will of the people. </span><br />
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Finally, Greece has no monopoly on elected governments. Our popular mandate dictates on what terms we're willing to borrow. The creditors' popular mandate dictates on what terms they're willing to lend. If the Venn diagram of the two is null, as it very likely is, then the honest and respectful thing to do is turn to the people and say - I'm sorry, we can't borrow from these people. And stop wasting time. <br />
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<strong>Myth 5: The Troika has imposed capital controls</strong><br />
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I need to make a special point here about the role of the troika in the institution of capital controls in Greece. As was repeated ad nauseam in the last few months, only our own government has ever had the power to introduce capital controls in Greece; <em>it is legally and practically impossible to do in any other way</em>. The ECB does have influence on this process, but only because Greek banks are illiquid and depend on it (via ELA) for funding.<br />
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Why are Greek banks illiquid? Because of a massive bank run, which started in December and peaked in January.<br />
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And here is the Greek bank run supposedly caused by the ecb in February. Starts in December, peaks in January <a href="http://t.co/X1HsUeLyYm">pic.twitter.com/X1HsUeLyYm</a>"</div>
— Emmanuel Schizas (@eschizas) <a href="https://twitter.com/eschizas/status/581149126169141248">March 26, 2015</a></blockquote>
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Why was there a bank run in the first place? Because a) Syriza's leadership repeated in its pre-election campaign that it was planning to tax deposits and b) because Greece was left without a credit line when the Troika were sent packing, raising fears that Greece may default - which would kill our banks. Yes the press reported on this - after December - and yes fears of a bank run can help cause a bank run; but the alternative is to muzzle the press on an issue that frankly is quite important (and on which they were reporting broadly accurately).<br />
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What did the ECB do in response? A coup-minded ECB could have shut off ELA back in February and shocked the Greek government into submission while they were still unsure of how government works. Instead, they kept increasing the amount Greek banks could borrow from them. Banks borrow ELA money against collateral - in many cases Greek bonds. With our own Finance Minister saying publicly that a) we are insolvent and b) we will seek debt relief, the ECB was left in the position of accepting bonds as collateral that it knew were very likely to be defaulted on. It should have stopped the moment Varoufakis uttered the words. Instead, it simply reviewed the haircut it applied on said bonds, throughout the negotiation. It stopped only when it became clear Greece was going to default on the IMF; a situation that was highly relevant to the value of our bonds and which was too public to (pretend to) ignore.<br />
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The ECB is far from angelic of course. But its greatest mistake is to continue to sign-off on Greek banks' solvency. Both the ECB and the Greek government have continued throughout this crisis to hide between the ECB's assessment, which is, frankly, BS. Solvency depends on asset prices and these are contingent on policy. Greek NPLs were not really pointing downwards yet in January and they sure as hell aren't falling now. Insolvencies are up. To add to this, the new government has taken a very dim view of foreclosures, effectively making a great deal of debt unsecured, and the value of whatever bonds the banks are still holding must have taken a beating.<br />
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Why is the ECB's solvency assessment being manipulated in this way? A critic on Twitter helped me clarify this in my head. Because it allows the ECB to provide ELA, which only solvent banks may receive. Without this pretense, the ECB would have to pull the plug - not stop raising the ceiling; stop providing ELA at all. It still hasn't to this date. This is wrong of course, but does it speak of a militant central bank out to get the new government? No. It speaks of one bending the rules in order to avoid having to do the nasty part of its job - resolution. I am not pretending the motivation here is humanitarian, but the outcome actually is.</div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-90279763920670787652015-06-03T00:34:00.000+01:002016-05-11T22:43:18.730+01:00THE REST OF THE TRUTH ABOUT GREEK PENSIONS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Much has been made of the role of pensions reform in the last stretch of our negotiations with the <strike>troika</strike> institutions.Yet amazingly, the discussion has focused on negotiating tactics over substance - namely the viability of the Greek social security funds. In this post, partly a translation of </span><a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/05/blog-post.html"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">my 22 May post</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> on the same topic, I will attempt to shed some light on the less transparent aspects of this debate.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">UPDATE 5/1/2016: Despite its name, this post has always been focused on Greek pension <em>funds</em>. It's important to remember, however, that about <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-416345_QID_-7231BFEA_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;SECTOR,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;NA_ITEM,L,Z,1;GEO,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-416345GEO,EL;DS-416345UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-416345NA_ITEM,D62PAY;DS-416345INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=SECTOR_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">EUR7bn of pensions and other benefits</a> are additionally paid to Greek state employees past and present, directly by central government. These are of course unfunded.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"><strong>Introduction</strong></span><br />
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I have to start with the following graph, based on </span><a href="http://bit.ly/1KagBqo"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Eurostat data</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">, which depicts all sources of income for Greek social security funds from 2006 to 2014. Each rectangle's area is proportionate to the amount of money it represents, providing an intuitive overview of the dependencies in our pension and benefits system. I am indebted for this idea to veteran blog reader @dalagiorgos.
<script id="infogram_0_income_of_greek_social_security_funds" src="//e.infogr.am/js/embed.js?p3f" type="text/javascript"></script>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The key takeaway from this graph is the enormous dependence of social security funds on subsidies, whether in the form of tax revenue ring-fenced for the funds or direct top-ups from the government budget. You see, the sum of workers' and employers' contributions into the funds and the funds' own investment income (including capital gains, interest on bonds and deposits and rents on property) came up to just 57% of the funds' income in 2014. You might dismiss this as a crisis-era aberration - after all employment is probably near all-time lows. But this share peaked at a mere 65% in the growth years (2007). Put simply, the Greek social security funds were never self-financing and social security as we know it (even in the austerity era) would cease to exist without the Government's top-up.</span><br />
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<span style="background-color: white;">This life-saving subsidy to the funds amounts to EUR13bn per annum - equal to 14-15% of all Greek government revenue. A legal obligation of the state, it was, as of 2014, still up by 6% compared to the 2006-8 average, in order to compensate for a 23% drop in contributions, a 74% drop in tax revenue ring-fenced for the funds, and a 81% drop in the funds' investment income. Total flows into the funds fell by 18%.</span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><strong>So are the funds viable?</strong></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">It might sound a little redundant to ask the question when funds are dependent on a government top-up for close to half of their income, but it is a matter of some debate whether Greek social security funds are viable. Our new government </span><a href="http://www.vouliwatch.gr/%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B1%CE%BB%CE%BF%CE%B3%CE%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AD%CF%82-%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%AD%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%82-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CF%84%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%B3%CF%89%CE%BD%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AD/" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">rubbished</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> the past few years' worth of actuarial studies recently, claiming that they did not take into account the funds' non-financial portfolios. For once </span><a href="http://www.dikaiologitika.gr/eidhseis/asfalish/54607/i-ethniki-analogistiki-arxi-adeiazei-ton-romania-gia-tis-meletes-pou-koyrepsan-tis-syntakseis" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">they are actually right</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">; the methodology of these reports does not involve making any assumptions on returns on (non-financial) assets. It merely compares the present value of predicted in-flows and out-flows. But as I shall demonstrate, taking into account these assets would make next to no difference.
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There's reasonably good data out there on the assets of social security funds, so you can test this for yourselves.</span><br />
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You can see the funds' financial balance sheet </span><a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-424382_QID_22B60BF3_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;CO_NCO,L,Z,1;SECTOR,L,Z,2;FINPOS,L,Z,3;GEO,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-424382CO_NCO,CO;DS-424382GEO,EL;DS-424382UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-424382INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-424382SECTOR,S1314;DS-424382FINPOS,ASS;&rankName1=FINPOS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=CO-NCO_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">. At a total of ca. EUR21bn, these assets would barely cover nine months' worth of pensions and benefits if they could somehow be liquidated under non-fire-sale conditions. Even had the funds not taken PSI losses of </span><a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-424382_QID_22B60BF3_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;CO_NCO,L,Z,1;SECTOR,L,Z,2;FINPOS,L,Z,3;GEO,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-424382CO_NCO,CO;DS-424382GEO,EL;DS-424382UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-424382INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-424382SECTOR,S1314;DS-424382FINPOS,ASS;&rankName1=FINPOS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=CO-NCO_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">ca. EUR10bn</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> in 2012 (more </span><a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/11/30/us-greece-crisis-pensions-idUSBRE8AT0CV20121130"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">), the total would still only come up to a year's worth of spending. The funds could never hope to live off the returns on this.</span><br />
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Estimates of the value of non-financial assets aren't as forthcoming, however a first census has been taken in 2013 as part of the implementation of the 'Hestia' database and the results can be seen </span><a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=114:2-idioktita-ktiria-kai-oikopeda-ana-forea&catid=87&Itemid=528" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">. Unfortunately, these are mark-to-algorithm values based on the Greek system of 'objective values' - which are nothing of the sort. Still, the objective values algorithm had </span><a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/04/10/greece-will-reassess-property-values/" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">just been rebased</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> to approximate market values when the Hestia census was taken in July 2013, and the Census estimate of funds' non-financial assets ran to barely EUR1.4bn. This means that the value of the funds' entire property portfolio would cover just over two weeks' worth of pensions and benefits. Nor would it be possible to close the gap merely by sweating the assets and increasing returns.</span><br />
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</span><a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=118:6-ekmisthoumena-akinita-ana-forea&catid=87&Itemid=528" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Barely 31%</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> of the properties making up the funds' real estate empire by value were being rented out in mid-2013, and those that were yielded just </span><a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=118:6-ekmisthoumena-akinita-ana-forea&catid=87&Itemid=528" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">3.3% of their 'objective' values</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">. A tenth by value </span><a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=119:7-kena-idioktita-akinita-ana-forea-pros-ekmetalefsi&catid=87&Itemid=528" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">were vacant</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">, and </span><a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120:8-idioxrisi-kai-alles-xriseis-ana-forea&catid=87&Itemid=528" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">the rest</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> (58% by value) were reserved by the funds and wider public sector for own use. Rental income was a mere EUR20m - not one thousandth of a year's worth of fund expenditures.</span><br />
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As for the funds' financial assets, it's plain to see </span><a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-424382_QID_22B60BF3_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;CO_NCO,L,Z,1;SECTOR,L,Z,2;FINPOS,L,Z,3;GEO,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-424382CO_NCO,CO;DS-424382GEO,EL;DS-424382UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-424382INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-424382SECTOR,S1314;DS-424382FINPOS,ASS;&rankName1=FINPOS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=CO-NCO_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> that three quarters are made up of government bonds, cash and deposits, yielding next to nothing. This distribution is </span><a href="http://www.worldpensionsummit.com/Portals/6/The%20Greek%20Pension%20Reform%20Strategy%202010%20-%202013%20Steering%20away%20from%20the%20tip%20or%20the%20iceberg.pdf" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">dictated by law</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> and cost them </span><a href="http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1394457"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">2-3 percentage points worth of returns per year in the good times</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">. One sixth of the funds' financial balance sheets are made up of debtors - overdue contributions, the returns on which after defaults are presumably negative.</span><br />
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To cut a long story short, the total assets of the greek social security funds would not pay for ten months' worth of pensions and benefits, even if we could somehow liquidate them all without causing a fire sale. I have nothing but respect for the actuarial profession, but an actuary's work right now would not be to discuss what pensions are affordable or what the pensionable age ought to be; it would be to discuss how much of the Greek public sector's wealth would need to be injected into the funds to make them halfway viable while targeting modest outcomes.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><b>Couldn't employers pay more? </b></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">One of my readers objects that Greek pension funds might be more viable if employers would pay more by way of contributions. After all, at <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-416345_QID_47B93E97_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=NA_ITEM,L,X,0;TIME,C,X,1;GEO,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-416345UNIT,PC_GDP;DS-416345SECTOR,S1314;DS-416345INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_0&rankName5=TIME_1_0_1_0&rankName6=GEO_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">4%-5% of GDP</a> their contributions have consistently been slightly smaller than household contributions, and way lower than the EU average (almost half). </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">I think it's a great idea to better enforce mandatory employer contributions, as a matter of principle. However, as I explain <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/04/on-greek-working-hours-and-structural.html">here</a>, Greeks are much less likely to <i>have </i>an employer than other Europeans. We are more than twice as likely to be self-employed and three times as likely to be 'contributing family workers', some of whom are unpaid. Account for this and the fact that employer contributions in Greece are proportionately lower than in Europe becomes a matter of labour market structure as opposed to unscrupulous employers. In fact, the latest available data (2008 and 2012) suggest that social security contributions <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-454805_QID_-2E7688A1_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SIZECLAS,L,Z,0;LCSTRUCT,L,Z,1;NACE_R2,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-454805LCSTRUCT,D111;DS-454805INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-454805NACE_R2,B-S_X_O;DS-454805SIZECLAS,GE10;&rankName1=LCSTRUCT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=SIZECLAS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=NACE-R2_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">were not a low share of the total payroll cost </a>of Greek employers by EU standards (higher than in Germany, for one) and their share of labour costs grew during the crisis. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">So increasing the headline or effective rate of employer contributions would make little financial difference, unless we could also a) increase real wages without reducing employment and/or b) restructure the Greek economy away from small and family businesses and further towards larger businesses. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><b>The welfare parastate</b></span><br />
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When I first posted this article, I got a very astute response from a Facebook user, which I reproduce below:</span><br />
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<i>One might say that this pension top-up compensates for (typically insufficent or nonexistent) housing, unemployment and subsistence benefits for relatives (first, second or higher degree, perhaps even friends). This social spending is instead delegated to the old and wise to distribute as they see fit among their extended family - a means, however unusual of supporting the family. </i></span><br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ8cia5GwJQNis0asBDFs_Hq4CfdjGA64BRE-rtMr5tDYBjosrNBfra0Rn_0ZHepvWZD5hj3UIPmbr5j9my5t7MIryN7ts5TaSmpIh2iNR6g2dF_w3NaV8QF0HW-8AXocdSFUGo7E-_niA/s1600/Over+65.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em; text-decoration: none;"><span style="color: black; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ8cia5GwJQNis0asBDFs_Hq4CfdjGA64BRE-rtMr5tDYBjosrNBfra0Rn_0ZHepvWZD5hj3UIPmbr5j9my5t7MIryN7ts5TaSmpIh2iNR6g2dF_w3NaV8QF0HW-8AXocdSFUGo7E-_niA/s320/Over+65.png" style="-webkit-box-shadow: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2) 0px 0px 0px; background: transparent; border-radius: 0px; border: 1px solid transparent; box-shadow: rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.2) 0px 0px 0px; padding: 8px; position: relative;" width="239" /></span></a><span style="background-color: #f6f7f8; line-height: 16.07px;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">This is 100% accurate. As I explain </span><a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/greeces-humanitarian-crisis-fact-and.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">here</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">, family income is more likely to be pooled in Greece than elsewhere in Europe. In the good years, the people sought, and governments gave, pension benefits in order to make up for other shortcomings of the welfare state - effectively outsourcing welfare to the pensioners. In auterity-era Greece, the heart-wrenching stereotype is of grandparents hanging their heads in shame as they find themselves unable to buy their grandkids a chocolate bar. But in reality, pension income was supporting a wider range of more basic needs, from education all the way to food.</span><br />
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Did Greece's welfare-delegation experiment ever work, though? </span><a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/03/greece-inequality-and-age-divide-some.html" style="text-decoration: none;"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">This post</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> (and the graphs to the right) summarises the outcomes using a wide range of inequality statistics for working-age and pensionable-age Greeks. In terms of narrowing or restraining inequality, the Greek welfare state only ever seemed to work for pensioners; it still did in the early crisis years.</span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; line-height: 19.6px;">As I keep saying, </span><a href="http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/33516/" style="background-color: white; color: #4d469c; line-height: 19.6px; text-decoration: none;">the latest data</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; line-height: 19.6px;">, and </span><a href="http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/hsz-rm-2008-07.pdf" style="background-color: white; color: #4d469c; line-height: 19.6px; text-decoration: none;">older data</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #444444; line-height: 19.6px;"><span style="line-height: 19.6px;"> too, show that Greece’s welfare state has for years been the worst in the OECD at tackling poverty – in terms of how much it manages to reduce the risk of poverty per Euro spent. The misdirection of the pension top-up from welfare to pensions is at the heart of this weakness.</span></span></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"><strong>Generous or treacherous?</strong></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">Famously, Greek pensions <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2015/02/27/greeces-pension-system-isnt-that-generous-after-all/">are not overly generous</a> - at least not on a per capita basis. Greece has a lot more people of pensionable age (the WSJ takes that to mean 65+) and therefore the higher expense to match. </span><span style="font-family: 'trebuchet ms';">The FT has recently </span><a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/2ea2eb52-0ac3-11e5-a8e8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3ct9rMRvv" style="font-family: 'trebuchet ms';">reported</a><span style="font-family: 'trebuchet ms';"> Government claims that the average pension is EUR750 per month - which are true enough of the primary pension, but overlook the fact that one in two Greek pensioners receives more than one pension (p 6 </span><a href="http://www.idika.gr/files/22%CE%B7_%CE%B5%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7_%CE%97%CE%9B%CE%99%CE%9F%CE%A3_v2.pdf" style="font-family: 'trebuchet ms';">here</a><span style="font-family: 'trebuchet ms';">).</span></div>
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<span style="font-family: trebuchet ms;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">But [update 11/5/2016] pensions don't have to be generous to be unsustainable. <a href="http://www.ecineq.org/ecineq_lux15/FILESx2015/CR2/p96.pdf">Matsagganis and Leventi (2015)</a> calculate that, from the first time they became insured to the moment of their death, the average member of Greece's IKA fund (the default private sector social security fund) was subsidised to the tune of ca EUR115k pre-crisis and ca 35k even post crisis. For some perspective one this, multiply the first number by ca 3m, a reasonable adjusted estimate of the number of people who have passed through all stages of the system over the last 40 years, and then by 35% (the typical share of pension funds' income that was provided directly by the state pre-crisis), and you get EUR121bn - that's almost half our pre-crisis debt burden. </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">A</span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">s I've explained </span><a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/dont-take-bait-alex-they-are-master.html" style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS";">here</a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">, Greeks on average don't retire much earlier than other Europeans, but they tend to have had shorter working lives when they do. Worse, a sizeable chunk of our labour force in major state-owned organisations </span><i style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS";">have </i><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"><a href="http://www.oecd.org/greece/1878497.pdf">historically</a> tended to retire very early, leaving the self-employed to lift the average retirement age.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">How can we test this claim? Well, Eurostat provides detailed estimates of the share of EU countries' inactive population that are retired, by sex and age group, <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-052946_QID_-5B9C80FE_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=AGE,L,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;REASON,L,Z,1;UNIT,L,Z,2;TIME,C,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-052946INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-052946SEX,T;DS-052946TIME,2014;DS-052946REASON,RETIRED;DS-052946UNIT,PC;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=REASON_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=TIME_1_0_1_0&rankName6=AGE_1_2_0_0&rankName7=GEO_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a></span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">. It also provides estimates of the share of the population that is inactive <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-055854_QID_672919F0_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=AGE,L,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;UNIT,L,Z,1;TIME,C,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-055854INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-055854UNIT,PC;DS-055854TIME,2014;DS-055854SEX,T;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=TIME_1_0_1_0&rankName5=AGE_1_2_0_0&rankName6=GEO_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>. By multiplying the two, you can figure out the percentage of the population at each age group that is retired and thus entitled to some kind of pension. Run these figures and the result is astounding. Just under one in six Greeks between the ages of 50 and 59 is retired - more than 4 times the Eurozone average, and lagging only Turkey, Croatia and Slovenia. The total value of the pensions of people in their fifties comes up to almost 300m per month, and they draw the largest pensions out of any age group (p. 7 <a href="http://www.idika.gr/files/22%CE%B7_%CE%B5%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7_%CE%97%CE%9B%CE%99%CE%9F%CE%A3_v2.pdf">here</a>). </span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">The problem isn't just that these guys (and very often ladies) will be drawing for years on benefits they can't possibly have earned. It's also that they are trapped into inactivity. Once you've retired from an office job at 50, or 55, it's fair to say you won't work again even if you wish to. </span><br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhaOoWlH4P_qeJPdfNz4P3JgdrRXeu2lM5uPOWLsAN-Veu4BmIrRhmfDPPB2AmK8qsWuI6xlw7TOW_LRHx44-11AKp93UjJEgn0-bUnON8zrLWTcWe5OPMhg8IXQQWkK-qLjG3nkB0Pe-_G/s1600/retiredyoung.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="198" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhaOoWlH4P_qeJPdfNz4P3JgdrRXeu2lM5uPOWLsAN-Veu4BmIrRhmfDPPB2AmK8qsWuI6xlw7TOW_LRHx44-11AKp93UjJEgn0-bUnON8zrLWTcWe5OPMhg8IXQQWkK-qLjG3nkB0Pe-_G/s400/retiredyoung.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><b>Is this a real priority?</b></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;"><br /></span></span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"><span style="background-color: white;">Back in February 2015, Yanis Varoufakis <a href="http://wrapper.zeit.de/wirtschaft/2015-02/yanis-varoufakis-greece-finance-minister-eng">publicly stated</a> that reforming pensions was not a priority area for reform; our efforts, he claimed, would be better spent battling corruption, e.g. in public procurement. But there's a catch. </span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The pension fund top-up (EUR13bn per annum as already established, plus another EUR7bn in public sector pensions and benefits), is way, way larger than the <i>entire </i>Greek public procurement bill, right down to the last paperclip, which came up to a mere <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-416345_QID_-515090CE_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;GEO,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-416345GEO,EL;DS-416345UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-416345SECTOR,S1314;DS-416345INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=GEO_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">EUR8bn as of 2014</a>. It has been larger as far back as the data go. And while not all procurement spending is unnecessary or corrupt, the pension top-up is going almost <i>entirely </i>to the wrong people, since it's generally <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-277751_QID_1D65E25F_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=SPDEPM,L,X,0;TIME,C,X,1;SPDEPB,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SEX,L,Z,1;GEO,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-277751SEX,T;DS-277751UNIT,PERS;DS-277751INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-277751GEO,EL;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName5=SPDEPM_1_2_0_0&rankName6=TIME_1_0_1_0&rankName7=SPDEPB_1_2_0_1&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">not means-tested</a> and inaccessible to, e.g., the young unemployed. </span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">The result is that Greece could be lifting more people out of poverty than it currently is through social spending, but we </span><i style="font-family: "Trebuchet MS", sans-serif;">choose </i><span style="background-color: white; font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">not to. Why wouldn't a left-wing government care about that? </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"><strong><br /></strong></span>
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"><strong>Where next?</strong></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">
Clearly, this system needs radical reform, the kind that would take years to achieve. In my view, pensions need to be cut down eventually to what the funds can pay for without further subsidy (i.e. almost cut in half). Their social policy functions should be moved instead to where they properly belong - the state budget, in the form of a means-tested guaranteed minimum income scheme. Greece piloted one such scheme, at the insistence of the Troika, <a href="http://www.ekathimerini.com/4dcgi/_w_articles_wsite2_1_14/10/2014_543703">in 2014</a>. The IMF proposed this in March 2012, and Syriza - today's government - endorsed this as a matter of urgency in June 2012, <a href="http://www.protagon.gr/?i=protagon.el.article&id=39945">before dismissing the 2014 pilot</a> as 'crumbs of state charity', only to then reintroduce a nominal reference to a 'basic income' to its rhetoric in <a href="http://www.basicincome.org/news/2015/02/greece-syriza-basic-income/">February 2015</a>.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">The second part of the necessary reform is to give pension funds a proper source of investment income. </span><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Syriza's </span><a href="http://www.syriza.gr/article/SYRIZA---THE-THESSALONIKI-PROGRAMME.html#.VW44qtJViko"><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;">Thessaloniki programme</span></a><span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"> proposed to cede some of the government's real estate portfolio over to the funds. That's definitely a welcome idea. But at <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-494255_QID_6B1CA952_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;ASSET10,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;SECTOR,L,Z,1;GEO,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-494255UNIT,CP_MEUR;DS-494255GEO,EL;DS-494255SECTOR,S13;DS-494255INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=ASSET10_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">ca. EUR100bn</a> on last count (2012), and even assuming every last asset can be rented out at the same nominal yield of 3.3% as the funds' existing assets, the <em>entire</em> non-financial wealth of the Greek government would only give social security funds a 3.3bn lifeline per year - a fifth of what is needed to replace the current state budget top-up.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">Thus, with interest rates predicted to stay low for some time, some discussion needs to be had about allowing funds to invest more of their assets in assets other than Greek bonds and bank deposits. Greek stocks are volatile and pension fund allocations would move the market excessively; but <strike>overseas stocks and emerging market bonds</strike> other asset classes, including foreign assets, might provide returns while also breaking the feedback loop between the state of the Greek economy and the returns on social security fund assets, which in a perfect world I'd hope would be counter-cyclical. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">(<em>Update 5/1/2015: I've been accused of proposing that Greek pension funds take on risk in a 'search for yield'. I think there's definitely a health warning there and I might have spoken too soon. But Greek pension funds have, as the analysis of returns on assets above shows, been ignoring yield for decades. In any case, even if yield is bad, diversification surely is good?)</em></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">The third part of the reform would be to realign the Greek welfare state to formally acknowledge pooled (extended) family budgets and balance sheets, thus applying tax free thresholds to family as opposed to individual income, or acknowledging shared use of property and shared debt in wealth taxation. This might allow families to, for instance, set bank and utility arrears off against property tax due but would not favour better-off pensioners against young people as our current system does. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">The final part is to make some provision for the people trapped into financial inactivity by early retirement. While I do not believe these are true victims of the system, they were nonetheless often lured into retirement by financial incentives, as a matter of government policy; and in any case they will not be able to earn a living again, so they are the burden of the state unless we decide to just shoot them. A means-tested guaranteed minimum income would address part of the financial problem of these individuals, but this may not be the only problem on the table.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">None of this can be done quickly, or painlessly. The institutions ought to be willing to wait, and ideally to subsidise some of the transition costs, including actuarial studies, systems design and implementation. But our current predicament is such that no one trusts the Greek government with time or money unless they're bound by the conditionalities of a bailout programme. I don't trust them either. A long-term programme, with a debt relief carrot at the end of it, just might do the trick; but things are not heading in that direction. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";"></span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">Either way, pensions will always be toxic as they involve a cross-subsidy from the active to the inactive, and sometimes from the poorer young to the better-off old. Within a nation state, we justify these things by appealing to people's sense of self-interest and (extended) family values and by glamorising the struggles of past generations. Across borders, none of this works.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms" , sans-serif;"></span><br />
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<span style="font-family: "trebuchet ms";">(<em>Update 5/1/2015: I will reiterate here what I've said in comments below: pension spending that cannot be supported by the funds' contributions and investment income needs to be treated as what it is: welfare. It's acceptable even to (my kind of) libertarians for the state to take on an unfunded welfare liability, but the public needs to know they are paying for this essentially through taxes; and benefits need to be means-tested. Failing to make the distinction only provides political cover for rentiers.)</em></span></div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com28tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-10484563608900186322015-05-23T21:47:00.001+01:002015-05-26T23:27:51.693+01:00Whither Syriza’s Wealth Tax?<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Lost amidst the tumultuous coverage of Eurogroup
meetings, negotiations, leaked documents and denials, the new Greek government’s plans for tax reform are slowly taking shape and are due to be announced in <a href="http://www.avgi.gr/article/5445095/o-neos-foros-megalis-akinitis-periousias">the early summer of 2015</a>. One
flagship fiscal policy, announced as far back as the Thessaloniki programme, is a wealth tax. We don't know much about it, but we do know that a) it will replace ENFIA b) it will not apply to primary residences c) it is likely to be levied almost exclusively against property, although other assets might follow d) it will most likely be a net wealth tax, i.e. levied against people's equity in their belongings.<o:p></o:p><br />
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This won’t be the first attempt by Greek governments to tax wealth of course - the
hated ENFIA may have actually <a href="http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/02/13/the-radicalisation-of-lower-middle-class-greek-families-was-the-key-to-syrizas-victory/">hastened the downfall of the previous government</a>,
prompting the kind of people that core Syriza voters had once derided as ‘<span lang="EL">νοικοκυραίοι</span>’ to join them in the party’s
ranks.<o:p></o:p><br />
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Ironically, no more than a year ago, the Bundesbank itself <a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a3ebc206-876d-11e3-9c5c-00144feab7de.html">proposed</a> a wealth tax (as a one-off, high impact measure) for troubled Eurozone countries.
The IMF also considered a recurring wealth tax (see pg 39 <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/02/pdf/fm1302.pdf">here</a>), again only to suggest that one-off levies on wealth might
work better. Cyprus, of course, got a brief taste of this medicine before moving on to a more traditional depositor bail-in. </div>
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<b>Towards a new Wealth Tax:
Taking stock<o:p></o:p></b><br />
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According to the ECB’s Household Consumption and Finances
Survey, it took a net 331,800 in assets to put a Greek household in the top 10%
of the wealth distribution (see Table A2 <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1709.pdf">here</a>) in
2009. While the threshold must have fallen very significantly since then, some of the fall in e.g. property wealth should be reversed when the economy begins to recover. So, without
access to more recent figures, I will assume that it would take a threshold of EUR300,000 to capture the top 10%
of Greek households by wealth. Not a bad place to start counting ‘the rich’ if you’re
looking to balance left-wing legitimacy with a decent revenue, and also a number often referred to in the past as Syriza's threshold for wealth taxation. <o:p></o:p><br />
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Next is the question of how much wealth these people <i>have</i>. The ECB’s 2009 figures aren’t much
help here, but Credit Suisse’s 2014 <a href="https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=60931FDE-A2D2-F568-B041B58C5EA591A4">estimate</a>
of D10 wealth in Greece (which allows for a fat tail uncaptured by surveys) is
at 56% of ca. $1 trillion, nearly half of which is in turn owned by the top 1% (pp.
125-6 <a href="https://publications.credit-suisse.com/tasks/render/file/?fileID=5521F296-D460-2B88-081889DB12817E02">here</a>).
The tax base potentially covered by our wealth tax system is therefore around EUR494
billion gross in today’s rates, or EUR462 billion net (assuming the top 10%’s
ratio of gross to net wealth has not changed since 2009). <o:p></o:p><br />
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[Note: I started writing this post in January; 'today's rates' unfortunately refer to late January]</div>
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This is the top line and it’s huge. Like an entrepreneur mulling
over their business plan, the new Greek government might be tempted to think –
if we can get just a little bit of that…<o:p></o:p></div>
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Well we can get a <i>little</i>.
We know because others have tried for years. Wealth taxes are far from new, but
were a dying breed in the run-up to the crisis, with more and more OECD
countries <a href="http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/papeles_trabajo/2007_04.pdf">abandoning</a>
them from the mid-90s onwards. Here's why.<o:p></o:p><br />
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<b>No miracles</b><br />
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First, even when the tax <i>base </i>is wealth, taxes are paid out of <i>income, </i>and wealth taxes are thus constrained to some extent by the income of the wealthy. In some parts of the world (well, Germany) there is even a <a href="http://www.hluthafar.is/assets/files/ExecSummaryHeckly.pdf">legal precedent</a> of courts capping wealth tax as a share of actual income. In this context, the main function of wealth taxes is to marginally improve the fit between households’ tax liabilities and their tax-paying capacity, often by using wealth as a proxy for undeclared income. In countries like Greece, where high earners are notorious for tax avoidance, the appeal is undeniable. But large numbers of households, especially olders ones, can be asset-rich (or asset-comfortable) and cash-poor. <o:p></o:p>A tragic example was one of the high-profile Greek suicides of 2012, a carer who twice insisted <a href="http://tvxs.gr/news/ellada/dipli-aytoktonia-sok-stin-plateia-bathi">in his suicide note</a> that he had ‘ample wealth, but no cash.’<br />
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Second, it's hard to pin down accurate valuations of wealth. Assets acquired in the (often remote) past may have appreciated enormously in value but, in the absence of a market sale, never been revalued accordingly. Taxpayers have no incentive to obtain independent valuations, especially under a wealth tax regime, But even if they wanted to obtain one, this will not always be possible since most of the assets that constitute wealth are highly illiquid and non-standardised. To name one example, the Spanish wealth tax system was known to consistently under-value property prices by <a href="http://www.ief.es/documentos/recursos/publicaciones/papeles_trabajo/2007_04.pdf">around 70%</a>.</div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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Third, wealth taxes distort markets in significant ways as taxpayers seek to minimise liabilities; taxpayers can sell property and rent it back, lease yachts instead of owning outright, use equity release schemes to reduce their net equity in properties, and, of course, move their deposits (if counted as wealth) to another country. This last option makes it hard for countries like Greece to levy any taxes on deposits unless they have the option of also implementing capital controls. I, for one, see no coincidence in the fact that Greek <a href="http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogDocumentEn/Deposits_sector.xls">deposit flight</a> accelerated following a series of news stories in January and <a href="http://www.kathimerini.gr/802153/article/oikonomia/ellhnikh-oikonomia/kinhta-kai-akinhta-sth-forologhsh-megalhs-perioysias">early February</a> claiming that Syriza was planning to tax deposits. While I cannot vouch for the quality of the sources cited by the press at the time, this plan chimed with a set of <a href="http://newpost.gr/post/206668/protasi-sok-toy-eykleidi-tsakalotoy-gia-forologisi-ton-katatheseon">2013 proposals</a> made by one E. Tsakalotos, better known today as our Much More Agreeable Lead Negotiator with the <strike>Troika</strike> Institutions.<br />
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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Finally, wealth taxes cost a lot to administer; they require a lot of high-quality information to run, when most states struggle to get even the basics right. Greece is struggling to get a register of <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/27/world/europe/greeces-tangled-land-ownership-is-a-hurdle-in-recovery.html?_r=0">property ownership</a> together, let alone take stock of other assets.<br />
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<b>So how much could we raise?</b></div>
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The tax yield from such exercises has varied across
countries but as a rule it has been surprisingly small. In Sweden, with a hundred years’ experience
of wealth taxation and a vastly different tax culture to Greece’s, the wealth
tax <a href="https://www.djoef-forlag.dk/sites/ntj/files/2014/1/2014_2.pdf">never
raised more than 0.4% of GDP</a> before being abolished. In France, it <a href="https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000292966/Income+and+wealth+taxes+in+the+euro+area%3A+An+initi.pdf">never
raised more than 0.25% of GDP</a> and in Spain it <a href="https://www.dbresearch.com/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_EN-PROD/PROD0000000000292966/Income+and+wealth+taxes+in+the+euro+area%3A+An+initi.pdf">never
raised more than 0.22%</a><span class="MsoHyperlink"> in recent history</span><i>. </i>The European Commission’s recent <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/studies/2014_eu_wealth_tax_project_finale_report.pdf">review</a>
of international wealth taxation found that revenues from net wealth taxes
throughout Europe didn’t seem to exceed 0.5% of GDP in any country – about
EUR1bn if applied to Greece. Historically, only small and very wealthy
countries able to exercise capital controls seem to have achieved more – Switzerland probably owns the record at
about <a href="http://www.tasc.ie/download/pdf/tasc_2014_tom_mcdonnell_june_20.pdf">3.5%
of GDP</a>.<br />
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<o:p></o:p>These examples are not entirely typical of what the Greek government could expect. Wealth taxes in other EU countries have generally focused on a narrower share of the population than the Greek government envisages and none have been implemented in the kind of struggle for survival the Greek government finds itself in. When the IMF used ECB data to calculate what might be raised on a recurring basis from a tax on the top 10%, they arrived at an estimate of around 1% of GDP across the EU (see pg 39 <a href="http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2013/02/pdf/fm1302.pdf">here</a>). The closest equivalent to Greece might still turn out to be the case of Iceland, which reintroduced a net wealth tax in 2010, and originally set it to sunset out in 2014. We know <a href="http://eng.fjarmalaraduneyti.is/media/rit2014/Table-03,-State-revenue.pdf">exactly</a> how much this raised – ca 0.9% to 1% of GDP in 2013 and 2014, despite the added support of capital controls.<br />
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That's the top-down approach. But a bottom-up estimate is also possible. My guess is that the pain threshold for such a tax is to cause taxpayers to pay as much as they would do if they had declared all income, but also not sell assets or eat into deposits, and also maintain their target ratio of liquid assets to income. If anyone is willing to try the math on this one, please leave a comment.<br />
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It’s hard to get to the liquid assets or the undeclared income of the top wealth decile in Greece, but extrapolating from the ECB’s figures for the four quartiles of the distribution back in 2009, I believe that their liquid assets might be around 3 times the group’s quarterly permanent household income (see Table 2 <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp1648.pdf">here</a> for the data underlying my extrapolation). Additionally, we have estimates of unreported income by wealth quantiles from the groundbreaking work of Artavanis et al, who find that the top 10% by wealth under-report their income by ca. 50% (see Fig 1 <a href="http://stat-athens.aueb.gr/~jpan/SSRN-id2109500.pdf">here</a>). That unreported income would also be part of the final tax base.<br />
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And how much would all of that that be? Well even assuming the top 10% by wealth are also the top 10% by income (which they are definitely not) their liquid assets would not exceed <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-050270_QID_26A01442_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;QUANTILE,L,Z,0;INDIC_IL,L,Z,1;CURRENCY,L,Z,2;INDICATORS,C,Z,3;&zSelection=DS-050270INDIC_IL,SHARE;DS-050270CURRENCY,EUR;DS-050270INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-050270QUANTILE,QUARTILE2;&rankName1=INDIC-IL_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=CURRENCY_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=QUANTILE_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName6=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">19%</a> of Greece’s total annual household income, or ca. EUR42bn on 2013 figures, and their annual undeclared income would be around EUR28bn.<br />
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If pressed, I would say that an annual yield double that of the <a href="http://www.capital.gr/tax/News_tax.asp?id=2198478">ENFIA income</a> would be the best-case scenario in the medium-term, and on a very favourable set of assumptions. On balance, the risks are weighed to the downside, suggesting the wealth tax would have to be broadened, meeting fierce resistance along the way. But seriously, that's just me sticking my finger in the air. If you're willing to do the math, get in touch. </div>
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Unlike other estimates, I am tempted to use the 2009 ratios from the ECB
household consumption and wealth study, because I suspect wealthier households
really do target liquid assets as a share of their annual income.</div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-25234097280340540732015-05-22T23:12:00.001+01:002015-05-27T22:46:09.525+01:00Περί ταμείων και συντάξεων: από ένα απλό infographic στο κοινωνικό παρακράτος<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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Το γράφημα που ακολουθεί βασίζεται σε στοιχεία της Eurostat και απεικονίζει όλα τα έσοδα των Ελληνικών ασφαλιστκών ταμείων από το 2006 ως και το 2014. Κάθε παραλληλόγραμο έχει εμβαδό ανάλογο με το ποσό των χρημάτων που απεικονίζει, ούτως ώστε να απεικονίζεται με απλό τρόπο πόσο εξαρτώνται τα ταμεία από κάθε πηγή εσόδων. Την ιδέα τη χρωστάω στον παλιό φίλο του ιστολογίου, τον @dalagiorgos.<br />
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Είναι σημαντικό να καταλάβει κανείς πόσο μεγάλο ποσοστό των συντάξεων στην Ελλάδα χρηματοδοτείται από το δημόσιο είτε μέσω φόρων είτε απευθείας. Οι εισφορές και οι αποδόσεις των επενδύσεών τους αποδίδουν στα ταμεία μόλις το 42% των εσόδων τους - προ κρίσεως μάλιστα, το ίδιο ποσοστό κυμαινόταν στο 34% με 37%. Αν βασιζόμασταν σε αυτές μόνο, το κοινωνικό κράτος όπως το ξέρουμε θα έπαυε να υπάρχει.<br />
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<iframe frameborder="0" height="810" scrolling="no" src="//e.infogr.am/________-08842895?src=embed" style="border-style: none; border-width: initial;" width="550"></iframe><br />
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<a href="https://infogr.am/________-08842895" style="color: #acacac; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank">Πόσα χρήματα μπαίνουν κάθε χρόνο στα ασφαλιστικά ταμεία και από πού;</a> | <a href="https://infogr.am/" style="color: #acacac; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank">Create infographics</a><br />
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Η απευθείας επιδότηση από τον προϋπολογισμό είναι γύρω στα 13δις το χρόνο - το 14-15% των συνολικών δαπανών του κράτους - και ως το 2014 παρέμενε αυξημένη (6%) σε σχέση με τη μέση αντίστοιχη των ετών 2006-8, καθώς στο μεταξύ οι εισφορές είχαν μειωθεί κατά 23%, τα έσοδα από φόρους υπέρ τρίτων κατά 74% και τα έσοδα από επενδύσεις κατά 81% - ενώ ταυτόχρονα οι συνολικές εισροές στα ταμεία μειώθηκαν κατά 18%.<br />
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<b>Την παλεύουν τα ταμεία;</b><br />
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Εκ των πραγμάτων για να αναγκάζεται να τσοντάρει διαχρονικά το κράτος τα ταμεία δεν μπορεί να είναι και τόσο βιώσιμα. Εντούτοις διαβάζοντας περισσότερα περί συντάξεων τις τελευταίες μέρες βλέπω ότι η νέα κυβέρνηση <a href="http://www.vouliwatch.gr/%CE%B1%CE%BD%CE%B1%CE%BB%CE%BF%CE%B3%CE%B9%CF%83%CF%84%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AD%CF%82-%CE%BC%CE%B5%CE%BB%CE%AD%CF%84%CE%B5%CF%82-%CE%BA%CE%B1%CE%B9-%CF%84%CF%81%CE%B9%CE%B3%CF%89%CE%BD%CE%B9%CE%BA%CE%AD/">έσπευσε να καταδικάσει </a>τις αναλογιστικές μελέτες των παρελθόντων ετών για τα ασφαλιστικά ταμεία, με βασικό επιχείρημα το ότι δεν λαμβάνουν υπόψιν 'την περιουσία' των ταμείων. Πράγμα που <a href="http://www.dikaiologitika.gr/eidhseis/asfalish/54607/i-ethniki-analogistiki-arxi-adeiazei-ton-romania-gia-tis-meletes-pou-koyrepsan-tis-syntakseis">ισχύει</a>, υπό την έννοια ότι δεν κάνουν υποθέσεις για την αξιοποίησή της. Είναι επίσης εντελώς αδιάφορο, όπως θα εξηγήσω αμέσως.<br />
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Την περιουσία των ταμείων ως ένα βαθμό τη γνωρίζουμε - τα χρηματοοικονομικά στοιχεία του ενεργητικού τους (ρευστό, καταθέσεις, ομόλογα, μετοχές) μπορείτε να τα δείτε <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-424382_QID_22B60BF3_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;CO_NCO,L,Z,1;SECTOR,L,Z,2;FINPOS,L,Z,3;GEO,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-424382CO_NCO,CO;DS-424382GEO,EL;DS-424382UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-424382INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-424382SECTOR,S1314;DS-424382FINPOS,ASS;&rankName1=FINPOS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=CO-NCO_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">εδώ</a>. Με αγοραία τιμή τα 21δις περίπου, αν πωλούνταν όλα μαζί δεν θα κάλυπταν τα έξοδα των ταμείων ούτε για εννέα μήνες. Για τα υπόλοιπα στοιχεία του ενεργητικού των ταμείων δεν είναι εύκολο να βρει κανείς υπολογισμούς, έχει ωστόσο γίνει μια πρώτη απογραφή για το ηλεκτρονικό σύστημα 'Εστία' ( και μπορείτε να τη δείτε <a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=114:2-idioktita-ktiria-kai-oikopeda-ana-forea&catid=87&Itemid=528">εδώ</a>. Δυστυχώς η απογραφή γίνεται με βάση αντικειμενικές αξίες - και ο όρος αυτός όπως ξέρουμε δεν έχει το νόημα που θα υπέθετε κανείς.<br />
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Δεδομένου πάντως ότι οι αντικειμενικές αξίες <a href="http://greece.greekreporter.com/2013/04/10/greece-will-reassess-property-values/">αναπροσαρμόστηκαν αμέσως πριν την απογραφή της Εστίας</a> και ότι τον Ιούλιο του 2013 τα ακίνητα των ταμείων είχαν συνολική αντικειμενική αξία 1.4δις Ευρώ, στο σύνολό της η περιουσία των ταμείων μάλλον αξίζει λιγότερο από ένα έτος εξόδων τους. Ούτε είναι δυνατόν να αυξηθούν κατακόρυφα οι αποδόσεις επί αυτής της περιουσίας.<br />
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Από τα ακίνητα αυτά <a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=118:6-ekmisthoumena-akinita-ana-forea&catid=87&Itemid=528">μόνο το 31%</a> (σε όρους αντ. αξίας) εκμισθώνονταν σε τρίτους, και αυτά απέδιδαν ετησίως ενοίκια ίσα (κατά μέσο όρο) με το <a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=118:6-ekmisthoumena-akinita-ana-forea&catid=87&Itemid=528">3.3% της αντικειμενικής τους αξίας</a>. Το ένα δέκατο <a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=119:7-kena-idioktita-akinita-ana-forea-pros-ekmetalefsi&catid=87&Itemid=528">δεν χρησιμοποιούντο</a>, και <a href="http://www.idika.org.gr/estia/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=120:8-idioxrisi-kai-alles-xriseis-ana-forea&catid=87&Itemid=528">τα υπόλοιπα</a> (58%) τα χρησιμοποιούσαν για δική τους χρήση είτε τα ίδια τα ταμεία είτε το ευρύτερο δημόσιο. Τα έσοδα από εκμισθώσεις μετά βίας φτάνουν τα 20εκ, δηλαδή δεν ισοδυναμούν ούτε το ένα χιλιοστό από τα έξοδα των ταμείων.<br />
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Όσο για τα χρηματοοικονομικά στοιχεία του ενεργητικού, μια ματιά στα στοιχεία της Eurostat <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-424382_QID_22B60BF3_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;UNIT,L,Z,0;CO_NCO,L,Z,1;SECTOR,L,Z,2;FINPOS,L,Z,3;GEO,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-424382CO_NCO,CO;DS-424382GEO,EL;DS-424382UNIT,MIO_EUR;DS-424382INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-424382SECTOR,S1314;DS-424382FINPOS,ASS;&rankName1=FINPOS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=CO-NCO_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">εδώ</a> δείχνει ότι τα ταμεία έχουν στο ενεργητικό τους κατά τα τρία τέταρτα ομόλογα, ρευστό και καταθέσεις (που δεν αποδίδουν σχεδόν τίποτε), και αυτή η κατανομή είναι <a href="http://www.worldpensionsummit.com/Portals/6/The%20Greek%20Pension%20Reform%20Strategy%202010%20-%202013%20Steering%20away%20from%20the%20tip%20or%20the%20iceberg.pdf">υποχρεωτική βάσει του νόμου</a>. Από την άλλη σχεδόν το ένα έκτο του ενεργητικού των ταμείων είναι οφειλές τρίτων - που αν μη τι άλλο έχουν αρνητικές αποδόσεις. <br />
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<b>Κοινωνικό παρακράτος</b><br />
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Μια από τις πρώτες (και πιο εύστοχες) αντιδράσεις που έλαβε το κείμενο αυτό όταν πρωτοδημοσιεύτηκε ήταν η εξής<br />
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<span style="background-color: #f6f7f8; color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, 'lucida grande', sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16.07px;">θα μπορούσε κανεις να πει πως αυτή η αυξημένη επιδότηση στις συντάξεις εμπεριέχει τα (συνήθως ανύπαρκτα-ανεπαρκή) επιδόματα σίτισης, στέγασης, ανεργίας κλπ για α',β', ίσως και παραπάνω βαθμού συγγενείς (και φίλους ίσως) τα οποία αναθέτει προς διανομή στα σοφά γηρατειά της ευρυτερης οικογένειας - ένας ιδιαίτερος τρόπος στήριξης της οικογένειας.</span><br />
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ8cia5GwJQNis0asBDFs_Hq4CfdjGA64BRE-rtMr5tDYBjosrNBfra0Rn_0ZHepvWZD5hj3UIPmbr5j9my5t7MIryN7ts5TaSmpIh2iNR6g2dF_w3NaV8QF0HW-8AXocdSFUGo7E-_niA/s1600/Over+65.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiQ8cia5GwJQNis0asBDFs_Hq4CfdjGA64BRE-rtMr5tDYBjosrNBfra0Rn_0ZHepvWZD5hj3UIPmbr5j9my5t7MIryN7ts5TaSmpIh2iNR6g2dF_w3NaV8QF0HW-8AXocdSFUGo7E-_niA/s320/Over+65.png" width="239" /></a><span style="background-color: #f6f7f8; color: #141823; font-family: helvetica, arial, 'lucida grande', sans-serif; font-size: 12px; line-height: 16.07px;"><br /></span>
Εννοείται αυτό είναι 100% αλήθεια. Οι συντάξεις στην Ελλάδα δεν είναι απλά συντάξεις - είναι ένας από τους πυλώνες του οικογενειακού εισοδήματος, το οποίο όπως εξηγώ <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/02/greeces-humanitarian-crisis-fact-and.html">εδώ</a> είναι πολύ πio πιθανό να το διαχειρίζεται συλλογικά η οικογένεια (αντί το κάθε μέλος τα δικά του χρήματα ξεχωριστά) στην Ελλάδα από ό,τι στην υπόλοιπη Ευρώπη. Ο λαός ζητούσε συντάξεις επί χρόνια, και οι πολιτικοί τις έδιναν, για να καλύψουν άλλα κενά του κοινωνικού κράτους, ουσιαστικά κάνοντας outsourcing του κράτους πρόνοιας στους συνταξιούχους pater familias. Το αποτέλεσμα αυτού του κοινωνικού παρακράτους φαίνονται ξεκάθαρα από το πώς εξελίχθη η ανισότητα στην Ελλάδα από το 80 και μετά, όπως εξηγώ <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2015/03/greece-inequality-and-age-divide-some.html">εδώ</a>. Λίγο οι συντεχνίες, λίγο το δημογραφικό, τελικά το ελληνικό κοινωνικό κράτος έφτασε να λειτουργεί (υπό την έννοια της άμβλυνσης της φτώχειας και των ανισοτήτων) μόνο για τους συνταξιούχους.<br />
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ΣΥΝΕΧΙΖΕΤΑΙ</div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com3tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-63557988995064779192015-04-19T21:26:00.001+01:002015-04-21T14:13:33.063+01:00RUNNING OUT OF MONEY - NOT AS SIMPLE AS IT LOOKS<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
When will the Greek government run out of money? It's hard to know how to begin answering the question, but this has not stopped anyone from trying to guess over the last two months.<br />
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First, Bloomberg ran with <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-04/greece-said-to-face-cash-crunch-in-march-without-ecb-help">February 25th</a>; then Reuters ran with <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/02/us-eurozone-greece-liquidity-idUSKBN0MT1HB20150402">April the 9</a>th; then Reuters ran with the <a href="http://www.digitallook.com/news/international-economic/greece-to-run-out-of-funds-by-20-april--693715.html">20th of April</a> and Bloomberg ran with <a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-15/greece-is-running-out-of-money-and-time">April 24</a>th. The Beeb have their sights on the <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32332221">12th of May</a>, when the IMF needs to be repaid. Bruegel did the math on our financial assets <a href="http://www.bruegel.org/nc/blog/detail/article/1610-will-greece-run-out-of-cash/">here</a> and found that Greece could stay afloat till the summer. The WSJ narrowed this down to <a href="http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2015/03/31/when-will-greece-run-out-of-money-the-short-answer/">July 20th</a>, when a large amount of ECB debt becomes due, on the back of a major round of T-bill repayments. The Guardian <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2015/feb/18/greece-bailout-eurozone-run-out-of-money">seems to agree</a>.<br />
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This speculation is sometimes driven by statements by Greek officials (typically unsourced and subsequently denied), but mostly by analysts poring over our schedule of repayments to the EU, the ECB and the IMF and trying to work out whether we'll have scraped enough money together from our <a href="http://www.ppp.mnec.gr/?q=en/content/general-government-monthly-bulletin-february-2015-0">tiny surplus</a>es, predicted to come in at EUR200m-300m per month in the second half of the year, and T-bill auctions (which our own banks can no longer <strike>be forced to</strike> absorb <a href="https://euobserver.com/news/128139">due to the ECB</a>) to pay these off. The speculation suits both sides, and is part of their negotiation tactics; since neither side wants Greece to default, underlining just how close the country is to default is important for both. There are reports of cautiousness and fatigue around such estimates, but they just keep coming.<br />
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You can compare and contrast the main repayment timelines <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/04/daily-chart-7">here</a>, <a href="http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2015/03/02/2120622/a-handy-greek-payment-timeline/">here </a>and <a href="http://rt.com/business/249477-greece-default-rumor-tsipras/">here</a>. You can also see <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/04/daily-chart-7">the Economist's</a> very recent and complete estimates of pending payments below, and contrast them with Greece's recent record of monthly surpluses. The reason why March, April and May were such popular targets for default theorists is partly that a very substantial amount of debt came due in March and partly that the three months are persistently cash negative for the Greek government, and there's three of them in a row. Even Greece's original bailout request came in <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/business/2010/may/05/greece-debt-crisis-timeline">April 2010</a>. But the barrage of large repayments in the summer is even more compelling.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGFmXdvPksKlaqufUdOIiEGdfNZ97-y9kp9W6u6JVbQbAL65yLuTj0VcDvfldTiRCfsUrCR9ivszZZlKLHkXFFzXhydJL4tlxnWQMTaptS7DebEX4eq8wj3WrjXvXDmHhK07X_eV6-JsSp/s1600/20150328_gdc618_1.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiGFmXdvPksKlaqufUdOIiEGdfNZ97-y9kp9W6u6JVbQbAL65yLuTj0VcDvfldTiRCfsUrCR9ivszZZlKLHkXFFzXhydJL4tlxnWQMTaptS7DebEX4eq8wj3WrjXvXDmHhK07X_eV6-JsSp/s1600/20150328_gdc618_1.png" height="252" width="400" /></a></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgX_3RTgQ3Ebj6FiLwbgMXP_jqv20EKiawKgvEeeeDSoYhRxOC5YX4kVPGp8erriRLMyjMZYvfLtgfm6SWt2r5zdEzN7BAh0b2o7Q3W57z8z6e4Fzd996StcoFYZym1jjq193McEnVV21jd/s1600/budget.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgX_3RTgQ3Ebj6FiLwbgMXP_jqv20EKiawKgvEeeeDSoYhRxOC5YX4kVPGp8erriRLMyjMZYvfLtgfm6SWt2r5zdEzN7BAh0b2o7Q3W57z8z6e4Fzd996StcoFYZym1jjq193McEnVV21jd/s1600/budget.png" height="205" width="400" /></a></div>
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If you ask me, this method of comparing payments due with monthly surpluses is a little misguided. It works well for people used to commenting on highly leveraged organisations such as major banks. Instead, Greece is far more likely to run out of money the way a medium-sized business would - in denial, tapping suppliers for credit, leaving staff unpaid and dodging debt collectors. This kind of default is messy - suppliers will down tools and refuse to provide further goods and services; staff will do likewise, e.g. through industrial action; and creditors will use their influence to cause difficulty and embarrassment. As a rule, messy defaults tend to amplify the original cash shortfall, as planned revenues remain unrealised or uncollected and expensive patches are needed to deal with interruptions in vital services.<br />
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The first sign of a messy default was the Greek Government's preparations to seize the surpluses and/or reserves of General Government entities. You can see these cash positions (currently up to Q3 2014, which isn't helpful) <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-417538_QID_1D1D7F4F_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;SECTOR,L,Y,0;NA_ITEM,L,Z,0;FINPOS,L,Z,1;ST_FL,L,Z,2;CO_NCO,L,Z,3;UNIT,L,Z,4;GEO,L,Z,5;INDICATORS,C,Z,6;&zSelection=DS-417538ST_FL,ST;DS-417538INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-417538FINPOS,ASS;DS-417538NA_ITEM,F2;DS-417538GEO,EL;DS-417538CO_NCO,CO;DS-417538UNIT,MIO_EUR;&rankName1=FINPOS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=CO-NCO_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=ST-FL_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName7=GEO_1_2_1_1&rankName8=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName9=SECTOR_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>, or check out the Bruegel article cited earlier. The Greek Government is already working in this direction, e.g. passing a law allowing it to force <a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-16/greece-grabs-cash-as-more-than-2-billion-in-payouts-loom">pension funds</a> to buy T-bills, and mulling raids on the cash reserves of <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11537495/Black-hole-in-Greek-finances-grows-as-Athens-is-pushed-to-the-brink-of-euro-exit.html">state enterprises.</a> and other <a href="http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/03/03/uk-eurozone-greece-funding-idUKKBN0LZ1XC20150303">entities</a>. But it's not just suppliers that can be tapped for credit - it's workers, too.<br />
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What might surprise outsiders is that Greece had a tradition of leaving general government contractors unpaid for a long time even in the good days - especially when their programmes had complex funding structures. But pockets of unpaid labour have started to spring up in recent months, including <a href="http://www.healthreport.gr/%CE%B1%CF%80%CE%BB%CE%AE%CF%81%CF%89%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%B9-%CF%80%CE%AD%CF%81%CE%B1%CF%83%CE%B1%CE%BD-%CF%84%CE%BF-%CF%80%CE%AC%CF%83%CF%87%CE%B1-%CE%BF%CE%B9-%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%B1%CF%84%CF%81%CE%BF%CE%AF/">hospital doctors</a>, <a href="http://www.larissanet.gr/2015/04/07/aplirotoi-oi-epikourikoi-giatroi-sto-pedy-mylarisas/">auxiliary doctors</a>, and <a href="http://www.sitiapress.gr/%CE%BD%CE%AD%CE%B1/%CE%BA%CF%81%CE%AE%CF%84%CE%B7/%CE%B1%CF%80%CE%BB%CE%AE%CF%81%CF%89%CF%84%CE%BF%CE%B9-%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%B1-%CE%AD%CE%BD%CE%B1-10%CE%BC%CE%B7%CE%BD%CE%BF-%CE%BF%CE%B9-%CE%B3%CE%B9%CE%B1%CF%84%CF%81%CE%BF%CE%AF-%CF%84%CE%BF%CF%85.html">general practitioners</a> tied to the health service, <a href="http://korinthostv.gr/us2/item/4877-energoi-polites-aplirotoi-oi-ergazomenoi-tis-touristikis-loutrakiou-a-e/4877-energoi-polites-aplirotoi-oi-ergazomenoi-tis-touristikis-loutrakiou-a-e">local authority tourism staff</a>, <a href="http://flashnews.gr/post/222893/aplhrwtoi-epi-3-mhnes-oi-ergazomenoi-stis-koinwnikes-domes">social workers</a>, local authority staff on <a href="http://www.nocomments.gr/news/topika-nea/71942/aplirotoi-oi-amea-ergazomenoi-toy-dimoy-dytikis-ahaias">disability inclusion programmes</a>, psychologists working for <a href="http://www.kathimerini.gr/810855/article/epikairothta/ellada/aplhrwtoi-episthmonikoi-synergates-sta-kentra-krathshs-metanastwn">immigrant detention facilities</a>, <a href="http://e-thessalia.gr/apliroti-archeologi-stin-karla/">archaeologists</a>, or <a href="http://www.seleo.gr/voreia-ellada/171901-aplirotoi-epitirites-ton-panelladikon-tou-2014-sto-kilkis#.VTP9sdJViko">exam invigilators</a>. Most, though not all, of these have been unpaid since before Syriza came to power.<br />
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This is horrible news for the people involved, but good news for the Greek Finmin: it is much harder for him (us!) to run out of money than people expect. Once a sovereign enters this cynical looking-glass world, and learns to view their own staff and suppliers as a source of finance, all expenses become opportunities to raise cheap funding - by paying late.<br />
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<a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-414695_QID_4F77899F_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;NA_ITEM,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Y,1;UNIT,L,Z,0;DIRECT,L,Z,1;SECTOR,L,Z,2;S_ADJ,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-414695DIRECT,PAID;DS-414695SECTOR,S13;DS-414695UNIT,CP_MEUR;DS-414695INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-414695S_ADJ,NSA;&rankName1=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=DIRECT_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=S-ADJ_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=NA-ITEM_1_2_0_1&rankName8=GEO_1_2_1_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">Here</a> are the payroll and procurement expenditures of the Greek government from early 2006 to Q3 2014. I use intermediate consumption as a close proxy for procurement, for which figures are not released with this frequency. The sum comes up to a cosy EUR7.3bn per quarter.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJBlmNhefJAlQxU3l4o8v4KLX9r-jiU67dNLEjOwc_9egqNk1KXLYtB8M_mSrW5wv3ukz1YI9Ady-zvcIYYAIE8cWxXWJyAchyyc6tJbRct371cD0UFu1YS0ofWXbQ0uTzM-eo601MnhyU/s1600/budget02.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiJBlmNhefJAlQxU3l4o8v4KLX9r-jiU67dNLEjOwc_9egqNk1KXLYtB8M_mSrW5wv3ukz1YI9Ady-zvcIYYAIE8cWxXWJyAchyyc6tJbRct371cD0UFu1YS0ofWXbQ0uTzM-eo601MnhyU/s1600/budget02.png" height="221" width="400" /></a></div>
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How much of this are we already tapping? In our quarterly financial accounts, you can find both the stocks and flows on a quarterly basis under 'other accounts payable' (see <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-417538_QID_-31D7326D_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;ST_FL,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Y,1;NA_ITEM,L,Z,0;FINPOS,L,Z,1;SECTOR,L,Z,2;CO_NCO,L,Z,3;UNIT,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-417538INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-417538SECTOR,S13;DS-417538FINPOS,LIAB;DS-417538NA_ITEM,F8;DS-417538CO_NCO,CO;DS-417538UNIT,MIO_EUR;&rankName1=FINPOS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=CO-NCO_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SECTOR_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=NA-ITEM_1_2_-1_2&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=ST-FL_1_2_0_1&rankName9=GEO_1_2_1_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a> for the figures*, and <a href="https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/acc/ESA2010/pdf/Correspondence_Table_ESA_2010_vs_ESA_95_for_Instruments.pdf?b68c5a1c177fe740280d813f811955bf">here</a> for definitions). The figures show that, for the first time since at least 2006, the Greek state was net paying off creditors throughout 2014, to the tune of around EUR1bn per quarter - a shift in policy that was equivalent, in cash terms, to a small fiscal stimulus.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh9M9l7d_qvqm1zHqV0ScwTcFIPGSYP4_Hxm-6nKDFIObt4GralGn3cjbRRCBqQOVgm1gYD0Ghw8SazGgdeRx91epP7_Jl4328Y13Dd9CBV5XSdiVdY8vGrznc6lFT-4xe1YmBniYS6b8PP/s1600/budget03.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh9M9l7d_qvqm1zHqV0ScwTcFIPGSYP4_Hxm-6nKDFIObt4GralGn3cjbRRCBqQOVgm1gYD0Ghw8SazGgdeRx91epP7_Jl4328Y13Dd9CBV5XSdiVdY8vGrznc6lFT-4xe1YmBniYS6b8PP/s1600/budget03.png" height="222" width="320" /></a></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhgizWZdQ-f44CL3MBn9B2KrXpux4ze1bsbO7m4oAmyU17nSXbCvxFlrw3dQ1-DBh-RXiHY37ndE6IaYhbX4Rb80DhrTccjsOCiQwVyJeXGmwewD1U7rqsl80hQwaK9w94KK68hJ9Ha6Er9/s1600/budget04.png" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhgizWZdQ-f44CL3MBn9B2KrXpux4ze1bsbO7m4oAmyU17nSXbCvxFlrw3dQ1-DBh-RXiHY37ndE6IaYhbX4Rb80DhrTccjsOCiQwVyJeXGmwewD1U7rqsl80hQwaK9w94KK68hJ9Ha6Er9/s1600/budget04.png" height="236" width="320" /></a>Unfortunately, we don't have recent figures beyond Q3 2014, but at least we can establish the orders of magnitude involved. The Greek state has never been able, post-crisis, to get away with borrowing more than a tenth of its procurement and payroll expenditure from staff and trade creditors. If it were to go back to this level now, it could count on about EUR1.8bn per quarter, albeit only for a <i>very</i> short period of time. It was only able to squeeze that much out of creditors back when its was creditworthy after all. Additionally, government agencies are now bound by the <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/fighting-late-payments/index_en.htm">Late Payment Directive</a>, which limits the terms of credit they can demand to 30 days (60 for hospitals). A more realistic target would be to simply get back to being cash neutral, which is still a stretch and would yield closer to EUR1.1bn. That would be enough to cover our summertime debt payments, and see us through to the traditionally cash-positive second half of the year.<br />
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But here's the deal. If Greece is to use this tactic to pay off the debt coming due in June and July, it needs to start delaying payments right now - and Syriza's populist government cannot afford a buildup of many months' worth of selective defaults on its own people. Generally speaking, this kind of internal borrowing is hair-raisingly risky, and cannot be sustained for long without risking total collapse.<br />
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So the bottom line is, behind the scenes the Greek government should be drawing up a list of the people it can afford to piss off for a couple of months, and who can afford to wait. If it manages to draw on suppliers and state employees for the credit to see it through July, and if it manages to control spending thereafter despite its pre-election promises, it just might scrape by the rest of the year, after which our repayments schedule becomes quite uneventful (see below, from <a href="http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/04/daily-chart-7">here</a>). It could work, but it's fraught with threats to the economy and to social cohesion.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8dYwMzuDS-Wumf2ZvPX5QwvGByky2MCx-yLu1LR-a3Cx5SI0au3Uvve-Ds2-oTAqsMLUBVV5WrNXTQGr5bWeA9-8RMbSZeo56zI9O9GIK9VumftxNE7adm51EShBe_Z4XKnNuyfmAh68r/s1600/20150328_gdc620_1.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEg8dYwMzuDS-Wumf2ZvPX5QwvGByky2MCx-yLu1LR-a3Cx5SI0au3Uvve-Ds2-oTAqsMLUBVV5WrNXTQGr5bWeA9-8RMbSZeo56zI9O9GIK9VumftxNE7adm51EShBe_Z4XKnNuyfmAh68r/s1600/20150328_gdc620_1.png" height="222" width="400" /></a></div>
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*I notice that, bizarrely, the stock and flow numbers don't reconcile after Q2 2014 - i.e., there are changes to the stock of trade creditors that cannot be accounted by transactions, i.e. by the state paying off its debts to suppliers. I have no idea what this means but it looks odd.<br />
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-83030463784604876342015-04-01T23:45:00.000+01:002017-01-10T20:43:00.649+00:00On Greek working hours and structural reforms<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
Did you know who the hardest-working Europeans are? Go on, guess. It's the Greeks. Crazy right? Don't you feel bad for thinking they were lazy until now?<br />
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Three times already I've looked into this subject (<a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/work-hard-play-dead.html">here and </a><a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2012/06/exploding-myth-of-exploding-myth-of.html">here </a>and <a href="http://lolgreece.blogspot.co.uk/2011/06/dont-take-bait-alex-they-are-master.html">here</a>), and three times the story has turned out to be fatally flawed; yet with each year's 'Weekly Hours Worked' release from Eurostat a new batch of clickbait articles pop up tantalising the few people left who haven't yet been exposed to this supposed mythbuster with some variation of 'you'll never guess who the hardest-working Europeans are!'<br />
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If you feel vindicated by such articles against unfair stereotypes of supposedly lazy Greeks, I can't blame you. A proper look at (appropriate) data confirms that we are not lazy. But if you actually take these articles at face value, you have been woefully misled. You've also missed out on an opportunity to understand the Greek labour market in more detail. The only lazy people here are content mills like Statista.<br />
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<strong>The latest iteration - 2013 working hours and the Independent</strong><br />
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This time, the story made it into the <a href="http://i100.independent.co.uk/article/the-european-workers-who-work-the-longest-hours--xycGVDQ36g">Independent</a>, after trickling down from other outlets (see <a href="http://econintersect.com/b2evolution/blog1.php/2015/03/14/greeks-work-the-longest-hours-in-europe">here</a> and the original, <a href="http://www.statista.com/chart/3297/greeks-work-the-longest-hours-in-europe/">here</a>), until the Greek edition of Vice ended up covering the story under the headline '<a href="http://www.vice.com/gr/read/oi-ellines-douleuoun-perissotero-stin-eurwpi">should we be proud that Greeks work the longest hours in Europe</a>?' The Vice_Gr story featured an interview with one Mr. Poupkos, Youth Secretary of the Greek tertiary Union, who is actually <a href="http://synmas.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/blog-post_25.html">not an entirely unreasonable guy</a> - however, on this occasion his commentary focused on curbing illegal overtime and unpaid work; reading the stats and the interview together, one might be excused for thinking that the reason Greeks work so much more than other Europeans is because of unscrupulous bosses (of which, I do not dispute, we have no shortage).<br />
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In fact, the truth is very, very different. Comparing like for like, Greeks don't work insane hours at all. But the Greek labour market itself is deeply, structurally unhealthy - and the whopping working hours total is merely a statistical artifact of its structural defects. To understand why this is, you have to understand what figures these publications are quoting, how they compare across countries, and what drives them.<br />
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<strong>About the hours worked data </strong><br />
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The comparative figures on hours worked in Europe come from three sets of publications - <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053128_QID_2F107585_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;WORKTIME,L,Z,1;WSTATUS,L,Z,2;ISCO08,L,Z,3;UNIT,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-053128WSTATUS,EMP;DS-053128UNIT,HR;DS-053128SEX,T;DS-053128INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-053128ISCO08,TOTAL;DS-053128WORKTIME,TOTAL;&rankName1=WSTATUS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=WORKTIME_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=ISCO08_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">actual hours worked in main job</a>; <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053130_QID_4BF8BA38_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;WORKTIME,L,Z,1;WSTATUS,L,Z,2;ISCO08,L,Z,3;UNIT,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-053130WSTATUS,EMP;DS-053130WORKTIME,TOTAL;DS-053130UNIT,HR;DS-053130SEX,T;DS-053130INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-053130ISCO08,TOTAL;&rankName1=WSTATUS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName3=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=WORKTIME_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=GEO_1_2_0_1&rankName6=ISCO08_1_2_-1_2&rankName7=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName8=SEX_1_2_-1_2&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">usual hours worked in main job</a>, and <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-056206_QID_D9146AC_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;WORKTIME,L,Z,1;WSTATUS,L,Z,2;NACE_R2,L,Z,3;UNIT,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-056206NACE_R2,TOTAL;DS-056206WORKTIME,TOTAL;DS-056206INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-056206UNIT,HR;DS-056206WSTATUS,EMP;DS-056206SEX,T;&rankName1=WSTATUS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName3=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=WORKTIME_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=GEO_1_2_0_1&rankName6=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName7=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName8=NACE-R2_1_2_-1_2&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">actual hours worked in second job</a>. In theory, usual hours for second jobs should be reported somewhere but I've struggled to locate them.<br />
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All three of these datasets are compiled by Eurostat on the basis of the Labour Force Survey, which is carried out across the EU, and you can see in minute detail how these were defined up to 2013 <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/1978984/6037342/EU-LFS-explanatory-notes-from-2012-onwards.pdf">here</a>. LFS is the same survey we rely on for employment and unemployment figures, and is carried out pretty uniformly across the EU member states. If you see anyone referring to <a href="http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=ANHRS">OECD hours worked figures</a>, like Statista does, note that these too are sourced from the LFS when it comes to EU countries. For non-EU countries, the data sources can vary, and the implications of such variation can be <a href="http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2009/05/art1full.pdf">very significant</a>, so country figures are not comparable (as the OECD duly <a href="http://stats.oecd.org/OECDStat_Metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=ANHRS&Lang=en&">points out</a>). For some reason, Statista's figures seem to be aligned to 'usual' as opposed to 'actual' hours worked, even though they cite 'actual' hours worked data as the source. The effect is to slightly overestimate the actual time worked by Greek employees - citing 42 hours per week in people's first jobs, as opposed to the 'actual' figure of 40.3. Adding people with second jobs yields an 'actual' figure of 41.2 hours a week (see <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3888793/6194252/KS-TC-14-010-EN-N.pdf/39a79a33-4442-49b6-b83f-f0a5e81b02ef">here</a>).<br />
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These hours are self-reported by individual respondents -not employers, as the LFS is a household survey. They include overtime but not lunch breaks or travel to and from work. They are not unduly seasonal, as they incorporate four quarterly measurements, with multiple survey waves per quarter.<br />
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<strong>Comparing like with like </strong><br />
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Whole-labour-force figures like the ones published by Statista are very crude: they lump every working person together, add up their hours and divide by the number of people. So unless the economies being compared are very similar, these sorts of comparisons end up not comparing like for like. Full-time workers work longer hours than part-time workers. Men work longer hours than women. The self-employed work longer hours than employees, particularly if they own businesses of their own.<br />
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When you do compare like for like the differences don't look so huge anymore. The Greeks who genuinely work longer hours than their Eurozone counterparts are everyone with a second job (by a long stretch), and people who work part-time for a family business. Additionally, male part-time employees and part-time own account workers work longer hours than their German counterparts, though not their Eurozone counterparts.<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0lckVQ_lAq2TmHybzN2ABXZIs4LF4nanqm1CI4hNqw9dpaHWxelPqmSoWXXbjj6AH5YnVnZX9r2k01I9Cwts04_L7okGYDh4ilfGo6MQZHgkkyq_OJ01f2GQ9GzyDnF6bTdWogYE3wFRT/s1600/Comparisons.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="275" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEh0lckVQ_lAq2TmHybzN2ABXZIs4LF4nanqm1CI4hNqw9dpaHWxelPqmSoWXXbjj6AH5YnVnZX9r2k01I9Cwts04_L7okGYDh4ilfGo6MQZHgkkyq_OJ01f2GQ9GzyDnF6bTdWogYE3wFRT/s1600/Comparisons.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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So the contribution of unscrupulous bosses to hours worked in Greece is very limited, and the bosses in question are most likely to be business owners employing their own families, employers of second-jobbers (who are, presumably neutral with regards to whether their employees have another job but prefer more qualified candidates), and employers unable to offer their staff full hours, who end up employing people part-time when everyone would prefer a full-time arrangement.</div>
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Using usual v. actual hours worked where possible doesn't change the big picture, although it does tend to amplify the differences between Greece and other countries.</div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsWUcf9ScqCmVMW_E-MCLNwxHMYLEZLpByrA9HUMRG5NoIpO64WOswXLvQsWHnYkwpSkxAQd1ewVvCSCDNnTXEUfCYj9EDjYOcHE1fIQWXVUGnypwan3R0iAZQRnhZQR8ozHWYfaDaWQ91/s1600/Comparisons2.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="221" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsWUcf9ScqCmVMW_E-MCLNwxHMYLEZLpByrA9HUMRG5NoIpO64WOswXLvQsWHnYkwpSkxAQd1ewVvCSCDNnTXEUfCYj9EDjYOcHE1fIQWXVUGnypwan3R0iAZQRnhZQR8ozHWYfaDaWQ91/s1600/Comparisons2.png" width="400" /></a></div>
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Note that the discrepancy that is so obvious when one looks at hours worked carries over to other areas of work that are far less documented - holidays, sick leave, retirement age, the lot. The self-employed and family workers, for instance, take fewer days off and retire later, if at all. </div>
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<strong>A structural issue</strong></div>
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So what accounts for the huge discrepancy in total hours worked, if not unscrupulous employers or workaholic Greeks? The structure of the labour market, that's what.</div>
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Simply put, Greece has <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053312_QID_321585AA_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;INDIC_EM,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-053312INDIC_EM,EMP_LFS;DS-053312INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-053312SEX,T;&rankName1=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDIC-EM_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">fewer part-time employees</a>* (less than half the EU average despite an upward trend); <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053514_QID_-69DB3D6A_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;INDIC_EM,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-053514SEX,F;DS-053514INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-053514INDIC_EM,ACT_RT_15_64;&rankName1=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDIC-EM_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=GEO_1_2_0_1&ppcRK=FIRST&ppcSO=ASC&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">fewer economically active women </a>(a participation rate ca. 12% lower than the EU average); more <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053124_QID_-27C803DA_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;AGE,L,Z,1;WSTATUS,L,Z,2;ISCO08,L,Z,3;UNIT,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-053124INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-053124UNIT,THS;DS-053124AGE,Y15-19;DS-053124SEX,T;DS-053124WSTATUS,SELF;DS-053124ISCO08,TOTAL;&rankName1=WSTATUS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=AGE_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=ISCO08_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">self-employed</a> people (including the 25.4% of our workforce who are own-account workers, v. 10.8% EU-wide and the 6.6% who are employers, v. 4.3% EU wide); more <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-053118_QID_4C96F9AD_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;AGE,L,Z,1;WSTATUS,L,Z,2;ISCO08,L,Z,3;UNIT,L,Z,4;INDICATORS,C,Z,5;&zSelection=DS-053118ISCO08,TOTAL;DS-053118WSTATUS,CFAM;DS-053118INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-053118UNIT,THS;DS-053118SEX,T;DS-053118AGE,Y15-64;&rankName1=WSTATUS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=AGE_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=ISCO08_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName7=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName8=GEO_1_2_0_1&pprRK=FIRST&pprSO=PROTOCOL&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">contributing family workers</a> (three times the EU average); but not <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-052902_QID_6B7A526_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;WSTATUS2,L,Z,1;WSTATUS,L,Z,2;UNIT,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-052902INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-052902WSTATUS,EMP;DS-052902SEX,T;DS-052902UNIT,THS;DS-052902WSTATUS2,EMP;&rankName1=WSTATUS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=WSTATUS2_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">more people with second jobs</a> - in fact, the share of employed people with second jobs (deduced from <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-052902_QID_6B7A526_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;WSTATUS2,L,Z,1;WSTATUS,L,Z,2;UNIT,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-052902INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-052902WSTATUS,EMP;DS-052902SEX,T;DS-052902UNIT,THS;DS-052902WSTATUS2,EMP;&rankName1=WSTATUS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=WSTATUS2_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here </a>and <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-052908_QID_-23088360_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;GEO,L,Y,0;SEX,L,Z,0;AGE,L,Z,1;ISCED11,L,Z,2;UNIT,L,Z,3;INDICATORS,C,Z,4;&zSelection=DS-052908ISCED11,TOTAL;DS-052908INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;DS-052908UNIT,THS;DS-052908AGE,Y15-64;DS-052908SEX,T;&rankName1=ISCED11_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=UNIT_1_2_-1_2&rankName3=AGE_1_2_-1_2&rankName4=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName5=SEX_1_2_-1_2&rankName6=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName7=GEO_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here</a>) peaked at 3.4% in 2009, 10% lower than the EU average, then fell to 1.8%, or less than half the EU average, by 2013; as might be expected when jobs are in short supply.</div>
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So the question of 'why do Greeks work so many hours', put in its proper context, becomes one of why we have so many unproductive family businesses, why there are so many own-account workers in our workforce, why our workplaces find it so hard to accommodate part-time workers, and why we can't get more women into the labour market. Not all of these are <i>necessarily </i>problems, but they are structural characteristics of the Greek economy. Changing them requires that magical catch-all phrase, 'structural reforms.'</div>
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* Note that LFS definitions of part-time employment differ among member states. </div>
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<strong>What about productivity?</strong></div>
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The usual counterarguments offered to the kinds of crude working hours statistics provided by the Indepedent are a) yes, but productivity is lower b) yes but it is possible to spend hours at work without doing much c) yes but it's possible to work very hard producing products/services that no-one wants. All three are roughly, though not exactly, equivalent, and all three generally lead back to the structural questions raised above.</div>
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Since these objections are prompted by a discussion of hours worked, the obvious point of departure in comparisons of productivity is output per hour worked. As you can see <a href="http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?query=BOOKMARK_DS-055408_QID_-E346A8D_UID_-3F171EB0&layout=TIME,C,X,0;UNIT,L,Y,0;GEO,L,Z,0;INDIC_NA,L,Z,1;INDICATORS,C,Z,2;&zSelection=DS-055408GEO,EL;DS-055408INDIC_NA,LPR;DS-055408INDICATORS,OBS_FLAG;&rankName1=INDICATORS_1_2_-1_2&rankName2=GEO_1_2_0_1&rankName3=INDIC-NA_1_2_1_1&rankName4=TIME_1_0_0_0&rankName5=UNIT_1_2_0_1&sortC=ASC_-1_FIRST&rStp=&cStp=&rDCh=&cDCh=&rDM=true&cDM=true&footnes=false&empty=false&wai=false&time_mode=NONE&time_most_recent=false&lang=EN&cfo=%23%23%23%2C%23%23%23.%23%23%23">here,</a> the Greek economy produced about a quarter less per hour worked than the EU as a whole, even after accounting for our lower purchasing power.</div>
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However, this tells us very little about Greek workers themselves: <em>individuals </em>are not 'productive' as such, because labour is only one factor of production. The productivity of labour is a function of many things, including private and public capital. So while it is meaningful to ask how many hours the average Greek works, it is pointless to ask how productive he/she is and attribute this to him/her as a <em>personal </em>characteristic. To do that, we need to ask a different set of questions altogether, and there are two alternatives.</div>
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We can measure the <em>quality </em>of labour used by the Greek economy and its <em>stock</em> of human capital; or how much of its output cannot be explained by inputs such as hours worked and capital employed alone. Each question is methodologically fraught but attempts have been made to answer them. </div>
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With regards to human capital, sources such as the WEF's <a href="http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_HumanCapitalReport_2013.pdf">Human Capital Report</a>, the WEF's <a href="http://knoema.com/WFGCI2014/the-global-competitiveness-index-2014-2015-data-platform-2014">World Competitiveness Report</a> or the UN's <a href="http://hdr.undp.org/en/2014-report">Human Development Index</a> are not terribly helpful because they include too many labour market <em>outcomes</em> in their calculations - what we're looking to capture are inputs, such as skills, motivation, resilience and self-discipline, and they only include education inputs up to a point. The best use one can put them to is in measuring the quantity and quality of education - where you'll find that Greeks do well for quantity but less so for quality - and even then a lot of the lag in quality comes in after one enters the job market - which is an employer's fault at least as much as it is the employee's.</div>
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One can also draw on social psychology research, and particularly comparative studies focusing on the Big Five personality traits, to measure some intrinsic qualities that make up the profile of a hard-working personality - <a href="http://psychology.about.com/od/personalitydevelopment/a/bigfive.htm">conscientiousness</a> in particular is a trait <a href="http://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/A-Meta-Analytic-Investigation-of-Conscientiousness-in-the-Prediction-of-Job-Performance-Examining-the-Intercorrelations-and-the-Incremental-Validity-of-Narrow-Traits..asp1_.pdf">known to correlate strongly</a> with work performance, and which fits the kind of attitudes involved in the 'hard working Greeks' theme. <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Amber_Thalmayer/publication/264162275_The_Questionnaire_Big_Six_in_26_Nations_Developing_Cross-Culturally_Applicable_Big_Six_Big_Five_and_Big_Two_Inventories/links/541c8b310cf203f155b936a6.pdf">One comparison</a> finds that Greeks score reasonably well and there is little difference in this regard between Greeks and Germans; in <a href="http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Dave_Bartram/publication/258144315_Scalar_Equivalence_of_OPQ32_Big_Five_Profiles_of_31_Countries/links/5480448d0cf2ccc7f8bb64f4.pdf">another</a>, we score slightly higher. Similarly, the OECD PISA <a href="http://www.oecd.org/pisa/keyfindings/PISA-2012-results-volume-III.pdf">comparisons of perseverance and motivation</a> among pupils show that Greek pupils do really quite well (check the data <a href="http://pisa2012.acer.edu.au/interactive.php">here</a>, there is too much to summarise). </div>
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TFP calculations are problematic because they require detailed data on the various factors of production (including different kinds of capital), which the Greek authorities do not produce regularly. Both the <a href="http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=PDB_LV">OECD</a> and <a href="http://www.euklems.net/">EU-KLEMS</a> projects include no TFP calculations for Greece, although EU KLEMS provided enough data for others to fill in the blanks. We now know, for instance, that Greek TFP <a href="http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/qr_euro_area/2014/pdf/qrea1_section_1_en.pdf">did not rise</a> from 1999 to 2007, nor indeed did TFP in any PIIGS country, or in Belgium for that matter (but see <a href="http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/92935/1/778812839.pdf">here</a> too for the opposite finding). Greek TFP was also losing ground against other developed countries <a href="http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/macro/docs/Year/2009/papers/paper_2_77.pdf">from the early 80s onwards</a>, possibly even <a href="http://www.eurobank.gr/Uploads/reports/ECONOMY_MARKETS_FEBRUARY2014.pdf">the 60s</a>, and continued to lose ground throughout the <a href="https://ucy.ac.cy/erc/documents/Mamuneas_Ketteni_67-79.pdf">early part of the crisis</a>. </div>
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But TFP figures us nothing about the attributes of Greek employees - only that they appear to be saddled with crap technologies (in the broad sense) of production. Indeed, TFP is a residual - the measure of our ignorance.</div>
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[TO BE CONTINUED]</div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com6tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4777210255040195387.post-47489919456784746012015-03-16T12:14:00.000+00:002015-03-16T12:22:47.169+00:00Greece, Inequality and the age divide. Some self-explanatory figures.<div dir="ltr" style="text-align: left;" trbidi="on">
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjcDrSsO-AJIARa8-zcO96V9yem8ahaiRvGfqsVpNw_SVDR8jd9iAyrEVZUd4qsLXmHThz_5xNsimuYgUb_S88FQu5nJp3_3xTyr77txCkmAX8HxjSAhgwEcKmPHRNIOhQwN0cRxyAwXTln/s1600/Over+65.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjcDrSsO-AJIARa8-zcO96V9yem8ahaiRvGfqsVpNw_SVDR8jd9iAyrEVZUd4qsLXmHThz_5xNsimuYgUb_S88FQu5nJp3_3xTyr77txCkmAX8HxjSAhgwEcKmPHRNIOhQwN0cRxyAwXTln/s1600/Over+65.png" height="640" width="476" /></a></div>
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Source: <a class="twitter-timeline-link" href="http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD" role="presentation"><span style="color: #abb8c2;">http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=IDD</span></a></div>
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Manoshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01568922717477813566noreply@blogger.com2