COUNTING GREECE'S LIBERTARIANS

Veteran readers will know of my love affair with the European Values Study of 2008 - the last snapshot of Greek society's beliefs and norms before the crisis. It's heartening to know that Greece will also take part in the 2017 iteration of the survey, which will allow us to assess the impact of the crisis on the Greek psyche in more detail than has hitherto been possible.

Today I was hoping to use the 2008 study for a simple stock-take of Greece's libertarian population. The EVS does not discuss libertarianism as such but does ask a range of questions to help establish people's attitudes towards social mores, institutions and the role of the state. Many of these questions are scored conveniently on a scale of 1 to 10 and look into behaviours that respondents approve or disapprove of and their level of agreement with a range of statements about society and the economy.

Factor analysis can be applied to these variables to reveal some of the key attitudes underlying people's responses and score individual respondents based on the extent to which they share each of them (scores will follow a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1).

In the case of Greece, seven core attitudes emerge:

1. Social Liberalism (tolerance for homosexuality, abortion, divorce, assisted suicide, casual sex, prostitution, adultery, soft drugs, suicide)
2. Dishonest Self-Interest (tolerance for lying in own interest, accepting a bribe, benefits fraud, paying bribes, tax evasion)
3. Preference for State Control of the Economy (tolerance for state intervention, competition seen as harmful, belief in state responsibility for the worse-off, preference for public ownership of enterprises, tolerance for less conditionality in unemployment benefits).
4. Distinction between 'victimless crimes' and behaviours involving obvious detriment (tolerance for joyriding, avoiding fares in public transport, tax evasion)
5. Appetite for controversial science (GM food, experiments involving human embryos)
6. Approval of the Death Penalty
7. Aversion to redistribution of incomes (Preference for rewarding effort over equal outcomes, self-identification as right-wing).

This analysis is based on 999 Greek responses (out of a full sample of 1,500 - each case had to have responses for all of the relevant questions to make it into the factor analysis).

If you run the exact same analysis on the pan-European version of the EVS2008, (using 38,218 out of 67,786 responses) the same factors emerge, with the exception of the 'victimless crimes' factor. This does not mean this way of thinking is unique to Greece, of course; only that it is not universally present throughout Europe. Note that 'Europe' for the purposes of the EVS includes all of the Nordics, as well as Russia, Turkey and the Caucasus. I'll try to use 'Europe+' where possible to remind you of the fact.

By design, the factors are orthogonal and standardised - ie they are not correlated. This means one must be careful and imaginative in interpreting them. For example, most people who want a redistribution of income also have at least some tolerance for state control of the economy. However, for the two factors to be orthogonal the concepts need some rewording so that they can be truly independent of each other. So the State Control factor is more about state ownership of the means of production and "to each according to his needs..." - classical Marxism in one sense - while the Redistribution factor deals more specifically with fiscal policy and the willingness to redistribute income through tax and benefits. A person can believe in public ownership and also not be convinced by redistribution of income - after all what's the point of taxation and a benefits system in the full-employment paradise of centrally planned production (and consumption)?

With this caveat in mind, it's fair to say that factors 1 and 7 are probably enough to identify potential libertarians, who should score high in factor 1 (socially liberal) and factor 7 (averse to redistribution of income), and low on factor 3 (against state control of the economy and redistribution of income). I realise I'm oversimplifying of course. It's possible to be a socially conservative libertarian; you may strongly disapprove of, say, adultery, or abortion, and even lecture people against them privately. However, if you always stop short of demanding that government legislate against such behaviours, or that they be penalised in some other mandatory way, you're a libertarian in my book. Unfortunately we don't have the kind of data that would allow this.

It's possible, using the pan-European version of the dataset, to position 2008 Greece in the spectrum of libertarianism: at .1 standard deviation above the European+ mean we were not doing quite so badly for social liberalism. We were marginally less averse to the redistribution of income than the average European+ country (at .16 of a standard deviation below the mean). But we were also one of the highest-ranked countries (at .32 of a standard deviation above the mean) in terms of wanting the government to have control of the economy. And that was in 2008. Commentators who dub Greece the last Soviet republic in Europe (and are routinely vilified for this) kind of have a point.

Now if we assume that libertarians need to be above the European+ average in terms of social liberalism and below the average in their appetite for state control and redistribution, then the number of Greek libertarians was small in 2008 - a mere 6.4% of the adult population and proportionately less than half the European+ average (13.6%). The leaderboard of countries with big libertarian populations is packed with notorious hell-holes like Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and the Netherlands. Nearly half of all Danes are libertarian by this grouping.

This is of course only a crude way of grouping people (I'll refer to it as the quadrant method for ease of reference). One could, alternatively, use cluster analysis to arrive at less arbitrary, more cohesive groups within which individuals have more in common. No method I've tried using the variables above creates a libertarian cluster naturally, whether in Greece or EU-wide. More skilled people might be able to produce better results (I'm looking at you @dimmu). The best I could do was a k-means clustering in which I forced SPSS to produce 8 clusters (the 'Octo-grouping'). The Octo-clusters are best interpreted as political tribes - the kind of people likely to take similar sides of a public issue. Often members of the same political tribe have significant ideological differences, but can put these aside for a common cause.

The results change a fair amount using this more cohesive grouping, and I find the way in which the results change particularly disappointing.
Under the 'Octo-grouping', the number of Greek libertarians rises slightly (to 7.2% against a Europe+ average of 10.9%). But the character or the group changes substantially - becoming less socially liberal and more extreme in their views on state control and income redistribution. In fact, Greek 'libertarians' under the Octo-grouping are not, on average, socially liberal; they straddle the axis instead. Only about 40% of the Greek octo-libertarians score against the Europe+ averages the way I described earlier; the bulk of the rest of the group is made up of individuals that I can only call 'free market paternalists' - people who hate state control and income redistribution but are socially conservative. Meanwhile, many 'quadrant' libertarians have more tribal ties with a very different political tradition - social liberals who believe that a certain level of state ownership can obviate the need for mass income redistribution by taking care of citizens' basic needs (think Singapore's policy on housing for instance).

From 2008 to 2015: who are we now?

Will the headline figures have changed much since 2008? On the one hand, some of the broad
attitudes described above surely correspond to stable personal values. On the other, it's been eight disastrous years for Greece since the EVS, and 'neoliberalism' has since been established for many Greeks as the source of all our misfortunes. This term (see here for one of the tortured, rambling definitions held up as definitive) has been applied indiscriminately to libertarians as well as others. Although not all of us identify with it we certainly know we're likely being talked about when it is used.

Well, two surveys of 1,000 Greeks each by DiaNEOSis found that around 10% self-identified as 'neoliberals' between April (10.6%) and November 2015 (9.3%). DiaNEOSis' 'neoliberals' are a fairly good proxy, I think, for my EVS (quadrant) libertarians, at least as far as their political affiliation goes. However, the Greek centre-right was twice as likely to be 'neoliberals' in 2015 as they were to be 'libertarians' in 2008, and at first I wondered to what extent that's because the Greek centre-right has largely emptied in the meantime. In reality, its share of the population has remained remarkably stable (18.5% in EVS, 19.3% in April DiaNEOSis and 20% in November DiaNEOSis). One explanation might be that the Greek crisis (or perhaps Syriza/ANEL rule) has shifted much of the Greek centre-right into the libertarian camp by convincing them of the dangers of excessive spending or state intervention. Or perhaps they've been drawn into the fold by the endless flow of divisive rhetoric of the past year. Or maybe, self-identification with the pejorative term 'neoliberal' suggests a confrontational attitude versus parts of the Greek political spectrum but few actual libertarian beliefs.

This section under contstruction

My original tables for this section were wrong. I am recalculating everything. Bear with me.

I need to provide some context here: EVS fieldwork in Greece took place between 12 September and 26 October 2008. This was before the mass protests of December 2008, and almost a year before the national elections of 2009. It followed the narrow passing of a pension reform bill (modest by today's standards but still strongly opposed) in March 2008, and the polls had already swung (narrowly) in favour of a PASOK win, with margins of anything between 0 and 3%. Syriza, or perhaps Ur-Syriza as it was still a radical, movement-based party at the time, was polling at anything between 8% and 10%.


Annex: Code for the factor analysis

The factor analysis is easy to reproduce if you have the raw EVS data, and the code is identical for both the Greek and the full EVS datasets:

FACTOR

  /VARIABLES v193 v194 v195 v196 v197 v198 v199 v233 v234 v235 v236 v237 v238 v239 v240 v241 v242 

    v243 v244 v245 v246 v247 v248 v249 v250 v251 v252

  /MISSING LISTWISE 

  /ANALYSIS v193 v194 v195 v196 v197 v198 v199 v233 v234 v235 v236 v237 v238 v239 v240 v241 v242 

    v243 v244 v245 v246 v247 v248 v249 v250 v251 v252

  /PRINT KMO ROTATION

  /FORMAT SORT BLANK(.40)

  /PLOT EIGEN

  /CRITERIA MINEIGEN(1) ITERATE(999)

  /EXTRACTION PC

  /CRITERIA ITERATE(999)

  /ROTATION VARIMAX

  /SAVE REG(ALL)

  /METHOD=CORRELATION.

Ο ΛΑΟΣ ΔΕΝ ΞΕΧΝΑ, ΟΚ. ΑΛΛΑ ΤΙ ΣΗΜΑΙΝΕΙ (ΚΕΝΤΡΟ)ΔΕΞΙΑ;

Ο λαός, λέει το σύνθημα, δεν ξεχνά τι σημαίνει δεξιά. Όπως όλα τα συνθήματα, έτσι κι αυτό είναι αστείο. Ο λαός ξεχνά και ξαναθυμάται κατά το συμφέρον του, και τη μανούβρα αυτή μπορεί να την κάνει και σε μετα-γνωσιακό επίπεδο: ξεχνά πως κάποτε ήξερε, ή θυμάται πως κάποτε ξέχασε, τι σημαίνει Δεξιά. Έτσι κάπως η ΝΔ ανακαλύπτει το αντιμνημόνιο που ξέχασε μετά το 2012 και η πρώτη φορά Αριστερά συγκυβερνά με Ανελ και κάνει (προσωρινά) υφυπουργό τον Πόρτα-Πόρτα.

Εντούτοις, ενόψει των εσωκομματικών εκλογών στη ΝΔ, με τον Καμμένο άλλη μια φορά κυβερνητικό εταίρο και την ΧΑ σταθερά τρίτο κόμμα (αν και ευτυχώς σε απόλυτους όρους η ψήφος της πέφτει) το σύνθημα είναι τουλάχιστον επίκαιρο αν εκφραστεί λίγο διαφορετικά. Κυρίως δε γίνεται επίκαιρο το τί σημαίνει κεντροδεξιά: ένα ερώτημα-δείγμα παρακμής από μόνο του, όπως και η συζήτηση περί κεντροαριστεράς που προηγήθηκε της τελικής διάλυσης του ΠαΣοΚ.

Προσωπικά δεν με ενδιαφέρει πώς ορίζουν την (κεντρο)δεξιά οι επίδοξοι ηγέτες της. Τα λόγια είναι τσάμπα εξάλλου, και όλοι έχουν κίνητρο να ανοιχτούν σε ένα πλατύ κοινό. Ούτε με ενδιαφέρει πώς την ορίζουν οι αντίπαλοί της. Με ενδιαφέρει μόνο το πώς καταλήγει κανείς να θεωρεί τον εαυτό του (κεντρο)δεξιό - ποιές αρχές, αξίες, μνήμες, συνθήκες διαβίωσης και παραστάσεις ωθούν κάποιον στο να ταυτιστεί με αυτή τη λέξη. Ευτυχώς υπάρχει τρόπος να το ελέγξουμε.

Τα στοιχεία μου εν προκειμένω προέρχονται από την Ευρωπαϊκή Έρευνα Αξιών του 2008 - την πιο πρόσφατη δυστυχώς. Περιμένω πώς και πώς την επόμενη έρευνα του 2017, στην οποία έμαθα με μεγάλη ανακούφιση ότι θα συμμετάσχει η Ελλάδα. Η σύγκριση των δύο ερευνών θα μας πει πιο πολλά για την κρίση, τα αίτια και τις επιπτώσεις της από δέκα διδακτορικά οικονομολόγων πάνω στο θέμα.

Το δείγμα της Έρευνας Αξιών είναι σταθμισμένο και αντιπροσωπευτικό: 1.208 Έλληνες άνω των 16 (η έρευνα περιλάμβανε γύρω στους 1.500 αλλά τόσοι απήντησαν στις ερωτήσεις που με απασχολούν - δείτε παρακάτω). Το ερωτηματολόγιο μπορείτε να το δείτε εδώ. Η πολιτική τοποθέτηση των ερωτηθέντων μετριέται σε κλίμακα από 1-10, όπου 1 είναι ο πιο αριστερός Έλληνας και 10 ο πιο δεξιός. Σε καμμία φάση της συνέντευξης δεν δίνεται ορισμός σε αυτές τις έννοιες. Πέρα από την ερώτηση περί πολιτικής τοποθέτησης, υπάρχουν και πολλές άλλες που εστιάζουν στις νοοτροπίες, αξίες και ιδανικά του συνεντευξιαζόμενου, αλλά και στην καταγωγή, την οικογενειακή και οικονομική κατάστασή του, και τη θέση του στην κοινωνία γενικότερα.

Η λογική είναι απλή: αν βρούμε τις νοοτροπίες, τις ιδέες και τα ιδανικά που τείνουν να ενστερνίζονται περισσότερο οι αυτοαποκαλούμενοι 'δεξιοί' από τους υπόλοιπους Έλληνες (και τα οποία τείνουν να ενστερνίζονται σε μεγαλύτερο βαθμό όσο πιο 'δεξιοί' θεωρούν ότι είναι), τότε έχουμε στα χέρια μας έναν εμπειρικό ορισμό και της δεξιάς, και της 'κεντροδεξιάς.' Και επειδή αυτό που στην πραγματικότητα αναζητούμε είναι μια σειρά από στερεότυπα, σκέφτηκα να χρησιμοποιήσω μια απλή μέθοδο - decision trees. Ουσιαστικά, η μέθοδος αυτή επιτρέπει να δοκιμάσουμε πολλές τέτοιες νοοτροπίες, ιδέες και ιδανικά, μία-μία, για να βρούμε ποιές χωρίζουν πιο ξεκάθαρα τον Ελληνικό λαό σε 'δεξιούς' και 'αριστερούς'. Μόλις βρεθεί η καλύτερη διαχωριστική γραμμή, η διαδικασία επαναλαμβάνεται για κάθε ένα ξεχωριστά από τα δύο μέρη στα οποία χωρίστηκε ο πληθυσμός με όλες τις μεταβλητές που δοκιμάσαμε και νωρίτερα - και ούτω καθεξής, μέχρι να καταλήξουμε σε υπο-ομάδες που παραείναι μικρές για να διασπαστούν παραπάνω, επειδή τα επιμέρους μέρη δεν θα μπορούσαν να συγκριθούν μεταξύ τους με στατιστικά σημαντικό τρόπο.

Εφαρμόζοντας αυτή τη λογική πάνω στο πλήρες δείγμα της έρευνας, βλέπει κανείς ότι μερικές ερωτήσεις χωρίζουν το δείγμα με ξεκάθαρο τρόπο σε περισσότερο και λιγότερο δεξιούς. Σημειώνω με (+) τους παράγοντες που σχετίζονται με πιο 'δεξιά' άτομα, και με (-) αυτούς που σχετίζονται με πιο 'αριστερά' άτομα. Τα 'επίπεδα' που σημειώνω υποδηλώνουν πόσες φορές έχει υποδιαιρεθεί ο πληθυσμός όταν εμφανίζεται για πρώτη φορά ως σημαντική διαχωριστική γραμμή μια μεταβλητή.

• Επίπεδο πρώτο: πόσο εμπιστεύεται κανείς την Εκκλησία ως θεσμό (+); 
• Επίπεδο δεύτερο: Πόση εμπιστοσύνη έχει στους δημοσίους υπαλλήλους (-) Έχει ποτέ συμματάσχει σε διαδήλωση (-); Πόση εμπιστοσύνη έχει στα εργατικά σωματεία και τους συνδικαλιστές (-); 
• Επίπεδο τρίτο: Θεωρεί αποδεκτή την έκτρωση για μια ανύπαντρη γυναίκα (-); Θεωρεί αποδεκτή συμπεριφορά το περιστασιακό σεξ με αγνώστους (-);  Θεωρεί ανεπιθύμητους ως γείτονες τους Ρομά (+); Θεωρεί επικίνδυνο το να επεμβαίνει ο άνθρωπος στο φυσικό του περιβάλλον (+); θεωρεί σημαντικό η δουλειά του να τον φέρνει σε επαφή με (ενδιαφέροντες) ανθρώπους (-); θεωρεί ότι είναι δουλειά των ιδιωτών ή του κράτους να φροντίζουν τους πιο αδύναμους; (-)

Δοκίμασα, βέβαια πολλές ακόμη ερωτήσεις που δεν αποδείχθηκαν καλές στο να ξεχωρίζουν τον πληθυσμό σε 'δεξιούς' και 'αριστερούς.' Δεν τις παραθέτω εδώ για λόγους συντομίας, αλλά περιλάμβαναν και πολλές δημογραφικού χαρακτήρα μεταβλητές όπως ηλικία, φύλο, οικογενειακό εισόδημα, καταγωγή και λοιπά. Θα προσέξετε ότι η ανάλυσή μου δεν εξετάζει την επίδραση των διαφόρων μεταβλητών ταυτόχρονα - δεν υπάρχουν controls. Οπότε δεν απαντά στο ερώτημα 'ποιές επιρροές κάνουν έναν Έλληνα δεξιό/αριστερό;' - μόνο στο ερώτημα 'τι σημαίνει στο μυαλό του Έλληνα δεξιά/αριστερά;'

Μιλήσαμε λοιπόν για το πλήρες δείγμα. Όμως και η αριστερά έχει τη 'δεξιότερη' μεριά της, και η δεξιά επίσης έχει την, αχέμ, 'δεξιότερη' μεριά της. Τι σημαίνει 'δεξιά' σε αυτό το πλαίσιο; Για να το εξηγήσουμε αυτό επαναλαμβάνουμε την ίδια ακριβώς ανάλυση, ξεχωριστά για 'δεξιούς' (6-10 στην κλίμακα αριστερά-δεξιά) και για 'αριστερούς' (1-5).

Για τους αριστερούς τα πράγματα έχουν ως εξής (τα θετικά πρόσημα υποδεικνύουν παράγοντες που σχετίζονται με την κεντροαριστερά):

• Επίπεδο πρώτο: πόσο εμπιστεύεται κανείς την Εκκλησία ως θεσμό (+); 
• Επίπεδο δεύτερο: πόσο σημαντικό μέρος της ζωής του είναι η πολιτική; (+) πόσο θεμιτό θεωρεί το να παίρνει κανείς επιδόματα πρόνοιας τα οποία τυπικά δεν δικαιούται; (-) πόσο σημαντικό θεωρεί ότι είναι για την υγεία ενός γάμου το να έχει το ζευγάρι ένα καλό σπίτι; (+); πόσο σημαντικό θεωρεί για τη ζωή του το να έχει άφθονο ελεύθερο χρόνο; (+); 
• Επίπεδο τρίτο: Θεωρεί αποδεκτή την έκτρωση για μια ανύπαντρη γυναίκα (-); πόση εμπιστοσύνη έχει στις ένοπλες δυνάμεις (+); θεωρεί σημαντικό για την υγεία ενός γάμου να έχουν οι δύο σύντροφοι ίδιες θρησκευτικές πεποιθήσεις; (+)

Για τους δεξιούς τα πράγματα έχουν ως εξής. Όπως πάντα τα θετικά πρόσημα υποδεικύουν παράγοντες που σχετίζονται με τη δεξιά, εν προκειμένω με τους αυτοχαρακτηριζόμενους ως πολύ δεξιούς ή και ακροδεξιούς. Άρα τα αρνητικά πρόσημα υποδηλώνουν συσχετισμό με την κεντροδεξιά:

• Επίπεδο πρώτο: πόσο σημαντικό θεωρεί ότι είναι για την υγεία ενός γάμου το να ζει το ζευγάρι ξεχωριστά από τους γονείς των δύο συντρόφων; (-)
• Επίπεδο δεύτερο: όταν τον ρωτάς αν η συντήρηση των φτωχότερων είναι καθήκον των ιδιωτών ή του κράτους, και όταν τον ρωτάς αν ο άνθρωπος έχει δικαίωμα να διαχειρίζεται τη φύση όπως νομίζει, απαντά με απόλυτο τρόπο (σίγουρα ναι ή σίγουρα όχι;) (+)
• Επίπεδο τρίτο: θεωρεί με απόλυτη βεβαιότητα ότι οι άντρες πρέπει να κάνουν παιδιά για να ολοκληρωθούν σαν άτομα; (+)

[Το γράφημα μου βγήκε λίγο λάθος - το διορθώνω σύντομα]

Συμπέρασμα - το 2008, οι Έλληνες θεωρούσαν 'δεξιά' μια θρησκευόμενη, κοινωνικά συντηρητική μερίδα του πληθυσμού που έβλεπε ως απειλές προς τον τρόπο ζωής της μια σειρά από επιστημονικές, κοινωνικές και γεωπολιτικές εξελίξεις και προέβαλλε ως αξία την άμυνα ενάντια σε αυτές. Η 'δεξιά' στο μυαλό του μέσου Έλληνα έβλεπε κάποιους συνανθρώπους ως ανεπιθύμητους, έβλεπε με δυσπιστία το συνδικαλισμό, τον ακτιβισμό , και είχε επιφυλάξεις απέναντι στο κοινωνικό κράτος και την πρόοδο της επιστήμης. Έβλεπε δε τη δουλειά πολύ περισσότερο ως μέσο βιοπορισμού και λιγότερο ως χώρο έκφρασης ή αυτοπραγμάτωσης.

Με βάση την ίδια λογική, οι δεξιότεροι Έλληνες θεωρούσαν 'Κεντροδεξιά' το κομμάτι της δεξιάς που φοβόταν τους δογματισμούς σε περίπλοκα ζητήματα, και έδειχνε ανοχή σε όσους αμφισβητούσαν τις δομές και αξίες της παραδοσιακής (εκτεταμένης;) οικογένειας.

Οι αριστερότεροι Έλληνες από την άλλη θεωρούσαν 'κεντροαριστερά' το κομμάτι της αριστεράς που ήταν θρησκευόμενο ή θεωρούσε την εκκλησία σημαντικό θεσμό, δεν εξέφραζε αντιμιλιταριστικές θέσεις, είχε μεσοαστικές αξιώσεις (οικονομική άνεση, πολιτική έκφραση και ελεύθερο χρόνο), και επιπλέον το ενοχλούσε η σπατάλη στις κοινωνικές δαπάνες.

Πού να είναι άραγε τώρα όλοι αυτοί οι κεντροαριστεροί και κεντροδεξιοί; Η πρώτη μου αντίδραση είναι ότι οι κεντροαριστεροί του 2008, με τις μεσοαστικές και (γιατί όχι;) υλιστικές αξίες τους, πρέπει να τσαλακώθηκαν περισσότερο από όλη την υπόλοιπη χώρα την εποχή της κρίσης και να εκφράζονται πλέον εντελώς διαφορετικά - ο χώρος τους δεν υπάρχει. Οι κεντροδεξιοί του 2008, από την άλλη, έχουν ελαφρύ ιδεολογικό στίγμα και θα μπορούσαν πλέον να ψηφίζουν ό,τιδήποτε.

Μια τελευταία σημείωση: Το 2008, από τους ερωτηθέντες που δέχτηκαν να πουν πού τοποθετούνται στην κλίμακα δεξιά-αριστερά, το 61% ήταν από κεντροαριστεροί (5) ως @conclavios (1). Το 20% προτίμησε να μην απαντήσει. Το 'κέντρο' (5-6) συγκέντρωνε το 40% της ψήφου, ανώ τα άκρα (1-2 και 9-10) το 18%.

WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT GREEK PRIVATE EDUCATION

In the early years of the Greek crisis, I used to feel a stirring of guilty pleasure when foreign media were forced to take deep dives into Greek politics. I would imagine young journos doing their meticulous research with a smug look on their faces and then suddenly being hit with a depressing realisation: "wow, this story goes so deep and so far back; I don't know who to trust; and every policy decision past or present hurts someone! - is that how it feels to be Greek?"

I rarely feel this way anymore, but the Economist's recent piece on Greek private education brought it all back for a moment.

VAT on Private Education: the story so far

As readers may know, in the aftermath of its capitulation in July and as details of the Third Memorandum were being ironed out with the Troika Institutions Quadriga, the Greek government found itself looking for alternatives to a VAT hike on beef. This idea, nominally popular with creditors, had run into stiff opposition within the ruling party, and speculation persists that pressure was being applied on the government by the French, eager to protect their beef exports (context here and here).

The Greek counter-proposal was to raise VAT on private education to an eye-watering 23%, and the story offered to the electorate at the time - that this was a specific demand from Greece's creditors - turned out to be a lie. On 'discovering' this in September, Syriza (now campaigning for re-election) pledged to reverse the measure if re-elected. However, on returning to power, they found little to offer the creditors in return and mooted a counterproposal for a three-tier VAT regime (0% for primary and pre-primary, 6% for vocational and cramming schools and 13% for private secondary schools). Unfortunately, the three-tier proposal was illegal. The VAT Directive lists services to which a two-or three-tier VAT regime may apply but this does not include education (for the entire context, read Articles 98, 132-133 and Annex III here). Effectively, the Greek government has only ever had a choice between applying a full VAT rate or a zero VAT rate to all private education.

With opposition to the VAT hike growing, and a number of private schools already in significant difficulty as a result, the Greek government will now, perhaps more appropriately, raise equivalent from gambling instead. Turns out the owners of newly-privatised OPAP aren't as good at lobbying as private schools, or maybe they did their lobbying too early.

Unfortunately, too little actual evidence was used in debating this issue; which is a shame because the facts on the ground tell us a fascinating (and often tragic) story about Greek society and how it's coping with the crisis.

An objection in principle

Before I go into the statistics, I need to clarify one thing: I believe that true education should not be taxed, and definitely shouldn't be subject to VAT of all taxes. Education, whether private or public, is not consumption; it is an investment. The time to tax is is when the human capital it creates starts generating income. There is a significant debate about how good the returns on investment in education are and whether any of the mechanisms that we assume produce its returns actually work (see this gem from Pseudoerasmus for example), but there is no doubting the purpose of most such spending; it is an investment in human capital.

I say most because not all spending with education providers purchases education as such. Parents may eg pay a premium for kids to be looked after a little while longer while they're at work. This extra schooling might build no human capital, but instead simply buy employers and employees additional flexibility. Rich parents might pay for access to a social elite - an investment in social capital but also (in less meritocratic societies) in future economic rents - which many libertarians would happily agree should be taxed. Parents afraid of the stiff competition their kids will face in getting into university or finding a job market may be paying for teaching-to-the-test even though they know it does not build human capital; as a kind of insurance for their children.

How education spending should be taxed or subsidised, whether it is investment or consumption, and whether it ought to be promoted or suppressed through better co-ordination really depends on these questions. It is perhaps natural for the ideological Left (whatever's left of it in Syriza) to despise private provision of a public good. However it's also worth bearing in mind a historical irony: in Greece's modern history, the expulson and, later, exclusion of teachers with open communist sympathies from public schools contributed strongly to building the supply of private tuition; this may also help explain its ability to specialise in serving lower-income groups.

How many Greek households use private education anyway?

The obvious starting point is the actual share of pupils enrolled in private education. 'Private education' is a very wide term, so it helps to speak more precisely by level of education, and to distinguish between provision in private schools and tuition in private institutions such as frontistiria, or by private tutors. Each of these sectors is a whole different kettle of fish, and taxability varies. Private one-on-one tutoring in particular can go underground in the blink of an eye - good luck collecting VAT on that.

About 7% of Greek pre-primary and primary school pupils go to private schools (see p 416 here or raw data here). The percentage falls as children grow, from 5% in lower secondary (gymnasio) to 4% in upper secondary (lykeio). By most countries' standards this is actually a small share of the population - only three OECD countries have (marginally) less privatised education systems. On last count (2012) there were ca 75,500 pupils in Greek private schools excluding nurseries and pre-schools (on which more details will follow), and an additional 11,500 in the latter.

Not only is the Greek private school population small in relative terms, it's also not growing; in fact (again, excluding nurseries) it peaked in 2003 and has fallen relatively consistently over the years, both in absolute numbers and as a share of the pupil population. Demand for upper secondary schools is positively falling in the long term. Overall, the private school population was down 12% from its peak even in 2007, and down 18% in 2012. This suggests to me that, all other arguments aside, private school fees make for a rather poor tax base, unless they are somehow a fantastic proxy for undeclared income (which I expect they are not).

But schools are not the only kind of private education out there. Private foreign language tuition is common. Over half a million Greek children were enrolled in 6,500 language schools as of 2013 - roughly one in three Greek children in education of any kind.

Then there is private tuition across a range of academic subjects, whether remedial or as a top-up for students cramming ahead of their final exams. PISA findings reveal that the majority of Greek secondary school pupils attended private lessons outside school in 2012 - 56% in the case of mathematics, though fewer when it came to other subjects. That might sound like a lot but the equivalent figure was 74% in 2009 and 2006; clearly parents cut down during the crisis. Possibly because of this, the overlap between different kinds of private lessons isn't as big as one might think. If you can get hold of the raw PISA 2012 data (I did) you can combine these figures to reveal that 72% of Greek high school kids had private lessons of some kind or other in 2012.

Shockingly, this included 69% of Greek kids in single-parent households. This is shocking because half of all single-parent households in Greece were, by that time, struggling to afford food. Let me repeat this in case it did not penetrate; in 2012 a good percentage of Greek single parents (38%, if you assume single parents have on average as many kids as two-parent households) were to some extent willing to prioritise paying for private lessons over food. One does not do this sort of thing on a whim; these people were no doubt convinced that private lessons were crucial if their children were to have any hope of getting out of poverty.

What about primary education?

There is one type of private education that is in particular demand among Greece's lower middle class: private nurseries, primary schools and pre-schools. As already demonstrated, the percentage of pre-primary school children going to private institutions doubled during the peak of the crisis (2011-12). As early as 2010, spending on primary and pre-primary education was already shooting up among the top 20% highest-earning households.

This is due to a combination of push and pull factors. The crisis forced more Greek women to become economically active, most of them working part time or only occasionally (on which much more detail here). This added, over exactly the years of the pre-primary boom, between 3 and 4 hours of childcare per week for the average household. This increase did not come from existing users taking on more hours, but from more families leaving their kids (especially those under 3) with nurseries. An even more important factor was the pilot operation of 801 all-day schools (see p 40 here) supported by EU structural funds. The pilot was meant to have a demonstration effect, with the Greek government taking over the cost of the scheme once it was convinced of its practicability and benefits. It did not, and the private primary education boom proved to be short-lived - in fact since 2012 the numbers have been slowly reverting back to normal as fewer and fewer people can afford nurseries, or alternatively fewer women can find part-time work.

Is it true that private schooling makes up for failings in the educational system?

There are two ways to approach this question. One is a matter of efficiency, as assessed by Koutsampelas (2015). I cite this study with apologies to the authors, who clearly are still working on the paper and don't want it used as is by other researchers until it has been finalised. They find [...] household willingness to pay €2,182 (annually, in 2009 prices) in 2009 and 2,517 (annually, in 2013 prices) in 2013 per school-age child for substituting state for private education. The corresponding figures for government cost per school-age child is €4,33915 and€ 3,70716 or 2009 and 2013 respectively, suggesting that from the consumers’ point of view the public provision of education in Greece might be inefficient.

You can check Koutsampelas' sums here. If you combine Eurostat's data with the OECD's figures on pupil numbers, the result is ca EUR3600 per pupil for primary and pre-primary and EUR4400 per pupil for secondary school as of 2012. Of course these figures are down from a peak of EUR4100 and EUR5600 respectively in 2009 and, assuming no change in pupil numbers in 2013, they would be 3300 and 3900 respectively.

The second way is to ask whether private school pupils do better than their state-educated peers, and why. The OECD's PISA assessment finds a persistent, statistically significant difference across all areas, with private schools performing better. However, the PISA 2009 assessment also found that, once the effects of pupils' social backgrounds, school independence and competition for pupils are taken into account, private school pupils actually do marginally worse. Adding 'independence' to the mix is not trivial though. Greek schools have probably the least discretion in deciding on their own curricula in the developed world (see IV.4.2. here).

Then there is the question of whether private out-of-school tuition makes up for failings of public schools specifically as opposed to those of the educational system. The answer is likely to be no. Going back to the PISA 2012 data, you can see that pupils in private schools still use private tutoring as much as public school students. When it comes to non-traditional subjects (ie not language, science or mathematics) they arguably use more private tuition.

UPDATE 15/11: PISA 2012 included three trick questions, in which pupils were invited to rate their familiarity with the made-up concepts of "proper numbers"; "declarative functions"; and "subjunctive scaling." Only ca. 3% of Greek pupils claimed to understand all three concepts well, but about 37% claimed at least some familiarity with all of them. This isn't bad by international standards. However, what is really interesting is the correlation between such 'overclaiming' and out-of-school tuition. Greek pupils that received out-of-school tuition in mathematics in 2012 were significantly more likely to over-claim (ca a quarter of a s.d.), and pupils that received 6 hours of out-of-school tuition per week or more were even more so - a full s.d above average. It could be reflex: when taught to the test, a pupil knows it's best to try some answer and show familiarity than none at all. It could be psychological pressure; a child taught on the insistence of parents may be eager to please. Or it could be confusion: a child desperate to keep track of new concepts may genuinely feel one is vaguely familiar, even if it is not.




Do poorer Greeks use private education?

The latest data we have suggest that, in 2010, and among Greek two-parent families with children, education made up ca. 5% of consumption spending. Among single parents, this went up to 10%. This generally includes all spending on education; books tend to be free but a wide range of accessories are not. Even so, private schools and tutoring are likely the major driver.

Eurostat doesn't break these figures up by income bracket and household composition at once, but there is a breakdown by income quintiles across the whole population here. This suggests that the top 20% of households by income spent 2.3 times as much on education as the bottom 20% in 2010 - but the differences are greatest for pre-primary and primary education, where the top 20% spent 6x as much. So we know that private education spending is skewed towards higher incomes - but is it the top end of the distribution driving this or the bottom end?

PISA confirms that private schooling in Greece is skewed towards higher incomes - more so than other countries, but suggests that this is mostly due to the exclusion of the very poor, not exclusivity to the privileged (see fig. 2.1 and 4.2 here). Private lessons and cram schools are, as we saw, widely used by lower income families and even charitable shadow education is becoming increasingly common. But again this is a story of the very poor missing out on a near-necessity, not the well-off enjoying a luxury: on PISA's standardised socio-economic status index non-users score a very significant 0.4 of a standard deviation lower than users.*

It's worth noting that Greek society is changing rapidly during the crisis. The findings of Koutsampelas (2015) suggests that Greek state schools are now receiving an influx of children from newly-poor, once middle-class families. This group dominates the flow out of private education to such an extent that the progressiveness of public education spending has actually increased during the crisis even though the class composition of state schools has widened to include better-off people.
The downside of this is that the government has rarely been able to budget for the increased demand for public schooling, leading to widespread teacher shortages and putting the Greek education budget under further pressure.

Epilogue

In Greece, attendance of private schools is rare, and falling. In fact, the crisis has pushed previously middle-class families into state education, leading to mass teacher shortages. Use of private daycare is more common and an important, if dysfunctional, contributor to labour market flexibility. But private lessons, cram schools and tutoring are extremely common, even though they too have taken a hit during the crisis. There is no suggestion that private tutoring in Greece is economically efficient; it is a bad, path-dependent solution to a poor education system. Because of this function, it's also a desperate necessity. Private schooling, on the other hand, is efficient up to a point; it does not make up for failings in public schools as such, simply for the lack of school autonomy and choice in the educational system as a whole.

The cases of private nurseries and of single parents using private tuition make me think of all the times critics have told me to put 'people over numbers' and check my figures against their (sometimes atypical, and almost always second-hand) slice-of-life anecdotes. The numbers are people, guys. The numbers are always people. Telling their story well is the same art as that of putting a tearful first-hand account into context. And if you can't be bothered to do the one, you probably can't do the other correctly either.


* [Bear in mind, PISA's index is a composite, and uses posessions, immigrant status, parents' jobs and parents' education to create a status proxy; this means it is not as variable as family income - if neither parent has become unemployed it is likely that a child's PISA status will not have changed throughout the crisis.]


PS: What if private schools do not confer an advantage after accounting for socio-economic status?

I can't know without running the OECD's regression whether school independence makes more of a difference ot the private/public performance gap than socio-economic status. But what if its impact turns out to be negligible? What would that mean? I have three pet theories.

1. Some of the Greek private school system may not be in the business of producing 'education'. It may be efficient in terms of meeting parents' actual requirements, which may not match a reasonable person's idea of 'good education.' Parents may be willing to spend money in order to ensure their kids are supervised while they work long hours; or are allowed to coast or get away with poor conduct; or are spared from mixing with 'the wrong sort' or have a chance to make their way into the elite.

2. Demand for private schooling could be compensating specifically, but inefficiently, for the lack of independence and competition among state schools. Parents may be willing to pay for a more tailored curriculum, or for non-mainstream teaching methods. This tailoring, however, may be inefficient because of Greece's fragmented geography and relative scarcity of children - which means that parents can rarely find exactly the 'alternative' education they need, and the schools may themselves struggle to find the specialist labour that they need. In other cases, parents with a demand for tailored schooling may genuinely want a good education but have preferences as to what this entails that don't prioritise academic achievement (eg they might want an education that provides religious indoctrination; or an environment that nurtures creativity).

3. Greek private schools may, by virtue of being private, have access to inferior inputs. If people who train as teachers in Greece value secure jobs more than marginal differences in pay and are willing to wait and/or relocate to get such jobs, they might prefer to pass up offers from private schools, especially if they are highly qualified on paper. Similarly, people moving into teaching (or a specific kind of teaching) after switching careers out of necessity may also be more likely to go into private schools for similar reasons. Parental effort is also an input. Parents who opt for private schooling because it helps them trade off money for working time may have less time to devote to supervising or encouraging learning.

STATPORN, STATPIMPS, STATWHORES PART II: THE ROAD TO GREEK STATISTICS

In this second part to my post, I try to explain the factors behind the decline and corruption of Greek statistics leading up to the 2009 deficit revision, and what it can teach us about Greece, Europe, and the State.

Goodhart's Law

Let's start with the basics: Goodhart's Law. It's reason number #45608 why centrally planned economies do not tend to work:

Goodhart’s “law” [...] stipulates that “any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes” [...] (Koen and Van den Noord 2005)

"when a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure."
Dame Ann Marilyn Strathern 

Normally, Government deficits are among the most closely monitored government statistics out there, and come with monthly targets; if Goodhart's Law holds, then it makes sense that they should be some of the most prone to manipulation. We don't know how they compare to other statistics but we know they are tampered with, at least in the Eurozone, as a result of political incentives subject to both economic and political cycles, and within the scope allowed by incomplete fiscal transparency. A number of studies demonstrate this conclusively, but I would single out Koen and Van de Noord (2005), Beetsma et al (2011), de Castro et al (2011) or Alt et al (2014) as the most useful. Readers may have others to contribute; all are welcome.

It takes constant vigilance to keep deficit figures relevant and free from interference - in fact, it is a job for institutions of fiscal governance and transparency, not for the occasional do-gooder. You might think Greece's historical record in this has always been poor, but you'd be wrong. As the IMF acknowledges, fiscal transparency was written into Greece's first constitution and elements of it were in place even during the Revolution. This is because the Greek state, born as it was out of war and a concerted Western nation-building effort, was dependent on foreign loans from day minus one. Subsequently, we spent decades under fiscal monitoring and monetary straitjackets of some sort or other (on which, read Tuncer (2009) and Lazaretou (2004)).

The Stability and Growth Pact

But what happens when institutions are as wrong as the people they're supposed to control? In Greece's case, the key institution was the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and its infamous 3% deficit target. Pina and Venes (2007) demonstrate that the SGP increased the tendency of governments to flatter their deficit forecasts. Alt at al (2014), moreover, demonstrate that the influence of the SGP reduced headline deficits but increased stock-flow adjustments, and particularly the disguising of deficits as equity injections into state-controlled enterprises. This stock-flow adjustment effect only occurred in countries with low levels of fiscal transparency. Unfortunately for us, Greece's recent record in this regard was poor, whatever our history might have prepared us for.

Differences of degree and of quality

These were in fact Eurozone-wide problems. All studies mentioned so far find the same problems when Greece is removed from the data. So what was special about Greece? For one, there are differences of degree. Tables 4 and 5 here  and Figure 1 here demonstrate that Greece has been an outlier in terms of downward revisions to the deficit figures, ever since 1997, with revisions typically doubling our deficits. The effect of accounting distortions on Greek deficit figures was typically three times the size of the distortions of the next worst-performing country.

As you can see in the graph to the right, the SGP (in effect from 98 onwards) was an effective constraint mostly on Greek governments' planned deficits - these were indeed never above the 3% ceiling. First releases were also subject to SGP; and although these would always revise the planned balances downward (2000 and 2006 were the sole exceptions), the size of the revision was more or less random, or subject to unforeseen circumstances such as the 2004 Olympics running much further over-budget than expected. Such revisions occasionally breached the 3% target. But it was the ex-post reviews, based on methodological visits and Eurostat interventions, that restored Greek deficits to a persistent, downward trajectory. The reason for this is that ex-post deficit figures weren't just about revisions due to random events or
within the bounds of good practice. They were all about gimmicks. Pg 28 here details the full list of accounting gimmicks used in the years leading up to 2005, and it really takes the whole page to go over them.

So what was the hard constraint on our deficits?

If the SGP was not a hard constraint on Greece's true deficits, did politicians see anything as a hard constraint? An OECD review of budgeting in Greece, prepared on the very eve of the crisis and two years ahead of the 2009 deficit revision, is clear on how things worked. Budgeting was a bottom-up, line-by-line as opposed to programme-by-programme process, planning for only one year at a time, leaving almost no role for Parliamentary control and with no provision for ex post oversight. Accounting became increasingly poor as one moved away from central government. Even the OECD had to concede that accrual accounting was not an immediate priority since the state was bad enough at cash accounting. Audit needed to be strengthened. But perhaps most telling is the way the OECD describes the relationship between the SGP targets and the actual budget (see p 14):

"for the medium term (t+2 and t+3), forecasts are done annually for the Stability and Growth Programme that the Greek government must deliver to the EU in the autumn each year. The medium-term forecast is not updated as part of the budget preparation process in the spring. The overall position of the central government finances is updated centrally using the new forecast. One feature of the forecasting process is the overall fiscal targets that the Greek government decides to reach in the medium-term Stability and Growth Programme forecasts. If the fiscal targets (deficit, expenditures, revenues) are not reached according to an updated medium-term forecast, unspecified or partly specified “reforms” are added (such as a reduction in tax evasion or government expenditures), without these reforms being specified in concrete detail. The macroeconomic forecasts are not used in the line ministries’ budget preparations; rather, as discussed below, they develop their own forecasts. This practice naturally hampers the use of the estimates and indeed undermines the integrity of the budget." 

As K. Featherstone, a long-time Greece-watcher argues, SGP compliance did make a difference but of a very different kind: it strengthened the hand of Greek finance ministers against their colleagues, at least in their short term:

The Maastricht convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact set clear policy parameters and created an external discipline for monetary policy in Greece. At home, the government was empowered: the legitimacy of the EU and the precision of the convergence criteria carried a difficult process of adjustment forward. [...] ultimately the strength of the domestic reform initiative would very probably have run aground without the Maastricht constraint. It was telling that, [...] in 2002 [...][t]he Simitis government did not call for a lessening of this external discipline: presumably, it saw advantages in having the corset. It was a means of strengthening its domestic position when pressing for difficult reform.  

I would argue that, in the post-Maastricht era, the ultimate constraint was not the SGP targets, or the government's deficit forecasts. The true targets were the Government's cash targets; these were constrained by a combination of tax revenue and 'safe' borrowing. Notice, in the OECD's 2008 review of Greek budgeting, how much more regular, robust, integrated and closely monitored the cash targets were than the actual budget and the SGP targets.

The process of cash management includes the preparation of the “budget expenditure implementation plan” and of the “cash plan”. Both plans are backed up by the monthly cash limit decision. The “budget expenditure implementation plan” shows monthly forecasts of expenditures. It is prepared for the entire fiscal year, and is updated and rolled over on a monthly basis. The plan is based on the budget appropriations. The monthly forecasts are prepared by using the assumptions underlying the budget preparation and monthly historical data. The “cash plan” puts the “budget expenditure implementation plan” in the context of the revenue forecasts. It is on a pure cash basis and shows daily cash inflows and outflows from the “Single Treasury Account”. [...] The “cash plan” is reviewed and updated every day for the whole month and every month for the whole year. [emphasis mine] The monitoring system includes a continuous flow of data from the Treasury’s departments, the Central Bank, the Fiscal Audit Offices, and the local Tax and Payment Offices. The “cash plan” is a tool for ensuring that there will be adequate cash balances to meet the budget obligations. The forecasts of the cash plan are used for decisions on borrowing and for investing the cash surpluses. The forecasts are elaborated and a ministerial decision is issued, defining a monthly cash limit for every unit involved. Fiscal Audit Offices and Tax and Payment Offices are required to ask for special approval before payments above a certain amount are made (EUR 3 million). The limits are checked against the monthly outcome data and crosschecked against information received on a daily basis by the Central Bank.

The cash constraint was much harder than the SGP's 3% target. But it was soft in another, more insidious way. Tax revenues may have looked steady but they were vulnerable to erosion and the political cycle; market financing was based on a colossal, global mispricing of risk.

We can test some of this insight empirically. A reasonable number of studies have looked into the causal link between tax revenue and government spending in Greece. The question common to all is whether we followed a 'tax and spend' model, whereby government sets its spending target based on what it can raise through taxes, or a 'spend and tax' model, whereby government sets its spending target based on politics and then scrambles to raise the taxes to pay for it. You can see my selection of studies for yourselves below:

• Richter and Paparas (2013):  spend and tax, years 1833-2009 (no typo!)
• Kollias and Makrydakis (2000) bi-directional causality, years 1950 - 1990
• Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (1996): spend and tax, years 1957-1993
• Konstantinou (2004): tax and spend, years 1970 to 1997
• Trachanas and Katrakilidis (2013): spend and tax, years 1970 to 2010
• Afonso and Rault (2008) spend and tax, years 1960 to 2006, except for 1986 onwards 
• Mutascu (2015) tax and spend, years 1988 to 2014.
• Athanasenas et al (2014) fiscal synchronisation with asymmetric fiscal adjustments, years 1999 to 2010

This is by no means the last word on the matter, but it seems to me that Greece operated a 'spend and tax' model (i.e. government set a spending target first and then adjusted taxes to fund this) for most of our modern history - but  switched to a strange type of cash-and spend policy post-Maastricht, which counted any borrowing we thought we could draw on without inviting undue attention as equivalent to tax revenue. It was the sum of this plus actual tax revenues which led government spending post-Maastricht.

Un-gaming Europe's deficits

People often wonder why, if Greece was only an extreme case of a much wider problem, Eurostat called for changes to European countries' deficit calculations in such a piecemeal manner, review by review, rather than demand that everything be restored to the appropriate level of accuracy at once. Part of the story has to do with the fact that Eurostat's powers and capabilities changed as a result of the Greek crisis - it did not always know what changes needed to be made, nor could it impose changes.

You see, back when our original 2009 deficit figures and the first revised 2009 deficit figures were released, Eurostat did not have auditing powers over national statistics agencies. It only got those in June 2010, because, and I quote, 'in 2005 [when this was originally proposed] several key member states were opposed to a strengthening of Eurostat's powers.'

This new demand for auditing powers for Eurostat came, appropriately, from the European Parliament, and this time, strengthened by the evidence of statistics gone wild in Greece, it managed to get past the Council. Eurostat's September 2010 visit to Greece, which resulted in the final deficit figures which are currently being questioned, was the first time ever that the Directorate made use of its new auditing powers. This resulted in an unprecedented ability to zero in on unreported or misclassified spending and liabilities.

Even in the days leading up to June 2010, the struggle to deny Eurostat its new auditing powers and maintain Governments' 'right' to lie to their citizens was fiercely defended by the Council:

[...] ministers have watered down aspects of the Commission's original proposal. The Commission wanted to require member states to punish their civil servants with “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” sanctions if they deliberately misreported data to Eurostat. Ministers have removed this requirement, because they felt it was an unacceptable infringement of national sovereignty.

The Commission also wanted to place a mandatory obligation on member states to provide Eurostat with “experts in national accounting”. These experts would work with Eurostat on a temporary basis, to help it prepare visits. This was also removed by finance ministers.

The Commission had protested against the changes, but backed down because it did not want to threaten the chance of the legislation being adopted. The Commission also wanted to place a mandatory obligation on member states to provide Eurostat with “experts in national accounting”. These experts would work with Eurostat on a temporary basis, to help it prepare visits. This was also removed by finance ministers. The Commission had protested against the changes, but backed down because it did not want to threaten the chance of the legislation being adopted.

Who were the 'key' member states so opposed to further scrutiny of their accounts? Why only the UK, France and Germany. There is no record of how Greece voted but, by the looks of it, that first bunch of proposals was dead on arrival.

TO BE CONTINUED

U CAN HAZ LOST DECADE!

Readers may have guessed by now that most of my method in preparing this blog consists mainly of three things: 1. scanning my regular newsletters from the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and other eee-vil New World Order organisations for interesting research papers, 2. going through the latest updates on Eurostat and ELStat looking for juicy new data, and 3. going to Google Scholar, and putting random economics-related phrases into Google Scholar's Advanced Search, filtering for papers released in the last year that mention Greece. It is literally that simple to maintain an amateur economics blog, although I'm not saying it's also easy. These tales have a way of growing with the telling and it can be hard to know where to finish.

Anyway, in my latest dive into Google Scholar, I dug out a paper that truly surprised me. Gogos et al (2012) sets out to prove that over the period of 1979 to 2001 the Greek economy fit all of the technical criteria for a great depression. In their own words, ‘to be a great depression, a negative deviation of real per capita GDP from trend […] must satisfy three conditions:

1. It must be a sufficiently large negative deviation (20% or larger). […]
2. The deviation must occur rapidly (with a negative deviation of 15% in the first decade) […]
3. The deviation must be sustained, in the sense that real per capita GDP cannot return to trend for a decade.’

I must admit, this struck me as a very bold statement. I have discussed the economic policies of 1981-89 before here and readers will know I am not a fan, but I wouldn't have dreamt of saying that real output per capita fell over that period: many in Greece still recall this fondly as the only time in living memory when politicians actually did what they are supposed to do (i.e. dole out cash to their clientele). 

I know three things about the Greek 80s. First, that people were generally more satisfied with the function of democracy in Greece during this period than at any time prior to (briefly) 1999 or 2004. Participation in elections was also high, and remained so until 1992. Second, Greece's
public debt exploded at a rate we have only seen again after 2008. And third, as Pseudoerasmus has shown, Greece's per capita GDP diverged from both the Eurozone core and the Eurozone periphery (as they would later become). But a depression? Really?

Yet it's hard to argue with the evidence, as presented by Gogos et al, and which I reproduce on the right.  Essentially, the entire period of 1979-91 was one long episode of stagnation during which the Greek economy performed very poorly. Recall that y is GDP, c is consumption and i are interest rates.

Importantly, Gogos et al suggest that the slowdown between 79 and 91 was not really a matter of policy (otherwise it would have started in 81, I should think) but rather a matter of demographics. Without sustained investment in human capital, falling population growth tends to reduce long-run economic growth too. Between 1960 and 1975, the growth rate of the Greek population collapsed, as a result of a drop in fertility rates starting in 1955, falling by about half in 60-65 compared to ten years earlier (data here). In 1955, first birth age in Greece bottomed out at 24 (an age largely unheard of today), possibly as a result of the increase in female education in the country - a good thing, by all accounts.

Except for that fact that, 19 to 26  years later, when that cohort of new labourers was set to enter the labour market, output per capita stopped growing. Unfortunately, the Greek governments of the time decided to spend prodigious amounts of money in the teeth of a demographic mega-trend. Bad idea.

Could this have been predicted at the time? Possibly, if it weren't for the Greek state's long history of ignoring population statistics.

While it's given me some excellent food for thought, I also have some reservations about this paper. First of all, the idea that economic performance must be benchmarked against some supposed 'trend' output (see right, and also here for a smug self-congratulatory discussion), is absurd to me. At best, it assumes that there is an intrinsic value to human and physical capital that is relatively stable through time, and was moreover priced correctly in the reference period used to calibrate the model. Not to mention the assumption that economy-wide production functions are laws of nature, varying in their parameters but not in their essence. This industrial-revolution-era thinking should have been abandoned long ago but somehow it still persists.

Second, to disaggregate growth into what is attributable to inputs and what is attributable to Total Factor Productivity (see right below) is all right when the emphasis is on the role of the individual inputs, but it's plain daft when it ends up emphasising the role of TFP itself. Like dark matter or dark energy in the calculation of the mass of the universe, TFP is a residual and hence it's not an insight to be celebrated. We don't know what it is, only that it doesn't behave in any manner our model can account for. There's no call for an 'aha' moment when it turns out to be the dominant force. It's like celebrating how small the R-square value of a regression is.

Finally, while I cannot find any better figures anywhere, I am a little worried about taking dictatorship-era national statistics at face value, and it is these that set the trend for later decades. The Greek junta was exceptional in that it was one of relatively few dictatorships in recent history that achieved growth rates higher than the democratic governments that succeeded them; in fact, growth rates were surprisingly high by any standards. Moreover, unlike the longer-lived Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships of the 20th century, the Greek junta pursued significant levels of welfare spending, though unsurprisingly it was less generous when it came to education (discussion here). I have yet to find any better data though, so I'll accept what I have for now.

What's also very interesting about Greece's lost decade, of course, is how all of the remedies offered to Greece's current woes (fiscal and monetary stimulus, as well as devaluation) were tried during this lost decade and failed spectacularly. The chart to the right demonstrates quite how little these remedies worked. (Money supply data here; real gdp data here; inflation data here; exchange rate data here).

'Surely though,' some of the newly contrite Socialist voters of the 80s will say, the Change was a valuable project to entrench equality in the country? I'm not sure about that. A quick dive into the OECD's database will show you what happened in that regard. Sure, the after-tax income distribution among workers was much more equitable in the mid-1980s compared to the mid-70s, but this trend continued almost unbroken till the crisis struck, under different policies, with perhaps a little hiccup in the late 90s. But the real change was among retirees - the legacy of the Change was primarily a false equality of pension income through massive redistribution to the old.

ΨΗΦΙΖΟΝΤΑΣ ΦΙΛΕΛΕΥΘΕΡΑ

Άκουσα με χαρά τις προάλλες ότι ένας τακτικός μου συνομιλητής, ο Γρηγόρης Φαρμάκης, θα είναι υποψήφιος της Δημοκρατικής Συμμαχίας. Διάβασα επίσης το κείμενο του Απόστολου Δοξιάδη στην Καθημερινή, στο οποίο στηρίζει δημόσια τη Δράση. Τους γνωρίζω και τους υπερ-εκτιμώ αμφότερους ως συνεπείς φιλελεύθερους και καταξιωμένους ανθρώπους στα αντίστοιχα αντικείμενά τους. Τους εύχομαι καλή επιτυχία στις επιλογές τους. Αλλά και να ήθελα δεν είναι εύκολο να τους ακολουθήσω σε αυτές ταυτόχρονα και τους δύο.

Άλλοτε πάλι ακούω ότι και τα παραπάνω αλλά και τα υπόλοιπα κόμματα του φιλελεύθερου χώρου πρέπει να αφήσουν κατά μέρος τους εγωισμούς και να ενωθούν σε ένα μεγάλο φιλελεύθερο συνασπισμό, και ότι οι διάφορες μεταξύ τους προσεγγίσεις έχουν ως τώρα προκαλέσει μάλλον πικρία παρά ελπίδα στους ομοϊδεάτες μου.

Όλα αυτά είναι πολύ ωραία αλλά πιστεύω ότι λογαριάζουμε χωρίς τον ξενοδόχο – το μέσο Έλληνα ψηφοφόρο – ο οποίος είτε μας αρέσει είτε όχι δεν είναι φιλελεύθερος.

Πόσοι είναι οι δυνάμει φιλελεύθεροι ψηφοφόροι στην Ελλάδα; Αυτοί που πιστεύουν σε κάποιο σημαντικό βαθμό στην αξία της προσωπικής ελευθερίας αλλά και αναγνωρίζουν ότι το κράτος συνήθως αυξάνει την επιρροή του μόνον εις βάρος της; Υπολογίζω ότι το 2008 ήταν περίπου το 17%,  αν πάρουμε ένα στενό ορισμό, και ένα 29% αν τσουβαλιάσουμε μέσα και όλους τους ελευθεριάζοντες αριστερούς, εκ των οποίων βέβαια οι περισσότεροι είναι απλά αντιεξουσιαστές και δεν θέλουν να ακούνε ούτε για πλάκα για φιλελευθερισμό. Αυτά είναι εν πάσει περιπτώσει υπεραισιόδοξα νούμερα. Κανένα κόμμα δεν συγκεντρώνει όλους τους δυνάμει ψηφοφόρους του. Μάλιστα θα με εξέπλησσε αν έμπαινε στη Βουλή ακόμη κι ένας ευρύς φιλελεύθερος συνασπισμός.

Ας μη σταθούμε όμως στα νούμερα, τα οποία έχουν προφανή ελαττώματα: είναι νομίζω σαφές ότι οι φιλελεύθεροι είναι και θα είναι μειοψηφία. Αυτοδυναμία δεν θα βγάλουν εγγυημένα ποτέ. Στην κυβέρνηση μόνο ως μειοψηφία μπορούν να μπούν και τότε θα χάσουν ό,τι δίκιο έχουν πολύ εύκολα και για πολλά χρόνια, ανακατευόμενοι με τα πίτουρα. Κι αυτό γιατί η μεγαλύτερη μερίδα των ψηφοφόρων (στο 47% τους υπολόγισα) είναι πεπεισμένη ότι δεν χρειάζεται να επιλέξει ούτε μεταξύ δεξιάς και αριστεράς, ούτε μεταξύ ελευθερίας και ισότητας – όλα γίνονται, σου λέει, αν υπάρχει η πολιτική βούληση: μια μη-ιδεολογία της οποίας η γνωστότερη πλέον υπο-περίπτωση είναι το ‘λεφτά υπάρχουν’. Γι αυτούς τους πολίτες ερίζουν τα κόμματα και ο φιλελευθερισμός εξ ορισμού δεν έχει πολλά να τους προσφέρει.

Ο φιλελευθερισμός εξάλλου δεν ευδοκιμεί σε κόμματα εξουσίας, ούτε αυτοδύναμος ούτε ως συνιστώσα, ούτε ως ‘κεντρικός πόλος’. Αργά ή γρήγορα εκφυλίζεται είτε σε κορπορατισμό (αν οι πολιτικοί φορείς του εχθρεύονται την αριστερά περισσότερο από τη λαϊκή δεξιά, όπως συμβαίνει με πολλούς φιλελεύθερους που πέρασαν από τη ΝΔ) είτε σε στείρο ‘προοδευτισμό’ σε κοινωνικά θέματα (αν οι πολιτικοί φορείς του εχθρεύονται τη λαϊκή δεξιά περισσότερο από την αριστερά, όπως ισχύει για πολλούς φιλελεύθερους που πέρασαν από το ΠαΣοΚ), είτε πάλι στην ταμπέλα, μισητή από το μεγαλύτερο μέρος του εκλογικού σώματος αλλά και των πολιτικών, του ‘τεχνοκράτη-μεταρρυθμιστή’ (αν οι φορείς του εχθρεύονται τη φθορά από την ανάμιξη με την πολιτική περισσότερο από τη φθορά της εξουσίας, όπως έχει συμβεί σε πολλούς υπουργούς των κομμάτων εξουσίας που πέρασαν από τα ψηφοδέλτια επικρατείας).

Η δουλειά της κυβέρνησης  είναι οι συμβιβασμοί, καλοί και κακοί, και εκ των πραγμάτων μόνο έξω από αυτήν ευδοκιμεί η όποια ιδεολογική καθαρότητα. Θαυμάστε π.χ. την ιδεολογική συνέπεια κομμάτων όπως το ΚΚΕ, που δεν αποτελούνται από συνιστώσες και δεν περιμένουν ποτέ να γίνουν κυβέρνηση παρά μόνο μετά από μια ιδεατή μαζική εξέγερση. Βέβαια κι αυτά ολισθαίνουν, αλλά σε καμμία περίπτωση τόσο ακραία και αποκαρδιωτικά όσο τα κόμματα εξουσίας.  Αυτό δε ισχύει και στις κυβερνήσεις συνασπισμού ή τις συγκυβερνήσεις. Σε αντίθεση με ό,τι θα ήλπιζε κανείς η επιδίωξη της εξουσίας (στην ανάγκη και με φόβητρο κάποιον κοινό πολιτικό αντίπαλο) είναι πιο συνεκτική από την ιδεολογία. Μάλιστα αυτό έχει εξεταστεί και εμπειρικά από τους Hellström και Bergman, οι οποίοι αποδεικνύουν ότι η ιδεολογική διάσταση μεταξύ των εταίρων ενός κυβερνητικού συνασπισμού αυξάνει τη μακροβιότητά του.

Εξάλλου, η απήχηση που βρίσκουν οι ιδεολογίες στο λαό δεν είναι απλή συνάρτηση της a priori ιδεολογίας των πολιτών. Μια εξαιρετική μελέτη του S. Galam πρόσφατα έδειξε ότι όταν τα εμπειρικά στοιχεία σχετικά με ένα σημαντικό ζήτημα που άπτεται του δημοσίου συμφέροντος είναι αμφισβητήσιμα ή αμφίσημα η πλευρά που υπερισχύει είναι αυτή με τους περισσότερους άκαμπτους (φανατικούς, αν προτιμάτε) υποστηρικτές. Οι μόνες τακτικές που έχουν κάποια ελπίδα επιτυχίας είναι αυτές που ενισχύουν το φανατισμό των πιστών και εξασθενούν το φανατισμό των αντιπάλων σπέρνοντας αμφιβολίες και διχόνοια. Εκεί ο φιλελευθερισμός έχει πρόβλημα γιατί οι φανατικοί είναι ένα πολύ μικρό ποσοστό των δυνάμει οπαδών του στην Ελλάδα – ώρες ώρες υποψιάζομαι ότι τους γνωρίζω όλους.

Ούτε μπορεί να αντιστρέψει αυτή τη θεμελιώδη δυναμική σε μια χώρα με μεγάλα ποσοστά φτώχειας και ανεργίας, αλλά και μεγάλη (και αθέμιτη) κρατική ανοχή στην παρανομία εκ μέρους του εργοδότη – καθένας μπορεί να βρει τραγικά αντιπαραδείγματα που θα κλονίσουν την πίστη οποιουδήποτε μετριοπαθούς και ‘αδιάβαστου’ φιλελεύθερου μέχρις ότου αναφωνήσει: ‘εντάξει εδώ δεν λέω, να επεμβαίνει το κράτος!’ Συν τοις άλλοις, ενώ οι ‘λύσεις’ των κρατιστών είναι προφανείς και οικείες (απαγορεύουμε το Χ κακώς κείμενο, ή παίρνουμε λεφτά από τους Υ και τα διοχετεύουμε στο Ζ αντικείμενο ή στους Ω αδικημένους) αυτές των φιλελευθέρων είναι πιο περίπλοκες και ανοίκειες και είναι δύσκολο να τις στηρίξει κανείς αβασάνιστα. Δείτε π.χ. τη λύση που προτείνω στο θέμα της διάσωσης των τραπεζών, και τα σημαντικά ελλαττώματά της τα οποία επισημαίνω. Όμοια προβλήματα αντιμετωπίζουν και εξ αριστερών οι αντιεξουσιαστές, όταν είναι βέβαια συνεπείς στο αντιεξουσιαστικό της ιδεολογίας τους.

Ακριβώς επειδή οι ιδεολογικοί συμβιβασμοί είναι αναπόφευκτο προϊόν της αναζήτησης της εξουσίας, και επειδή οι αναπόφευκτες παλινωδίες δημιουργούν φυγόκεντρες τάσεις, είναι μάταιο το να αναζητούμε τη σωτηρία στο προσωπικό brand κάποιου πεφωτισμένου φιλελεύθερου Ηγέτη. Εξάλλου η εμμονή με τους Ηγέτες προσελκύει πρώτους τους χειρότερους ψηφοφόρους ενός χώρου και τα αποτελέσματά της τα έχουμε δει επί Αλλαγής. Υπερεκτιμά τραγικά δε τόσο το βαθμό διακριτικής ευχέρειας που έχει ένας πρωθυπουργός ή πολιτικός αρχηγός μπροστά στις χιλιάδες πιέσεις τις οποίες υφίσταται όσο και την ικανότητα των πολιτικών, όσο ικανοί και να είναι να προβλέπουν, να προγραμματίζουν και να μεθοδεύουν το μάκρο-μέλλον της χώρας. 

Αυτή η αδυναμία εξάλλου είναι μια από τις βάσεις της φιλελεύθερης ιδεολογίας.

Και για να καταλήξω κάπου. Δεν υπάρχει καμμία προοπτική εξουσίας στην Ελλάδα (και στις περισσότερες χώρες του κόσμου) για ένα ιδεολογικά συνεπές φιλελεύθερο κόμμα. Ο φιλελευθερισμός θα λειτουργούσε καλύτερα ως ένα κίνημα και δίκτυο πολιτών, όπως αυτά των καταναλωτών ή όπως το εργατικό ή το οικολογικό κίνημα, κάνοντας lobby όλα (σχεδόν) τα κόμματα ξεχωριστά με σκοπό να αποσπάσει όποιες παραχωρήσεις μπορεί. Ειδάλλως θα δεθεί μοιραία στο άρμα ενός κόμματος και θα απορρίπτεται συνολικά όταν το κόμμα αυτό χάνει τις εκλογές ή αποφασίζει να απευθυνθεί σε ψηφοφόρους που δεν έχουν σε μεγάλη εκτίμηση την ατομική ελευθερία, ή βέβαια όταν το κόμμα κάνει άσχετες με το φιλελευθερισμό επιλογές οι οποίες το απαξιώνουν στη συνείδηση των πολιτών. Η επιρροή ενός συνεκτικού κινήματος χωρίς κομματική υπόσταση δεν είναι ποτέ αμελητέα, γιατί τα αιτήματα 1.5 εκατομμυρίου δυνάμει ψηφοφόρων έχουν περισσότερη αξία για οποιονδήποτε πολιτικό από αυτά ισάριθμων μαντρωμένων.  

Η ερευνητική βιβλιογραφία περί τέτοιων μορφωμάτων (δείτε π.χ. σελ 206 και εξής εδώ) μάς διδάσκει ότι είναι προτιμώτερο να επικεντρώνουν την προσοχή τους σε λίγα θέματα ευρείας απήχησης (στην περίπτωσή μας, θέματα όπως το άνοιγμα των επαγγελμάτων, η μεταρρύθμιση του δημοσίου ή οι ιδιωτικοποιήσεις), παρά να ευαγγελίζονται την ιδεολογία τους επί παντώς επιστητού με την ελπίδα να προσηλυτίσουν πιστούς. Και όντως στην Ελλάδα τέτοιου είδους φιλελεύθερες προτάσεις  βρίσκουν πολύ μεγαλύτερη αποδοχή από την προβολή του ίδιου του φιλελευθερισμού ως κυβερνητικής ιδεολογίας.

Κάποιοι ομοϊδεάτες ίσως ενοχληθούν στην ιδέα ενός κινήματος με βασικό εργαλείο το lobbying. Θα μου πούν: αυτή είναι η δουλειά σου, αυτά ξέρεις, αυτά μας προτείνεις. Ή ίσως άλλοι πιο ενοχλημένοι να αντιτείνουν: θέλεις δηλαδή χάριν της απαστράπτουσας ιδεολογικής καθαρότητας  να αφήσουμε τους κρατιστές, τους λαϊκιστές και τα μπάχαλα να αλωνίζουν;  Έχω να τους απαντήσω ότι αν είναι ειλικρινείς με τους εαυτούς τους θα αναγνωρίσουν από τώρα το χαμένο παιχνίδι. Ούτε ανάχωμα σε όλους αυτούς τους δήθεν κακούς συμπολίτες μας έχουμε αποτελέσει ποτέ ούτε θα είμαστε υποχρεωμένοι χωρίς ένα ‘δικό μας’ κόμμα να σφίγγουμε λιγδιασμένα χέρια εν μέσω ουίσκι και πόκερ σε ντουμανιασμένα υπόγεια. Όσο οι θέσεις και οι απαιτήσεις μας είναι σαφείς, έγκαιρες και ιδεολογικά συνεπείς όλα μπορούν να γίνουν όπως πρέπει – στο φως της ημέρας. Ειδάλλως ας πάμε σπίτια μας.

Καλά όλα αυτά αλλά οι εκλογές θα έρθουν και τα φιλελεύθερα κόμματα θα κατέβουν. Τι να ψηφίσω λοιπόν; Δεν έχω αποφασίσει αλλά ξέρω τουλάχιστον πώς θα επιλέξω.

Θα προτιμήσω ένα μικρό φιλελεύθερο κόμμα αντί ενός κόμματος εξουσίας γιατί σε μια πολυκομματική Βουλή καμμία ψήφος κατά συνείδηση δεν πάει χαμένη, αλλά και γιατί πιο εύκολα θα μπορώ να υπερασπιστώ ή να απολογηθώ για τις πράξεις του πρώτου αν βρεθεί με κάποιο τρόπο στην εξουσία παρά αυτές του δεύτερου. Δεν με ενδιαφέρει όμως το πόσο ‘ρεύμα’ εικάζεται ότι έχει το κάθε κόμμα ούτε το κατά πόσο ο λόγος του υπήρξε τάχα ενωτικός γιατί ούτε περιμένω ούτε θέλω να βρεθεί στην κυβέρνηση κάποιο ‘φιλελεύθερο’ κόμμα.

Θα ψηφίσω ένα κόμμα το οποίο κρίνω ότι είναι αρκετά ιδεολογικά καθαρό και έχει αποδεδειγμένα αντισταθεί στον πειρασμό του λαϊκισμού, του τοπικισμού, του κορπορατισμού και λοιπών για να έχω τη συνείδησή μου ήσυχη. Ιδεολογική καθαρότητα δεν είναι η αποκήρυξη της αριστεράς ή των συντεχνιών ή των μπαχαλάκηδων, αλλά η ανάδειξη της προσωπικής ευθύνης και πρωτοβουλίας και η αποσύνδεση κράτους και κοινωνίας. Μπόνους θα πάρουν όσοι επίδοξοι πολιτικοί αρχηγοί χρησιμοποιούν τον πρώτο πληθυντικό εννοώντας μόνο το κόμμα τους ή κάποια τέλως πάντων συλλογικότητα στην οποία ανήκουν, και όχι το κράτος.

Θα ψηφίσω ένα κόμμα που αντί να ετοιμάζεται για κυβέρνηση επί παντός επιστητού θα είναι δομημένο όσο το δυνατόν περισσότερο σαν ομάδα άσκησης πίεσης και δη σε ένα πεπερασμένο αριθμό θεμάτων. Αν έχουν προνοήσει να βάλουν και ορισμένες κόκκινες γραμμές ώστε να μπορούν να ελεγχθούν στη συνέχεια τόσο το καλύτερο. Μπόνους θα πάρουν όσοι δηλώσουν ότι δεν ελπίζουν να γίνουν ποτέ κόμμα εξουσίας, έστω και απαλλαγμένο από τα ελαττώματα των προκατόχων του.

Θα ψηφίσω τέλος ένα κόμμα το οποίο θεωρώ ότι δεν εξαρτάται όσο τα άλλα από την προσωπική επιρροή του ηγέτη του ή κάποιον κοινό εχθρό αλλά από μια κοινή ιδεολογία. Και επειδή ως προς αυτό το κριτήριο οι επιλογές μου δεν είναι καταπληκτικές, υπάρχει και ένα βοηθητικό τεστ. Τι θεωρώ ότι θα έκανε ο/η πρόεδρος αν το κόμμα πάτωνε μεν στις εκλογές και έμενε εκτός Βουλής, του/της προσφερόταν όμως ένα πρωτοκλασσάτο υπουργείο σε μια κυβέρνηση ΝΔ-ΠαΣοΚ με πολιτικό πρωθυπουργό; Μηδενίζεται αυτόματα σε αυτή την κατηγορία οποιοδήποτε κόμμα κάνει συγκεντρώσεις με εξέδρα και επική μουσική.

Έτσι μόνο θα κοιμάμαι ήσυχος, κι αν κάνω λάθος θα μπορώ να το παραδεχθώ με τα χέρια (αλλά και το κεφάλι) ψηλά.

UPDATE: Ο @suorm μου επεσήμανε ότι τον ανησυχούν τα περί 'αποσύνδεσης κράτους-κοινωνίας' που ανέφερα παραπάνω. Την εννοώ πρακτικά αυτή τη φράση. Σκεφτείτε το μπελά που βρήκε ο Ron Paul όταν του παρετέθη το παράδειγμα ενός νέου χωρίς ασφάλιση που παθαίνει ένα τραγικό ατύχημα και βρίσκεται σε κώμα. 'Μας λέτε ότι η κοινωνία πρέπει να τον αφήσει να πεθάνει;' ρώτησε ο Wolf Blitzer. Ο Ron Paul απήντησε ειλικρινά, 'αυτό είναι ελευθερία, να αναλαμβάνεις τους κινδύνους [που συνεπάγονται οι αποφάσεις] σου.' Κι όμως η απάντησή του δεν είναι επαρκής.

Η σωστή απάντηση θα ήταν ότι κράτος και κοινωνία δεν είναι το ίδιο πράγμα και κάθε ταύτισή τους γίνεται εκ του πονηρού. Η κοινωνία πρέπει να τον βοηθήσει όπως μπορεί. Αυτό έκαναν και οι υποστηρικτές του Ron Paul όταν κάτι παρόμοιο συνέβη σε έναν από αυτούς. Το κράτος πρέπει να τον αφήσει στα χέρια της κοινωνίας. Αν οι κοινωνία τον αφήσει να πεθάνει, το κρίμα στο λαιμό της. Ο καθένας έχει αναλάβει τις ευθύνες του.

Και όσο το κράτος αντιστέκεται στον πειρασμό του να φουσκώνει το κόστος της περίθαλψης με τις επεμβάσεις του, τόσο πιο πιθανό είναι να καταφέρει η κοινωνία να μαζέψει τα απαραίτητα χρήματα (ή τις απαραίτητες συνδρομές σε είδος από γιατρούς και φαρμακευτικές) για να συνδράμει τον αναξιοπαθούντα.

Βέβαια εν προκειμένω υπάρχουν οικονομικοί λόγοι για να επιδοτείται η υγεία (τα γνωστά positive externalities των οικονομολόγων, που αποτελούν αποτυχία της αγοράς να αποτιμήσει σωστά το κοινωνικό όφελος από την παροχή υπηρεσιών υγείας). Αλλά σε καμμία περίπτωση δεν δικαιολογούν δωρεάν περίθαλψη παντός είδους για όλους.

Αν όπως ακούω θέλετε να ακούσετε και το ίδιο επιχείρημα με τον επιχειρηματία στη θέση του αναξιοπαθούντα, δείτε εδώ και εδώ.